Rory Stewart: Time to end the war in Afghanistan

譯者: Vicky Chen 審譯者: Ann Lee

The question today is not:

今天的問題不是:

Why did we invade Afghanistan?

我們為什麼侵略阿富汗?

The question is:

而是

why are we still in Afghanistan

我們為什麼還待在那裡?

one decade later?

十年之後?

Why are we spending

我們為什麼要花

$135 billion?

135億美元

Why have we got 130,000 troops on the ground?

我們為什麼要有13萬軍隊部屬在戰爭現場

Why were more people killed

為什麼有更多人死去

last month

上個月

than in any preceding month

比之前任何一個月都多

of this conflict?

因為這個戰爭?

How has this happened?

為什麼會這樣?

The last 20 years

最後20年

has been the age of intervention,

是干預的年代

and Afghanistan is simply one act

而阿富汗只是其中一個行動

in a five-act tragedy.

在一個接連5個行動的悲劇

We came out of the end of the Cold War

我們絕望地從冷戰末期

in despair.

走出

We faced Rwanda;

我們面對過盧安達(種族)大屠殺

we faced Bosnia,

我們面對波士尼亞(瑟布雷尼卡)屠殺事件

and then we rediscovered our confidence.

然後我們重拾信心

In the third act, we went into Bosnia and Kosovo

在第三個行動中，我們進入波士尼亞和科索沃

and we seemed to succeed.

最終我們似乎成功了

In the fourth act, with our hubris,

在第四個行動中，我們以驕傲的心態，

our overconfidence developing,

變得越來越過度自信

we invaded Iraq and Afghanistan,

我們侵略了伊拉克和阿富汗

and in the fifth act,

在第五個行動中

we plunged into a humiliating mess.

我們慘陷令人不堪的泥诏

So the question is: What are we doing?

所以，我們在幹嘛?

Why are we still stuck in Afghanistan?

為什麼我們還陷在阿富汗?

And the answer, of course,

當然這個答案

that we keep being given

提供我們的一直是

is as follows:

如下

we're told that we went into Afghanistan

我們被告知去阿富汗

because of 9/11,

是因為911恐怖攻擊

and that we remain there

而我們之所以還待在這裡

because the Taliban poses an existential threat

是因為塔利班的存在

to global security.

對全球安全帶來了威脅

In the words of President Obama,

歐巴馬總統多次談到

"If the Taliban take over again,

如果塔利班捲土重來

they will invite back Al-Qaeda,

他們將會迎回蓋達組織

who will try to kill as many of our people

這組織將盡他們所能

as they possibly can."

試著殺死我們的人民

The story that we're told

我們被告知的說法

is that there was a "light footprint" initially --

是我們最初只是輕輕地踏上那土地

in other words, that we ended up in a situation

換句話說，我們的結局反而造成了

where we didn't have enough troops,

我們並沒有足夠的軍力

we didn't have enough resources,

我們沒有足夠的資源

that Afghans were frustrated --

使阿富汗人民很沮喪

they felt there wasn't enough progress

他們感覺不到足夠的進展

and economic development and security,

經濟發展和安全

and therefore the Taliban came back --

因此塔利班才會回來

that we responded in 2005 and 2006

2005年和2006年之間

with troop deployments,

我們部屬了軍隊

but we still didn't put enough troops on the ground.

但數量依然不足夠

And that it wasn't until 2009,

一直到2009年

when President Obama signed off on a surge,

當歐巴馬總統在波濤洶湧的情勢下批准後

that we finally had,

我們才終於有了

in the words of Secretary Clinton,

套句美國國務卿希拉克林頓的話

"the strategy, the leadership and the resources."

策略，領導精神和資源

So, as the president now reassures us,

所以，當總統又再次向我們保證

we are on track to achieve our goals.

我們正走在實現目標的正軌上時

All of this is wrong.

這些都是錯的

Every one of those statements is wrong.

那些陳素也都是錯的

Afghanistan does not

阿富汗並不是

pose an existential threat

對全球安全來說

to global security.

並不是個威脅

It is extremely unlikely

根本不可能

the Taliban would ever be able to take over the country --

塔利班能夠再次接管這個國家

extremely unlikely they'd be able to seize Kabul.

他們更不可能能夠佔領喀布爾

They simply don't have a conventional military option.

她們就是沒有一個傳統的軍隊選擇

And even if they were able to do so, even if I'm wrong,

即使她們能夠這樣做，即使我錯了

it's extremely unlikely

依然不太可能

the Taliban would invite back Al-Qaeda.

塔利班會迎回蓋達組織

From the Taliban's point of view,

從塔利班的角度來看，

that was their number one mistake last time.

上次是他們犯過最大的錯誤

If they hadn't invited back Al-Qaeda,

如果他們沒有贏回蓋達組織

they would still be in power today.

他們今天就應該還會掌權

And even if I'm wrong about those two things,

即使我對這兩件事的看法都錯了

even if they were able to take back the country,

即使她們可以奪回國家

even if they were to invite back Al-Qaeda,

即使他們會迎回蓋達組織

it's extremely unlikely

還是非常不可能

that Al-Qaeda would significantly enhance

蓋達組織會顯著地強大

its ability to harm the United States

傷害美國的能力

or harm Europe.

或傷害英國

Because this isn't the 1990s anymore.

因為現在已經不是1990年代了

If the Al-Qaeda base

如果蓋達組織基地

was to be established near Ghazni,

會蓋在加茲尼附近

we would hit them very hard,

我們會猛烈攻擊他們

and it would be very, very difficult

那將會非常困難

for the Taliban to protect them.

要保護他們的話

Furthermore, it's simply not true

那完全不是事實

that what went wrong in Afghanistan

在阿富汗造成的錯誤

is the light footprint.

只是輕微的影響

In my experience, in fact,

事實上，就我經驗談

the light footprint was extremely helpful.

這個輕微影響其實很有幫助

And these troops that we brought in --

而那些我們帶進去的軍隊

it's a great picture of David Beckham

這是一張貝克漢的照片

there on the sub-machine gun --

拿著衝鋒槍

made the situation worse, not better.

這使情況更糟，沒有更好

When I walked across Afghanistan

當我行走阿富汗時

in the winter of 2001-2002,

在2001和2002年間的冬天

what I saw was scenes like this.

我看到的是像這樣的場景

A girl, if you're lucky,

如果你夠幸運，一個女孩

in the corner of a dark room --

在昏暗房間的角落裡

lucky to be able to look at the Koran.

幸運地能夠看著可蘭經

But in those early days

但是在早些日子那時

when we're told we didn't have enough troops and enough resources,

我們被告知沒有足夠的軍隊和資源

we made a lot of progress in Afghanistan.

我們其實在阿富汗有很大的進展

Within a few months,

在幾個月內

there were two and a half million more girls in school.

學校裡有超過250萬的女孩們就讀

In Sangin where I was sick in 2002,

2002年時我在Sangin病倒了

the nearest health clinic

最近的衛生診所

was within three days walk.

還要走三天的路

Today, there are 14 health clinics

今天，有14個衛生珍所

in that area alone.

單單在那個區域

There was amazing improvements.

那時其實有驚人的改善

We went from almost no Afghans

我們從幾乎沒有阿富汗人

having mobile telephones during the Taliban

在塔利班時期擁有電話

to a situation where, almost overnight,

進展到一個現象，幾乎一夜之間

three million Afghans had mobile telephones.

三百萬阿富汗人擁有手機

And we had progress in the free media.

我們在媒體自由上也有進展

We had progress in elections --

我們在選舉上也有進展

all of this with the so-called light footprint.

這些都是所謂的輕輕踏過

But when we began to bring more money,

但是當我們開始帶來更多金錢

when we began to invest more resources,

開始投資更多資源時

things got worse, not better. How?

事情沒變好卻更糟。 怎麼這樣?

Well first see, if you put 125 billion dollars a year

嗯 首先 如果你一年投入125億元

into a country like Afghanistan

在像阿富汗這樣的國家上

where the entire revenue of the Afghan state

整個國家財政收入

is one billion dollars a year,

一年才一億元

you drown everything.

那就是像石沉大海

It's not simply corruption and waste

你造成的不只是

that you create;

貪汙和浪費

you essentially replace the priorities of the Afghan government,

你根本上替換了阿富汗政府的執政重點

the elected Afghan government,

那個被選出來的政府

with the micromanaging tendencies

而傾向由短期旅居的外國人

of foreigners on short tours

隨著他們的喜好

with their own priorities.

管東管西

And the same is true for the troops.

對軍隊來說也是這樣

When I walked across Afghanistan,

當我行走阿富汗時

I stayed with people like this.

我借住在這樣的人家裡

This is Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj.

這位是指揮官 Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj

Commandant Haji Malem Mohsin Khan of Kamenj was a great host.

他是一位很讚的東家

He was very generous,

非常大方

like many of the Afghans I stayed with.

就像我借住過的很多阿富汗人一樣

But he was also considerably more conservative,

但他相對來說也比較保守

considerably more anti-foreign,

比較仇外

considerably more Islamist

比較伊斯蘭基本教義派

than we'd like to acknowledge.

比起我們認為的

This man, for example, Mullah Mustafa,

譬如說 這個人Mullah Mustafa

tried to shoot me.

想要射殺我

And the reason I'm looking a little bit perplexed in this photograph

我之所以在照片裡看來有點迷茫

is I was somewhat frightened,

是因為我有點被嚇到

and I was too afraid on this occasion

而且我在這樣的場合下太害怕

to ask him, having run for an hour through the desert

問他 在我在沙漠中跑了一小時後

and taken refuge in this house,

終於在這屋裡可以避難後

why he had turned up and wanted to have his photograph taken with me.

為什麼他突然要和我合照

But 18 months later, I asked him

但18個月後，我問他

why he had tried to shoot me.

為什麼他要射殺我

And Mullah Mustafa -- he's the man with the pen and paper --

Mullah Mustafa 拿著筆和紙的那個人

explained that the man sitting immediately to the left as you look at the photograph,

解釋坐在照片左邊的那個人

Nadir Shah

Nadir Shah

had bet him that he couldn't hit me.

和他打賭他不敢打我

Now this is not to say

我的意思不是說

Afghanistan is a place full of people like Mullah Mustafa.

在阿富汗都是像Nadir Shah這樣的人

It's not; it's a wonderful place

不是 它是一個好地方

full of incredible energy and intelligence.

充滿著難以置信的能量和智慧

But it is a place

但是這個地方

where the putting-in of the troops

部屬軍隊

has increased the violence rather than decreased it.

只會增加暴力而不是減少

2005, Anthony Fitzherbert,

2005年時 Anthony Fitzherbert

an agricultural engineer,

一個農業工程師

could travel through Helmand,

可以旅經爾曼德

could stay in Nad Ali, Sangin and Ghoresh,

可以待在奈德阿里Sangin 和Ghoresh

which are now the names of villages where fighting is taking place.

但現在那些村莊戰爭正在進行

Today, he could never do that.

現在他再也不能這樣做了

So the idea that we deployed the troops

所以我們想部屬軍隊

to respond to the Taliban insurgency

來回應塔利班的暴亂

is mistaken.

是錯的

Rather than preceding the insurgency,

不但沒有早於暴亂發生之前

the Taliban followed the troop deployment,

塔利班還接著軍隊部屬後而來

and as far as I'm concerned,

就我所知

the troop deployment caused their return.

軍對部屬導致他們重返

Now is this a new idea?

難道這是個新的想法嗎?

No, there have been any number of people

不，在過去七年裡

saying this over the last seven years.

很多人一直提出這個想法

I ran a center at Harvard

我在哈佛主持一個中心

from 2008 to 2010,

從2008到2010年間

and there were people like Michael Semple there

那裡有像Michael Semple

who speak Afghan languages fluently,

會一口流利阿富汗語的人

who've traveled to almost every district in the country.

幾乎去過整個國家的每一區

Andrew Wilder, for example,

比如說Andrew Wilder

born on the Pakistan-Iranian border,

他出生在巴基斯坦和伊朗的邊界

served his whole life

把他的一生都奉獻

in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

於巴基斯坦和阿富汗

Paul Fishstein who began working there in 1978 --

像從1978年就在那裡工作的Paul Fishstein

worked for Save the Children,

是為了拯救孩童

ran the Afghan research and evaluation unit.

他主持阿富汗研究和評估單位

These are people

這些人

who were able to say consistently

可以肯定一貫地說

that the increase in development aid

發展援助的增加

was making Afghanistan less secure, not more secure --

讓阿富汗更不安全而不是更安全

that the counter-insurgency strategy

而且反暴動策略

was not working and would not work.

不但過去無效也不可能有效

And yet, nobody listened to them.

但是卻沒人聽得進去

Instead,

反之

there was a litany of astonishing optimism.

卻有一連串驚人的樂觀主義出現

Beginning in 2004,

從膽2004開始

every general came in saying,

每個將軍都說

"I've inherited a dismal situation,

我承接著了一個慘淡的局勢

but finally I have the right resources and the correct strategy,

但終於有了對的資源和正確的策略

which will deliver,"

將帶來

in General Barno's word in 2004,

套一句Barno將軍在2004年的話

the "decisive year."

決定性的一 年

Well guess what? It didn't.

你猜怎麼著? 那並沒有發生。

But it wasn't sufficient to prevent General Abuzaid saying

但這並足夠阻止General Abuzaid說

that he had the strategy and the resources

他有策略和資源

to deliver, in 2005,

在2005年帶來

the "decisive year."

決定性的一年

Or General David Richards to come in 2006

或在2006年 阻止General David Richards

and say he had the strategy and the resources

說他有策略和資源

to deliver the "crunch year."

帶來緊縮的一年

Or in 2007,

或是2007時

the Norwegian deputy foreign minister, Espen Eide,

挪威外交部長代表Espen Eide

to say that that would deliver the "decisive year."

說的即將帶來決定性的一年

Or in 2008, Major General Champoux

或是2008年時 少將 Champoux

to come in and say he would deliver the "decisive year."

說他會帶來決定性的一年

Or in 2009, my great friend,

或2009年 我的好朋友

General Stanley McChrystal,

Stanley McChrystal將軍

who said that he was "knee-deep in the decisive year."

他身處決定性的一年裡

Or in 2010,

或2010年

the U.K. foreign secretary, David Miliband,

英國外交部長David Miliband

who said that at last we would deliver the "decisive year."

說我們終於將帶來決定性的一年

And you'll be delighted to hear in 2011, today,

你會很開心聽到2011年的今天

that Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister,

德國的外交部長 Guido Westerwelle

assures us that we are in the "decisive year."

向我們保證今年是決定性的一年

(Applause)

(掌聲)

How do we allow

我們怎能容許

any of this to happen?

這些發生

Well the answer, of course, is,

答案當然是

if you spend 125 billion or 130 billion

如果你每年花125億或130億美元

dollars a year in a country,

在一個國家上

you co-opt almost everybody.

你幾乎吸收了每個人

Even the aid agencies,

甚至援助機構

who begin to receive an enormous amount of money

他們開始收到一大筆錢

from the U.S. and the European governments

來自美國和英國政府

to build schools and clinics,

用來蓋學校和診所

are somewhat disinclined

他們不太願意

to challenge the idea

挑戰這個阿富汗是

that Afghanistan is an existential threat

是對全球安全的一個存在威脅

to global security.

的想法

They're worried, in other words,

換句話說 他們擔心

that if anybody believes that it wasn't such a threat --

如果有人相信其實阿富汗不具有如此威脅性

Oxfam, Save the Children

樂施會，拯救孩童

wouldn't get the money

就不能得到錢

to build their hospitals and schools.

來建造醫院和學校

It's also very difficult to confront a general

要對抗一個胸上有獎牌的上將

with medals on his chest.

也是非常難的

It's very difficult for a politician,

對一個政治人物來說非常困難

because you're afraid that many lives have been lost in vain.

因為你害怕太多生命已經徒勞犧牲

You feel deep, deep guilt.

你感到愧疚萬分

You exaggerate your fears,

你誇大了恐懼

and you're terrified about the humiliation

而且你被失敗的羞辱嚇死了

of defeat.

嚇死了

What is the solution to this?

這個解決方法是什麼呢?

Well the solution to this

解決方法就是

is we need to find a way

我們需要找到一個方法

that people like Michael Semple, or those other people,

讓像Michael Semple的人或其它那些人

who are telling the truth, who know the country,

那些說真話，了解這個國家

who've spent 30 years on the ground --

那些花了30年在現場

and most importantly of all,

最重要的是

the missing component of this --

這件事情少了的部分

Afghans themselves,

阿富汗人他們自己

who understand what is going on.

他們才了解正在發生什麼

We need to somehow get their message

我們必須想辦法讓他們的訊息

to the policymakers.

傳給立法者知道

And this is very difficult to do

因為我們的結構

because of our structures.

這很難辦到

The first thing we need to change

首要改變的是

is the structures of our government.

我們政府的結構

Very, very sadly,

令人很難過的是

our foreign services, the United Nations,

我們的外國服務，聯合國

the military in these countries

這些國家的軍隊

have very little idea of what's going on.

不甚了解發生了甚麼事

The average British soldier is on a tour of only six months;

英國軍人平均巡迴阿富汗六個月

Italian soldiers, on tours of four months;

義大利軍人四個月

the American military, on tours of 12 months.

美國軍人12個月

Diplomats are locked in embassy compounds.

外交官被關在大使館圍牆裡

When they go out, they travel in these curious armored vehicles

就算他們出去，也是躲在奇怪的裝甲車裡

with these somewhat threatening security teams

帶著這些有些嚇人的安防隊伍

who ready 24 hours in advance

每天24小時前就準備好

who say you can only stay on the ground for an hour.

說你只能現場待一小時

In the British embassy in Afghanistan

阿富汗的英國大使館裡

in 2008,

2008年時

an embassy of 350 people,

在350個人的大使管理

there were only three people who could speak Dari,

只有3個人可以說像樣程度的Dari語

the main language of Afghanistan, at a decent level.

阿富汗的主要語言

And there was not a single Pashto speaker.

沒有一個說Pashto語的人

In the Afghan section in London

在倫敦的阿富汗區

responsible for governing Afghan policy on the ground,

負責治理阿富汗現場的政策

I was told last year

去年我被告知

that there was not a single staff member

在那一個外交辦公室的組別裡

of the foreign office in that section

沒有任何一個組員

who had ever served

曾經用阿富汗語

on a posting in Afghanistan.

張貼過任何消息

So we need to change that institutional culture.

所以我們必須改變那個體制文化

And I could make the same points about the United States

對美國和聯合國來說

and the United Nations.

我講得也是有道理的

Secondly, we need to aim off of the optimism of the generals.

第二，我們必須把目標從那些上將的樂觀主義上轉移

We need to make sure that we're a little bit suspicious,

我們必須確定我們有些多疑

that we understand that optimism

我們知道樂觀

is in the DNA of the military,

是軍人基因中與生俱來的

that we don't respond to it

我們不能太敏捷

with quite as much alacrity.

地回應它

And thirdly, we need to have some humility.

第三，我們必須謙虛一點

We need to begin from the position

我們必須從了解到

that our knowledge, our power,

我們的知識，力量

our legitimacy

和合法性

is limited.

是有限的定位出發

This doesn't mean

這並不是指

that intervention around the world is a disaster.

干預國際事務是個災難

It isn't.

不是

Bosnia and Kosovo

波士尼亞和科索沃

were signal successes,

是成功的信號

great successes.

偉大的成功

Today when you go to Bosnia

如果你現在去波士尼亞

it is almost impossible to believe

你幾乎不會相信

that what we saw in the early 1990s happened.

我們在1990年代看到

It's almost impossible to believe the progress we've made

以及自從1994年來我們促進的發展

since 1994.

發生過

Refugee return,

難民回來了

which the United Nations High Commission for Refugees

這是聯合國難民屬

thought would be extremely unlikely,

覺得極不可能發生的

has largely happened.

竟然大大的發生了

A million properties have been returned.

一百萬個檔案資料已經被送回

Borders between the Bosniak territory

在波士尼亞領土附近的邊界

and the Bosnian-Serb territory have calmed down.

以及波士尼亞和賽爾維亞邊界的情勢已經安定下來

The national army has shrunk.

播士尼亞國軍已經縮減

The crime rates in Bosnia today

現在波士尼亞的犯罪率

are lower than they are in Sweden.

比瑞典還低

This has been done

這全靠

by an incredible, principled effort

驚人 有紀律的努力

by the international community,

以及國際社會

and, of course, above all,

當然最重要的是

by Bosnians themselves.

波士尼亞人們自己才能辦到

But you need to look at context.

但是必須要知道事情前後脈絡

And this is what we've lost in Afghanistan and Iraq.

這是我們在阿富汗和伊拉克所喪失的

You need to understand that in those places

你必須知道在那些地方

what really mattered

真正重要的

was, firstly, the role of Tudman and Milosevic

首先是圖季曼和米洛舍維奇的角色

in coming to the agreement,

能夠達成協議

and then the fact those men went,

以及那些人真的去了

that the regional situation improved,

區域的情勢改善了

that the European Union could offer Bosnia

歐盟也提供波士尼亞

something extraordinary:

很棒的東西

the chance to be part

那個可以成為

of a new thing, a new club,

一個新東西，一個新社團

a chance to join something bigger.

可以加入一個更大的團體的機會

And finally, we need to understand that in Bosnia and Kosovo,

最後，我們必須了解在波士尼亞和科索沃

a lot of the secret of what we did,

我們所做得絕大秘密

a lot of the secret of our success,

我們成功的絕大秘密

was our humility --

都功歸於我們的謙虛

was the tentative nature of our engagement.

和我們試驗性的參與天性

We criticized people a lot in Bosnia

我們在波士尼亞批評了很多人

for being quite slow to take on war criminals.

太慢與戰爭罪人對抗

We criticized them

批評他們

for being quite slow to return refugees.

太慢送回難民

But that slowness, that caution,

但是那個慢速度，那個慎重

the fact that President Clinton initially said

柯林頓總統最初說的事實

that American troops would only be deployed for a year,

美國軍隊只會部屬一年

turned out to be a strength,

結果變成我們的強處

and it helped us to put our priorities right.

幫助我們放對重點

One of the saddest things

在我們涉入阿富汗事件中

about our involvement in Afghanistan

最可悲的事情

is that we've got our priorities out of sync.

就是我們的重點沒做到同步

We're not matching our resources to our priorities.

我們並沒有把資源運用在我們的重點上

Because if what we're interested in is terrorism,

因為如果我們關心恐怖主義

Pakistan is far more important than Afghanistan.

巴基斯坦比阿富汗重要得多了

If what we're interested in is regional stability,

如果我們關心的是區域性的穩定

Egypt is far more important.

埃及重要得多了

If what we're worried about is poverty and development,

如果我們擔心的是貧窮和發展

sub-Saharan Africa is far more important.

次撒哈拉非洲地區重要得多了

This doesn't mean that Afghanistan doesn't matter,

這並不是說阿富汗不重要

but that it's one of 40 countries in the world

但只是世界上40個國家中

with which we need to engage.

我們需要參與其中的其中之一

So if I can finish with a metaphor for intervention,

所以如果用一個比喻來說干預這件事

what we need to think of

我們需要想到的是

is something like mountain rescue.

像山區救援這樣的事情

Why mountain rescue?

為什麼呢

Because when people talk about intervention,

因為當人們談到干預

they imagine that some scientific theory --

他們認為某些蘭德公司

the Rand Corporation goes around

做的科學理論

counting 43 previous insurgencies

把之前43起叛亂

producing mathematical formula

算出一個公式

saying you need one trained counter-insurgent

告訴你你需要一個訓練好的反叛亂行動

for every 20 members of the population.

給人口中每20個人一個

This is the wrong way of looking at it.

這是錯誤的看法

You need to look at it in the way that you look at mountain rescue.

你需要像看山區救援那樣看待它

When you're doing mountain rescue,

當你進行山區救援時

you don't take a doctorate in mountain rescue,

你不需要博士學位才行

you look for somebody who knows the terrain.

你要找一個瞭解地勢的人

It's about context.

這和背景有關

You understand that you can prepare,

你知道可以準備

but the amount of preparation you can do

但你能做的準備

is limited --

有限

you can take some water, you can have a map,

你可以帶些水，帶個地圖

you can have a pack.

你可以準備一個包包

But what really matters

但真的重要的是

is two kinds of problems --

兩種問題

problems that occur on the mountain

山裡會發生的問題

which you couldn't anticipate,

而你預料不到

such as, for example, ice on a slope,

例如像是坡上的冰

but which you can get around,

但你還可以逃開

and problems which you couldn't anticipate

以及預料不到

and which you can't get around,

又逃不開的問題

like a sudden blizzard or an avalanche

像突然的暴風雪和雪崩

or a change in the weather.

或是天氣驟變

And the key to this

對此的解決之道

is a guide who has been on that mountain,

就是一個曾經在山上

in every temperature,

待過各種氣候

at every period --

任何時間的嚮導

a guide who, above all,

最重要的是， 一個

knows when to turn back,

知道什麼時候該回頭

who doesn't press on relentlessly

當情勢轉劣時不會堅持前進

when conditions turn against them.

的嚮導

What we look for

我們從

in firemen, in climbers, in policemen,

消防員，登山員和警察

and what we should look for in intervention,

以及應該從干預中找的

is intelligent risk takers --

是聰明的冒險者

not people who plunge blind off a cliff,

不是盲目跳下懸崖的人

not people who jump into a burning room,

不是跳進火坑的人

but who weigh their risks,

而是會衡量風險

weigh their responsibilities.

衡量她們的責任

Because the worst thing we have done in Afghanistan

因為我們在阿富汗做過最糟的事

is this idea

就是抱著

that failure is not an option.

沒有失敗的選擇的想法

It makes failure invisible,

這使失敗隱形了

inconceivable and inevitable.

無法想像且無可避免

And if we can resist

如果我們能抵抗

this crazy slogan,

這個瘋狂口號

we shall discover --

我們會發現

in Egypt, in Syria, in Libya,

在埃及 敘利亞 利比亞

and anywhere else we go in the world --

以及世界上任何其他國家

that if we can often do much less than we pretend,

如果我們能卸去偽裝

we can do much more than we fear.

我們就能無畏地做得更多

Thank you very much.

非常感謝你們

(Applause)

(掌聲)

Thank you. Thank you very much.

謝謝。謝謝你們。

Thank you. Thank you very much.

謝謝，謝謝你們。

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

謝謝你們謝謝你們謝謝你們

(Applause)

(掌聲)

Thank you.

謝謝你們

Thank you. Thank you.

謝謝你們謝謝你們

Thank you.

謝謝你們

(Applause)

(掌聲)

Bruno Giussani: Rory, you mentioned Libya at the end.

Bruno Giussani: Rory你最後提到利比亞

Just briefly, what's your take on the current events there

簡短說一下，你對現今在那裏發生的事情的想法

and the intervention?

還有那邊的干預

Rory Stewart: Okay, I think Libya poses the classic problem.

好 我認為利比亞構成一個經典的問題

The problem in Libya

利比亞的問題

is that we are always pushing for the black or white.

是我們總是在推動黑人或白人

We imagine there are only two choices:

我們以為只有兩個選擇

either full engagement and troop deployment

不是全心投入部屬軍隊

or total isolation.

就是完全與之隔離

And we are always being tempted up to our neck.

我們總是對誘惑動心萬分

We put our toes in and we go up to our neck.

我們踏進泥诏然後滿身泥濘出來

What we should have done in Libya

我們在利比亞應該做的是

is we should have stuck to the U.N. resolution.

我們應該謹守聯合國的決議

We should have limited ourselves very, very strictly

我們應該嚴格限制自己

to the protection of the civilian population in Benghazi.

只要保護班加西的平民

We could have done that.

我們應該早就做得到

We set up a no-fly zone within 48 hours

我們設立一個48小時內無飛機的區域

because Gaddafi had no planes

因為格達費48小時內

within 48 hours.

沒有飛機

Instead of which, we've allowed ourselves to be tempted

反之，我們允許自己被誘惑

towards regime change.

想改變政權

In doing so, we've destroyed our credibility with the Security Council,

因為這樣，我們已經摧毀安全理事會對我們的信任

which means it's very difficult

這使得

to get a resolution on Syria,

對敘利亞的決議非常困難

and we're setting ourselves up again for failure.

而且我們又再次邁向自己設好的失敗

Once more, humility,

我再重申一次 謙虛

limits, honesty,

限制 誠實

realistic expectations

實際的期望

and we could have achieved something to be proud of.

那我們就能做到值得驕傲的事情

BG: Rory, thank you very much.

Rory非常謝謝你

RS: Thank you. (BG: Thank you.)

謝謝 謝謝