Trita Parsi: Iran and Israel: Peace is possible

Translator: Alisa Xholi Reviewer: Helena Bedalli

"Iran is Israel's best friend,

"Irani eshte miku i ngushte i Izraelit,

and we do not intend to change our position

dhe nuk kemi ndermend te ndryshojme poziten tone

in relation to Tehran."

ne lidhje me Teheranin."

Believe it or not, this is a quote

Besojeni apo jo, ky eshte nje citat

from an Israeli prime minister,

nga nje kryeminister i Israelit,

but it's not Ben-Gurion or Golda Meir

por nuk eshte Ben-Gurion apo Golda Meir

from the era of the Shah.

nga epoka e Shah-ut.

It's actually from Yitzhak Rabin.

Eshte faktikisht nga Yitzhak Rabin.

The year is 1987.

Eshte viti 1987.

Ayatollah Khomeini is still alive,

Ayatollah Khomeini jeton ende,

and much like Ahmadinejad today,

dhe pak a shume si Ahmadinejad sot,

he's using the worst rhetoric against Israel.

ai po perdor retoriken me te keqe kundrejt Israelit.

Yet, Rabin referred to Iran

Sidoqofte, Rabin i rreferohet Iranit

as a geostrategic friend.

si nje mik gjeostrategjik.

Today, when we hear the threats of war

Sot, kur degjojme per kercenimet e luftes

and the high rhetoric,

dhe retoriken e larte,

we're oftentimes led to believe

shpesh perpiqemi te besojme

that this is yet another one of those unsolvable

se ky eshte ende nje nga ato konfliktet

Middle Eastern conflicts

e pazgjidhura te Lindjes se Mesme

with roots as old as the region itself.

me rrenjet aq te vjetra sa dhe rajoni vete.

Nothing could be further from the truth,

Asgje nuk mund te jete me larg te vertetes,

and I hope today to show you why that is.

dhe shpresoj sot t'ju tregoj pse-ne.

The relations between the Iranian and the Jewish people

Lidhjet midis njerezve te Iranit dhe Israelit

throughout history has actually been quite positive,

gjate historise kane qene realisht pozitive,

starting in 539 B.C.,

duke filluar ne 539 P.K,

when King Cyrus the Great of Persia

kur mbreti Cyrus i Persise se Madhe

liberated the Jewish people from their Babylonian captivity.

cliroi njerezit Hebre nga roberia e Babilonise.

A third of the Jewish population

Nje e treta e popullsise hebre

stayed in Babylonia.

qendroi ne Babiloni.

They're today's Iraqi Jews.

Ata jane sot hebrenjte e Irakut.

A third migrated to Persia.

Nje e treta emigroi ne Persi.

They're today's Iranian Jews,

Ata jane sot Hebrenjte e Iranit,

still 25,000 of them living in Iran,

ende 25.000 nga ata jetojne ne Iran,

making them the largest Jewish community

duke i bere ata komuniteti me i madh hebre

in the Middle East outside of Israel itself.

ne Lindjen e Mesme jashte Israelit.

And a third returned to historic Palestine,

Dhe nje e treta u kthye ne Palestinen historike,

did the second rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem,

kryen rindertimin e dyte te Tempullit ne Jerusalem,

financed, incidentally, by Persian tax money.

te financuar, rastesisht, nga parate e taksave persiane.

But even in modern times,

Por edhe ne kohet moderne,

relations have been close at times.

lidhjet kane qene te aferta.

Rabin's statement was a reflection

Deklarata e Rabin ishte nje reflektim

of decades of security and intelligence collaboration

i dekadave te bashkepunimit te sigurise dhe inteligjences

between the two, which in turn

ndermjet tyre, e cila sic duket

was born out of perception of common threats.

lindi nga perceptimi i kercenimeve te zakonshme.

Both states feared the Soviet Union

Te dy shtetet frikesoheshin nga Bashkimi Sovjetik

and strong Arab states such as Egypt and Iraq.

dhe shtetet Arabe te fuqishme si Egjipti dhe Iraku.

And, in addition, the Israeli doctrine of the periphery,

Dhe, vec kesaj, dogmes izraelite te periferise,

the idea that Israel's security was best achieved

idese se siguria e Izraelit ishte e arritur me mire

by creating alliances with the non-Arab states

duke krijuar aleanca me shtete jo-Arabike

in the periphery of the region

ne periferi te rajonit

in order to balance the Arab states in its vicinity.

ne menyre qe te balancoje shtetet Arabe ne fqinjesine e saj.

Now, from the Shah's perspective, though,

Tani, nga perspektiva e Shah-ut, ndonese,

he wanted to keep this as secret as possible,

ai donte ta mbante kete sa me te fshehte,

so when Yitzhak Rabin, for instance,

dhe kur Yitzhak Rabin, per shembull,

traveled to Iran in the '70s,

udhetonte ne Iran ne vitet 70

he usually wore a wig

zakonisht perdorte nje paruke

so that no one would recognize him.

ne menyre qe mos ta njihte askush.

The Iranians built a special tarmac

Iranianet ndertuan nje piste speciale

at the airport in Tehran, far away from the central terminal,

ne aeroportin e Teheranit, shume larg nga terminali qendror,

so that no one would notice the large number

qe askush mos dallonte numrin e madh

of Israeli planes shuttling between Tel Aviv and Tehran.

te avioneve israelite ndermjet Tel Aviv-it dhe Teheran-it.

Now, did all of this end with the Islamic revolution

A perfunduan keto me revolucionin Islamik

in 1979?

ne 1979?

In spite of the very clear anti-Israeli ideology

Pavaresisht ideologjise shume te qarte kunder-izraelite

of the new regime, the geopolitical logic

te regjimit te ri, logjika gjeopolitike

for their collaboration lived on,

per bashkepunimin e tyre, vazhdoi,

because they still had common threats.

sepse ata kishin ende kercenime te perbashketa.

And when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980,

Dhe kur Iraku pushtoi Iranin ne 1980,

Israel feared an Iraqi victory

Izraeli pati frike nga nje fitore e Irakut

and actively helped Iran by selling it arms

dhe ndihmoi aktivisht Iranin duke i shitur arme

and providing it with spare parts

dhe duke e pajisur me pjese rezerve

for Iran's American weaponry

per armatimet amerikane te Iranit

at a moment when Iran was very vulnerable

ne nje moment ku Irani ishte shume i prekshem

because of an American arms embargo

per shkak te nje embargoje amerikane ndaj armeve

that Israel was more than happy to violate.

qe Israeli e shkeli me shume deshire.

In fact, back in the 1980s,

Ne fakt, pas ne vitet 1980,

it was Israel that lobbied Washington

ishte Israeli qe loboi ne Washington

to talk to Iran, to sell arms to Iran,

te flase me Iran, ti shese arme Iranit,

and not pay attention to Iran's anti-Israeli ideology.

dhe te mos i jape rendesi ideologjise kunder-izraelite te Iranit.

And this, of course, climaxed

Dhe kjo, sigurisht, arriti kulmin

in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s.

ne skandalin e Iran-Contra ne vitet 80.

But with the end of the Cold War

Por me fundin e Luftes se Ftohte

came also the end of the Israeli-Iranian cold peace.

erdhi gjithashtu edhe fundi i paqes se ftohte Izrael-Iran.

Suddenly, the two common threats

Papritur, dy kercenimet e perbashketa

that had pushed them closer together throughout decades,

qe i kishin afruar permes dekadave,

more or less evaporated.

pak a shume u zhduken.

The Soviet Union collapsed,

Bashkimi Sovjetik u shemb,

Iraq was defeated,

Iraku u mund

and a new environment was created in the region

dhe nje mjedis i ri u krijua ne rajon

in which both of them felt more secure,

ne te cilin te dy ata ndjeheshin me te sigurte,

but they were also now left unchecked.

por gjithashtu ishin lene tashme te pakontrolluar.

Without Iraq balancing Iran,

Pa Irakun qe balanconte Iranin,

Iran could now become a threat,

Irani tashme mund te kthehej ne nje kercenim,

some in Israel argued.

argumentonin disa ne Izrael.

In fact, the current dynamic

Ne fakt, dinamika aktuale

that you see between Iran and Israel

qe mund te shihni ndermjet Iranit dhe Israelit

has its roots more so

i ka rrenjet me te thella

in the geopolitical reconfiguration of the region

ne rikofingurimin gjeopolitik te rajonit

after the Cold War

pas Luftes se Ftohte

than in the events of 1979,

sesa ne ngjarjet e 1979,

because at this point, Iran and Israel

sepse ne kete pike, Irani dhe Izraeli

emerge as two of the most powerful states in the region,

shfaqeshin si dy nga shtetet me te fuqishme ne rajon,

and rather than viewing each other

dhe ne vend qe te shiheshin ndermjet tyre

as potential security partners,

si partnere te mundshem sigurie,

they increasingly came to view each other

ata gjithnje e me shume nisen te shiheshin

as rivals and competitors.

si kundershtare dhe konkurues.

So Israel, who in the 1980s

Pra Izraeli, i cili ne 1980

lobbied for and improved U.S.-Iran relations

loboi per dhe permiresoi lidhjet Sh.B.A - Iran

now feared a U.S.-Iran rapprochement,

tashme frikesohej nga nje rivendosje e raporteve miqesore ndermjet Sh.B.A dhe Iranit,

thinking that it would come

duke menduar se mund te perfundonte

at Israel's security interests' expense,

te varej nga Izraeli per sigurine,

and instead sought to put Iran

dhe ne vend te kesaj kerkoi te vendosi Iranin

in increased isolation.

ne izolim te madh.

Ironically, this was happening at a time

Ironikisht, kjo po ndodhte ne nje kohe

when Iran was more interested

qe Irani ishte me shume i interesuar

in peacemaking with Washington

ne paqeberje me Washingtonin

than to see to Israel's destruction.

se sa te shikonte shkaterrimin e Izraelit.

Iran had put itself in isolation

Irani e kishte vendosur veten ne izolim

because of its radicalism,

per shkak te radikalizmit te vet,

and after having helped the United States indirectly

dhe pasi kishte ndihmuar Shtetet e Bashkuara terthorazi

in the war against Iraq in 1991,

ne luften kundrejt Irakut ne 1991,

the Iranians were hoping

iranianet po shpresonin

that they would be rewarded by being included

se ata do te shperbleheshin duke u perfshire

in the post-war security architecture of the region.

ne arkitekturen e sigurise pas luftes ne rajon.

But Washington chose to ignore Iran's outreach,

Por Washingtoni zgjodhi te injoroje shpresen e Iranit,

as it would a decade later in Afghanistan,

sic do bente pas nje dekate ne Afganistan,

and instead moved to intensify Iran's isolation,

dhe nderkohe zhvilloi rritjen e izolimit te Iranit,

and it is at this point, around 1993, '94,

dhe ne kete kohe, rreth 1993, '94,

that Iran begins to translate

Irani filloi te perkthente

its anti-Israeli ideology

ideologjine e saj kundra-izraelite

into operational policy.

ne politike operacionale.

The Iranians believed that whatever they did,

Iranianet besonin se cfaredo qe te benin,

even if they moderated their policies,

edhe sikur te ndryshonin politikat e tyre,

the U.S. would continue to seek Iran's isolation,

Sh.B.A do te vazhdonte te kerkonte izolimin e Iranit,

and the only way Iran could compel Washington

dhe e vetmja menyre qe Irani te detyronte Washingtonin

to change its position was by imposing a cost

te ndryshonte pozicionin e tij ishte duke i imponuar nje kosto

on the U.S. if it didn't.

Sh.B.A nese nuk do ta ndryshonin.

The easiest target was the peace process,

Objektivi me i lehte ishte procesi i paqes

and now the Iranian ideological bark

dhe ne kete moment befas ideologjia Iraniane

was to be accompanied by a nonconventional bite,

duhet te ishte e mbeshtjelle nga nje problem jo tradicional,

and Iran began supporting extensively

dhe Irani filloi te mbeshtese gjeresisht

Palestinian Islamist groups that it previously

grupet Islamiste Palestineze qe me pare

had shunned.

ishin shmangur.

In some ways, this sounds paradoxical,

Ne disa menyre, kjo dukej paradoksale,

but according to Martin Indyk

por sipas Martin Indyk

of the Clinton administration,

te administrates Clinton,

the Iranians had not gotten it entirely wrong,

Iranianet nuk e kishin kuptuar totalisht gabim

because the more peace there would be

sepse sa me shume paqe do te ekzistonte

between Israel and Palestine,

midis Izraelit dhe Palestines,

the U.S. believed, the more Iran would get isolated.

sipas Sh.B.A, aq me shume do izolohej Irani.

The more Iran got isolated, the more peace there would be.

Sa me shume te izolohej Irani, aq me shume paqe do kishte.

So according to Indyk, and these are his words,

Pra sipas Indyk, dhe keto jane fjalet e tij,

the Iranians had an interest to do us in

Iranianet kishin nje interes te na fusnin

on the peace process

ne procesin e paqes

in order to defeat our policy of containment.

ne menyre qe te mposhte politiken e kontrollit.

To defeat our policy of containment,

Per te mposhtur politiken tone te kontrollit,

not about ideology.

jo per ideologjine.

But throughout even the worst times of their entanglement,

Por gjate kesaj edhe ne kohet me te keqija te ngaterresave,

all sides have reached out to each other.

te gjitha anet zgjasnin doren tek njera tjetra.

Netanyahu, when he got elected in 1996,

Netanyahu, kur u zgjodh ne 1996,

reached out to the Iranians to see

i zgjati doren Iranianeve per te pare

if there were any ways that

nese do kishte ndonje menyre qe

the doctrine of the periphery could be resurrected.

dogma e periferise mund te ringjallej.

Tehran was not interested.

Teherani nuk ishte i interesuar.

A few years later, the Iranians sent

Disa vite me pas, Iranianet derguan

a comprehensive negotiation proposal to the Bush administration,

nje propozim negociate gjitheperfshires ne administraten e Bush-it,

a proposal that revealed that there was some potential

nje propozim i cili u zbulua se mund te kishte potencial

of getting Iran and Israel back on terms again.

per te futur Iranin dhe Izraelin ne terma perseri.

The Bush administration did not even respond.

Administrata e Bush-it nuk u pergjigj fare.

All sides have never missed an opportunity

Te gjitha anet nuk kishin humbur kurre nje mundesi

to miss an opportunity.

per ta humbur nje tani.

But this is not an ancient conflict.

Por ky nuk eshte nje konflikt i lashte.

This is not even an ideological conflict.

Ky nuk eshte as nje konflikt ideologjik.

The ebbs and flows of hostility

Ngritjet dhe uljet e armiqesise

have not shifted with ideological zeal,

nuk kane ndryshuar me zell ideologjik,

but rather with changes in the geopolitical landscape.

por me ndryshimet e tablose gjeopolitike.

When Iran and Israel's security imperatives

Kur siguria e Iranit dhe Izraelit u be thelbesore

dictated collaboration, they did so

dhe diktoi bashkepunim, ata e bene

in spite of lethal ideological opposition to each other.

pavaresisht opozites vdekjeprurese ideologjike mbi njeri tjetrin.

When Iran's ideological impulses collided

Kur impulset ideologjike te Iranit u perplasen

with its strategic interests,

me interesat e tyre strategjike,

the strategic interests always prevailed.

interesat strategjike gjithmone mbizoteruan.

This is good news, because it means

Ky eshte lajm i mire, sepse tregon

that neither war nor enmity

se as lufta as armiqesia

is a foregone conclusion.

nuk eshte nje perfundim i pashmangshem.

But some want war.

Por disa donin lufte.

Some believe or say that it's 1938,

Disa besonin ose thonin se eshte 1938,

Iran is Germany,

Irani eshte Gjermani,

and Ahmadinejad is Hitler.

dhe Ahmadinejad eshte Hitleri.

If we accept this to be true,

Nese e pranojme kete te jete e vertete,

that indeed it is 1938, Iran is Germany,

se ne te vertete eshte 1938, Irani eshte Gjermani,

Ahmadinejad is Hitler,

Ahmadinejadi eshte Hitleri,

then the question we have to ask ourself is,

atehere pyetja qe duhet ti bejme vetes eshte,

who wishes to play the role of Neville Chamberlain?

kush deshiron te luaje rolin e Neville Chamberlain?

Who will risk peace?

Kush do rrezikoje paqen?

This is an analogy that is deliberately aimed

Kjo eshte nje analogji e cila me qellim kerkon

at eliminating diplomacy,

te eliminoje diplomacine,

and when you eliminate diplomacy,

dhe kur diplomacia eliminohet,

you make war inevitable.

atehere lufta behet e pashmangshme.

In an ideological conflict, there can be no truce,

Ne nje konflikt ideologjik, nuk mund te kete armepushim,

no draw, no compromise,

nuk mund te kete terheqje, as kompromise,

only victory or defeat.

vetem fitore ose humbje.

But rather than making war inevitable

Por ne vend qe ta bejme luften te pashmangshme

by viewing this as ideological,

duke e pare kete si ideologjike,

we would be wise to seek ways

do tregoheshim te mencur duke kerkuar menyra

to make peace possible.

per te bere paqen te mundshme.

Iran and Israel's conflict is a new phenomenon,

Konflikti i Iranint dhe Izraelit eshte nje fenomen i ri,

only a few decades old

vetem pak dekadash i vjeter

in a history of 2,500 years,

ne nje histori prej 2.500 vitesh,

and precisely because its roots are geopolitical,

dhe pikerisht sepse rrenjet e tij jane gjeopolitike,

it means that solutions can be found,

do te thote se zgjidhje mund te gjehen,

compromises can be struck,

kompromiset mund te kerkohen,

however difficult it yet may be.

sa do te veshtira te jene ato.

After all, it was Yitzhak Rabin himself who said,

Ne fund te fundit, ishte Yitzhak Rabin qe tha,

"You don't make peace with your friends.

"Ti nuk e ben paqen me miqte e tu.

You make it with your enemies."

Por me armiqte."

Thank you.

Faleminderit.

(Applause)

(Duartrokitje)