Julian Assange: Why the world needs WikiLeaks

Chris Anderson: Julian, welcome.

It's been reported that WikiLeaks, your baby,

has, in the last few years

has released more classified documents

than the rest of the world's media combined.

Can that possibly be true?

Julian Assange: Yeah, can it possibly be true?

It's a worry -- isn't it? -- that the rest of the world's media

is doing such a bad job

that a little group of activists

is able to release more

of that type of information

than the rest of the world press combined.

CA: How does it work?

How do people release the documents?

And how do you secure their privacy?

JA: So these are -- as far as we can tell --

classical whistleblowers,

and we have a number of ways for them

to get information to us.

So we use this state-of-the-art encryption

to bounce stuff around the Internet, to hide trails,

pass it through legal jurisdictions

like Sweden and Belgium

to enact those legal protections.

We get information in the mail,

the regular postal mail,

encrypted or not,

vet it like a regular news organization, format it --

which is sometimes something that's quite hard to do,

when you're talking about

giant databases of information --

release it to the public

and then defend ourselves

against the inevitable legal and political attacks.

CA: So you make an effort to ensure

the documents are legitimate,

but you actually

almost never know who the identity of the source is?

JA: That's right, yeah. Very rarely do we ever know,

and if we find out at some stage

then we destroy that information as soon as possible.

(Phone ring) God damn it.

(Laughter)

CA: I think that's the CIA asking what the code is

for a TED membership.

(Laughter)

So let's take [an] example, actually.

This is something

you leaked a few years ago.

If we can have this document up ...

So this was a story in Kenya a few years ago.

Can you tell us what you leaked and what happened?

JA: So this is the Kroll Report.

This was a secret intelligence report

commissioned by the Kenyan government

after its election in 2004.

Prior to 2004, Kenya was ruled

by Daniel arap Moi

for about 18 years.

He was a soft dictator of Kenya.

And when Kibaki got into power --

through a coalition of forces that were trying

to clean up corruption in Kenya --

they commissioned this report,

spent about two million pounds

on this and an associated report.

And then the government sat on it

and used it for political leverage on Moi,

who was the richest man --

still is the richest man -- in Kenya.

It's the Holy Grail of Kenyan journalism.

So I went there in 2007,

and we managed to get hold of this

just prior to the election --

the national election, December 28.

When we released that report,

we did so three days after the new president, Kibaki,

had decided to pal up with

the man that he was going to clean out,

Daniel arap Moi,

so this report then

became a dead albatross

around President Kibaki's neck.

CA: And -- I mean, to cut a long story short --

word of the report leaked into Kenya,

not from the official media, but indirectly,

and in your opinion, it actually shifted the election.

JA: Yeah. So this became front page of the Guardian

and was then printed in all the surrounding countries of Kenya,

in Tanzanian and South African press.

And so it came in from the outside.

And that, after a couple of days,

made the Kenyan press feel safe to talk about it.

And it ran for 20 nights straight on Kenyan TV,

shifted the vote by 10 percent,

according to a Kenyan intelligence report,

which changed the result of the election.

CA: Wow, so your leak

really substantially changed the world?

JA: Yep.

(Applause)

CA: Here's -- We're going to just show

a short clip from this

Baghdad airstrike video.

The video itself is longer,

but here's a short clip.

This is -- this is intense material, I should warn you.

Radio: ... just fuckin', once you get on 'em just open 'em up.

I see your element, uh, got about four Humvees, uh, out along ...

You're clear. All right. Firing.

Let me know when you've got them. Let's shoot.

Light 'em all up.

C'mon, fire!

(Machine gun fire)

Keep shoot 'n. Keep shoot 'n.

(Machine gun fire)

Keep shoot 'n.

Hotel ... Bushmaster Two-Six, Bushmaster Two-Six,

we need to move, time now!

All right, we just engaged all eight individuals.

Yeah, we see two birds [helicopters], and we're still firing.

Roger. I got 'em.

Two-Six, this is Two-Six, we're mobile.

Oops, I'm sorry. What was going on?

God damn it, Kyle. All right, hahaha. I hit 'em.

CA: So, what was the impact of that?

JA: The impact on the people who worked on it

was severe.

We ended up sending two people to Baghdad

to further research that story.

So this is just the first of three attacks

that occurred in that scene.

CA: So, I mean, 11 people died in that attack, right,

including two Reuters employees?

JA: Yeah. Two Reuters employees,

two young children were wounded.

There were between 18 and 26 people killed all together.

CA: And releasing this caused

widespread outrage.

What was the key element of this

that actually caused the outrage, do you think?

JA: I don't know. I guess people can see

the gross disparity in force.

You have guys walking in a relaxed way down the street,

and then an Apache helicopter sitting up at one kilometer

firing 30-millimeter cannon shells

on everyone --

looking for any excuse to do so --

and killing people rescuing the wounded.

And there was two journalists involved that clearly weren't insurgents

because that's their full-time job.

CA: I mean, there's been this U.S. intelligence analyst,

Bradley Manning, arrested,

and it's alleged that he confessed in a chat room

to have leaked this video to you,

along with 280,000

classified U.S. embassy cables.

I mean, did he?

JA: We have denied receiving those cables.

He has been charged,

about five days ago,

with obtaining 150,000 cables

and releasing 50.

Now, we had released,

early in the year,

a cable from the Reykjavik U.S. embassy,

but this is not necessarily connected.

I mean, I was a known visitor of that embassy.

CA: I mean, if you did receive thousands

of U.S. embassy diplomatic cables ...

JA: We would have released them. (CA: You would?)

JA: Yeah. (CA: Because?)

JA: Well, because these sort of things

reveal what the true state

of, say,

Arab governments are like,

the true human-rights abuses in those governments.

If you look at declassified cables,

that's the sort of material that's there.

CA: So let's talk a little more broadly about this.

I mean, in general, what's your philosophy?

Why is it right

to encourage leaking of secret information?

JA: Well, there's a question as to what sort of information is important in the world,

what sort of information

can achieve reform.

And there's a lot of information.

So information that organizations

are spending economic effort into concealing,

that's a really good signal

that when the information gets out,

there's a hope of it doing some good --

because the organizations that know it best,

that know it from the inside out,

are spending work to conceal it.

And that's what we've found in practice,

and that's what the history of journalism is.

CA: But are there risks with that,

either to the individuals concerned

or indeed to society at large,

where leaking can actually have

an unintended consequence?

JA: Not that we have seen with anything we have released.

I mean, we have a harm immunization policy.

We have a way of dealing with information

that has sort of personal --

personally identifying information in it.

But there are legitimate secrets --

you know, your records with your doctor;

that's a legitimate secret --

but we deal with whistleblowers that are coming forward

that are really sort of well-motivated.

CA: So they are well-motivated.

And what would you say to, for example,

the, you know, the parent of someone

whose son is out serving the U.S. military,

and he says, "You know what,

you've put up something that someone had an incentive to put out.

It shows a U.S. soldier laughing

at people dying.

That gives the impression, has given the impression,

to millions of people around the world

that U.S. soldiers are inhuman people.

Actually, they're not. My son isn't. How dare you?"

What would you say to that?

JA: Yeah, we do get a lot of that.

But remember, the people in Baghdad,

the people in Iraq, the people in Afghanistan --

they don't need to see the video;

they see it every day.

So it's not going to change their opinion. It's not going to change their perception.

That's what they see every day.

It will change the perception and opinion

of the people who are paying for it all,

and that's our hope.

CA: So you found a way to shine light

into what you see

as these sort of dark secrets in companies and in government.

Light is good.

But do you see any irony in the fact that,

in order for you to shine that light,

you have to, yourself,

create secrecy around your sources?

JA: Not really. I mean, we don't have

any WikiLeaks dissidents yet.

We don't have sources who are dissidents on other sources.

Should they come forward, that would be a tricky situation for us,

but we're presumably acting in such a way

that people feel

morally compelled

to continue our mission, not to screw it up.

CA: I'd actually be interested, just based on what we've heard so far --

I'm curious as to the opinion in the TED audience.

You know, there might be a couple of views

of WikiLeaks and of Julian.

You know, hero -- people's hero --

bringing this important light.

Dangerous troublemaker.

Who's got the hero view?

Who's got the dangerous troublemaker view?

JA: Oh, come on. There must be some.

CA: It's a soft crowd, Julian, a soft crowd.

We have to try better. Let's show them another example.

Now here's something that you haven't yet leaked,

but I think for TED you are.

I mean it's an intriguing story that's just happened, right?

What is this?

JA: So this is a sample of what we do

sort of every day.

So late last year -- in November last year --

there was a series of well blowouts

in Albania,

like the well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico,

but not quite as big.

And we got a report --

a sort of engineering analysis into what happened --

saying that, in fact, security guards

from some rival, various competing oil firms

had, in fact, parked trucks there and blown them up.

And part of the Albanian government was in this, etc., etc.

And the engineering report

had nothing on the top of it,

so it was an extremely difficult document for us.

We couldn't verify it because we didn't know

who wrote it and knew what it was about.

So we were kind of skeptical that maybe it was

a competing oil firm just sort of playing the issue up.

So under that basis, we put it out and said,

"Look, we're skeptical about this thing.

We don't know, but what can we do?

The material looks good, it feels right,

but we just can't verify it."

And we then got a letter

just this week

from the company who wrote it,

wanting to track down the source --

(Laughter)

saying, "Hey, we want to track down the source."

And we were like, "Oh, tell us more.

What document is it, precisely, you're talking about?

Can you show that you had legal authority over that document?

Is it really yours?"

So they sent us this screen shot

with the author

in the Microsoft Word ID.

Yeah.

(Applause)

That's happened quite a lot though.

This is like one of our methods

of identifying, of verifying, what a material is,

is to try and get these guys to write letters.

CA: Yeah. Have you had information

from inside BP?

JA: Yeah, we have a lot, but I mean, at the moment,

we are undergoing a sort of serious fundraising and engineering effort.

So our publication rate

over the past few months

has been sort of minimized

while we're re-engineering our back systems

for the phenomenal public interest that we have.

That's a problem.

I mean, like any sort of growing startup organization,

we are sort of overwhelmed

by our growth,

and that means we're getting enormous quantity

of whistleblower disclosures

of a very high caliber

but don't have enough people to actually

process and vet this information.

CA: So that's the key bottleneck,

basically journalistic volunteers

and/or the funding of journalistic salaries?

JA: Yep. Yeah, and trusted people.

I mean, we're an organization

that is hard to grow very quickly

because of the sort of material we deal with,

so we have to restructure

in order to have people

who will deal with the highest national security stuff,

and then lower security cases.

CA: So help us understand a bit about you personally

and how you came to do this.

And I think I read that as a kid

you went to 37 different schools.

Can that be right?

JA: Well, my parents were in the movie business

and then on the run from a cult,

so the combination between the two ...

(Laughter)

CA: I mean, a psychologist might say

that's a recipe for breeding paranoia.

JA: What, the movie business?

(Laughter)

(Applause)

CA: And you were also -- I mean,

you were also a hacker at an early age

and ran into the authorities early on.

JA: Well, I was a journalist.

You know, I was a very young journalist activist at an early age.

I wrote a magazine,

was prosecuted for it when I was a teenager.

So you have to be careful with hacker.

I mean there's like -- there's a method

that can be deployed for various things.

Unfortunately, at the moment,

it's mostly deployed by the Russian mafia

in order to steal your grandmother's bank accounts.

So this phrase is not,

not as nice as it used to be.

CA: Yeah, well, I certainly don't think

you're stealing anyone's grandmother's bank account,

but what about

your core values?

Can you give us a sense of what they are

and maybe some incident in your life

that helped determine them?

JA: I'm not sure about the incident.

But the core values:

well, capable, generous men

do not create victims;

they nurture victims.

And that's something from my father

and something from other capable, generous men

that have been in my life.

CA: Capable, generous men do not create victims;

they nurture victims?

JA: Yeah. And you know,

I'm a combative person,

so I'm not actually so big on the nurture,

but some way --

there is another way of nurturing victims,

which is to police perpetrators

of crime.

And so that is something

that has been in my character

for a long time.

CA: So just tell us, very quickly in the last minute, the story:

what happened in Iceland?

You basically published something there,

ran into trouble with a bank,

then the news service there

was injuncted from running the story.

Instead, they publicized your side.

That made you very high-profile in Iceland. What happened next?

JA: Yeah, this is a great case, you know.

Iceland went through this financial crisis.

It was the hardest hit of any country in the world.

Its banking sector was 10 times the GDP

of the rest of the economy.

Anyway, so we release this report

in July last year.

And the national TV station was injuncted

five minutes before it went on air,

like out of a movie: injunction landed on the news desk,

and the news reader was like,

"This has never happened before. What do we do?"

Well, we just show the website instead,

for all that time, as a filler,

and we became very famous in Iceland,

went to Iceland and spoke about this issue.

And there was a feeling in the community

that that should never happen again,

and as a result,

working with Icelandic politicians

and some other international legal experts,

we put together a new sort of

package of legislation for Iceland

to sort of become an offshore haven

for the free press,

with the strongest journalistic protections in the world,

with a new Nobel Prize

for freedom of speech.

Iceland's a Nordic country,

so, like Norway, it's able to tap into the system.

And just a month ago,

this was passed by the Icelandic parliament unanimously.

CA: Wow.

(Applause)

Last question, Julian.

When you think of the future then,

do you think it's more likely to be

Big Brother exerting more control,

more secrecy,

or us watching

Big Brother,

or it's just all to be played for either way?

JA: I'm not sure which way it's going to go.

I mean, there's enormous pressures

to harmonize freedom of speech legislation

and transparency legislation around the world --

within the E.U.,

between China and the United States.

Which way is it going to go? It's hard to see.

That's why it's a very interesting time to be in --

because with just a little bit of effort,

we can shift it one way or the other.

CA: Well, it looks like I'm reflecting the audience's opinion

to say, Julian, be careful,

and all power to you.

JA: Thank you, Chris. (CA: Thank you.)

(Applause)