Mary's Room: A philosophical thought experiment - Eleanor Nelsen

譯者: Giulia Wu 審譯者: yue chen

Imagine a brilliant neuroscientist named Mary.

想像有一位叫做瑪麗的 傑出神經科學家

Mary lives in a black and white room,

她住在一間只有黑色和白色的屋子裡

she only reads black and white books,

只能閱讀黑白的書

and her screens only display black and white.

而且所有的螢幕也都是黑白的

But even though she has never seen color, Mary is an expert in color vision

但即使瑪麗從未看到過顏色

她卻是一個顏色視覺的專家

and knows everything ever discovered about its physics and biology.

色覺的物理和生理知識她都了解

She knows how different wavelengths of light

她知道光的不同波長

stimulate three types of cone cells in the retina,

如何刺激視網膜的三種視錐細胞

and she knows how electrical signals

也知道電子信號是如何

travel down the optic nerve into the brain.

沿著視神經進入大腦

There, they create patterns of neural activity

在那裡，它們引起神經活動

that correspond to the millions of colors most humans can distinguish.

產生人類所能分辨的數百萬種顏色

Now imagine that one day,

現在想像有那麼一天

Mary's black and white screen malfunctions

瑪麗的黑白電腦出現故障

and an apple appears in color.

一個彩色的蘋果出現在螢幕上

For the first time,

有史以來第一次

she can experience something that she's known about for years.

她真實地體驗到這些 她已經了解了很多年的事物

Does she learn anything new?

她能從中發現新的東西嗎？

Is there anything about perceiving color that wasn't captured in all her knowledge?

在她顏色感知的知識系統中 有什麼被遺漏了嗎？

Philosopher Frank Jackson proposed this thought experiment,

1982 年，哲學家弗蘭克·傑克遜 (Frank Jackson) 提出了這個

called Mary's room, in 1982.

稱為「瑪麗的屋子」的思想實驗

He argued that if Mary already knew all the physical facts about color vision,

他主張，如果瑪麗已經知道 所有關於顏色視覺的物理事實

and experiencing color still teaches her something new,

而真實體驗顏色仍然能 教給她一些新的東西

then mental states, like color perception,

那麼，精神狀態，比如色彩感知

can't be completely described by physical facts.

就不能被物理事實完全地描述出來

The Mary's room thought experiment

「瑪麗的屋子」思想實驗

describes what philosophers call the knowledge argument,

被哲學家們稱為知識論證

that there are non-physical properties and knowledge

即，存在著非物理的特性與知識

which can only be discovered through conscious experience.

只能通過意識體驗來被發現

The knowledge argument contradicts the theory of physicalism,

知識論證與物理主義的理論相悖

which says that everything, including mental states,

物理主義認為包括 精神狀態在內的所有事物

has a physical explanation.

都能被物理解釋

To most people hearing Mary's story,

大部分聽了這個故事的人

it seems intuitively obvious that actually seeing color

僅憑直覺就可判斷 真正看到顏色與學習它

will be totally different than learning about it.

明顯是完全不同的

Therefore, there must be some quality of color vision

因此，顏色視覺肯定有一些

that transcends its physical description.

無法被物理學解釋的特性

The knowledge argument isn't just about color vision.

知識論證不是只關於顏色視覺

Mary's room uses color vision to represent conscious experience.

「瑪麗的屋子」實驗 是用顏色視覺來代表意識體驗

If physical science can't entirely explain color vision,

如果物理科學 無法完全解釋顏色視覺

then maybe it can't entirely explain other conscious experiences either.

那麼也許它也不能完全 解釋其他的意識體驗

For instance, we could know every physical detail

例如，我們可以知道

某個人的大腦結構 功能等所有物理細節

about the structure and function of someone else's brain,

but still not understand what it feels like to be that person.

但仍然無法明白 成為那個人是怎樣的體驗

These ineffable experiences have properties called qualia,

這個無法形容的體驗 有個被稱作「感受質」的屬性

subjective qualities that you can't accurately describe or measure.

感受質是個主觀質量 無法準確地描述或者衡量

Qualia are unique to the person experiencing them,

感受質對於每個體驗它的人來說 都是獨一無二的，

like having an itch,

像是發癢

being in love,

戀愛

or feeling bored.

或者感到無聊

Physical facts can't completely explain mental states like this.

物理事實不能完全解釋 這樣的精神狀態

Philosophers interested in artificial intelligence

對人工智能感興趣的哲學家

have used the knowledge argument

用這個知識論證推理出

to theorize that recreating a physical state

重建一個物質狀態

won't necessarily recreate a corresponding mental state.

不一定能重建出與之相關的精神狀態

In other words,

換句話說

building a computer which mimicked the function of every single neuron

一個模擬人類大腦的所有神經元功能

of the human brain

創造出的電腦

won't necessarily create a conscious computerized brain.

不一定是一個有意識的計算機腦

Not all philosophers agree that the Mary's room experiment is useful.

不是所有的哲學家 都認同「瑪麗的屋子」實驗

Some argue that her extensive knowledge of color vision

一些人主張 她對顏色視覺的廣泛智識

would have allowed her to create the same mental state

足夠使她產生相同的精神狀態

produced by actually seeing the color.

如同她真正地看到了顏色

The screen malfunction wouldn't show her anything new.

那個螢幕故障 導致的蘋果對她並不新鮮

Others say that her knowledge was never complete in the first place

另外一些人說 首先她的知識就不完整

because it was based only on those physical facts

因為她獲得的知識只是那些

that can be conveyed in words.

可以用語言來傳達的物理事實而已

Years after he proposed it,

在傑克遜提出知識論證幾年後

Jackson actually reversed his own stance on his thought experiment.

他自己推翻了他的立場

He decided that even Mary's experience of seeing red

他認為，瑪麗看到紅色這個體驗

still does correspond to a measurable physical event in the brain,

仍然源自於瑪麗的大腦裡 一個可測量的物理事件

not unknowable qualia beyond physical explanation.

並不是一個不能被 物理解釋的未知感受質

But there still isn't a definitive answer

但對於當瑪麗看到蘋果時

to the question of whether Mary would learn anything new

是否學到了新東西

至今仍然沒有一個確定的答案

when she sees the apple.

Could it be that there are fundamental limits to what we can know

是不是不可能無限制地認知

about something we can't experience?

我們無法親身體驗的事物呢？

And would this mean there are certain aspects of the universe

那這是否意味著宇宙中有一些方面

that lie permanently beyond our comprehension?

是永遠存在於我們的理解力之外呢？

Or will science and philosophy allow us to overcome our mind's limitations?

科學與哲學又是否能使我們 克服這種思維的局限呢？