Trita Parsi: Iran and Israel: Peace is possible

Prevodilac: Stefan Zrnović Lektor: Mile Živković

"Iran is Israel's best friend,

"Iran je Izraelov najbolji prijatelj,

and we do not intend to change our position

i ne nameravamo da menjamo svoju poziciju

in relation to Tehran."

prema Teheranu."

Believe it or not, this is a quote

Verovali ili ne, ovo je izjava

from an Israeli prime minister,

izraelskog predsednika Vlade,

but it's not Ben-Gurion or Golda Meir

ali to nije Ben Gurio ili Golda Meir

from the era of the Shah.

iz vremena Šaha.

It's actually from Yitzhak Rabin.

Već zapravo od Jicaka Rabina.

The year is 1987.

Godina je 1987.

Ayatollah Khomeini is still alive,

Ajatolah Komeini je još uvek živ,

and much like Ahmadinejad today,

i poput Ahamdinedžada danas,

he's using the worst rhetoric against Israel.

koristio je najgoru retoriku protiv Izraela.

Yet, Rabin referred to Iran

Ipak, Rabin je o Iranu govorio

as a geostrategic friend.

kao o geostrateškom prijatelju.

Today, when we hear the threats of war

Danas, kada čujemo pretnje ratom

and the high rhetoric,

i visoku retoriku

we're oftentimes led to believe

često smo vođeni verovanjem

that this is yet another one of those unsolvable

da je ovo još jedan od nerešivih

Middle Eastern conflicts

bliskoistočnih konflikata

with roots as old as the region itself.

sa korenima starim koliko i sama regija.

Nothing could be further from the truth,

Ništa ne može da bude dalje od istine,

and I hope today to show you why that is.

i nadam se da ću vam pokazati danas i zašto.

The relations between the Iranian and the Jewish people

Veza između iranskog i jevrejskog naroda

throughout history has actually been quite positive,

bila je prilično pozitivna kroz istoriju,

starting in 539 B.C.,

datirajući od 539. godine p.n.e;

when King Cyrus the Great of Persia

kada je Kir Veliki od Persije

liberated the Jewish people from their Babylonian captivity.

oslobodio jeverejski narod od svojih vavilonskih robovlasnika.

A third of the Jewish population

Trećina jevrejske populacije

stayed in Babylonia.

ostala je u Vavilonu.

They're today's Iraqi Jews.

Oni su današnji irački Jevreji.

A third migrated to Persia.

Trećina je migrirala u Persiju.

They're today's Iranian Jews,

Oni su današnji iranski Jevreji,

still 25,000 of them living in Iran,

i dalje 25 000 njih živi u Iranu,

making them the largest Jewish community

čineći najveću jevrejsku zajednicu,

in the Middle East outside of Israel itself.

na Bliskom istoku van samog Izraela.

And a third returned to historic Palestine,

I trećina se vratila u istorijsku Palestinu

did the second rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem,

i izvršila drugu dogradnju hrama u Jerusalimu

financed, incidentally, by Persian tax money.

finanisranog, slučajno, persijskim porezom.

But even in modern times,

Ali čak u modernim vremenima,

relations have been close at times.

veze su se vremenom jačale.

Rabin's statement was a reflection

Rabinova izjava bila je prikaz

of decades of security and intelligence collaboration

decenija saradnje bezbednosnih i obaveštajnih službi

between the two, which in turn

između dve države, koja je zauzvrat

was born out of perception of common threats.

stvorena zbog percepcije zajedničkih pretnji.

Both states feared the Soviet Union

Obe strane su strahovale od Sovjetskog saveza

and strong Arab states such as Egypt and Iraq.

i jakih arapskih zemalja poput Egipta i Iraka.

And, in addition, the Israeli doctrine of the periphery,

Kao dodatak, izraelska dokrtina oboda,

the idea that Israel's security was best achieved

ideja da je sigurnost Izraela najbolje postignuta

by creating alliances with the non-Arab states

stvaranjem saveza sa nearapskim zemljama

in the periphery of the region

na obodu regije

in order to balance the Arab states in its vicinity.

u cilju balansiranja arapskih država u svom okruženju.

Now, from the Shah's perspective, though,

Iz Šahove perspektive,

he wanted to keep this as secret as possible,

on je želeo da zadrži ovo u što većoj tajnosti,

so when Yitzhak Rabin, for instance,

tako da kada je Jicak Rabin, na primer,

traveled to Iran in the '70s,

putovao za Iran '70-ih godina,

he usually wore a wig

uglavnom je nosio periku

so that no one would recognize him.

kako ga niko ne bi prepoznao.

The Iranians built a special tarmac

Iračani su napravili posebnu pistu na aerodromu u Teheranu,

at the airport in Tehran, far away from the central terminal,

daleko od centralnog terminala

so that no one would notice the large number

kako niko ne bi primetio veliki broj

of Israeli planes shuttling between Tel Aviv and Tehran.

izraelskih aviona koji preleću između Tel Aviva i Teherana.

Now, did all of this end with the Islamic revolution

Da li se sve ovo završilo islamskom revolucijom

in 1979?

1979. godine?

In spite of the very clear anti-Israeli ideology

Uprkos veoma jasnoj antiizraelskoj ideologiji

of the new regime, the geopolitical logic

novog režima, geopolitička logika

for their collaboration lived on,

za njihovu saradnju nastavila je da živi,

because they still had common threats.

jer su i dalje imali zajedničke pretnje.

And when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980,

Kada je Irak napao Iran 1980. godine,

Israel feared an Iraqi victory

Izrael se plašio pobede Iraka

and actively helped Iran by selling it arms

i aktivno je pomogao Iranu prodajući im oružje

and providing it with spare parts

i dobavljajući im rezervne delove

for Iran's American weaponry

za iračko američko oružje

at a moment when Iran was very vulnerable

u momentu kada je Iran bio veoma osetljiv

because of an American arms embargo

zbog američkog oružanog embarga

that Israel was more than happy to violate.

koji je Izrael bio i više nego srećan da zloupotrebi.

In fact, back in the 1980s,

Zapravo, u 1980-im,

it was Israel that lobbied Washington

Izrael je lobirao za Vašington

to talk to Iran, to sell arms to Iran,

da razgovara sa Iranom, da proda oružje Iranu,

and not pay attention to Iran's anti-Israeli ideology.

i ne obrati pažnju na iransku antiizraelsku ideologiju.

And this, of course, climaxed

I naravno, ovo je rezultiralo

in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s.

iranskim Kontra skandalom 1980-ih.

But with the end of the Cold War

Ali sa krajem Hladnog rata

came also the end of the Israeli-Iranian cold peace.

došao je i kraj izraelsko-iranskog hladnog mira.

Suddenly, the two common threats

Odjednom su dve zajedničke pretnje

that had pushed them closer together throughout decades,

koje su ih približile kroz decenije,

more or less evaporated.

manje ili više isparile.

The Soviet Union collapsed,

Sovjetski Savez se raspao,

Iraq was defeated,

Irak je poražen,

and a new environment was created in the region

i stvoreno je novo okruženje u ovom regionu

in which both of them felt more secure,

u kojem će se obe države osećati sigurnije,

but they were also now left unchecked.

ali su obe završile kao neproverene.

Without Iraq balancing Iran,

Ako Irak ne balansira Iran,

Iran could now become a threat,

Iran bi sada mogao da postane pretnja,

some in Israel argued.

za neke u Izraelu.

In fact, the current dynamic

Zapravo, trenutna dinamika,

that you see between Iran and Israel

koju vidite između Irana i Izraela,

has its roots more so

ima svoje korene više

in the geopolitical reconfiguration of the region

u geopolitičkom restruktuiranju regiona

after the Cold War

nakon Hladnog rata,

than in the events of 1979,

nego u događajima iz 1979. godine,

because at this point, Iran and Israel

jer su se u tom trenutku, Iran i Izrael

emerge as two of the most powerful states in the region,

istakli kao dve najsnažnije zemlje u regionu,

and rather than viewing each other

i umesto da posmatraju jedna drugu

as potential security partners,

kao potencijalnog partnera,

they increasingly came to view each other

sve više su počeli da posmatraju jedni druge

as rivals and competitors.

kao rivale i konkurenciju.

So Israel, who in the 1980s

Izrael, koji je '80-ih

lobbied for and improved U.S.-Iran relations

lobirao i pospešio odnose Sjedinjenih Država i Irana

now feared a U.S.-Iran rapprochement,

sada se uplašio njihovog zbližavanja,

thinking that it would come

misleći da bi to išlo

at Israel's security interests' expense,

na štetu izraelskih sigurnosnih interesa

and instead sought to put Iran

i umesto toga tražio da smesti Iran

in increased isolation.

u povećanu izolaciju.

Ironically, this was happening at a time

Ironično, ovo se dešava u vreme

when Iran was more interested

kada je Iran bio zainteresovaniji

in peacemaking with Washington

za stvaranje mira sa Vašingtonom,

than to see to Israel's destruction.

nego za posmatranje raspada Izraela.

Iran had put itself in isolation

Iran je smestio sebe u izolaciju

because of its radicalism,

zbog svog radikalizma,

and after having helped the United States indirectly

i nakon što su indirektno pomogle Sjedinjenim Državama,

in the war against Iraq in 1991,

u ratu protiv Iraka 1991. godine,

the Iranians were hoping

Iranci su se nadali

that they would be rewarded by being included

da će biti nagrađeni uključivanjem

in the post-war security architecture of the region.

u posleratnu sigurnosnu arhitekturu regiona.

But Washington chose to ignore Iran's outreach,

Ipak, Vašington je izabrao da ignoriše iranski doprinos,

as it would a decade later in Afghanistan,

kao što je to uradio deceniju kasnije u Avganistanu,

and instead moved to intensify Iran's isolation,

i umesto toga intenzivirao izolaciju Irana,

and it is at this point, around 1993, '94,

i u tom trenutku, oko 1993/1994. godine,

that Iran begins to translate

Iran je počeo da prevodi

its anti-Israeli ideology

svoju antii-izraelsku ideologiju

into operational policy.

u operacionu politiku.

The Iranians believed that whatever they did,

Iranci su verovali da štagod da urade,

even if they moderated their policies,

čak i ako su obuzdali njihovu strategiju,

the U.S. would continue to seek Iran's isolation,

Sjedinjene Države bi nastavile da traže izolaciju Irana,

and the only way Iran could compel Washington

i jedini način na koji bi Iran mogao da primora Vašington

to change its position was by imposing a cost

da promeni svoju poziciju, bio je nametanjem troška

on the U.S. if it didn't.

Sjedinjenim Državama, ukoliko se to ne desi.

The easiest target was the peace process,

Najlakša meta bio je mirovni proces,

and now the Iranian ideological bark

i sada je iranski ideološki čamac

was to be accompanied by a nonconventional bite,

bio praćen nekonvencionalnim mamcem,

and Iran began supporting extensively

i Iran je značajno počeo da podržava

Palestinian Islamist groups that it previously

palestinske islamističke grupe

had shunned.

koje je pretnodno izbegavao.

In some ways, this sounds paradoxical,

Na neki način, ovo zvuči paradoksalno

but according to Martin Indyk

ali prema Martinu Indiku

of the Clinton administration,

iz Klintonove administracije,

the Iranians had not gotten it entirely wrong,

Iranci nisu sve shvatili pogrešno,

because the more peace there would be

jer što je više mira

between Israel and Palestine,

između Izraela i Palestine,

the U.S. believed, the more Iran would get isolated.

Sjedinjene Države su verovale da bi više Iranaca bilo izolovano.

The more Iran got isolated, the more peace there would be.

Što se više Iranaca izoluje, to će više biti mira.

So according to Indyk, and these are his words,

Prema Indiku, a ovo su njegove reči:

the Iranians had an interest to do us in

"Iranci su imali interesa da nas napadnu

on the peace process

u mirovnom procesu

in order to defeat our policy of containment.

u cilju da odbrane našu strukturu od zadržavanja.

To defeat our policy of containment,

Da bi odbranili svoju strukturu od zadržavanja,

not about ideology.

bez ideologije.

But throughout even the worst times of their entanglement,

Ali i kroz najgora vremena njihovog uplitanja,

all sides have reached out to each other.

sve strane su se međusobno pomogle.

Netanyahu, when he got elected in 1996,

Kada je Netanjahu bio izabran 1996. godine,

reached out to the Iranians to see

dopreo je do Iranaca da vidi

if there were any ways that

da li postoji ikakav način

the doctrine of the periphery could be resurrected.

da doktrina periferije može da oživi.

Tehran was not interested.

Teheran nije bio zainteresovan.

A few years later, the Iranians sent

Nekoliko godina kasnije, Iranci su poslali

a comprehensive negotiation proposal to the Bush administration,

obiman pregovarački predlog Bušovoj administraciji,

a proposal that revealed that there was some potential

predlog koji je otkrio da je postojao potencijal

of getting Iran and Israel back on terms again.

vraćanja Irana i Izraela u dobre odnose.

The Bush administration did not even respond.

Bušova administracija nije čak ni odgovorila.

All sides have never missed an opportunity

Obe strane nisu nikada propustile priliku

to miss an opportunity.

da propuste priliku.

But this is not an ancient conflict.

Ali ovo nije stari sukob.

This is not even an ideological conflict.

Ovo nije čak ni ideološki sukob.

The ebbs and flows of hostility

Struje netrpeljivosti

have not shifted with ideological zeal,

nisu se pomerile sa ideološkim žarom,

but rather with changes in the geopolitical landscape.

već promenama u geopolitičkom okruženju.

When Iran and Israel's security imperatives

Kada su iranski i izraelski sigurnosni imperativi

dictated collaboration, they did so

diktirali saradnju, oni su to i činili

in spite of lethal ideological opposition to each other.

uprkos ubistvenoj ideološkoj opoziciji jednih prema drugima.

When Iran's ideological impulses collided

Kada su se iranski ideološki impulsi

with its strategic interests,

sukobili sa svojim strateškim interesima,

the strategic interests always prevailed.

strateški interesi su uvek prevagnuli.

This is good news, because it means

Ovo su dobre vesti, jer to znači

that neither war nor enmity

da niti rat niti neprijateljstvo

is a foregone conclusion.

ne nose prerani zaključak.

But some want war.

Ali neki žele rat.

Some believe or say that it's 1938,

Neki veruju ili kažu da je 1938. godina,

Iran is Germany,

Iran je Nemačka,

and Ahmadinejad is Hitler.

i Ahmadinedžad je Hitler.

If we accept this to be true,

Ako prihvatimo ovo kao istinu,

that indeed it is 1938, Iran is Germany,

to onda znači da je 1938. godina i da je Iran Nemačka,

Ahmadinejad is Hitler,

Ahmadinedžad Hitler,

then the question we have to ask ourself is,

a onda je pitanje koje treba da pitamo sebe:

who wishes to play the role of Neville Chamberlain?

ko želi da glumi ulogu Nevila Čemberlena?

Who will risk peace?

Ko će rizikovati mir?

This is an analogy that is deliberately aimed

Ovo je analogija koja osmišljeno cilja

at eliminating diplomacy,

na eliminisanje diplomatije,

and when you eliminate diplomacy,

i kada eliminišete diplomatiju,

you make war inevitable.

činite rat neizbežnim.

In an ideological conflict, there can be no truce,

U ideološkom sukobu ne postoji primirje,

no draw, no compromise,

izjednačenje, niti kompromis,

only victory or defeat.

samo pobeda ili poraz.

But rather than making war inevitable

Ali umesto da činimo rat neizbežnim,

by viewing this as ideological,

posmatrajući ga kao ideološki,

we would be wise to seek ways

bili bismo pametniji da tražimo načine

to make peace possible.

da učinimo mir mogućim.

Iran and Israel's conflict is a new phenomenon,

Iranski i izraelski sukob je novi fenomen,

only a few decades old

star samo nekoliko decenija

in a history of 2,500 years,

u istoriji od 2500 godina,

and precisely because its roots are geopolitical,

i baš zato što su njegovi koreni geopolitički,

it means that solutions can be found,

to znači da se rešenja mogu naći,

compromises can be struck,

ostvariti kompromisi,

however difficult it yet may be.

koliko god da je teško.

After all, it was Yitzhak Rabin himself who said,

Nakon svega, sam Jicak Rabin je jednom rekao:

"You don't make peace with your friends.

"Ne stvarate mir sa svojim prijateljima.

You make it with your enemies."

Stvarate ga sa svojim neprijateljima."

Thank you.

Hvala vam.

(Applause)

(Aplauz)