Charmian Gooch: Meet global corruption's hidden players

Translator: Anders Finn Jørgensen Reviewer: Allan Jensen

When we talk about corruption,

Når vi taler om korruption,

there are typical types of individuals that spring to mind.

er der nogle typiske typer som falder os ind.

There's the former Soviet megalomaniacs.

Der er megalomanerne fra det tidligere Sovjetunionen

Saparmurat Niyazov, he was one of them.

Saparmurat Niyazov, han var en af dem.

Until his death in 2006,

Frem til hans død i 2006,

he was the all-powerful leader of Turkmenistan,

var han enehersker af Turkmenistan,

a Central Asian country rich in natural gas.

et centralasiatisk land rigt på naturgas.

Now, he really loved to issue presidential decrees.

Ja, og han virkeligt elskede at udstede præsidentielle dekreter.

And one renamed the months of the year

Et var at omdøbe årets måneder

including after himself and his mother.

blandt andet efter ham selv og hans mor.

He spent millions of dollars

Han brugte millioner af dollars

creating a bizarre personality cult,

til at lave en bizar personkult,

and his crowning glory was the building

og kronen på det hele var bygningen

of a 40-foot-high gold-plated statue of himself

af en 12 meter høj guldbelagt statue af ham selv,

which stood proudly in the capital's central square

som stod prangende på hovedstadens centrale plads

and rotated to follow the sun.

og roterede rundt med solen.

He was a slightly unusual guy.

Han var en smule usædvanlig type.

And then there's that cliché,

Og så er der den kliche,

the African dictator or minister or official.

den afrikanske diktator, minister eller embedsmand.

There's Teodorín Obiang.

Der er Teodorin Obiang.

So his daddy is president for life of Equatorial Guinea,

Han far er præsident for livstid i Ækvatorial Guinea,

a West African nation that has exported

et vestafrikansk land som har eksporteret

billions of dollars of oil since the 1990s

for milliarder af dollars af olie siden 1990'erne

and yet has a truly appalling human rights record.

og har en virkelig forfærdende status på menneskerettigheder.

The vast majority of its people

Den store majoritet af befolkningen

are living in really miserable poverty

lever i virkelig miserabel fattigdom

despite an income per capita that's on a par

selvom deres gennemsnitlige indkomst per borger

with that of Portugal.

er på niveau med Portugal.

So Obiang junior, well, he buys himself

Så Obang junior, han køber til ham selv

a $30 million mansion in Malibu, California.

et 30 million dollar dyrt landsted i Malibu, Californien.

I've been up to its front gates.

Jeg har været ved dens indgangsport.

I can tell you it's a magnificent spread.

Jeg kan fortæller jer at han forstår at sprede sig

He bought an €18 million art collection

Han købte en € 18 million kostbar kunstsamling

that used to belong to fashion designer Yves Saint Laurent,

som før tilhørte modedesigneren Yves Saint Laurent,

a stack of fabulous sports cars,

en samling fantastiske sportsbiler,

some costing a million dollars apiece --

nogle kostede en million dollars stykket --

oh, and a Gulfstream jet, too.

Ja, forresten også en Gulfstream jet.

Now get this:

Nå hør her:

Until recently, he was earning an official monthly salary

Indtil fornylig, havde han officielt en månedsløn

of less than 7,000 dollars.

på mindre end 7.000 dollars.

And there's Dan Etete.

Og her er Dan Etete.

Well, he was the former oil minister of Nigeria

Han er den forrige olieminister i Nigeria

under President Abacha,

under præsident Abacha,

and it just so happens he's a convicted money launderer too.

og lige nu er han også dømt som pengevasker.

We've spent a great deal of time

Vi har brugt en masse tid

investigating a $1 billion --

på at undersøge en $1 milliard --

that's right, a $1 billion —

det er rigtigt, en $ 1 milliard --

oil deal that he was involved with,

oliehandel som han var involveret i,

and what we found was pretty shocking,

og hvad vi fandt ud af var temmelig chokerende,

but more about that later.

men mere om det senere.

So it's easy to think that corruption happens

Det er så let at tænke at korruption foregår

somewhere over there,

kun hos de andre,

carried out by a bunch of greedy despots

udført af en bunke grådige despoter

and individuals up to no good in countries

og dårlige individer i lande

that we, personally, may know very little about

som vi, personligt, ved meget lidt om

and feel really unconnected to

og ikke føler os forbundet til

and unaffected by what might be going on.

og uberørte af hvad der egentligt foregår.

But does it just happen over there?

Men foregår det kun de andre steder?

Well, at 22, I was very lucky.

Well, som 22-årig, var jeg meget heldig.

My first job out of university

Mit første job udenfor universitetet

was investigating the illegal trade in African ivory.

var at undersøge den illegale handel med afrikansk elfenben.

And that's how my relationship with corruption really began.

Og det var der mit forhold til korruption rigtigt begyndte.

In 1993, with two friends who were colleagues,

I 1993 med to venner der også var kollegaer

Simon Taylor and Patrick Alley,

Simon Taylor og Patrick Alley,

we set up an organization called Global Witness.

startede vi en organisation kaldet Global Witness [Globalt vidne]

Our first campaign was investigating the role

Vores første kampagne var at undersøge hvordan

of illegal logging in funding the war in Cambodia.

illegal skovhugst finansierede krigen i Cambodia.

So a few years later, and it's now 1997,

Så få år senere, det er nu 1997,

and I'm in Angola undercover investigating blood diamonds.

er jeg i Angola og undersøger bloddiamanter undercover.

Perhaps you saw the film,

Måske så i filmen,

the Hollywood film "Blood Diamond,"

Hollywoodfilmen "Blood Diamonds",

den med Leonardo DiCaprio.

the one with Leonardo DiCaprio.

Well, some of that sprang from our work.

Well, noget af handlingen udspringer af vores arbejde.

Luanda, it was full of land mine victims

Luanda, som var fuld af landmineofre

who were struggling to survive on the streets

som kæmpede for at overleve på gaderne

and war orphans living in sewers under the streets,

and børn forældreløse fra krigen, som lever i kloaker under gaderne,

and a tiny, very wealthy elite

og en lille velhavende elite

who gossiped about shopping trips to Brazil and Portugal.

som sludrede om de seneste shoppingture til Brasilien og Portugal.

And it was a slightly crazy place.

Og det var lidt skørt sted.

So I'm sitting in a hot and very stuffy hotel room

Så jeg sider i en varmt og tætpakket hotelværelse

feeling just totally overwhelmed.

føler mig totalt overvældet.

But it wasn't about blood diamonds.

Men det var ikke på grund af bloddiamanterne.

Because I'd been speaking to lots of people there

men fordi jeg talte med en masse folk der

who, well, they talked about a different problem:

som, well, talte om et andet problem:

that of a massive web of corruption on a global scale

At det massive netværk af korruption på global skala

and millions of oil dollars going missing.

og millioner af dollars som mangler.

And for what was then a very small organization

Og for det som dengang var en meget lille organisation

of just a few people,

på bare nogle få folk,

trying to even begin to think how we might tackle that

der prøver at begynde at tænke på hvordan vi kan takle det

was an enormous challenge.

var en enorm udfordring.

And in the years that I've been,

Og i alle de år jeg har været

and we've all been campaigning and investigating,

og vi alle har været i gang med at føre kampagne og undersøge,

I've repeatedly seen that what makes corruption

har jeg gentagne gange set hvad der gør korruption

on a global, massive scale possible,

på en global, massiv skala muligt,

well it isn't just greed or the misuse of power

det er ikke kun grådighed og magtmisbrug

or that nebulous phrase "weak governance."

eller den tågede frase om "svag regeringsførelse".

I mean, yes, it's all of those,

Jeg mener, det er det også,

but corruption, it's made possible by the actions

men korruptionen er lavet mulig af deltagelse

of global facilitators.

globale facilitatorer.

So let's go back to some of those people I talked about earlier.

Så lad os gå tilbage til nogle af de folk jeg talte om før.

Now, they're all people we've investigated,

Nu er dette alle folk vi har efterforsket,

and they're all people who couldn't do what they do alone.

og det er alle folk der ikke har kunnet gøre det alene.

Take Obiang junior. Well, he didn't end up

Tag Obiang Junior. Han endte ikke med

with high-end art and luxury houses without help.

super kunst og et luksushuse uden hjælp.

He did business with global banks.

Han gjorde forretninger med globale banker.

A bank in Paris held accounts of companies controlled by him,

En bank i Paris havde konti for de firmaer han kontrollerede,

one of which was used to buy the art,

hvoraf han brugte det ene til at købe kunst,

and American banks, well, they funneled

og amerikanske banker, det formidlede

73 million dollars into the States,

73 millioner ind i Staterne,

some of which was used to buy that California mansion.

hvoraf nogle blev brugt til at købe det kaliforniske landsted.

And he didn't do all of this in his own name either.

Og han gjorde ikke alt dette i sit eget navn heller.

He used shell companies.

han brugte dækselskaber.

He used one to buy the property, and another,

Han brugte et til at købe ejendommen, og et andet,

which was in somebody else's name,

som var i en andens navn,

to pay the huge bills it cost to run the place.

til at betale de store regninger for have stedet.

And then there's Dan Etete.

Og så er der Dan Etete.

Well, when he was oil minister,

Well, mens han var olieminister,

he awarded an oil block now worth over a billion dollars

Han overgav et olieområde til en værdi over en milliard dollars

to a company that, guess what, yeah,

til et selskab, gæt engang,

he was the hidden owner of.

han var den skjulte ejer af.

Now, it was then much later traded on

Nå, det var senere handlet videre

with the kind assistance of the Nigerian government --

med venlig assistance fra den nigerianske regering --

now I have to be careful what I say here —

Nu skal jeg være omhyggelig med hvad jeg siger her --

to subsidiaries of Shell and the Italian Eni,

til underselskaber af Shell og det italienske Eni,

two of the biggest oil companies around.

To af de største olieselskaber i verden.

So the reality is, is that the engine of corruption,

Så virkeligheden er, at motoren i korruptionen,

well, it exists far beyond the shores of countries

den findes langt væk fra kysterne af lande

like Equatorial Guinea or Nigeria or Turkmenistan.

som Ækvatorial Guinea eller Nigeria eller Turkmenistan.

This engine, well, it's driven

Denne motor, den er drevet

by our international banking system,

af vores internationale banksystem,

by the problem of anonymous shell companies,

af anonyme dækselskaber,

and by the secrecy that we have afforded

og det hemmelighedskræmmeri vi har tilladt

big oil, gas and mining operations,

de store olie-, gas- og mineselskaber,

and, most of all, by the failure of our politicians

og mest af alt, af forsømmelsen fra vores politikere

to back up their rhetoric and do something

til at følge op på deres retorik og gøre noget

really meaningful and systemic to tackle this stuff.

rigtigt meningsfuldt og systematisk for at takle det.

Now let's take the banks first.

Nå, lad mig tale om bankerne først.

Well, it's not going to come as any surprise

Det kommer næppe som en overraskelse

for me to tell you that banks accept dirty money,

når jeg fortæller jer at bankerne modtager beskidte penge,

but they prioritize their profits in other destructive ways too.

men de prioriterer deres profit også på andre destruktive måder.

For example, in Sarawak, Malaysia.

For eksempel, i Sarawak, Malaysia.

Now this region, it has just five percent

Denne region, den har bare fem procent

of its forests left intact. Five percent.

af sin skov tilbage. Fem procent.

So how did that happen?

Så hvad skete der?

Well, because an elite and its facilitators

Fordi en elite og deres facilitatorer

have been making millions of dollars

har lavet millioner af dollars

from supporting logging on an industrial scale

med at støtte skovhugst på en industriel skala

for many years.

gennem mange år.

So we sent an undercover investigator in

Så vi sendte en undercover undersøger ind

to secretly film meetings with members of the ruling elite,

for at hemmeligt at filme et møde med medlemmer af den herskende elite,

and the resulting footage, well, it made some people very angry,

og de endelige optagelser, de gjorde nogle folk meget ophidsede,

and you can see that on YouTube,

og I kan se det på Youtube,

but it proved what we had long suspected,

og de bevidste hvad vi længe havde mistanke om,

fordi det viste hvordan statens hovedminister,

because it showed how the state's chief minister,

despite his later denials,

på trods af hans senere benægtelser

used his control over land and forest licenses

brugt sin kontrol over land- og skovlicenser

to enrich himself and his family.

til at berige sig selv og sin familie.

And HSBC, well, we know that HSBC bankrolled

Og HSBC, vi ved at HSBC som var bank for

the region's largest logging companies

regionen største skovfældningsselskaber

that were responsible for some of that destruction

som var ansvarlige for noget af ødelæggelserne

i Sarawak og andre steder.

in Sarawak and elsewhere.

The bank violated its own sustainability policies in the process,

Banken overtrådte sin egen bæredygtighedspolitik i den proces,

but it earned around 130 million dollars.

men de tjente 130 millioner dollars.

Now shortly after our exposé,

Og kort tid efter vores afdækning,

very shortly after our exposé earlier this year,

meget kort efter vores afdækning tidligere i år,

the bank announced a policy review on this.

annoncerede banken en gennemgang af deres politik.

And is this progress? Maybe,

Og er det et fremskridt? Måske,

but we're going to be keeping a very close eye

men vi er nødt til at holde meget tæt øje

on that case.

med den sag.

And then there's the problem of anonymous shell companies.

Og der er et problem med de anonyme dækselskaber.

Well, we've all heard about what they are, I think,

Vi har alle hørt om hvad de er, tror jeg,

and we all know they're used quite a bit

og alle ved at de bruges meget

by people and companies who are trying to avoid

af folk og firmaer som prøver at undgå

paying their proper dues to society,

at betale deres andel til samfundet

also known as taxes.

også kendt som skat.

But what doesn't usually come to light

Men hvad der sjældent kommer frem i lyset

is how shell companies are used to steal

er hvordan dækselskaber er brugt til at stjæle

huge sums of money, transformational sums of money,

kæmpe summer af penge, betydende summer af penge,

from poor countries.

fra fattige lande.

In virtually every case of corruption that we've investigated,

I næsten alle de sager om korruption vi har efterforsket,

shell companies have appeared,

her dækselskaber optrådt,

and sometimes it's been impossible to find out

og nogen gange har det været umuligt at finde ud af

who is really involved in the deal.

hvem der i virkeligheden har været deltagere i handlen.

A recent study by the World Bank

Et nyligt studie fra Verdensbanken

looked at 200 cases of corruption.

kiggede på 200 sager om korruption.

It found that over 70 percent of those cases

Og fandt i over 70% af sagerne

had used anonymous shell companies,

var anonyme dækselskaber blevet brugt,

totaling almost 56 billion dollars.

for omkring 56 milliarder dollars.

Now many of these companies were in America

Mange af disse selskaber var i Amerika

or the United Kingdom,

eller United Kingdom,

its overseas territories and Crown dependencies,

det oversøiske territorier og kongelige besiddelser

and so it's not just an offshore problem,

og det er ikke kun et offshore problem

it's an on-shore one too.

det er også et indlands.

You see, shell companies, they're central

Som I ser, dækselskaber, de er centrale

to the secret deals which may benefit wealthy elites

for hemmelige aftaler som kommer rige eliter til gode

rather than ordinary citizens.

snarer end de almindelige borgere.

One striking recent case that we've investigated

En nylig iøjefaldende sag vi har efterforsket

is how the government in the Democratic Republic of Congo

er hvordan den Demokratiske Republik Congo

sold off a series of valuable, state-owned mining assets

frasolgte en serie af værdifulde, statsejede miner

to shell companies in the British Virgin Islands.

til et dækselskab på de Britiske Jomfruøer .

So we spoke to sources in country,

Så vi talte med kilder i landet,

trawled through company documents and other information

gennemtrawlede forretningsdokumenter og anden information

trying to piece together a really true picture of the deal.

og prøvede at stykke det sande billede sammen af aftalen.

And we were alarmed to find that these shell companies

Og vi var alarmerede over at finde at disse dækselskaber

had quickly flipped many of the assets on

havde hurtigt omsat mange af disse værdier

for huge profits to major international mining companies

med store profitter for store internationale mineselskaber

listed in London.

med adresse i London.

Now, the Africa Progress Panel, led by Kofi Annan,

Nu, det afrikanske fremskridtspanel, ledet af Kofi Annan,

they've calculated that Congo may have lost

de har beregnet at Congo kan have tabt

more than 1.3 billion dollars from these deals.

mere end 1,3 milliard dollars fra disse handler.

That's almost twice

Det er næsten det dobbelte af

the country's annual health and education budget combined.

landets samlede udgifter til sundhed og uddannelse.

And will the people of Congo, will they ever get their money back?

Og vil folkene i Congo nogensinde få deres penge tilbage?

Well, the answer to that question,

Svaret på det spørgsmål,

and who was really involved and what really happened,

og hvem som i virkeligheden var involveret og hvad der egentlig skete,

well that's going to probably remain locked away

det svar vil forblive låst inde

in the secretive company registries of the British Virgin Islands

hos hemmelige selskaber registeret på de Britiske Jomfruøer

and elsewhere unless we all do something about it.

og andre steder medmindre vi alle gør noget ved det.

And how about the oil, gas and mining companies?

Og hvad med olie-, gas- og mineselskaberne?

Okay, maybe it's a bit of a cliché to talk about them.

Okay, det er lidt af en kliche at tale om dem.

Corruption in that sector, no surprise.

Korruption i den sektor, ingen overraskelse.

There's corruption everywhere, so why focus on that sector?

Der er korruption alle steder, så hvorfor fokuserer på den sektor?

Well, because there's a lot at stake.

Fordi der er meget på spil.

In 2011, natural resource exports

I 2001, eksport af naturressourcer

outweighed aid flows by almost 19 to one

oversteg ulandshjælp med omkring 19 til en

in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Nineteen to one.

i Afrika, Asien og Latin Amerika. Nitten til en.

Now that's a hell of a lot of schools and universities

Det er en helvedes mange skoler og universiteter

and hospitals and business startups,

og hospitaler og iværksætterfirmaer,

many of which haven't materialized and never will

mange som ikke har vist sig og aldrig vil

because some of that money has simply been stolen away.

fordi mange af de penge simpelthen er blevet stjålet.

Now let's go back to the oil and mining companies,

Nå, lad os gå tilbage til olie- og mineselskaberne,

and let's go back to Dan Etete and that $1 billion deal.

og lad os gå tilbage til Dan Etete og den 1 milliard dollar store aftale.

And now forgive me, I'm going to read the next bit

Og undskyld mig at jeg er nødt til at læse det næste stykke op

because it's a very live issue, and our lawyers

fordi det er en åben sag og vores advokater

have been through this in some detail

har været igennem nogle af detaljerne

and they want me to get it right.

så jeg ønsker at de skal siges korrekt.

Now, on the surface, the deal appeared straightforward.

NU, på overfladen, så handlen ud til at være lige ud af landevejen.

Subsidiaries of Shell and Eni

Underselskaber af Shell og Eni

paid the Nigerian government for the block.

betalte den nigerianske regering for rettighederne.

The Nigerian government transferred

Den nigerianske regering overførte

precisely the same amount, to the very dollar,

præcist det samme beløb, ned til den enkelte dollar,

to an account earmarked for a shell company

til en konto øremærket for et dækselskab

whose hidden owner was Etete.

hvis skjulte ejer var Etete.

Now, that's not bad going for a convicted money launderer.

Nu, det er ikke dårligt for en dømt pengevasker.

And here's the thing.

og her er pointen.

After many months of digging around

Efter mange måneders gravearbejde

and reading through hundreds of pages of court documents,

og læsning gennem hundreder sider af retsdokumenter,

we found evidence that, in fact,

har vi fundet bevis for, faktisk,

Shell and Eni had known that the funds

at Shell og Eni vidste at disse beløb

would be transferred to that shell company,

ville blive overført til dette dækselskab,

and frankly, it's hard to believe they didn't know

og ærligt, det er svært at tro at de ikke vidste

who they were really dealing with there.

hvem de i virkeligheden handlede med.

Now, it just shouldn't take these sorts of efforts

Nu, det burde ikke kræve den slags anstrengelser

to find out where the money in deals like this went.

for at finde ud af hvor penge i handler som disse ender.

I mean, these are state assets.

Jeg mener, det er statsejendom.

They're supposed to be used for the benefit

De brude blive brugt til fordel for

of the people in the country.

folket i landet.

But in some countries, citizens and journalists

Men i nogle lande, borgere og journalister

who are trying to expose stories like this

som prøver at frembringe historier som disse

have been harassed and arrested

har blevet overfaldet og arresteret

and some have even risked their lives to do so.

og nogle har også risikeret deres liv, for at gøre det.

And finally, well, there are those who believe

Og til sidst, der er dem som tror

that corruption is unavoidable.

at korruption er uundgåelig.

It's just how some business is done.

Det er bare sådan forretning gøres.

It's too complex and difficult to change.

Det er for svært og kompliceret at ændre.

So in effect, what? We just accept it.

Så hvad der effekten, Vi må bare accepterer det.

But as a campaigner and investigator,

Men som kampagnefører og efterforsker,

I have a different view,

jeg har et andet synspunkt,

because I've seen what can happen

fordi jeg har set hvad der kan ske

when an idea gains momentum.

når en ide får momentum.

In the oil and mining sector, for example,

I olie- og minesektoren, for eksempel,

there is now the beginning

er der nu en begyndelse

of a truly worldwide transparency standard

på en ægte verdensomspændende gennemsigtigheds-standard

that could tackle some of these problems.

som kan takle nogle af disse problemer.

In 1999, when Global Witness called

i 1999, da Global Witness opfordrede

for oil companies to make payments on deals transparent,

olieselskaberne at gøre deres betalinger for aftaler gennemsigtige,

well, some people laughed at the extreme naiveté

nogle folk grinte af den ekstreme naivitet

of that small idea.

af den lille ide.

But literally hundreds of civil society groups

Men bogstaveligt hundrede af civilsamfundsgrupper

from around the world came together

fra hele verden fandt sammen

to fight for transparency,

om at kæmpe for gennemsigtighed,

and now it's fast becoming the norm and the law.

og nu er det hurtigt begyndt at blive normen og loven.

Two thirds of the value

To tredjedele af værdien

of the world's oil and mining companies

og jordens olie- og mineselskaber

are now covered by transparency laws. Two thirds.

er nu omfattet af gennemsigtighedslove. To tredjedele.

So this is change happening.

Så ændringer sker.

This is progress.

Dette er fremskridt.

But we're not there yet, by far.

Men vi er der ikke endnu, langt fra.

Because it really isn't about corruption

Fordi dette handler ikke kun om korruption

somewhere over there, is it?

ovre hos de andre, gør det?

In a globalized world, corruption

I en globaliseret verden, korruption

is a truly globalized business,

er en rigtig globaliseret forretning,

and one that needs global solutions,

og den behøver globale løsninger,

supported and pushed by us all, as global citizens,

støttet og presset på af os alle, globale borgere,

right here.

lige her.

Thank you.

Mange tak.

(Applause)

(Bifald)