Joseph Nye on global power shifts

翻译人员: Yanna Zhang 校对人员: Xiaoqiao Xie

I'm going to talk to you

我想讨论的

about power in this 21st century.

是21世纪的权利。

And basically, what I'd like to tell you

基本上我想告诉大家的

is that power is changing,

是权利的变化，

and there are two types of changes

有两种变化

I want to discuss.

是我想探讨的。

One is power transition,

一种是权利的转移，

which is change of power amongst states.

国家和国家之间的权利变化。

And there the simple version of the message

这是对权利转移的简单解读，

is it's moving from West to East.

即权利正从西方转移到东方。

The other is power diffusion,

另一种是权利的分散，

the way power is moving

即权利的转移

from all states West or East

是从西方和东方的各个国家

to non-state actors.

到非国家的范围。

Those two things

以上两种情况

are the huge shifts of power

是本世纪权利的

in our century.

重要转移。

And I want to tell you about them each separately

我想分别说说这两种情况

and then how they interact

和它们之间的相互影响

and why, in the end, there may be some good news.

以及为什么说最终可能是个好消息。

When we talk about power transition,

说到权利的转移，

we often talk about the rise of Asia.

我们经常会提起亚洲的崛起。

It really should be called

确切地说应该称作

the recovery or return of Asia.

亚洲的复兴或者亚洲的回归。

If we looked at the world

回顾19世纪的

in 1800,

世界，

you'd find that more than half of the world's people

你会发现世界上一半以上的人口

lived in Asia

都居住在亚洲

and they made more than half the world's product.

而且他们生产的产品占了世界总量的一半以上。

Now fast forward to 1900:

现在我们来看20世纪，

half the world's people -- more than half -- still live in Asia,

世界上一般的人口——超过一半——仍然在亚洲居住，

but they're now making

但是他们的生产总值

only a fifth of the world's product.

进占全球的五分之一。

What happened? The Industrial Revolution,

这是为什么呢？工业革命，

which meant that all of a sudden,

也就是说突然之间，

Europe and America

欧洲和美国

became the dominant center of the world.

成为主导世界的中心。

What we're going to see in the 21st century

而到了21世纪，我们看到的

is Asia gradually returning

是亚洲将重新回到

to being more than half of the world's population

占世界一半以上人口

and more than half of the world's product.

和生产总值的位置。

That's important and it's an important shift.

这很重要，而且是一次重大的权利转移。

But let me tell you a little bit about

但是接下来我要和你们探讨一下

the other shift that I'm talking about,

刚才提到的另外一种转移，

which is power diffusion.

那就是权利分散。

To understand power diffusion

要理解权利分散

put this in your mind:

就要明白一点：

computing and communications costs

计算和交流的成本

have fallen a thousandfold

已经降到原来的千分之几

between 1970

从1970年

and the beginning of this century.

到本世纪初。

Now that's a big abstract number.

这个数字很大，很抽象，

But to make it more real,

但是具体来说，

if the price of an automobile

如果汽车价格

had fallen as rapidly

的降幅

as the price of computing power,

和计算机的降幅一样，

you could buy a car today

那么今天你只花五美元，

for five dollars.

就可以买辆车。

Now when the price of any technology

那么如果所有的技术价格

declines that dramatically,

都以这个幅度下跌，

the barriers to entry go down.

获得这一技术的门槛就会降低；

Anybody can play in the game.

人人都可以享有。

So in 1970,

从20世纪70年代开始，

if you wanted to communicate

如果你想

from Oxford to Johannesburg

从牛津到约翰内斯堡

to New Delhi

或到新德里

to Brasilia

或到巴西利亚

and anywhere simultaneously,

或是其他任何地方获得即时通讯，

you could do it.

是可行的，

The technology was there.

因为技术已经发展到了这个阶段。

But to be able to do it,

但是要真正做到这一点，

you had to be very rich --

你需要很有钱才行——

a government, a multinational corporation,

你要么是政府，要么是跨国公司，

maybe the Catholic Church --

也可能是基督教堂

but you had to be pretty wealthy.

不过你得及其有钱才行。

Now, anybody has that capacity,

但是几天人人都能享有这些技术，

which previously was restricted by price

以前人们受到价格的制约

just to a few actors.

只有少数人才能享有，

If they have the price of entry into an Internet cafe --

如果人们有足够的钱去网吧——

the last time I looked, it was something like a pound an hour --

我上次查到的价格大概是每小时一磅左右——

and if you have Skype, it's free.

但是如果你用Skype，是免费的。

So capabilities

所以曾经

that were once restricted

被限制的能力

are now available to everyone.

现在人人都可以享有。

And what that means

这并不意味着

is not that the age of the State is over.

国家的时代结束了。

The State still matters.

国家依然很重要。

But the stage is crowded.

但是舞台是很拥挤的。

The State's not alone. There are many, many actors.

国家不可能单独存在。还有很多很多的角色。

Some of that's good:

其中有一些是好的角色。

Oxfam,

比如牛津饥荒救济委员会（乐施会）

a great non-governmental actor.

就是一个很重要的非政府角色。

Some of it's bad:

其中也有一些是不好的。

Al Qaeda, another non-governmental actor.

基地组织，是另一个非政府角色。

But think of what it does

但是试想这些对我们

to how we think in traditional terms and concepts.

传统的思维方式和观念有哪些改变。

We think in terms of war

我们过去考虑的是战争

and interstate war.

和内战。

And you can think back to 1941

大家可以想一想1941年，

when the government of Japan

日本政府

attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor.

日本政府袭击美国珍珠港。

It's worth noticing

只得注意的是

that a non-state actor

在2001年，一个非政府的角色

attacking the United States in 2001

袭击了美国

killed more Americans

在这次袭击中丧生的美国人超过了

than the government of Japan did in 1941.

1941年日本政府的行为。

You might think of that

你可能会想

as the privatization of war.

战争已经不再是国家行为。

So we're seeing a great change

因此我们看到的是权力分散的

in terms of diffusion of power.

一个重大变化。

Now the problem is

可问题是

that we're not thinking about it in very innovative ways.

我们对此的看法不够新。

So let me step back

所以让我们再重新审视

and ask: what's power?

并且想一想：什么是权利？

Power is simple the ability

权利其实就是一种能力

to affect others

能够影响他人

to get the outcomes you want,

以达到你的目的，

and you can do it in three ways.

实现权利的方式有三种。

You can do it with threats

可以威胁他人，

of coercion, "sticks,"

通过强迫——棍棒，

you can do it with payments,

可以买通他人

"carrots,"

胡萝卜，

or you can do it by getting others

或者通过让别人心甘情愿地

to want what you want.

做你想要达成的结果。

And that ability to get others to want what you want,

而让别人心甘情愿地做逆向要做的，

to get the outcomes you want

来达到你的目的，

without coercion or payment,

而不是通过强迫或买通，

is what I call soft power.

就是我所说的软实力。

And that soft power has been much neglected

而这种软实力很大程度上被人们所忽视

and much misunderstood,

所误解了。

and yet it's tremendously important.

然而软实力是极其重要地。

Indeed, if you can learn

事实上，如果你知道如何

to use more soft power,

运用软实力，

you can save a lot

你会节省很多地

on carrots and sticks.

胡萝卜和棍棒。

Traditionally, the way people thought about power

按照惯例，人们认为权利

was primarily in terms of military power.

基本就是军事力量。

For example, the great Oxford historian

例如来自牛津的伟大的历史学家

who taught here at this university, A.J.P. Taylor,

A.J.P. 泰勒

defined a great power

对大国的定义是

as a country able to prevail in war.

能够打赢战争的国家。

But we need a new narrative

但是我们需要一个新的阐述

if we're to understand power in the 21st century.

来真正懂得21世纪地权利。

It's not just prevailing at war,

权利不仅仅是赢得战争

though war still persists.

尽管战争依旧存在。

It's not whose army wins;

哪一个国家的军队赢了并不重要；

it's also whose story wins.

重要的是谁讲的故事能够赢得人心。

And we have to think much more in terms of narratives

而且我们需要进一步考虑这个阐释

and whose narrative is going to be effective.

以及谁的阐释更加有效。

Now let me go back

现在我要回到

to the question

国家之间

of power transition

权利转移

between states

的问题

and what's happening there.

讲讲最新的动态。

the narratives that we use now

我们现在用的阐释

tend to be the rise and fall

大多是大国的

of the great powers.

崛起和没落。

And the current narrative is all about

而近来这种阐述全都是

the rise of China

中国的崛起

and the decline of the United States.

和美国的没落

Indeed, with the 2008 financial crisis,

确实，2008年发生的经济危机

many people said this was

会让很多人说这是

the beginning of the end of American power.

美国领导力终结的开始。

The tectonic plates

全球政治格局的板块

of world politics were shifting.

正在发生转变。

And president Medvedev of Russia, for example,

例如俄罗斯的总统梅德韦杰夫，

pronounced in 2008

在2008年曾说过

this was the beginning of the end

经济危机是美国领导力结束

of United States power.

的开端。

But in fact,

然而事实上，

this metaphor of decline

这种衰落的比喻

is often very misleading.

非常误导人。

If you look at history, in recent history,

如果回顾历史，近代历史

you'll see the cycles of belief

你会发现这种认为

in American decline

美国衰落的说法

come and go every 10 or 15 years or so.

每隔10年到20年左右就会出现。

In 1958,

1958年，

after the Soviets put up Sputnik,

苏联发射人造卫星以后

it was "That's the end of America."

人们就说“美国要衰落了。”

In 1973, with the oil embargo

1973年的石油禁运

and the closing of the gold window,

和黄金窗口的关闭，

that was the end of America.

又有人说美国要衰落了。

In the 1980s,

20世纪80年代，

as America went through a transition in the Reagan period,

在里根就职期间，美国经历了一次

between the rust belt economy of the midwest

从美国中西部老工业基地

to the Silicon Valley economy of California,

到加州的硅谷经济的转变，

that was the end of America.

又有人在说美国要衰落了。

But in fact, what we've seen

但事实上，我们发现

is none of those were true.

所有这些谣言都不是真的。

Indeed, people were over-enthusiastic

事实上，正是人们在21世纪初

in the early 2000s,

过分乐观，

thinking America could do anything,

认为美国无所不能，

which led us into some disastrous

导致了我们作出了一些灾难性的

foreign policy adventures,

外交政策，

and now we're back to decline again.

现在又出现了美国衰落的声音。

The moral of this story

总之

is all these narratives about rise and fall and decline

所有这些关于崛起，倒退和衰落的阐述

tell us a lot more about psychology

讲的更多的是一种心理

than they do about reality.

而不是事实。

If we try to focus on the reality,

现在让我们只关注事实，

then what we need to focus on

那么我们就需要关注

is what's really happening

当下在中国和美国

in terms of China and the United States.

正在发生的事情。

Goldman Sachs has projected

高盛预言

that China, the Chinese economy,

中国，中国经济

will surpass that of the U.S.

将会在2027年

by 2027.

超过美国。

So we've got, what,

所以我们只剩下

17 more years to go or so

在中国超过美国之前

before China's bigger.

我们只剩下17年左右。

Now someday,

也许未来

with a billion point three people getting richer,

等到这1.3亿人口富起来的时候，

they are going to be bigger than the United States.

他们将超过美国。

But be very careful about these projections

但是不要轻易接受

such as the Goldman Sachs projection

高盛这些公司做出的预测。

as though that gives you an accurate picture

尽管这些预测能给你本世纪潜力转移的

of power transition in this century.

精确画面。

Let me mention three reasons why it's too simple.

让我来给出为什么这些预测过于简单的原因。

First of all, it's a linear projection.

第一，它是线性的预测。

You know, everything says,

种种迹象

here's the growth rate of China, here's the growth rate of the U.S.,

这是中国的增长率，这是美国的增长率，

here it goes -- straight line.

请看——直线

History is not linear.

然而历史不是一条直线。

There are often bumps along the road, accidents along the way.

历史进程经常出现曲折和突发事件。

The second thing is

第二

that the Chinese economy

中国经济

passes the U.S. economy in, let's say, 2030,

如果说在2030年超过了美国经济，

which it may it,

就算事实真的如此，

that will be a measure of total economic size,

也是按经济总量来衡量的，

but not of per capita income --

并非人均收入——

won't tell you about the composition of the economy.

并不能说明经济的组成。

China still has large areas

中国的广大地区

of underdevelopment

还很落后。

and per capita income is a better measure

人均收入能够更好的衡量

of the sophistication of the economy.

经济的复杂性。

And that the Chinese won't catch up or pass the Americans

在这之后，中国才有可能在人均收入

until somewhere in the latter part,

超过美国，

after 2050, of this century.

那会是在本世纪，2050年以后。

The other point that's worth noticing

另外值得一提的是

is how one-dimensional

这个预测的衡量标准

this projection is.

是多么的单一。

You know, it looks at economic power

它看到是通过GDP，

measured by GDP.

衡量的经济实力。

Doesn't tell you much about military power,

并不说明军事实力，

doesn't tell you very much about soft power.

也不能说明软实力。

It's all very one-dimensional.

它的衡量标准是单一的。

And also, when we think about the rise of Asia,

而且说到亚洲的崛起，

or return of Asia

或者是亚洲的回归，

as I called it a little bit earlier,

就像我之前提到的，

it's worth remembering Asia's not one thing.

需要注意的是亚洲不是一个整体。

If you're sitting in Japan,

对于日本，

or in New Delhi,

新德里，

or in Hanoi,

或者河内来说，

your view of the rise of China

对与中国的崛起

is a little different than if you're sitting in Beijing.

和中国自己的看法是不同的。

Indeed, one of the advantages

事实上，关于亚洲的势力

that the Americans will have

美国拥有的

in terms of power in Asia

一个优势

is all those countries

就是所有这些国家

want an American insurance policy

都希望得到美国政策的保护

against the rise of China.

来制衡中国。

It's as though Mexico and Canada

就像墨西哥和加拿大

were hostile neighbors to the United States,

历史上是美国不很友好的邻邦，

which they're not.

现在也是这样的。

So these simple projections

所以高盛作出的这些

of the Goldman Sachs type

简单的预测

are not telling us what we need to know

并不能说明我们应该知道的

about power transition.

全力转移。

But you might ask, well so what in any case?

然而，你可能会说，无论如何，那又怎么样呢？

Why does it matter? Who cares?

为什么这一点很重要？谁会在乎？

Is this just a game

这只是一场

that diplomats and academics play?

外交家们和学术界的一场游戏吗？

The answer is it matters quite a lot.

答案是这一点很重要。

Because, if you believe in decline

因为，如果相信衰落

and you get the answers wrong on this,

关于这个问题得到的答案是错误的，

the facts, not the myths,

事实上，不是谣传，

you may have policies which are very dangerous.

这样错误的答案是很危险的。

Let me give you an example from history.

以下是历史上的例子。

The Peloponnesian War

伯罗奔尼萨战争

was the great conflict

是希腊城邦体制的

in which the Greek city state system

很大的冲突

tore itself apart

导致了两千伍佰年前

two and a half millennia ago.

希腊的分崩离析。

What caused it?

根源是什么？

Thucydides, the great historian of the the Peloponnesian War,

修西得底斯，伯罗奔尼萨战争时期的伟大历史学家，

said it was the rise in the power of Athens

说是因为希腊人的崛起

and the fear it created in Sparta.

和斯巴达克人对希腊人崛起的恐惧。

Notice both halves of that explanation.

注意这前后这两部分的原因。

Many people argue

很多人认为

that the 21st century

21世纪

is going to repeat the 20th century,

将会重蹈20世纪的覆辙，

in which World War One,

第一次世界大战

the great conflagration

的战火

in which the European state system

使得整个欧洲的体制

tore itself apart

分崩离析

and destroyed its centrality in the world,

破坏了它在世界的中心地位，

that that was caused by

原因就是

the rise in the power of Germany

德国的崛起

and the fear it created in Britain.

和英国的恐慌。

So there are people who are telling us

所以今天有些人告诉我们

this is going to be reproduced today,

今天这样得历史将会重演，

that what we're going to see

为我们将会看到的

is the same thing now in this century.

是本世纪历史得重演。

No, I think that's wrong.

不，我认为这不会发生。

It's bad history.

那段历史不会重蹈。

For one thing, Germany had surpassed Britain

一方面，在1900年德国得工业实力

in industrial strength by 1900.

已经超过了英国。

And as I said earlier,

就像我之前说过的，

China has not passed the United States.

中国还没有超过美国。

But also, if you have this belief

但同时如果相信衰落

and it creates a sense of fear,

就会产生恐惧，

it leads to overreaction.

导致过度反映。

And the greatest danger we have

我们在处理权利向东方转移时

of managing this power transition

面临的最大的危险

of the shift toward the East is fear.

就是恐惧。

To paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt

用罗斯福的话

from a different context,

来说就是

the greatest thing we have to fear is fear itself.

我们最需要害怕的是害怕本身。

We don't have to fear the rise of China

我们不需要害怕中国的崛起

or the return of Asia.

或者亚洲的回归。

And if we have policies

如果我们采取的

in which we take it

政策

in that larger historical perspective,

能够从历史的大局出发，

we're going to be able

我们就可以

to manage this process.

处理好这个过程。

Let me say a word now

现在我想说的一个词就是

about the distribution of power

权利的分配

and how it relates to power diffusion

以及它是如何和权利的分散相联系的

and then pull these two types together.

然后我会把二者撮合到一起。

If you ask how is power distributed in the world today,

如果你们想知道今天世界的是如何分配的，

it's distributed much like

权利的分配很像是

a three-dimensional chess game.

三维的象棋。

Top board:

最高层：

military power among states.

各国的军事力量。

The United States is the only superpower,

美国是唯一的超级大国，

and it's likely to remain that way

而且未来20到30年

for two or three decades.

依然如此。

China's not going to replace the U.S. on this military board.

中国在军事这盘棋还不能取代美国。

Middle board of this three-dimensional chess game:

这盘三维象棋的中间是：

economic power among states.

各国经济实力的较量。

Power is multi-polar.

经济实力是多极的。

There are balancers --

各级之间相互平衡。

the U.S., Europe,

美国，欧洲，

China, Japan

中国，日本

can balance each other.

能够相互制衡。

The bottom board of this three-dimensional,

三维象棋的最下层，

the board of transnational relations,

是各国之间的关系，

things that cross borders outside the control of governments,

是各国政府所不能够控制的因素，

things like climate change, drug trade,

例如气候变暖，毒品走私，

financial flows,

货币流入和流出，

pandemics,

传染病，

all these things that cross borders

所有这些跨国因素

outside the control of governments,

都不是政府所能掌控的，

there nobody's in charge.

而且也没有人负责。

It makes no sense to call this unipolar

把这些叫做单极或者多极是没有

or multi-polar.

任何意义的。

Power is chaotically distributed.

权利的分配是很混乱的。

And the only way you can solve these problems --

而且唯一能解决这些跨国问题的——

and this is where many greatest challenges

这也正是本世纪出现的很多

are coming in this century --

大的挑战的唯一出路——

is through cooperation,

那就是合作，

through working together,

通过互相合作，

which means that soft power becomes more important,

也就是说软实力越来越重要了，

that ability to organize networks

协调各国的关系

to deal with these kinds of problems

来解决这些问题

and to be able to get cooperation.

并达成一致日益重要。

Another way of putting it

另外一种阐释就是

is that as we think of power in the 21st century,

说到21世纪的权利，

we want to get away from the idea

我们想要摆脱

that power's always zero sum --

权利总是走向零和——

my gain is your loss and vice versa.

不是你死就是我活

Power can also be positive sum,

权利也可以是正和，

where your gain can be my gain.

你获得的同时我也可以获得。

If China develops greater energy security

如果中国能的能源安全发展的更好，

and greater capacity

处理

to deal with its problems of carbon emissions,

碳排放的能力越强

that's good for us

对我们来说有好处，

as well as good for China

同时对中国有好处

as well as good for everybody else.

而且对每个国家都有好处。

So empowering China

因此赋予中国

to deal with its own problems of carbon

应对温室效应的能力

is good for everybody,

对谁都有好处，

and it's not a zero sum, I win, you lose.

而且这不是一个零和游戏，我赢你就输了。

It's one in which we can all gain.

这是一场双赢的游戏。

So as we think about power

所以想到本世纪的

in this century,

权利，

we want to get away from this view

我们要摆脱这种

that it's all I win, you lose.

你死我活的观念。

Now I don't mean to be Pollyannaish about this.

我并不是过分乐观。

Wars persist. Power persists.

战争已就存在，权利依旧存在。

Military power is important.

军事力量依旧很重要。

Keeping balances is important.

保持平衡很重要。

All this still persists.

所有这些仍然继续。

Hard power is there,

硬实力很重要，

and it will remain.

而且依然很重要。

But unless you learn how to mix

但是除非学会如何将

hard power with soft power

硬实力和软实力相结合

into strategies that I call smart power,

到我所说的巧实力的战略中，

you're not going to deal with the new kinds of problems

就不用再处理我们所面对的类似的

that we're facing.

新问题了。

So the key question that we need to think about as we look at this

因此关键问题是关于这个问题时我们需要

is how do we work together

思考如何合作

to produce global public goods,

来创造有益于全世界

things from which all of us can benefit?

有益于每个国家的东西。

How do we define our national interests

思考如何定义国家利益

so that it's not just zero sum,

这样它就不再是零和，

but positive sum.

而是正和。

In that sense, if we define our interests,

那样的话，如果我们能够定义我们的利益，

for example, for the United States

例如，在19世纪英国

the way Britain defined its interests in the 19th century,

认为美国可以使其

keeping an open trading system,

保持开放的贸易体系，

keeping a monetary stability, keeping freedom of the seas --

稳定的货币，和海上自由——

those were good for Britain,

这些对英国都是有利的，

they were good for others as well.

对其他国家也是有利的。

And in the 21st century, you have to do an analog to that.

在21世界，我们应该以史为鉴，

How do we produce global public goods,

如何创造有利于全世界，

which are good for us,

有利于我们自己，

but good for everyone at the same time?

但同时又有利于每个人的事情，

And that's going to be the good news dimension

这就是我们在思考

of what we need to think about

21世纪的权利时

as we think of power in the 21st century.

想到的一些好的结果。

There are ways to define our interests

对于国家利益的理解，

in which, while protecting ourselves with hard power,

在用硬实力保护自我的同时

we can organize with others in networks

我们还可以协调和其他国家的关系

to produce, not only public goods,

来创造不仅是有利于全世界

but ways that will enhance our soft power.

同时也有利于增强我们的软实力的理解。

So if one looks at the statements

因此得到这一结论的

that have been made about this,

说法，

I am impressed that when Hillary Clinton

希拉里克林顿

described the foreign policy

关于奥巴马政府

of the Obama administration,

外交政策的阐述让我印象颇深，

she said that the foreign policy of the Obama administration

她说奥巴马政府的外交政策

was going to be smart power,

应该立足于巧实力，

as she put it, "using all the tools

就向她说得那样“利用

in our foreign policy tool box."

外交政策的各种策略。“

And if we're going to deal

要处理好

with these two great power shifts that I've described,

我提到的这两种全力转移，

the power shift represented by transition among states,

一种是国家之间权利的转移，

the power shift represented

一种是

by diffusion of power away from all states,

从国家分散出来的权利，

we're going to have to develop a new narrative of power

我们就需要形成关于权利的新的阐释

in which we combine hard and soft power

将软硬实力结合

into strategies of smart power.

到巧实力中。

And that's the good news I have. We can do that.

这就是我说的好消息。我们能够做到。

Thank you very much.

非常感谢。

(Applause)

（鼓掌）