Charmian Gooch: Meet global corruption's hidden players

Translator: Alban Nako Reviewer: Iris Xholi

When we talk about corruption,

Kur flasim per korrupsion,

there are typical types of individuals that spring to mind.

ka disa lloje individeve qe te vijne ne mendje

There's the former Soviet megalomaniacs.

Eshte tipi i ish-Sovjetikut megaloman.

Saparmurat Niyazov, he was one of them.

Saparmurat Niyazov, ishte njëri prej tyre.

Until his death in 2006,

Deri sa vdiq ne 2006,

he was the all-powerful leader of Turkmenistan,

ai ishte drejtuesi i gjithepushtetshem i Turkmenistanit,

a Central Asian country rich in natural gas.

nje vend i Azise Qendore i pasur me gaz natyror.

Now, he really loved to issue presidential decrees.

Ai me te vertete dashuronte te leshonte dekrete presidenciale.

And one renamed the months of the year

Dhe nje riemertonte emrat e muajve te vitit

including after himself and his mother.

perfshire emrin e tij dhe se emes.

He spent millions of dollars

Ai harxhoi miliona dollar

creating a bizarre personality cult,

per te krijuar nje kult personaliteti te cudicem,

and his crowning glory was the building

dhe kurorezimi i lavdise se tij ishte ndertimi

of a 40-foot-high gold-plated statue of himself

i një statuje te vetes e tera prej ari te praruar dhe 12 m te larte

which stood proudly in the capital's central square

e cila qendronte me krenari ne sheshin qendror te kryeqytetit

and rotated to follow the sun.

dhe rrotullohej per te ndjekur djellin.

He was a slightly unusual guy.

Ai ishte nje djale paksa i pazakonte.

And then there's that cliché,

Dhe pastaj eshte klishe-ja,

the African dictator or minister or official.

diktatori Afrikan ose ministri ose zyrtari.

There's Teodorín Obiang.

Eshte Teodorin Obiang.

So his daddy is president for life of Equatorial Guinea,

Babai i tij eshte president i perjetshem i Guine-se Ekuadoriale

a West African nation that has exported

nje vend Afrikano-Perendimor i cili ka eksportuar

billions of dollars of oil since the 1990s

miliarda dollar nafte qe prej 1990s

and yet has a truly appalling human rights record.

dhe akoma ka nje te vertete te tmerrshme ne raport me te drejtat e njeriut.

The vast majority of its people

Shumica derrmuese e popullsises se saj

are living in really miserable poverty

jetojne ne nje varferi vertet te mjerueshme.

despite an income per capita that's on a par

pavaresish te ardhurave per fryme qe jne ne te njetin nivel

with that of Portugal.

me ate te Portugalise.

So Obiang junior, well, he buys himself

Keshtu qe Obiang i riu, epo, ai i blen vetes

a $30 million mansion in Malibu, California.

nje rezidence 30 milion $ ne Malibu, Kaliforni.

I've been up to its front gates.

Une kam qene deri te portat e saj te parme.

I can tell you it's a magnificent spread.

Mund t'ju them se ka nje shtrirje madheshtore.

He bought an €18 million art collection

Ai bleu nje koleksion arti 18 milion euro

that used to belong to fashion designer Yves Saint Laurent,

qe dikur i perkiste dizenjatorit te modes Yves Saint Laurent,

a stack of fabulous sports cars,

nje tufe makinash sportive perrallore,

some costing a million dollars apiece --

disa qe kushtonin miliona dollar copa--

oh, and a Gulfstream jet, too.

oh, dhe nje reaktiv Gulfstream, gjithashtu.

Now get this:

Tani degjoje kete:

Until recently, he was earning an official monthly salary

Deri kohet e fundit, ai fitonte nje page zyrtare mujore

of less than 7,000 dollars.

jo me pak se 7,000 dollare.

And there's Dan Etete.

Dhe ai eshte Dan Etete.

Well, he was the former oil minister of Nigeria

E pra, ai ishte ish-ministri i naftes i Nigerise

under President Abacha,

nen Presidenin Abacha,

and it just so happens he's a convicted money launderer too.

dhe ndodhi pikerisht keshtu ai eshte nje i denuar per pastrim parash gjithashtu.

We've spent a great deal of time

Ne kemi shpenzuar nje pjese te madhe te kohes

investigating a $1 billion --

duke investiguar rreth 1 miliarde dollar

that's right, a $1 billion —

e degjuat mire, 1 miliarde dollar--

oil deal that he was involved with,

per nje marrveshje nafte ne te cilen ai ishte perfshire,

and what we found was pretty shocking,

dhe ajo qe ne zbuluam ishte me te vertete shokuese,

but more about that later.

por per kete do flasim me vone.

So it's easy to think that corruption happens

Keshtu qe eshte e lehte te mendosh qe korrupsioni ndodh

somewhere over there,

diku atje pertej,

carried out by a bunch of greedy despots

e kryer nje nje tufe despotesh te babezitur

and individuals up to no good in countries

dhe individesh qe nuk i sjellin asnje te mire ne vende

that we, personally, may know very little about

qe ne, personalisht, mund te dime shume pak rreth tij

and feel really unconnected to

dhe qe ndjehemi vertete te palidhur me te

and unaffected by what might be going on.

dhe te paprekur me ate qe ndodh atje.

But does it just happen over there?

Por thjesht a ndodh vetem atje?

Well, at 22, I was very lucky.

Mire, kur isha 22, isha me te verte me fat.

My first job out of university

Puna ime e pare pas universitetit

was investigating the illegal trade in African ivory.

ishte te hetoja tregtine e paligjshme te fildishit Afrikan.

And that's how my relationship with corruption really began.

Dhe keshtu eshte se si marredhenia ime me korrupsionin me te vertete filloi.

In 1993, with two friends who were colleagues,

Ne 1993, me dy miq te cilet ishin koleg,

Simon Taylor and Patrick Alley,

Simon Taylor dhe Patrick Alley,

we set up an organization called Global Witness.

ne kemi ngritur nje organizate te quajtur Global Witness.

Our first campaign was investigating the role

Fushata jone e pare ishte te hetonim rolin

of illegal logging in funding the war in Cambodia.

e prerjeve te paligjshme ne financimin e luftes ne Kamboxhia.

So a few years later, and it's now 1997,

Keshtu qe disa vjet me vone, dhe tani eshte 1997,

and I'm in Angola undercover investigating blood diamonds.

jam ne Angola nen nje hetim te fshehte duke hetuar diamantet e pergjakura.

Perhaps you saw the film,

Ndoshta ju keni pare filmin,

the Hollywood film "Blood Diamond,"

filmin e Hollywood-it "Blood Diamond,"

ai me Leonardo DiCaprio.

the one with Leonardo DiCaprio.

Well, some of that sprang from our work.

Pra, dicka nga ajo doli prej punes sone.

Luanda, it was full of land mine victims

Luanda, ishte plot nga viktimat e minave tokesore

who were struggling to survive on the streets

te cilet ishin duke u munduar te mbijetonin rrugeve

and war orphans living in sewers under the streets,

dhe jetimet e luftes te cilet jetonin ne kanalizimet nen rruge,

and a tiny, very wealthy elite

dhe nje elite e vogel, e shume e pasur

who gossiped about shopping trips to Brazil and Portugal.

e cila "bente thashetheme" rreth udhetimeve tregtare ne Brazil dhe Portugali.

And it was a slightly crazy place.

Dhe ishte nje vend pak i cudicem.

So I'm sitting in a hot and very stuffy hotel room

Keshtu qe jam ulur ne nje dhome te nxehte hoteli dhe po me zihej fryma

feeling just totally overwhelmed.

ndjehesha thjesht plotesisht e tronditur.

But it wasn't about blood diamonds.

Por nuk ishte per diamantet e pergjakura.

Because I'd been speaking to lots of people there

Sepse kam folur me shume njerez atje

who, well, they talked about a different problem:

te cilet, pra, ata diskutonin per nje problem tjeter:

that of a massive web of corruption on a global scale

te nje rrjete masive korrupsioni ne shkalle globale

and millions of oil dollars going missing.

dhe te milionave dollare nafte qe mungonin.

And for what was then a very small organization

Dhe per ate qe njehere ishe nje organizate shume e vogel

of just a few people,

e pak njerezeve,

trying to even begin to think how we might tackle that

duke u perpjekur te fillonim te mendonim sesi mund ta trajtonim ate

was an enormous challenge.

ishte nje sfide e madhe.

And in the years that I've been,

Dhe ne vitet qe kam qene,

and we've all been campaigning and investigating,

dhe qe te gjithe kemi qene duke bere fushate dhe hetime,

I've repeatedly seen that what makes corruption

une ne menyre perseritese kam pare cka e ben korrupsionin

on a global, massive scale possible,

ne nje shkalle boterore me masive te mundeshme,

well it isn't just greed or the misuse of power

edhe ajo nuk eshte vetem lakmia apo keqperdorimi i pushtetit

or that nebulous phrase "weak governance."

apo shprehja e mjegullt "qeverisje e dobet".

I mean, yes, it's all of those,

Dua te them, po, eshte secila prej tyre,

but corruption, it's made possible by the actions

por korrupsioni, eshte bere i mundur nga veprimet

of global facilitators.

e ndihmuesve boteror.

So let's go back to some of those people I talked about earlier.

Le te kthehemi tek disa nga ata njerez qe folem me pare.

Now, they're all people we've investigated,

Tani, ata jane te gjithe njerez qe ne kemi hetuar,

and they're all people who couldn't do what they do alone.

dhe ata jane njerez te cilet smund te benin ate qe ben te vetem.

Take Obiang junior. Well, he didn't end up

Le te marrim Obiang junior. Pra, ai nuk perfundoi

with high-end art and luxury houses without help.

me nje koleksion te cmueshem arti dhe nje shtepi luksoze pa ndihme.

He did business with global banks.

Ai beri bisnes me banka boterore.

A bank in Paris held accounts of companies controlled by him,

Nje banke ne Paris mbante llogarite e kompanive te kontrolluara prej tij,

one of which was used to buy the art,

nje prej te cilave perdorej per te blere art,

and American banks, well, they funneled

dhe bankat Amerikane, pra, ato kanalizuan

73 million dollars into the States,

73 milion dollar per ne Sh.B.A

some of which was used to buy that California mansion.

dhe nje pjese u perdor per te blere ate rezidencen ne Kaliforni.

And he didn't do all of this in his own name either.

Dhe ai nuk i ka bere te gjitha keto ne emrin e tij.

He used shell companies.

Ai perdorte komanite anonime joaktive "guacke".

He used one to buy the property, and another,

Ai perdorte nje per te blere prona, dhe nje tjeter,

which was in somebody else's name,

e cila ishte ne emrin e dikujt tjeter,

to pay the huge bills it cost to run the place.

per te paguar faturat e medha qe nevojiteshin per te drejtuar skemen (vendin).

And then there's Dan Etete.

Dhe ja ku eshte Dan Etete.

Well, when he was oil minister,

Pra, kur ai ishte minister i naftes,

he awarded an oil block now worth over a billion dollars

vendosi nje embargo te naftes(bllokoi naften) qe tani ka vleren mbi nje miliard dollar

to a company that, guess what, yeah,

tek nje kompani qe, gjejeni cfare, yeah (po)

he was the hidden owner of.

ai ishte pronari i fshehte i saj.

Now, it was then much later traded on

Pra, ishte e tregtueshme per me vone

with the kind assistance of the Nigerian government --

fale ndihmes se vecante te qeverise Nigeriane

now I have to be careful what I say here —

tani duhet te tregohem e kujdeshme cka them tani-

to subsidiaries of Shell and the Italian Eni,

tek deget e Shell dhe te Eni-it italian,

two of the biggest oil companies around.

dy nga kompanite me te medha te naftes ne qarkullim.

So the reality is, is that the engine of corruption,

Keshtu qe realiteti, eshte qe zemra e korrupsionit,

well, it exists far beyond the shores of countries

pra, ekziston pertej brigjeve te shteteve

like Equatorial Guinea or Nigeria or Turkmenistan.

si Guinea Ekuadoriale apo Nigeria a Turkmenistani.

This engine, well, it's driven

Ky motorr, pra, shtyhet

by our international banking system,

nga sistemi yne nderkombetar bankar,

by the problem of anonymous shell companies,

nga problemi i kompanive joaktive "guacke",

and by the secrecy that we have afforded

dhe nga fshehtesia qe ne kemi perballuar

big oil, gas and mining operations,

kundrejt opercaioneve te medha te naftes, gazit dhe minierave

and, most of all, by the failure of our politicians

dhe, mbi te gjitha, nga deshtimi i politikaneve tane

to back up their rhetoric and do something

per te lene menjane retoriken dhe per te bere dicka

really meaningful and systemic to tackle this stuff.

me te vertete kuptimplote dhe sistematike per te trajtuar kete fenomen.

Now let's take the banks first.

Tani le te marrim bankat si fillim.

Well, it's not going to come as any surprise

Mire, nuk ka per t'iu ardhur si surprize

for me to tell you that banks accept dirty money,

prej meje kur tju tregoj qe bankat pranojne para te piste,

but they prioritize their profits in other destructive ways too.

por ata i japin prioritet perfitimit te tyre ne forma te cilat jane shkaterruese gjithashtu.

For example, in Sarawak, Malaysia.

Per shembull, ne Sarawak, Malajzi.

Now this region, it has just five percent

Tani kjo zone, ka vetem 5 %

of its forests left intact. Five percent.

te pyjeve te saj te paprekura. Pese perqind.

So how did that happen?

Si ndodhi gjithe kjo?

Well, because an elite and its facilitators

Mire, sepse nje elite dhe ndihmesit e tyre

have been making millions of dollars

kane bere miliona dollar

from supporting logging on an industrial scale

duke mbeshtetur prerjen e pyjeve ne nje shkalle industriale

for many years.

per shume vjet.

So we sent an undercover investigator in

Keshtu qe ne derguam nje hetues te fshehte atje

to secretly film meetings with members of the ruling elite,

qe fshehtesisht te filmonte mbledhjet e anetareve te elites sunduese

and the resulting footage, well, it made some people very angry,

dhe ajo qe rezultoj nga filmimi, beri disa persona me te vertete te inatosur,

and you can see that on YouTube,

dhe ju mund ta shihni ate ne YouTube,

but it proved what we had long suspected,

por ajo provoi ate cka ne kishim kohe qe dyshonim,

sepse shfaqte se si kryeministri i vendit,

because it showed how the state's chief minister,

despite his later denials,

pavarsisht mohimeve te mevonshme,

used his control over land and forest licenses

perdorte kontrollin mbi licensat per tokat dhe pyjet

to enrich himself and his family.

per te pasuruar veten dhe familjen e tij.

And HSBC, well, we know that HSBC bankrolled

Dhe HSBC, ne dime se HSBC financonte

the region's largest logging companies

kompanite me te medhaja te prerjeve te pyjeve

that were responsible for some of that destruction

te cilat ishin pergjegjese per disa nga ato shkaterrimet

ne Sarawak dhe gjithkund.

in Sarawak and elsewhere.

The bank violated its own sustainability policies in the process,

Banka shkeli politikat e saj te qendrueshme ne kete proces

but it earned around 130 million dollars.

por perfitoi rreth 130 milion dollar.

Now shortly after our exposé,

Tani menjehere pas ekspozese sone,

very shortly after our exposé earlier this year,

shume shpejt pas ekspozese sone te ketij viti

the bank announced a policy review on this.

banka shpalli nje rishikim te politikes se saj bazuar ne te.

And is this progress? Maybe,

Dhe ky eshte progres? Ndoshta,

but we're going to be keeping a very close eye

por ne do te vazhdojme te vezhgojme

on that case.

ne kete ceshtje.

And then there's the problem of anonymous shell companies.

Dhe pastaj eshte problemi i kompanive anonime joaktive.

Well, we've all heard about what they are, I think,

Pra, ne te gjithe kuptuam se cfare jane ato, une mendoj,

and we all know they're used quite a bit

dhe ne e dime qe ato shpesh perdoren

by people and companies who are trying to avoid

nga njerez dhe kompani qe perpiqen te shmangin

paying their proper dues to society,

te paguajne detyrimet e tyre ne shoqeri,

also known as taxes.

te njohura edhe si taksa.

But what doesn't usually come to light

Por ajo cka jo zakonisht nuk del ne drite

is how shell companies are used to steal

eshte se si kompanite joaktive perdoren per te vjedhur

huge sums of money, transformational sums of money,

shuma te medha parash, shuma paraje te transformueshme,

from poor countries.

nga vendet e varfera.

In virtually every case of corruption that we've investigated,

Ne pothuajse cdo rast korrupsioni qe ne kemi hetuar,

shell companies have appeared,

jane shfaqur kompanite anonime,

and sometimes it's been impossible to find out

dhe disa here ka qene e pamundur te zbulonim

who is really involved in the deal.

se cilet ishte te pershire ne marrveshje.

A recent study by the World Bank

Nje studim i fundit i Bankes Boterore

looked at 200 cases of corruption.

shqyrtoj rreth 200 raste korrupsioni.

It found that over 70 percent of those cases

Zbuloj qe mbi 70% e atyre rasteve

had used anonymous shell companies,

kishte perdorur kompanite anonime "guacke",

totaling almost 56 billion dollars.

qe arrin pothuajse ne 56 Bilion Dollar.

Now many of these companies were in America

Tani, shume prej atyre kompanimve gjendeshin ne Amerike

or the United Kingdom,

ose ne Mbreterine e Bashkuar,

its overseas territories and Crown dependencies,

territoret e saj jashte vendit dhe ne varesine e kurores,

and so it's not just an offshore problem,

keshtu nuk eshte vetem nje problem pertej bregut,

it's an on-shore one too.

eshte nje problem brenda-bregut gjithashtu.

You see, shell companies, they're central

E kuptoni, kompanite "guacke", ato jane celsi

to the secret deals which may benefit wealthy elites

i marrveshjeve sekrete nga te cilat perfitojne eltat e pasura

rather than ordinary citizens.

ne vend te qytetareve te zakonshem.

One striking recent case that we've investigated

Nje rast i habitshem i koheve te fundit ne te cilin kemi hetuar

is how the government in the Democratic Republic of Congo

ishte sesi qeveria Demokratike e Republikes se Kongos

sold off a series of valuable, state-owned mining assets

shiti nje seri te vlefshme asetesh shteterore minerare

to shell companies in the British Virgin Islands.

nje kompanije "guacke" ne ishujt Britanik Virgin.

So we spoke to sources in country,

Keshtu qe ne folem me burime te vendit,

trawled through company documents and other information

zhbiruam dokumentet e kompanise dhe cdo informacion tjeter

trying to piece together a really true picture of the deal.

duke u perpjekur per te vendosur pjeset se bashku per te patur nje tablo te qarte te marrveshjes.

And we were alarmed to find that these shell companies

Dhe ne ishim te alarmuar kur zbuluam qe keto kompani "guacke"

had quickly flipped many of the assets on

menjehere kishin dhene shume nga keto asete kundrejt

for huge profits to major international mining companies

perfitimeve te medhaja tek nje kompani nderkombetare minerare

listed in London.

regjistruar ne Londer.

Now, the Africa Progress Panel, led by Kofi Annan,

Tani, Paneli i Progresit Afrikan, udhehequr nga Kofi Annan,

they've calculated that Congo may have lost

ka perllogaritur qe Kongo mund te kete humbur

more than 1.3 billion dollars from these deals.

mbi 1.3 Bilion dollar nga keto marreveshje.

That's almost twice

Eshte perafersisht sa dyfishi

the country's annual health and education budget combined.

i buxhetit vjetor te vendit nese kombiniojme shendetesine dhe arsimin.

And will the people of Congo, will they ever get their money back?

Dhe a do te munden njerzit e Kongos, do te munden te marrin mbrapsht parate e tyre?

Well, the answer to that question,

Pra, pergjigja e kesaj pyetje,

and who was really involved and what really happened,

dhe kush ishte me te vertete i perfshire dhe cfare ndodhi me te vertete,

well that's going to probably remain locked away

do te mbesin me shume mundesi te mbyllura larg

in the secretive company registries of the British Virgin Islands

ne rregjistrat e fshehte te kombanise ne ishujt Britanik Virxhin

and elsewhere unless we all do something about it.

dhe gjithkund nese ne nuk bejme dicka rreth saj.

And how about the oil, gas and mining companies?

Po rreth kompanive te naftes, gazit dhe minierave?

Okay, maybe it's a bit of a cliché to talk about them.

Ne rregull, mbase eshte paska klishe te flasesh rreth tyre.

Corruption in that sector, no surprise.

Korrupsion ne ate sektor, mos u habisni.

There's corruption everywhere, so why focus on that sector?

Ka korrupsion kudo, keshtu qe pse te fokusohemi ne ate sektor?

Well, because there's a lot at stake.

Mire, sepse eshte shume e rrezikshme.

In 2011, natural resource exports

Ne 2011, eksportet e burimeve natyrore

outweighed aid flows by almost 19 to one

mbizoteruan ardhjen e ndihmave me pothuajse 19 me nje

in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Nineteen to one.

ne Afrike, Azi dhe Ameriken Latine. Nentembedhjete me nje.

Now that's a hell of a lot of schools and universities

Tashme ka nje sere shkollash dhe universitetesh

and hospitals and business startups,

dhe spitalesh dhe bisnesesh qe duan te fillojne,

many of which haven't materialized and never will

shume prej te cileve nuk e kane kuptuar dhe kurre nuk do ta kuptojne

because some of that money has simply been stolen away.

sepse nje pjese e atyre parave thjesht eshte vjedhur.

Now let's go back to the oil and mining companies,

Tani le te kthehemi tek kompanite e naftes dhe minierave,

and let's go back to Dan Etete and that $1 billion deal.

dhe ti rikthehemi perseri Dan Etete dhe marrveshjes 1 Miliard Dollarshe.

And now forgive me, I'm going to read the next bit

Dhe tani ju kerkoj ndjese, do tju lexoj pasazhin e ardhshem

because it's a very live issue, and our lawyers

sepse eshte nje ceshtje shume e gjalle, dhe avokatet tane

have been through this in some detail

e kane kaluar ne disa detaje

and they want me to get it right.

dhe ata duan qe une t'jua them drejt.

Now, on the surface, the deal appeared straightforward.

Tani, ne siperfaqe, marrveshja paraqitet si me poshte.

Subsidiaries of Shell and Eni

Filialet e Shell dhe Eni

paid the Nigerian government for the block.

paguan qeverine Nigeriane per bllokaden.

The Nigerian government transferred

Qeveria Nigeriane transferoi

precisely the same amount, to the very dollar,

saktesisht te njejten shume, deri ne qindarken e fundit,

to an account earmarked for a shell company

tek nje llogari rezervuar per nje komani "guacke"

whose hidden owner was Etete.

ku pronari i fshehte ishe Etete.

Now, that's not bad going for a convicted money launderer.

Tani, nuk eshte aspak keq per nje te denuar per pastrim parash.

And here's the thing.

Dhe ja si qendron ceshtja.

After many months of digging around

Pas shume muajsh duke gjurmuar verdalle

and reading through hundreds of pages of court documents,

dhe duke lexuar me qindra faqe te vendimeve gjyqesore,

we found evidence that, in fact,

ne gjetem prova qe, ne fakt,

Shell and Eni had known that the funds

Shell dhe Eni kishin dijeni qe fondet

would be transferred to that shell company,

do te transferoheshin tek ajo kompani "guacke",

and frankly, it's hard to believe they didn't know

dhe sinqerisht, eshte e veshtire te besosh qe nuk e dinin

who they were really dealing with there.

se me ke po benin marrveshje atje.

Now, it just shouldn't take these sorts of efforts

Tani, sduket te kishim ndermarr gjithe keto lloj perpjekjesh

to find out where the money in deals like this went.

per te gjetur ku shkuan parate e nje marrveshje te tille.

I mean, these are state assets.

Dua te them, keto jane asete shteterore.

They're supposed to be used for the benefit

Ato supozohet te perdoren per te miren

of the people in the country.

e njerzeve te ketij vendi.

But in some countries, citizens and journalists

Por ne disa vende, qytetaret dhe gazetaret

who are trying to expose stories like this

te cilet perpiqen te tregojne histori te tilla

have been harassed and arrested

kane qene kercenuar dhe arrestuar

and some have even risked their lives to do so.

dhe disa madje kane rrezikuar jeten e tyre duke bere dicka te tille.

And finally, well, there are those who believe

Ne perfundim, mire, jane ata te cilet besojne

that corruption is unavoidable.

qe korrupsioni eshte i pashmangshem.

It's just how some business is done.

Eshte thjesht sesi disa bisnese jane krijuar.

It's too complex and difficult to change.

Eshte teper e komplikuar dhe e veshtire per tu ndryshuar.

So in effect, what? We just accept it.

Keshtu qe ne te vertete, cfare? Ne e pranojme ate.

But as a campaigner and investigator,

Por si nje aktiviste dhe hetuese,

I have a different view,

kam nje kendveshtrim tjeter,

because I've seen what can happen

sepse kam pare cfare mund te ndodhe

when an idea gains momentum.

kur nje ide fiton vrull.

In the oil and mining sector, for example,

Ne sektorin e naftes dhe minierave, per shembull,

there is now the beginning

tashme eshte fillimi

of a truly worldwide transparency standard

i nje standarti te vertete nderkombetar transparence

that could tackle some of these problems.

qe mund te zgjidhi disa nga to probleme.

In 1999, when Global Witness called

Ne 1999, kur Global Witness ftoi

for oil companies to make payments on deals transparent,

kompanite e naftes te benin publike pagesat mbi marrveshjet,

well, some people laughed at the extreme naiveté

mire, shume njerez qeshen nga naiviteti ekstrem

of that small idea.

i kesaj ideje te vogel.

But literally hundreds of civil society groups

Por me qindra grupe te shoqerise civile

from around the world came together

nga e gjithe bota u bashkuan

to fight for transparency,

per te luftuar per transparence,

and now it's fast becoming the norm and the law.

dhe me shpejtesi po shnderrohet ne norme dhe ligj.

Two thirds of the value

Dy te tretat e gjithe

of the world's oil and mining companies

kompanive boterore te naftes dhe minierave

are now covered by transparency laws. Two thirds.

jane tani te mbuluara nga ligjet e transparences. Dy te tretat.

So this is change happening.

Ky eshte ndryshimi qe po ndodh.

This is progress.

Ky eshte nje progres.

But we're not there yet, by far.

Por ne akoma nuk ja kemi dale.

Because it really isn't about corruption

Sepse nuk eshte ne te vertete rreth korrupsionit

somewhere over there, is it?

diku atje tej, apo jo?

In a globalized world, corruption

Ne nje bote te globalizuar, korrupsioni

is a truly globalized business,

eshte ne te vertete nje bisnes boteror,

and one that needs global solutions,

dhe si i tille ka nevoje per zgjidhje boterore,

supported and pushed by us all, as global citizens,

mbeshtetur dhe nxitur nga te gjithe ne, si qytetar te botes,

right here.

pikerisht ketu.

Thank you.

Ju Faleminderit.

(Applause)

(Duartrokitje)