The surprising way groups like ISIS stay in power | Benedetta Berti

Translator: Klavdija Cernilogar Reviewer: Nika Kotnik

For the past decade,

Zadnjih deset let

I've been studying non-state armed groups:

preučujem nedržavne oborožene skupine:

armed organizations like terrorists, insurgents or militias.

teroriste, upornike in milice.

I document what these groups do when they're not shooting.

Zanima me, kaj te skupine počnejo, kadar ne streljajo.

My goal is to better understand these violent actors

Ta nasilna gibanja želim bolje razumeti

and to study ways to encourage transition from violent engagement

in najti poti, kako spodbuditi prehod od nasilja

to nonviolent confrontation.

k nenasilni konfrontaciji.

I work in the field, in the policy world and in the library.

Delam na terenu, na ravni politik in v knjižnici.

Understanding non-state armed groups is key to solving most ongoing conflict,

Da bi rešili večino trenutnih konfliktov, moramo razumeti take oborožene skupine,

because war has changed.

saj se je značaj vojne spremenil.

It used to be a contest between states.

Nekoč je šlo za tekmovanje med državami.

No longer.

Nič več.

It is now a conflict between states and non-state actors.

Zdaj je konflikt med državami in nedržavnimi akterji.

For example, of the 216 peace agreements

Na primer: od 216 mirovnih sporazumov,

signed between 1975 and 2011,

podpisanih med 1975 in 2011,

196 of them were between a state and a non-state actor.

jih je bilo 196 med državo in nedržavnim akterjem.

So we need to understand these groups; we need to either engage them

Zato jih moramo bolje razumeti: moramo jih bodisi vključiti

or defeat them in any conflict resolution process that has to be successful.

bodisi premagati skozi uspešno rešitev konflikta.

So how do we do that?

Ampak kako naj to naredimo?

We need to know what makes these organizations tick.

Vedeti moramo, kaj jih vodi.

We know a lot about how they fight, why they fight,

Veliko vemo o tem, kako in zakaj se borijo,

but no one looks at what they're doing when they're not fighting.

skoraj nič pa o tem, kaj počnejo, ko niso v boju.

Yet, armed struggle and unarmed politics are related.

Oborožen boj in politika brez orožja sta povezana.

It is all part of the same organization.

Gre za delo iste organizacije.

We cannot understand these groups, let alone defeat them,

Teh skupin ne bomo razumeli, sploh pa ne premagali,

if we don't have the full picture.

če ne dobimo celostnega vpogleda.

And armed groups today are complex organizations.

Današnje oborožene skupine so kompleksno organizirane.

Take the Lebanese Hezbollah,

Libanonski Hezbolah, recimo,

known for its violent confrontation against Israel.

je znan po nasilnem spopadanju z Izraelom.

But since its creation in the early 1980s,

A od ustanovitve v zgodnjih 80. letih

Hezbollah has also set up a political party,

je Hezbolah vzpostavil tudi politično stranko,

a social-service network, and a military apparatus.

mrežo socialnih storitev ter vojaški aparat.

Similarly, the Palestinian Hamas,

Palestinski Hamas,

known for its suicide attacks against Israel,

ki je tudi znan po samomorilskih napadih na Izrael,

also runs the Gaza Strip since 2007.

vodi območje Gaze od leta 2007.

So these groups do way more than just shoot.

Te skupine torej niso samo strelci.

They multi-task.

Opravljajo več nalog.

They set up complex communication machines --

Vzpostavljajo kompleksne sisteme komunikacije,

radio stations, TV channels,

radijske postaje, TV kanale,

Internet websites and social media strategies.

spletne strani in strategije za družabne medije.

And up here, you have the ISIS magazine,

Tule je ISIS revija,

printed in English and published to recruit.

ki izhaja v angleščini in je namenjena rekrutiranju.

Armed groups also invest in complex fund-raising --

Oborožene skupine vlagajo tudi v zbiranje sredstev -

not looting, but setting up profitable businesses;

ne s plenjenjem, pač pa z odpiranjem dobičkonosnih podjetij,

for example, construction companies.

denimo v gradbeništvu.

Now, these activities are keys.

Te dejavnosti so ključne.

They allow these groups to increase their strength,

Skupinam pomagajo krepiti moč,

increase their funds,

zbirati sredstva,

to better recruit and to build their brand.

rekrutirati in graditi blagovno znamko.

Armed groups also do something else:

Oborožene skupine počnejo še nekaj:

they build stronger bonds with the population

z vlaganjem v socialne službe

by investing in social services.

krepijo vezi s prebivalstvom.

They build schools, they run hospitals,

Gradijo šole, vodijo bolnišnice,

they set up vocational-training programs or micro-loan programs.

odpirajo programe poklicnega izobraževanja, dajejo mikrokredite.

Hezbollah offers all of these services and more.

Hezbolah ponuja vse to in več.

Armed groups also seek to win the population over

Oborožene skupine skušajo ljudi pridobiti tudi tako,

by offering something that the state is not providing:

da ponujajo tisto, česar država ne:

safety and security.

varnost.

The initial rise of the Taliban in war-torn Afghanistan,

Prvotni vzpon talibanov v povojnem Afganistanu

or even the beginning of the ascent of ISIS,

ali celo prvi koraki razvoja ISIS

can be understood also by looking at these groups' efforts

so povezani tudi s poskusi teh skupin

to provide security.

zagotoviti varnost.

Now, unfortunately, in these cases,

Na žalost je bila v teh primerih

the provision of security came at an unbearably high price

cena take varnosti

za prebivalce neznosna.

for the population.

But in general, providing social services fills a gap,

Na splošno pa s socialno službo te skupine poskrbijo za nekaj,

a governance gap left by the government,

česar vlada ni sposobna narediti,

and allows these groups to increase their strength

kar še okrepi njihovo moč

and their power.

in vpliv.

For example, the 2006 electoral victory of the Palestinian Hamas

Volilne zmage Hamasa leta 2006

cannot be understood without acknowledging the group's social work.

ne bi razumeli, če ne upoštevamo socialnega dela, ki ga nudi.

Now, this is a really complex picture,

Slika je res zapletena,

yet in the West, when we look at armed groups,

a z vidika Zahoda oborožene skupine predstavljajo samo nasilje.

we only think of the violent side.

But that's not enough to understand these groups' strength,

Vendar to ne pokaže njihove celotne moči,

strategy or long-term vision.

strategije ali dolgoročne vizije.

These groups are hybrid.

Te skupine so hibridi.

They rise because they fill a gap left by the government,

Vzpnejo se, ker zapolnijo praznino, ki je vlada ne,

and they emerge to be both armed and political,

postanejo tako oborožene kot politične,

engage in violent struggle and provide governance.

vključijo se tako v nasilni boj kot v vladanje.

And the more these organizations are complex and sophisticated,

In bolj ko so kompleksne in prefinjene,

the less we can think of them as the opposite of a state.

manj v njih vidimo nasprotje državi.

Now, what do you call a group like Hezbollah?

Kako bi opredelili Hezbolah?

They run part of a territory, they administer all their functions,

Nadzorujejo del ozemlja in upravljajo z njim,

they pick up the garbage, they run the sewage system.

pobirajo smeti in vodijo komunalo.

Is this a state? Is it a rebel group?

Je to država? So uporniki?

Or maybe something else, something different and new?

So nekaj drugega, novega?

And what about ISIS?

Kaj pa ISIS?

The lines are blurred.

Meje so zabrisane.

We live in a world of states, non-states, and in-between,

Živimo v svetu držav, ne-držav in nečesa vmes,

and the more states are weak, like in the Middle East today,

in šibkejše ko so države, kot denimo na Bližnjem vzhodu,

the more non-state actors step in and fill that gap.

bolj nedržavni akterji vstopajo na ta teren.

This matters for governments, because to counter these groups,

To je pomembno za vlade, saj bodo za boj s temi skupinami

they will have to invest more in non-military tools.

morale bolj vlagati v nevojaška orodja.

Filling that governance gap

Vsak pristop, da bo trajen,

has to be at the center of any sustainable approach.

se mora osredotočiti na boljše vladanje.

This also matters very much for peacemaking and peacebuilding.

To velja tudi za zagotavljanje miru.

If we better understand armed groups,

Če bomo bolje razumeli oborožene skupine,

we will better know what incentives to offer

bomo vedeli, kakšne spodbude

to encourage the transition from violence to nonviolence.

bodo omogočile prehod od nasilja k nenasilju.

So in this new contest between states and non-states,

V tem novem boju med državami in drugimi akterji

military power can win some battles,

vojaška moč lahko dobi nekaj bitk,

but it will not give us peace nor stability.

ne bo pa prinesla miru in stabilnosti.

To achieve these objectives,

Da bi to dosegli,

what we need is a long-term investment in filling that security gap,

potrebujemo dolgoročno vlaganje v zagotavljanje varnosti,

in filling that governance gap

v zagotavljanje dobre vlade,

that allowed these groups to thrive in the first place.

pomanjkanje česar je pripeljalo do vzpona teh skupin.

Thank you.

Hvala.

(Applause)

(Aplavz)