Mary's Room: A philosophical thought experiment - Eleanor Nelsen

翻译人员: Di SUN 校对人员: Qinyang Zeng

Imagine a brilliant neuroscientist named Mary.

想象有一位杰出的神经系统科学家， 名叫玛丽。

Mary lives in a black and white room,

玛丽住在一个 只有黑色和白色的房间里，

she only reads black and white books,

她只读过黑白的书，

and her screens only display black and white.

她的显示屏也是黑白的。

But even though she has never seen color, Mary is an expert in color vision

尽管她从没见过彩色， 她却是彩色视觉专家，

and knows everything ever discovered about its physics and biology.

通晓彩色视觉相关的 物理现象和生物方面的知识。

She knows how different wavelengths of light

她知道不同波长的光

stimulate three types of cone cells in the retina,

如何刺激视网膜上三种视锥细胞。

and she knows how electrical signals

而且她知道电子信号

travel down the optic nerve into the brain.

如何通过视神经传到脑部，

There, they create patterns of neural activity

从而产生多种神经活动，

that correspond to the millions of colors most humans can distinguish.

对应大多数人能分辨的 数百万种颜色。

Now imagine that one day,

有一天，

Mary's black and white screen malfunctions

玛丽的黑白显示屏发生故障，

and an apple appears in color.

显示出了一个彩色的苹果。

For the first time,

这是玛丽第一次

she can experience something that she's known about for years.

能够体验到她熟知已久的东西。

Does she learn anything new?

那么，她是否学到了新知识呢？

Is there anything about perceiving color that wasn't captured in all her knowledge?

在她彩色视觉的知识系统中， 是否有部分知识被遗漏了呢？

Philosopher Frank Jackson proposed this thought experiment,

哲学家法兰克·杰克森在1982年 提出了这个叫做

called Mary's room, in 1982.

"玛丽的房间"的思想实验。

He argued that if Mary already knew all the physical facts about color vision,

他认为即便玛丽已经通晓 彩色视觉的所有物理事实，

and experiencing color still teaches her something new,

直接感知彩色 仍然教给她新的知识。

then mental states, like color perception,

也就是说，精神状态， 比如色彩感知，

can't be completely described by physical facts.

不能完全通过物理事实描述出来。

The Mary's room thought experiment

玛丽的房间这个思想实验，

describes what philosophers call the knowledge argument,

揭示了哲学家们讨论的 知识论证的问题，

that there are non-physical properties and knowledge

即，这些存在非物理的属性和知识

which can only be discovered through conscious experience.

只能通过意识体验习得。

The knowledge argument contradicts the theory of physicalism,

知识论证的观点与物理主义相悖。

which says that everything, including mental states,

物理主义认为所有的事物， 包括精神状态，

has a physical explanation.

都可以通过物理事实描述。

To most people hearing Mary's story,

大多数听说玛丽的房间实验的人，

it seems intuitively obvious that actually seeing color

凭直觉可以判断， 真正看到颜色

will be totally different than learning about it.

与单纯学习理论知识 是截然不同的。

Therefore, there must be some quality of color vision

这说明彩色视觉必然有

that transcends its physical description.

不能通过物理描述解释的知识。

The knowledge argument isn't just about color vision.

知识论证并不仅限于彩色视觉。

Mary's room uses color vision to represent conscious experience.

玛丽的房间通过彩色视觉 代表意识体验。

If physical science can't entirely explain color vision,

如果物理科学 不能完全解释彩色视觉，

then maybe it can't entirely explain other conscious experiences either.

那么它或许也不能完全解释 其他的意识体验。

For instance, we could know every physical detail

例如，我们可以知晓某人大脑中

about the structure and function of someone else's brain,

所有结构和功能的物理细节，

but still not understand what it feels like to be that person.

但我们依旧不明白成为那个人 会是一种怎样的体验。

These ineffable experiences have properties called qualia,

这些难以形容的体验 有被称为“感受性”的属性，

subjective qualities that you can't accurately describe or measure.

这是一种难以被准确描述或衡量的主观素质，

Qualia are unique to the person experiencing them,

感知对于每个体验它的人来说， 都是独一无二的。

like having an itch,

比如说感到发痒，

being in love,

坠入爱河中，

or feeling bored.

或是感到无聊，

Physical facts can't completely explain mental states like this.

这些心理状态都 不能通过物理事实完全解释。

Philosophers interested in artificial intelligence

对人工智能感兴趣的哲学家

have used the knowledge argument

用知识论证推理出

to theorize that recreating a physical state

重建一个物理状态

won't necessarily recreate a corresponding mental state.

并不一定能够创造出 与之对应的精神状态。

In other words,

换句话说，

building a computer which mimicked the function of every single neuron

一个通过模拟人类大脑 所有神经元功能

of the human brain

而创造出的电脑，

won't necessarily create a conscious computerized brain.

并不一定具有人脑的意识。

Not all philosophers agree that the Mary's room experiment is useful.

并不是所有哲学家都认同 玛丽的房间试验的价值。

Some argue that her extensive knowledge of color vision

一些人认为玛丽 丰富的彩色视觉知识

would have allowed her to create the same mental state

能让她形成同样的精神状态，

produced by actually seeing the color.

如同她真正看到了彩色一样。

The screen malfunction wouldn't show her anything new.

因此显示屏出故障后出现的苹果 并不能让她学到新的知识。

Others say that her knowledge was never complete in the first place

而另一些人认为玛丽的知识在最开始就是不完整的，

because it was based only on those physical facts

因为它们仅是从物理事实的

that can be conveyed in words.

描述中习得的。

Years after he proposed it,

在提出知识论证的数年后，

Jackson actually reversed his own stance on his thought experiment.

杰克逊自己推翻了 这思想试验得出的观点。

He decided that even Mary's experience of seeing red

他认为， 玛丽看到红色的体验

still does correspond to a measurable physical event in the brain,

仍然源自于大脑中一些 可预测的事件，

not unknowable qualia beyond physical explanation.

而非无法被物理事实解释的感受性。

But there still isn't a definitive answer

关于玛丽看到苹果

to the question of whether Mary would learn anything new

能否学到新的知识，

仍然没有定论。

when she sees the apple.

Could it be that there are fundamental limits to what we can know

对于无法感受的事物，

about something we can't experience?

我们的认知是否也存在限制？

And would this mean there are certain aspects of the universe

关于宇宙的某些方面知识，

that lie permanently beyond our comprehension?

是否永远超出我们理解范围呢？

Or will science and philosophy allow us to overcome our mind's limitations?

然而科学和哲学 又能否帮我们克服这些思维局限呢？