Trita Parsi: Iran and Israel: Peace is possible

譯者: lin piao 審譯者: Zhiting Chen

"Iran is Israel's best friend,

「伊朗是以色列最好的朋友，

and we do not intend to change our position

我們並不打算因德黑蘭

而改變態度。」

in relation to Tehran."

Believe it or not, this is a quote

你們相信嗎

這句話出自一位以色列的總理

from an Israeli prime minister,

but it's not Ben-Gurion or Golda Meir

但並不是本-古里安或戈尔迪·梅厄

from the era of the Shah.

在伊朗沙王治國時期的那些總理

而是伊札克·拉賓

It's actually from Yitzhak Rabin.

The year is 1987.

西元1987年

伊朗最高領袖何梅尼還在世

Ayatollah Khomeini is still alive,

and much like Ahmadinejad today,

而他就像現任總統艾馬丹加一樣

he's using the worst rhetoric against Israel.

針對以色列發表很糟的言論

Yet, Rabin referred to Iran

但拉賓還是將伊朗

as a geostrategic friend.

稱為地理上的戰略夥伴

Today, when we hear the threats of war

今天當我們聽到那些

and the high rhetoric,

戰爭威脅以及情緒激昂的言論時

we're oftentimes led to believe

我們常常因此相信

that this is yet another one of those unsolvable

這又是另一個

Middle Eastern conflicts

中東地區難解的衝突

with roots as old as the region itself.

就像當地的宗教淵源一樣古老

Nothing could be further from the truth,

但是這並不是對的

and I hope today to show you why that is.

我希望今天能告訴你們為何並非如此

The relations between the Iranian and the Jewish people

伊朗人和猶太人的關係

throughout history has actually been quite positive,

從歷史上來看其實一直很正面

starting in 539 B.C.,

西元前539年

when King Cyrus the Great of Persia

波斯國王賽羅斯

liberated the Jewish people from their Babylonian captivity.

將猶太人民從巴別塔中釋放出來

A third of the Jewish population

三分之一的猶太人

stayed in Babylonia.

定居在巴比隆尼亞

They're today's Iraqi Jews.

他們就是今天的伊拉克猶太人

A third migrated to Persia.

另外三分之一移民到波斯

They're today's Iranian Jews,

他們是今天的伊朗猶太人

still 25,000 of them living in Iran,

有2萬5千人還住在伊朗

making them the largest Jewish community

是現今中東除了

in the Middle East outside of Israel itself.

以色列以外最大的猶太社群

And a third returned to historic Palestine,

最後三分之一 回到歷史淵遠的巴勒斯坦

did the second rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem,

二次重建耶路撒冷聖殿

financed, incidentally, by Persian tax money.

順帶一提，他們用的是波斯人的納稅錢

But even in modern times,

但即使在今天

relations have been close at times.

他們的關係曾經緊密過

Rabin's statement was a reflection

拉賓的言論重新讓我們反思

of decades of security and intelligence collaboration

過去幾十年這兩個國家的國安協防

between the two, which in turn

和情報合作

was born out of perception of common threats.

其實是源於感到共同的威脅

Both states feared the Soviet Union

兩個國家都害怕蘇聯

and strong Arab states such as Egypt and Iraq.

以及強大的阿拉伯國家如埃及和伊拉克

而且以色列的國土安全

And, in addition, the Israeli doctrine of the periphery,

the idea that Israel's security was best achieved

是主張以色列的國家安全可以通過

與周圍的非阿拉伯國家結盟得到保障

by creating alliances with the non-Arab states

in the periphery of the region

in order to balance the Arab states in its vicinity.

才能在這特殊地帶

與阿拉伯國家的勢力抗衡

Now, from the Shah's perspective, though,

但從伊朗沙王的角度來看

he wanted to keep this as secret as possible,

卻希望越少人知道這件事越好

所以舉例來說，當拉賓

so when Yitzhak Rabin, for instance,

traveled to Iran in the '70s,

他在70年代到伊朗時

he usually wore a wig

通常會戴頂假髮

so that no one would recognize him.

這樣就沒有人認得出他來

伊朗還鋪了一道特殊的飛機跑道

The Iranians built a special tarmac

at the airport in Tehran, far away from the central terminal,

在德黑蘭機場，離中央航廈很遠

so that no one would notice the large number

這樣就沒人會注意到

在特拉維夫和德黑蘭之間 往來的以色列班機

of Israeli planes shuttling between Tel Aviv and Tehran.

Now, did all of this end with the Islamic revolution

這些互動難道在1979年的伊斯蘭革命後

in 1979?

就結束了嗎?

In spite of the very clear anti-Israeli ideology

即使新政權的反以意識很強烈

of the new regime, the geopolitical logic

地緣政治上應有的合作關係

for their collaboration lived on,

because they still had common threats.

依然存在

因為他們仍擁有相同的威脅

And when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980,

當伊拉克在1980入侵伊朗

Israel feared an Iraqi victory

以色列為阻止伊拉克勝利

and actively helped Iran by selling it arms

還主動幫助伊朗

販售武器給伊朗

and providing it with spare parts

及提供伊朗美軍武器的零件

for Iran's American weaponry

at a moment when Iran was very vulnerable

在伊朗軍力不足

because of an American arms embargo

因為美國軍武禁運時

that Israel was more than happy to violate.

以色列樂得置美國於不顧

In fact, back in the 1980s,

其實在80年代

it was Israel that lobbied Washington

是以色列遊說華府與伊朗溝通

to talk to Iran, to sell arms to Iran,

賣軍武給伊朗

and not pay attention to Iran's anti-Israeli ideology.

不要在意伊朗的反以情結

And this, of course, climaxed

而當然，這是秘密行動

in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s.

隨著80年代的伊朗門事件達到高峰

But with the end of the Cold War

不過隨著冷戰結束

came also the end of the Israeli-Iranian cold peace.

以色列與伊朗之間 表面的和平也結束了

Suddenly, the two common threats

兩國之間的共同威脅

that had pushed them closer together throughout decades,

曾經迫使他們互助幾十年的威脅

more or less evaporated.

就這樣消失了

The Soviet Union collapsed,

蘇聯解體

Iraq was defeated,

伊拉克戰敗

and a new environment was created in the region

新的秩序在這裡重新建立

in which both of them felt more secure,

他們都更有安全感

but they were also now left unchecked.

同時也更不受控制

Without Iraq balancing Iran,

沒有伊拉克制衡伊朗

Iran could now become a threat,

伊朗就可能成為以色列的威脅

some in Israel argued.

有些以色列人這麼認為

In fact, the current dynamic

其實目前

that you see between Iran and Israel

伊朗和以色列間

has its roots more so

關係的變動

in the geopolitical reconfiguration of the region

是源自冷戰後

地理戰略上的重新佈局

after the Cold War

than in the events of 1979,

而不是1979年發生的一連串事件

because at this point, Iran and Israel

在那時伊朗和以色列

emerge as two of the most powerful states in the region,

一躍成為中東地區最強大的兩個國家

他們不將對方視為國土安全上

and rather than viewing each other

as potential security partners,

they increasingly came to view each other

可能的合作夥伴

反倒漸漸視對方

as rivals and competitors.

為敵人和競爭對象

So Israel, who in the 1980s

所以當以色列在80年代

lobbied for and improved U.S.-Iran relations

遊說並改善美國和伊朗的關係後

now feared a U.S.-Iran rapprochement,

開始擔心美伊之間的友好

thinking that it would come

認為這將

at Israel's security interests' expense,

影響以色列的國土安全利益

and instead sought to put Iran

試著要置伊朗

in increased isolation.

於逐漸孤立的境地

Ironically, this was happening at a time

諷刺的是，那時後的

when Iran was more interested

伊朗剛好更希望與

in peacemaking with Washington

華府和平共處

than to see to Israel's destruction.

而不是想要搞垮以色列

伊朗因為激進主義

Iran had put itself in isolation

because of its radicalism,

使自己處於孤立狀態

and after having helped the United States indirectly

伊朗曾間接地幫助過美國

in the war against Iraq in 1991,

在1991年美國和伊拉克的戰爭中

the Iranians were hoping

伊朗人希望

that they would be rewarded by being included

他們能因為幫忙而被納入

戰後該地區安全框架中

in the post-war security architecture of the region.

But Washington chose to ignore Iran's outreach,

但是華府選擇忽略伊朗的示好

as it would a decade later in Afghanistan,

就像十年後對阿富汗那樣

and instead moved to intensify Iran's isolation,

就此更顯得伊朗的孤立無援

and it is at this point, around 1993, '94,

就在此時約1993，1994年時

that Iran begins to translate

伊朗開始將

反以的意識形態

its anti-Israeli ideology

into operational policy.

成為國家方針政策的一部分

The Iranians believed that whatever they did,

伊朗人相信不論他們做什麼

even if they moderated their policies,

即使改變政策

the U.S. would continue to seek Iran's isolation,

美國還是會繼續孤立他們

and the only way Iran could compel Washington

伊朗唯一能迫使華府

to change its position was by imposing a cost

改變立場的方式

就是讓美國為此付出代價 如果華府還沒有付出代價

on the U.S. if it didn't.

The easiest target was the peace process,

最好的著手處就是和平進程

and now the Iranian ideological bark

現在，伊朗意識形態的狂吠

was to be accompanied by a nonconventional bite,

不守成規地大咬了美國一口

and Iran began supporting extensively

伊朗開始大規模援助 巴勒斯坦的伊斯蘭教徒

Palestinian Islamist groups that it previously

而不像之前那樣

had shunned.

躲避他們

In some ways, this sounds paradoxical,

就某方面來說，這聽起來很矛盾

but according to Martin Indyk

但是柯林頓執政時期的

of the Clinton administration,

駐以大使英迪克認為

the Iranians had not gotten it entirely wrong,

伊朗這樣做並不無道理

because the more peace there would be

因為以色列和巴勒斯坦之間的關係

between Israel and Palestine,

the U.S. believed, the more Iran would get isolated.

越和平

美國相信伊朗會越孤立

The more Iran got isolated, the more peace there would be.

伊朗越孤立，中東情勢就會越和平

So according to Indyk, and these are his words,

所以根據英迪克，他是這樣說的

the Iranians had an interest to do us in

伊朗想要破壞

on the peace process

我們的和平計畫

in order to defeat our policy of containment.

為了打擊我們的遏制政策

To defeat our policy of containment,

是為了打擊我們的遏制政策

not about ideology.

而非意識形態

But throughout even the worst times of their entanglement,

即使在他們互相角力的最糟情勢

三方都嘗試向對方示好

all sides have reached out to each other.

Netanyahu, when he got elected in 1996,

內塔尼亞胡在1996年當選以色列總理時

reached out to the Iranians to see

曾試圖與伊朗溝通

if there were any ways that

看有沒有可能

the doctrine of the periphery could be resurrected.

重建過去守護領土的協議

Tehran was not interested.

德黑蘭對此毫無興趣

A few years later, the Iranians sent

幾年後，伊朗向

a comprehensive negotiation proposal to the Bush administration,

布希政府送上全面的談判提議

a proposal that revealed that there was some potential

裡面提到

伊朗和以色列再度和解的可能

of getting Iran and Israel back on terms again.

The Bush administration did not even respond.

但是布希政府根本不回應

All sides have never missed an opportunity

三方都有意地

to miss an opportunity.

錯過談判機會

But this is not an ancient conflict.

但是這不是長久以來的衝突

This is not even an ideological conflict.

甚至不是意識形態的衝突

The ebbs and flows of hostility

敵對關係

沒有隨意識形態的狂熱而消長

have not shifted with ideological zeal,

but rather with changes in the geopolitical landscape.

而是地理上的政治版圖

When Iran and Israel's security imperatives

當伊朗和以色列的 最高國安教條是合作

dictated collaboration, they did so

他們就合作過

in spite of lethal ideological opposition to each other.

即使在意識形態上水火不容

When Iran's ideological impulses collided

當伊朗的意識本能

with its strategic interests,

與戰略利益衝突

the strategic interests always prevailed.

他們永遠以戰略上的利益為主

This is good news, because it means

這是一件好事

that neither war nor enmity

這意味著戰爭或敵意

is a foregone conclusion.

並不是必然的結局

But some want war.

但是有些人想要戰爭

有些人相信或是表示 現在就是1938年

Some believe or say that it's 1938,

Iran is Germany,

伊朗是德國

and Ahmadinejad is Hitler.

而總統艾瑪加就是希特勒

如果我們接受這個假設

If we accept this to be true,

that indeed it is 1938, Iran is Germany,

現在的確是1938年，伊朗是德國

Ahmadinejad is Hitler,

艾瑪加是希特勒

那麼我們需要自問的是

then the question we have to ask ourself is,

誰要來當張伯倫容忍納粹行徑?

who wishes to play the role of Neville Chamberlain?

Who will risk peace?

誰會拿和平冒險?

這是一個比喻，是有意地

This is an analogy that is deliberately aimed

at eliminating diplomacy,

在摧毀外交關係

and when you eliminate diplomacy,

當外交手段行不通時

戰爭將無可避免地來臨

you make war inevitable.

如果遇到意識形態上的衝突 那就不可能有停戰

In an ideological conflict, there can be no truce,

no draw, no compromise,

沒有平手，也沒有妥協

only victory or defeat.

只有勝利或戰敗

But rather than making war inevitable

但與其將戰爭視為 意識形態上的衝突

by viewing this as ideological,

無法避免

we would be wise to seek ways

我們應該明智地尋找一個途徑

to make peace possible.

使和平成為可能

伊以衝突是一個新的現象

Iran and Israel's conflict is a new phenomenon,

在兩千五百年的歷史長河裡

only a few decades old

不過有幾十年的歷史

in a history of 2,500 years,

and precisely because its roots are geopolitical,

而且由於它地理上的政治關係

it means that solutions can be found,

這意味著一定找得到解決的辦法

compromises can be struck,

妥協是可以達成的

however difficult it yet may be.

即使可能相當困難

畢竟拉賓是這麼說的：

After all, it was Yitzhak Rabin himself who said,

「人們不必和朋友維持和平關係，

"You don't make peace with your friends.

You make it with your enemies."

而要跟敵人維持和平相處。」

Thank you.

(Applause)

謝謝大家

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