Rory Stewart: Time to end the war in Afghanistan

翻译人员: Zhangyi Liu 校对人员: Angelia King

The question today is not:

在今天我们的问题不是：

Why did we invade Afghanistan?

为什么我们要侵略阿富汗？

The question is:

真正的问题是：

why are we still in Afghanistan

十年之后，为什么我们仍然

one decade later?

呆在那儿？

Why are we spending

为什么我们花费

$135 billion?

1350亿美金？

Why have we got 130,000 troops on the ground?

为什么我们仍然有13万地面部队？

Why were more people killed

为什么在

last month

上个月被杀的人

than in any preceding month

比这次冲突之前的

of this conflict?

任何一个月都要多？

How has this happened?

这为什么会发生？

The last 20 years

过去的20年

has been the age of intervention,

已经成为了介入干预的20年

and Afghanistan is simply one act

并且阿富汗只是

in a five-act tragedy.

五个灾难当中的其中一个。

We came out of the end of the Cold War

我们绝望的

in despair.

走出了冷战。

We faced Rwanda;

我们面对卢旺达内战；

we faced Bosnia,

我们面对波黑战争；

and then we rediscovered our confidence.

然后我们重新找到了我们的自信。

In the third act, we went into Bosnia and Kosovo

在第三个行动中，我们进入了波斯尼亚和科索沃

and we seemed to succeed.

并且我们看起来似乎成功干预了。

In the fourth act, with our hubris,

在第四个行动中，我们带着傲慢，

our overconfidence developing,

和我们过度的自负

we invaded Iraq and Afghanistan,

入侵了伊拉克和阿富汗。

and in the fifth act,

在第五个行动中，

we plunged into a humiliating mess.

我们深陷令人蒙羞的困境。

So the question is: What are we doing?

所以真正的问题是：我们到底在干什么？

Why are we still stuck in Afghanistan?

为什么我们仍然被困在阿富汗？

And the answer, of course,

当然，我们

that we keep being given

被给予的答案是

is as follows:

以下几个。

we're told that we went into Afghanistan

我们说我们进入阿富汗

because of 9/11,

是因为9/11事件

and that we remain there

并且我们仍然呆在那里

because the Taliban poses an existential threat

因为塔利班对国际安全

to global security.

构成了生死存亡的威胁。

In the words of President Obama,

引用奥巴马总统的话说，

"If the Taliban take over again,

“如果塔利班夺回主权的话，

they will invite back Al-Qaeda,

他们会把基地组织请回来，

who will try to kill as many of our people

他们会杀掉

as they possibly can."

他们能杀掉的所有人。”

The story that we're told

我们被告知的故事

is that there was a "light footprint" initially --

在一开始就是一个缺少充分的理由--

in other words, that we ended up in a situation

换句话说，我们处在一个

where we didn't have enough troops,

没有足够军队

we didn't have enough resources,

没有足够资源

that Afghans were frustrated --

阿富汗人都很挫败的绝境之下。

they felt there wasn't enough progress

他们觉得情况

and economic development and security,

与经济和社会安全都没有得到足够的发展

and therefore the Taliban came back --

因此塔利班即将回来。

that we responded in 2005 and 2006

所以我们回应在2005与2006年

with troop deployments,

军队的部署问题，

but we still didn't put enough troops on the ground.

但是我们仍然没有部署足够多的地面部队。

And that it wasn't until 2009,

并且一直持续到2009年，

when President Obama signed off on a surge,

当奥巴马签下了扩军合约，

that we finally had,

我们终于拥有了，

in the words of Secretary Clinton,

用国务卿克林顿的话来说，

"the strategy, the leadership and the resources."

“战略，领导力和资源，”

So, as the president now reassures us,

所以，就像美国总统保证我们的一样，

we are on track to achieve our goals.

我们已经在实现目标的正轨上。

All of this is wrong.

上述所有的这些都是错误的。

Every one of those statements is wrong.

每一个声明都是错误的。

Afghanistan does not

阿富汗并没有

pose an existential threat

构成对

to global security.

国际社会生死存亡的威胁。

It is extremely unlikely

塔利班会夺回政权

the Taliban would ever be able to take over the country --

是极度不可能的。

extremely unlikely they'd be able to seize Kabul.

他们可以夺取喀布尔也是极度不可能的。

They simply don't have a conventional military option.

他们根本没有常规的军事解决途径。

And even if they were able to do so, even if I'm wrong,

并且即使他们可以这么做，如果我说错了，

it's extremely unlikely

塔利班会请基地组织回来

the Taliban would invite back Al-Qaeda.

也是几乎不可能的。

From the Taliban's point of view,

从塔利班的角度来看，

that was their number one mistake last time.

这是他们以前犯得第一大错误。

If they hadn't invited back Al-Qaeda,

如果他们没有请回基地组织，

they would still be in power today.

他们今天还会仍然执政。

And even if I'm wrong about those two things,

并且如果对于这两件事我仍然错了，

even if they were able to take back the country,

如果他们甚至夺回了政权，

even if they were to invite back Al-Qaeda,

并且请回了基地组织，

it's extremely unlikely

基地组织会显著提高

that Al-Qaeda would significantly enhance

对美国

its ability to harm the United States

或者欧洲的伤害能力

or harm Europe.

这也是不可能的。

Because this isn't the 1990s anymore.

因为现在已经不是90年代了。

If the Al-Qaeda base

如果阿富汗

was to be established near Ghazni,

在Ghazni附近建立基地的话，

we would hit them very hard,

我们会狠狠地打击他们，

and it would be very, very difficult

并且对于塔利班来说

for the Taliban to protect them.

去保护他们是很困难的。

Furthermore, it's simply not true

此外，

that what went wrong in Afghanistan

在阿富汗的失误

is the light footprint.

是缺少充分的理由，这根本就不是真的。

In my experience, in fact,

根据我的经验，事实上，

the light footprint was extremely helpful.

这缺少充分的理由是非常有帮助的。

And these troops that we brought in --

并且我们带去的这些更多的军队--

it's a great picture of David Beckham

这是一张贝克汉姆

there on the sub-machine gun --

和轻机枪的图片--

made the situation worse, not better.

让这个情况更糟，并不是更好。

When I walked across Afghanistan

当我在2001-2002冬天

in the winter of 2001-2002,

走访阿富汗时，

what I saw was scenes like this.

我看到的画面是这个。

A girl, if you're lucky,

一个女孩，如果你幸运的话，

in the corner of a dark room --

在一个黑暗房间的角落--

lucky to be able to look at the Koran.

幸运的可以看到古兰经。

But in those early days

但是在当我们说

when we're told we didn't have enough troops and enough resources,

我们没有足够的军队与资源时，

we made a lot of progress in Afghanistan.

我们在阿富汗却取得了很多进展。

Within a few months,

在几个月之内，

there were two and a half million more girls in school.

有多于250万的女孩进入了学校。

In Sangin where I was sick in 2002,

2002年当我在Sangin生病时，

the nearest health clinic

最近的诊所

was within three days walk.

是在3天的步行路程内。

Today, there are 14 health clinics

而今天，仅仅在那个区域

in that area alone.

就有14家诊所。

There was amazing improvements.

这是不可思议的发展。

We went from almost no Afghans

在塔利班执政期间，从阿富汗几乎没有人

having mobile telephones during the Taliban

拥有手机

to a situation where, almost overnight,

转眼间到现在，

three million Afghans had mobile telephones.

3百万的阿富汗人拥有手机。

And we had progress in the free media.

并且我们在媒体自由方面取得了进步。

We had progress in elections --

我们在选举上取得了进步--

all of this with the so-called light footprint.

所有的这些都是与所谓的“缺少充分的理由”联系在一起的。

But when we began to bring more money,

但是当我们开始带来更多的钱，

when we began to invest more resources,

当我们开始投资更多的资源，

things got worse, not better. How?

事情反而变得更糟，而不是更好。这是怎么了？

Well first see, if you put 125 billion dollars a year

好，我们来看， 如果我们把每年1250亿美金

into a country like Afghanistan

投入一个像阿富汗这样的国家

where the entire revenue of the Afghan state

一个总收入

is one billion dollars a year,

每年只有10亿美金的国家，

you drown everything.

你就毁坏了所有的事情。

It's not simply corruption and waste

这不仅仅是你创造了

that you create;

腐败与浪费；

you essentially replace the priorities of the Afghan government,

你本质上取代了阿富汗政府的优先权，

the elected Afghan government,

当选的阿富汗政府

with the micromanaging tendencies

以及外国短途旅行团的

of foreigners on short tours

微观管理倾向

with their own priorities.

以及他们的优先权。

And the same is true for the troops.

并且这同样适用于军队。

When I walked across Afghanistan,

当我走访阿富汗时，

I stayed with people like this.

我与这些人呆在一起。

This is Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj.

这是卡门吉的Haji Malem Mohsin Khan司令官。

Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj was a great host.

他是一个很好的主人。

He was very generous,

他非常的慷慨大方

like many of the Afghans I stayed with.

就如同很多与我一起呆过的阿富汗人一样。

But he was also considerably more conservative,

但是他也是相当的保守，

considerably more anti-foreign,

相当的不喜欢外国人

considerably more Islamist

相当的伊斯兰化

than we'd like to acknowledge.

比我们所了解到的还要多。

This man, for example, Mullah Mustafa,

举例来说，这个男人，Mullah Mustafa

tried to shoot me.

曾尝试杀了我。

And the reason I'm looking a little bit perplexed in this photograph

并且在这张照片中我看起来比较困惑的原因是

is I was somewhat frightened,

我有一点害怕

and I was too afraid on this occasion

而且我非常的恐惧在这样的场合下

to ask him, having run for an hour through the desert

去问他，在沙漠中行进了一小时

and taken refuge in this house,

然后庇护在这个房子里，

why he had turned up and wanted to have his photograph taken with me.

为什么他转变了并且想与我照一张相。

But 18 months later, I asked him

但在18个月后，我问他

why he had tried to shoot me.

为什么他尝试着要杀我。

And Mullah Mustafa -- he's the man with the pen and paper --

然后Mullah Mustafa--他是那个拿着纸和笔的男人--

explained that the man sitting immediately to the left as you look at the photograph,

解释到如这幅图中大家看到的坐在他左边的那个男人，

Nadir Shah

Nadir Shah

had bet him that he couldn't hit me.

跟他打赌他不能打我。

Now this is not to say

我这儿并不是想说

Afghanistan is a place full of people like Mullah Mustafa.

阿富汗是一个到处都有像Mullah Mustafa这种人的地方。

It's not; it's a wonderful place

它不是；它是一个充满

full of incredible energy and intelligence.

不可思议的能量与智慧的地方。

But it is a place

但是这个

where the putting-in of the troops

投入军队的地方

has increased the violence rather than decreased it.

反而增加了暴力，而不是减少。

2005, Anthony Fitzherbert,

2005年，Anthony Fitzherbert

an agricultural engineer,

一个农业工程师，

could travel through Helmand,

可以经过赫尔曼德省,

could stay in Nad Ali, Sangin and Ghoresh,

可以呆在Nad Ali, Sangin和Ghoresh，

which are now the names of villages where fighting is taking place.

这些都是战斗发生时村庄的名字。

Today, he could never do that.

今天，他再也不能这样做了。

So the idea that we deployed the troops

所以展开军事行动

to respond to the Taliban insurgency

去回应塔利班叛乱的想法

is mistaken.

是错误的。

Rather than preceding the insurgency,

而不是开始叛乱，

the Taliban followed the troop deployment,

塔利班反而开始军队部署。

and as far as I'm concerned,

并且就我而言，

the troop deployment caused their return.

军队部署反而造成了他们的返回。

Now is this a new idea?

所以这是不是一个新的主意？

No, there have been any number of people

不，在过去的7年当中

saying this over the last seven years.

有无数人说过这样的话。

I ran a center at Harvard

在2008到2010年

from 2008 to 2010,

我在哈佛大学运营一个中心

and there were people like Michael Semple there

并且它有像Michael Semple

who speak Afghan languages fluently,

可以流利的说阿富汗语，

who've traveled to almost every district in the country.

几乎去过这国家里每一个角落的人。

Andrew Wilder, for example,

再举例，Andrew Wilder,

born on the Pakistan-Iranian border,

在巴基斯坦和伊朗的边界上出生，

served his whole life

有生之年

in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

都呆在了巴基斯坦和阿富汗。

Paul Fishstein who began working there in 1978 --

Paul Fishstein，他1978年开始

worked for Save the Children,

为救助儿童在那儿工作，

ran the Afghan research and evaluation unit.

他负责阿富汗研究和评估单位。

These are people

这些人，

who were able to say consistently

他们都会始终如一地说

that the increase in development aid

那些增加的援助

was making Afghanistan less secure, not more secure --

只让阿富汗变得安全性较差，更加不安全--

that the counter-insurgency strategy

那个反叛乱策略

was not working and would not work.

并没有奏效并且不会奏效。

And yet, nobody listened to them.

但是，没有人听他们的。

Instead,

取而代之的是，

there was a litany of astonishing optimism.

却有无数惊人的乐观面。

Beginning in 2004,

从2004年开始，

every general came in saying,

每一个将军都说，

"I've inherited a dismal situation,

“我继承了一个惨淡的现状，

but finally I have the right resources and the correct strategy,

但是最终我会有正确的资源与策略

which will deliver,"

交付给大家。”

in General Barno's word in 2004,

2004年，巴诺将军说道

the "decisive year."

这是“决定性的一年”。

Well guess what? It didn't.

猜猜看？它并不是决定性的。

But it wasn't sufficient to prevent General Abuzaid saying

但是这并不能足以防止Abuzaid将军在2005年说

that he had the strategy and the resources

他拥有策略和资源

to deliver, in 2005,

给大家一个交付。

the "decisive year."

这是“决定性的一年”。

Or General David Richards to come in 2006

或看看在2006年大卫·理查兹将军

and say he had the strategy and the resources

说道他有策略和资源

to deliver the "crunch year."

去交付给大家“粉碎（塔利班）之年”。

Or in 2007,

再看在2007年，

the Norwegian deputy foreign minister, Espen Eide,

挪威外交部副部长，Espen Eide

to say that that would deliver the "decisive year."

说道这会是“决定性的一年”。

Or in 2008, Major General Champoux

2008年，少将Champoux

to come in and say he would deliver the "decisive year."

说道他会给大家一个“决定性的一年”。

Or in 2009, my great friend,

2009年，我的好朋友，

General Stanley McChrystal,

斯坦利·麦克里斯特尔将军，

who said that he was "knee-deep in the decisive year."

他说道他“身陷在这决定性的一年”。

Or in 2010,

2010年，

the U.K. foreign secretary, David Miliband,

英国的外交部长大卫·米利班德

who said that at last we would deliver the "decisive year."

他说道2010年会是“决定性的一年”。

And you'll be delighted to hear in 2011, today,

并且你将会高兴地听到在2011年，现在，

that Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister,

德国外交部长基多·威斯特威勒

assures us that we are in the "decisive year."

向我们保证这是“决定性的一年”。

(Applause)

（掌声）

How do we allow

我们是

any of this to happen?

怎么允许这些事情发生的？

Well the answer, of course, is,

当然，答案是

if you spend 125 billion or 130 billion

如果你花费每年1250亿或1300亿

dollars a year in a country,

美金在一个国家上，

you co-opt almost everybody.

你会串通几乎每个人，

Even the aid agencies,

甚至救援部门--

who begin to receive an enormous amount of money

它们开始收到从美国和欧洲政府

from the U.S. and the European governments

过来的大量的资金

to build schools and clinics,

去建设学校和诊所--

are somewhat disinclined

它们有点不愿意服从

to challenge the idea

去挑战这种

that Afghanistan is an existential threat

阿富汗是国际安全

to global security.

生死存亡的威胁的看法。

They're worried, in other words,

换句话说，它们很担心，

that if anybody believes that it wasn't such a threat --

如果每个人都相信阿富汗不是一个威胁--

Oxfam, Save the Children

牛津饥荒救济委员会，一个救助孩子的机构-

wouldn't get the money

将不会拿到资金

to build their hospitals and schools.

去建造他们的医院和学校。

It's also very difficult to confront a general

而且去面对一个胸前挂有勋章的将军时，

with medals on his chest.

这是非常困难的。

It's very difficult for a politician,

对于政客来说这是很困难的，

because you're afraid that many lives have been lost in vain.

因为你害怕许多人丧失了生命是徒劳的。

You feel deep, deep guilt.

你有种深深，深深的罪恶感。

You exaggerate your fears,

你夸大你的恐惧

and you're terrified about the humiliation

并且你惧怕失败

of defeat.

给你带来的羞耻。

What is the solution to this?

那么什么是解决这些的方案呢？

Well the solution to this

解决的方法是

is we need to find a way

我们需要找到一种方法

that people like Michael Semple, or those other people,

让像Michael Semple这样的人，和更多的

who are telling the truth, who know the country,

说实话，了解这个国家，

who've spent 30 years on the ground --

在这儿土地上呆了30多年的人

and most importantly of all,

而且最重要的是

the missing component of this --

这是被遗漏的一部分--

Afghans themselves,

让阿富汗他们自己人，

who understand what is going on.

他们最知道什么才是出路。

We need to somehow get their message

我们需要以某种方法得到他们的想法

to the policymakers.

并告诉政策的制定者。

And this is very difficult to do

这是非常困难去做到的

because of our structures.

因为我们的政府结构。

The first thing we need to change

我们需要改变的第一件事

is the structures of our government.

就是我们政府的结构。

Very, very sadly,

非常非常可悲的是，

our foreign services, the United Nations,

我们的外交服务，联合国，

the military in these countries

在国外的军队

have very little idea of what's going on.

他们都不知道发生了什么。

The average British soldier is on a tour of only six months;

一个普通的英国士兵的服役只有六个月；

Italian soldiers, on tours of four months;

意大利士兵服役4个月；

the American military, on tours of 12 months.

美国士兵服役12个月。

Diplomats are locked in embassy compounds.

外交官被困在与大使馆的和解当中。

When they go out, they travel in these curious armored vehicles

当他们出来时，他们坐在这些奇怪的装甲车当中

with these somewhat threatening security teams

与在24小时前就准备好

who ready 24 hours in advance

告知你只能在周边待上一小时

who say you can only stay on the ground for an hour.

的这些有点让人感到恐吓的安全部队随行在一起。

In the British embassy in Afghanistan

英国驻阿富汗大使馆

in 2008,

在2008年，

an embassy of 350 people,

350人的大使馆

there were only three people who could speak Dari,

只有3个人可以像样的说达利语，

the main language of Afghanistan, at a decent level.

而达利语是阿富汗的主要语言。

And there was not a single Pashto speaker.

而且没有一个说普什图语的人。

In the Afghan section in London

在伦敦的对阿富汗机构

responsible for governing Afghan policy on the ground,

它们是负责控制在阿富汗地面政策的，

I was told last year

去年有人告诉我

that there was not a single staff member

那个对外机构

of the foreign office in that section

没有一个人

who had ever served

曾经在

on a posting in Afghanistan.

阿富汗服役过。

So we need to change that institutional culture.

所以我们需要改变这种制度文化。

And I could make the same points about the United States

同时我可以对美国

and the United Nations.

和联合国提出相同的观点。

Secondly, we need to aim off of the optimism of the generals.

其次，我们需要将目标瞄准在那些将军身上的乐观面。

We need to make sure that we're a little bit suspicious,

我们需要确定我们要有多疑的态度，

that we understand that optimism

我们理解乐观

is in the DNA of the military,

是随军队的DNA而来的，

that we don't respond to it

但我们不

with quite as much alacrity.

那样乐观地回应他们。

And thirdly, we need to have some humility.

第三，我们需要有谦卑之心。

We need to begin from the position

我们需要从

that our knowledge, our power,

我们的知识，权利，

our legitimacy

我们的合法性

is limited.

是有限制的位置开始思考。

This doesn't mean

这并不表示

that intervention around the world is a disaster.

世界各地的干预是一场灾难。

It isn't.

它并不是。

Bosnia and Kosovo

波斯尼亚和科索沃

were signal successes,

它们是显著的成功，

great successes.

极大的成功。

Today when you go to Bosnia

今天，当你去波斯尼亚

it is almost impossible to believe

你将几乎不可能相信

that what we saw in the early 1990s happened.

你在1990年代所看到的一切。

It's almost impossible to believe the progress we've made

你几乎不可能相信我们从

since 1994.

1994年所取得了的进展。

Refugee return,

难民返回，

which the United Nations High Commission for Refugees

联合国难民高级委员会

thought would be extremely unlikely,

认为这是不可能

has largely happened.

但这已经在很大程度上发生了。

A million properties have been returned.

一百万财产被退还。

Borders between the Bosniak territory

在波斯尼亚人领地和

and the Bosnian-Serb territory have calmed down.

波斯尼亚-塞尔维亚人领地的边界平静了下来。

The national army has shrunk.

国家军队已经缩小。

The crime rates in Bosnia today

现波斯尼亚的犯罪率

are lower than they are in Sweden.

已经比瑞典的还要低。

This has been done

这些成就都是

by an incredible, principled effort

通过令人难以置信的、原则性的努力

by the international community,

通过国际社会的帮助，

and, of course, above all,

当然，最重要的是

by Bosnians themselves.

通过波斯尼亚人自己创造的。

But you need to look at context.

但是你需要看看周围的环境。

And this is what we've lost in Afghanistan and Iraq.

这些都是我们在阿富汗和伊拉克已经失去的。

You need to understand that in those places

我们需要去理解在这些地方

what really mattered

什么是真正重要的

was, firstly, the role of Tudman and Milosevic

首先Tudman和米洛舍维奇

in coming to the agreement,

达成了协议，

and then the fact those men went,

然后事实上，那些军队撤了，

that the regional situation improved,

地区形势改善，

that the European Union could offer Bosnia

欧盟可以给波斯尼亚提供

something extraordinary:

一些不同寻常的东西：

the chance to be part

一个机会去成为

of a new thing, a new club,

一个新事物，新团体的一部分，

a chance to join something bigger.

一个机会去加入一些更大的事情。

And finally, we need to understand that in Bosnia and Kosovo,

最终，我们需要明白在波斯尼亚和科索沃，

a lot of the secret of what we did,

我们所做的秘密

a lot of the secret of our success,

我们成功的秘密，

was our humility --

是我们的谦卑之心--

was the tentative nature of our engagement.

是我们与生俱来的承诺。

We criticized people a lot in Bosnia

我们因为相当缓慢地处理战犯的事

for being quite slow to take on war criminals.

而批评在波斯尼亚的人们。

We criticized them

我们因为太缓慢地返回难民的事

for being quite slow to return refugees.

也批评他们。

But that slowness, that caution,

但是这种缓慢，这种谨慎，

the fact that President Clinton initially said

事实上如同克林顿总统一开始说过

that American troops would only be deployed for a year,

美国军队只会在那里部署一年，

turned out to be a strength,

这都转化为一种力量，

and it helped us to put our priorities right.

它帮助我们纠正我们的优先权利。

One of the saddest things

关于我们参与阿富汗事件

about our involvement in Afghanistan

最让人难过的事情之一

is that we've got our priorities out of sync.

就是我们把我们的优先权脱离了正规。

We're not matching our resources to our priorities.

我们不匹配我们的资源和我们的优先权。

Because if what we're interested in is terrorism,

因为如果我们感兴趣的是恐怖主义，

Pakistan is far more important than Afghanistan.

巴基斯坦比阿富汗要重要的多。

If what we're interested in is regional stability,

如果我们感兴趣的是地区稳定，

Egypt is far more important.

埃及要重要的多。

If what we're worried about is poverty and development,

如果我们都很担心是贫困和发展，

sub-Saharan Africa is far more important.

撒哈拉以南的非洲要重要的多。

This doesn't mean that Afghanistan doesn't matter,

这并不是说阿富汗不重要，

but that it's one of 40 countries in the world

但它只是世界上40个

with which we need to engage.

需要我们帮助的国家之一、

So if I can finish with a metaphor for intervention,

所以如果我们可以以一个关于干预的隐喻作为结尾，

what we need to think of

我们需要思考地是

is something like mountain rescue.

有点像山峰紧急救援。

Why mountain rescue?

为什么是山峰紧急救援呢？

Because when people talk about intervention,

因为当人们谈干预时，

they imagine that some scientific theory --

他们认为一些科学的理论依据--

the Rand Corporation goes around

围绕着兰德集团

counting 43 previous insurgencies

计算43个已有的叛乱

producing mathematical formula

造出数学公式

saying you need one trained counter-insurgent

说你需要对每20个人口的成员

for every 20 members of the population.

配有一个训练有素的反叛乱的战士。

This is the wrong way of looking at it.

这是一个错误的方法去看干预。

You need to look at it in the way that you look at mountain rescue.

你需要用你看山地紧急救援的眼光去看它。

When you're doing mountain rescue,

当你在山地紧急救援时，

you don't take a doctorate in mountain rescue,

你不会带一个博士生同行，

you look for somebody who knows the terrain.

而是寻找一个知道地形的人。

It's about context.

这是关于环境的。

You understand that you can prepare,

你知道你是可以做提前准备的，

but the amount of preparation you can do

但你所能做的准备

is limited --

却是有限的。

you can take some water, you can have a map,

你可以带上水，一个地图，

you can have a pack.

你可以有一个背包。

But what really matters

但是真正重要的是

is two kinds of problems --

两种问题--

problems that occur on the mountain

一种在上山时

which you couldn't anticipate,

你不能预料到的问题，

such as, for example, ice on a slope,

例如，坡上的冰，

but which you can get around,

但你可以绕过去，

and problems which you couldn't anticipate

还有一种问题是你没能预料到

and which you can't get around,

并且你不可以绕过去的问题，

like a sudden blizzard or an avalanche

就像突然暴雪或雪崩

or a change in the weather.

或天气突变。

And the key to this

这种问题的解决方法是

is a guide who has been on that mountain,

一个在任何温度

in every temperature,

任何时间

at every period --

都来过这个山的向导--

a guide who, above all,

一个首先

knows when to turn back,

知道当条件不利时

who doesn't press on relentlessly

何时该回头，

when conditions turn against them.

不屈不饶的向导。

What we look for

我们在

in firemen, in climbers, in policemen,

救火员，登山者，警察当中寻找，

and what we should look for in intervention,

关于介入干预，我们需要寻找的

is intelligent risk takers --

是聪明的甘于冒险的人--

not people who plunge blind off a cliff,

不是盲目地深陷于悬崖的人，

not people who jump into a burning room,

不是一头跳进熊熊大火房间里的人，

but who weigh their risks,

而是权衡风险，

weigh their responsibilities.

权衡责任的人。

Because the worst thing we have done in Afghanistan

因为我们在阿富汗做过的最糟的事情

is this idea

就是这个想法：

that failure is not an option.

失败不是一个选项。

It makes failure invisible,

这让失败成为了隐形的，

inconceivable and inevitable.

不可思议的且不可避免的。

And if we can resist

并且如果我们可以

this crazy slogan,

抵抗这些疯狂的标语，

we shall discover --

我们就会发现--

in Egypt, in Syria, in Libya,

在埃及，在叙利亚，在利比亚，

and anywhere else we go in the world --

和世界上任何一个地方--

that if we can often do much less than we pretend,

如果我们可以经常做的比我们假装的要少，

we can do much more than we fear.

我们就可以做的比我们所恐惧的要多。

Thank you very much.

谢谢。

(Applause)

（掌声）

Thank you. Thank you very much.

谢谢。非常感谢。

Thank you. Thank you very much.

谢谢。非常感谢。

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

谢谢。谢谢 谢谢

(Applause)

（掌声）

Thank you.

谢谢

Thank you. Thank you.

谢谢。谢谢

Thank you.

谢谢

(Applause)

（掌声）

Bruno Giussani: Rory, you mentioned Libya at the end.

布鲁诺·朱萨尼：罗里，你在演讲的最后提到了利比亚。

Just briefly, what's your take on the current events there

请大致地讲一下，你对当前在那里发生的事件

and the intervention?

和干预的看法？

Rory Stewart: Okay, I think Libya poses the classic problem.

罗里·斯图尔特：好的，我认为利比亚显示了一个很传统的问题。

The problem in Libya

在利比亚的问题

is that we are always pushing for the black or white.

是我们总是争取不是黑就是白。

We imagine there are only two choices:

我们想象一下只有两种选择：

either full engagement and troop deployment

要不全部投入和部署军队

or total isolation.

要不就完全孤立起来。

And we are always being tempted up to our neck.

但是无论我们如何选择。

We put our toes in and we go up to our neck.

我们都无法得到最好的结果。

What we should have done in Libya

我们在利比亚应当做的是

is we should have stuck to the U.N. resolution.

我们应该坚持联合国的决议。

We should have limited ourselves very, very strictly

我们应该非常、非常的严格限制我们自己

to the protection of the civilian population in Benghazi.

去保护在班加西的平民。

We could have done that.

我们应该这样做。

We set up a no-fly zone within 48 hours

我们在48小时之内建立了禁飞区

because Gaddafi had no planes

因为卡扎菲Gaddafi在48小时之内

within 48 hours.

没有飞机。

Instead of which, we've allowed ourselves to be tempted

相反的，我们允许我们自己受到

towards regime change.

对政权变更的诱惑。

In doing so, we've destroyed our credibility with the Security Council,

在这样做时，我们已经摧毁了我们与联合国安理会的信誉

which means it's very difficult

这也说明这是非常困难

to get a resolution on Syria,

去找到一个叙利亚的解决方案，

and we're setting ourselves up again for failure.

并且我们让自己又一次失败了。

Once more, humility,

再一次，谦卑，

limits, honesty,

极限，诚实，

realistic expectations

切实的期望

and we could have achieved something to be proud of.

以及我们可以做到值得骄傲的事。

BG: Rory, thank you very much.

BG：罗里，非常感谢。

RS: Thank you. (BG: Thank you.)

RS：谢谢！（BG：谢谢）