Joseph Nye on global power shifts

譯者: Eric Chu 審譯者: Wang-Ju Tsai

I'm going to talk to you

我想和你們談談

about power in this 21st century.

這21世紀裡的權力。

And basically, what I'd like to tell you

而基本上我想告訴你們的，

is that power is changing,

就是權力正在改變。

and there are two types of changes

有兩種改變

I want to discuss.

是我想要探討的。

One is power transition,

一是權力的轉移，

which is change of power amongst states.

也就是國際中不同國家擁有的權力的改變。

And there the simple version of the message

這種改變簡單說起來

is it's moving from West to East.

就是權力正由西方移向東方。

The other is power diffusion,

另一個則是權力的擴散

the way power is moving

也就是權力移動的方式

from all states West or East

從所有國家，西方或東方

to non-state actors.

到非國家或非政府個體。

Those two things

這兩種現象

are the huge shifts of power

就是這世紀裡重要的

in our century.

權力轉移。

And I want to tell you about them each separately

而我想和你們分別聊聊這兩種現象

and then how they interact

以及它們如何的互動

and why, in the end, there may be some good news.

和為什麽，在最後，可能還是有好消息。

When we talk about power transition,

在討論權力的轉移的時候，

we often talk about the rise of Asia.

我們常常講到亞洲的崛起。

It really should be called

但它真的應該要被稱為

the recovery or return of Asia.

亞洲的回復，或重返國際舞臺。

If we looked at the world

如果我們來看

in 1800,

1800年的世界，

you'd find that more than half of the world's people

你會發覺世界上過半的人口

lived in Asia

住在亞洲，

and they made more than half the world's product.

這過半的人口也生產世界上超過一半的產品。

Now fast forward to 1900:

現在快轉到1900年，

half the world's people -- more than half -- still live in Asia,

世界上一半的人口--超過一半的人仍然住在亞洲，

but they're now making

但他們只有生產了

only a fifth of the world's product.

世界上五分之一的產品。

What happened? The Industrial Revolution,

有什麼事件發生了嗎? 工業革命。

which meant that all of a sudden,

這表示一夕之間

Europe and America

歐洲和美洲

became the dominant center of the world.

成為了世界上的統治中心。

What we're going to see in the 21st century

我們在二十一世紀會看到的

is Asia gradually returning

是亞洲逐步地再擁有

to being more than half of the world's population

世界過半的人口

and more than half of the world's product.

和生產超過世界一半的產品。

That's important and it's an important shift.

那是重要的一點，也是很重要的轉變。

But let me tell you a little bit about

但讓我來告訴你們一些

the other shift that I'm talking about,

我一開始談到的另一個轉變，

which is power diffusion.

權力的擴散。

To understand power diffusion

要了解權力的擴散，

put this in your mind:

你們必須先設想：

computing and communications costs

計算和通信的費用

have fallen a thousandfold

跟1970年比起來

between 1970

二十一世紀初的價格

and the beginning of this century.

降低了整整一千倍。

Now that's a big abstract number.

這聽起來像是個大而抽象的數字，

But to make it more real,

但要讓這聽起來比較真實一點，

if the price of an automobile

我們來假想如果汽車的價格

had fallen as rapidly

也是跌了一千倍，

as the price of computing power,

就像電腦計算能力的價格一樣，

you could buy a car today

你今天可以去買一輛車，

for five dollars.

而那只會花上你五塊美金。

Now when the price of any technology

當任何科技的價格

declines that dramatically,

如此戲劇性的降低，

the barriers to entry go down.

入門的門檻也會跟著降低，

Anybody can play in the game.

任何人都可以參與競爭。

So in 1970,

在1970年，

if you wanted to communicate

如果你想要啟動

from Oxford to Johannesburg

從牛津到約翰尼斯堡

to New Delhi

到新德里

to Brasilia

到巴西利亞

and anywhere simultaneously,

和任何地方的同步通訊，

you could do it.

你是做得到的，

The technology was there.

科技是有的。

But to be able to do it,

但要真的去做，

you had to be very rich --

你必須要非常的富有--

a government, a multinational corporation,

像是政府、多國企業、

maybe the Catholic Church --

或許天主教廷等才有可能

but you had to be pretty wealthy.

總之你必須要非常有錢。

Now, anybody has that capacity,

但現在，任何人都做得到，

which previously was restricted by price

之前因為價格的限制

just to a few actors.

使得能參與的個體極少，

If they have the price of entry into an Internet cafe --

現在任何人付得起使用網咖的費用--

the last time I looked, it was something like a pound an hour --

我上次看得時候一小時大概才一英鎊吧--

and if you have Skype, it's free.

而且如果你有用Skype的話還免費。

So capabilities

所以在以前

that were once restricted

僅限於少數人特權

are now available to everyone.

現在已經到了普及大眾的程度。

And what that means

而這表示的

is not that the age of the State is over.

並不是美國的時代已經結束了。

The State still matters.

美國仍然很重要。

But the stage is crowded.

但是國際舞台上變得更擁擠，

The State's not alone. There are many, many actors.

美國並不孤單。還有很多很多的參與者。

Some of that's good:

有些是好的：

Oxfam,

像，樂施會，

a great non-governmental actor.

這是一個很棒的非政府組織。

Some of it's bad:

有些是不好的：

Al Qaeda, another non-governmental actor.

蓋達組織，另一個非政府組織。

But think of what it does

但想想這些

to how we think in traditional terms and concepts.

對我們傳統的觀念做了哪些改變。

We think in terms of war

我們用戰爭

and interstate war.

或國與國之間的戰爭的角度來思考。

And you can think back to 1941

而你們可以回想一下，在1941年

when the government of Japan

日本政府

attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor.

攻擊了美國珍珠港。

It's worth noticing

值得一提的是

that a non-state actor

一個非政府的組織

attacking the United States in 2001

在2001年對美國的攻擊

killed more Americans

比1941年日本政府

than the government of Japan did in 1941.

殺的美國人還要多。

You might think of that

你可以想成

as the privatization of war.

這是戰爭的私有化。

So we're seeing a great change

所以我們正看到了很大的改變

in terms of diffusion of power.

發生在權力擴散這方面。

Now the problem is

現在問題是

that we're not thinking about it in very innovative ways.

我們並沒有用很創新的想法來考量這個現象。

So let me step back

讓我們來重新檢視，

and ask: what's power?

來問問: 權力是什麼?

Power is simple the ability

權力，最簡單來說就是

to affect others

“影響別人

to get the outcomes you want,

去得到你想要的結果的能力。”

and you can do it in three ways.

而這可以用三種方式達成：

You can do it with threats

你可以使用威脅，

of coercion, "sticks,"

強勢的逼迫--棍子；

you can do it with payments,

你也可以使用金錢--

"carrots,"

紅蘿蔔；

or you can do it by getting others

或你可以讓別人

to want what you want.

去想要你所想要的結果。

And that ability to get others to want what you want,

而用這種使別人想要你所想要的能力

to get the outcomes you want

來達到你想要的結果，

without coercion or payment,

沒有威脅或金錢利誘

is what I call soft power.

我稱之為軟實力。

And that soft power has been much neglected

而軟實力常常被忽略

and much misunderstood,

甚至誤解。

and yet it's tremendously important.

但其實它扮演了極度重要的角色。

Indeed, if you can learn

沒錯，如果你能學習

to use more soft power,

去使用更多的軟實力，

you can save a lot

你可以省下很多的

on carrots and sticks.

紅蘿蔔和棍子。

Traditionally, the way people thought about power

傳統來說，大多數人想到權力的時候，

was primarily in terms of military power.

主要都是以武力的角度來想。

For example, the great Oxford historian

舉個例子：偉大的牛津史學家

who taught here at this university, A.J.P. Taylor,

A.J.P.泰勒曾在這間大學教書。

defined a great power

他定義一個強權

as a country able to prevail in war.

為一個在戰爭裡能夠得勝的國家。

But we need a new narrative

但我們需要一個新的闡述方法

if we're to understand power in the 21st century.

來幫助我們了解二十一世紀裡的權力。

It's not just prevailing at war,

這不只是在戰爭中得勝，

though war still persists.

雖然戰爭持續在發生，

It's not whose army wins;

這不是誰的軍隊可以贏，

it's also whose story wins.

而也是誰的故事可以贏。

And we have to think much more in terms of narratives

而我們必須要多多以故事的角度來想，

and whose narrative is going to be effective.

看看誰的故事會是最有效的。

Now let me go back

現在讓我回到

to the question

有關於

of power transition

權力轉移於

between states

不同國家之間的問題

and what's happening there.

和現在的情況究竟是如何。

the narratives that we use now

我們現在所使用的闡述方法，

tend to be the rise and fall

常常是強權的

of the great powers.

崛起和殞落。

And the current narrative is all about

而當前我們看到的全部都是

the rise of China

中國的崛起

and the decline of the United States.

和美國的衰退。

Indeed, with the 2008 financial crisis,

沒錯，2008年的財務危機，

many people said this was

很多人說這是

the beginning of the end of American power.

美國強權結束的開始。

The tectonic plates

世界政治的

of world politics were shifting.

結構板塊正在轉移。

And president Medvedev of Russia, for example,

而舉個例子來說：俄羅斯的總統梅德維傑夫

pronounced in 2008

在2008年對外宣稱

this was the beginning of the end

這是美國強權

of United States power.

結束的開始。

But in fact,

但事實上，

this metaphor of decline

這種所謂衰退的象徵

is often very misleading.

是非常誤導人的。

If you look at history, in recent history,

如果你看看歷史，最近的歷史，

you'll see the cycles of belief

你會看到每隔十到十五年，

in American decline

就會出現對於

come and go every 10 or 15 years or so.

美國衰退的看法。

In 1958,

在1958年，

after the Soviets put up Sputnik,

蘇聯把史普尼克1號送上太空之後，

it was "That's the end of America."

很多人說「那是美國的末日。」

In 1973, with the oil embargo

在1973年的石油禁運

and the closing of the gold window,

以及美元和黃金互相轉換的結束，

that was the end of America.

很多人也說那是美國的末日。

In the 1980s,

在1980年代，

as America went through a transition in the Reagan period,

當美國經歷了雷根總統任內的經濟轉換--

between the rust belt economy of the midwest

從美國中西部的銹帶經濟

to the Silicon Valley economy of California,

到加州的矽谷經濟--

that was the end of America.

很多人也說那是美國的末日。

But in fact, what we've seen

但事實上，我們所看到的

is none of those were true.

是沒有任何一個關於美國末日的說法是事實。

Indeed, people were over-enthusiastic

沒錯，人們在2000年代早期

in the early 2000s,

是過度樂觀的，

thinking America could do anything,

他們相信美國什麼都做得到，

which led us into some disastrous

進而導致一些災難性的

foreign policy adventures,

外交政策，

and now we're back to decline again.

現在我們又回到了美國正在衰退這個論點。

The moral of this story

這個故事的寓意指出

is all these narratives about rise and fall and decline

所有這些有關崛起衰退再崛起的看法，

tell us a lot more about psychology

告訴我們很多關於心理層面的想法，

than they do about reality.

而不真正是對現實的描述。

If we try to focus on the reality,

如果我們試著專注於現實，

then what we need to focus on

那我們真的要關心的

is what's really happening

是在中國和美國之間

in terms of China and the United States.

真的在發生的事情。

Goldman Sachs has projected

高盛集團預測

that China, the Chinese economy,

中國和中國的經濟

will surpass that of the U.S.

會在2027年

by 2027.

超越美國。

So we've got, what,

所以我們還有，

17 more years to go or so

大約十七多年

before China's bigger.

才會等到中國比美國壯大。

Now someday,

有一天，

with a billion point three people getting richer,

當十三億人同時的富有起來

they are going to be bigger than the United States.

他們會比美國還要強大。

But be very careful about these projections

但我們應該謹慎來看，

such as the Goldman Sachs projection

像是由高盛集團所提出的這些預測。

as though that gives you an accurate picture

這些並不能告訴你們

of power transition in this century.

這個世紀裡權力會如何真正的轉移。

Let me mention three reasons why it's too simple.

讓我提出三個為什麼這些預測太簡易的原因：

First of all, it's a linear projection.

第一，這些預測都是直線形的預測。

You know, everything says,

你們知道，所有的資料顯示

here's the growth rate of China, here's the growth rate of the U.S.,

這是中國的成長率，而那是美國的成長率

here it goes -- straight line.

所以我們來就用這些成長率來做線形的預測。

History is not linear.

歷史不是直線形的，

There are often bumps along the road, accidents along the way.

歷史的長路上中間常常會有凸塊甚至有意外發生。

The second thing is

第二點，

that the Chinese economy

當中國的經濟

passes the U.S. economy in, let's say, 2030,

在，我們假設2030年好了，超越美國的經濟，

which it may it,

這有可能會發生，

that will be a measure of total economic size,

那會是一個整個經濟體的測量，

but not of per capita income --

但不是人均收入的測量--

won't tell you about the composition of the economy.

也就是那並不會顯示整個經濟體的結構。

China still has large areas

中國仍然有大部分的區域

of underdevelopment

處於尚未開發的狀態，

and per capita income is a better measure

而人均收入是一個比較好的測量方式，

of the sophistication of the economy.

尤其對於中國如此複雜的經濟體。

And that the Chinese won't catch up or pass the Americans

而中國人在人均收入

until somewhere in the latter part,

在這個世紀後期，2050年以後

after 2050, of this century.

都不會追上或超越美國人的人均收入。

The other point that's worth noticing

第三點值得注意的

is how one-dimensional

是這些預測

this projection is.

都是只考慮單方面的。

You know, it looks at economic power

你們知道，當測量經濟實力的時候

measured by GDP.

採用的是國內生產總值，

Doesn't tell you much about military power,

這沒辦法告訴你多少關於軍事實力，

doesn't tell you very much about soft power.

沒辦法告訴你多少關於軟實力，

It's all very one-dimensional.

這完全是一維化的。

And also, when we think about the rise of Asia,

同時，當我們想到亞洲崛起，

or return of Asia

或我早些對這個現象的稱呼

as I called it a little bit earlier,

亞洲重返國際舞臺的時候，

it's worth remembering Asia's not one thing.

我們應該要記得亞洲不是一個個體.

If you're sitting in Japan,

如果你坐在日本、

or in New Delhi,

新德里、

or in Hanoi,

或是河內，

your view of the rise of China

那你對中國崛起的看法

is a little different than if you're sitting in Beijing.

將會和你坐在北京的看法有些不同。

Indeed, one of the advantages

沒錯，美國

that the Americans will have

在亞洲的權力分配裡

in terms of power in Asia

將會有的優勢之一，

is all those countries

是很多亞洲國家

want an American insurance policy

會想要有美國作靠山

against the rise of China.

來抗衡中國的崛起。

It's as though Mexico and Canada

這就像是如果墨西哥和加拿大

were hostile neighbors to the United States,

是美國危險的鄰居--

which they're not.

他們當然不是。

So these simple projections

所以這些例如高盛

of the Goldman Sachs type

所做的簡單的預測，

are not telling us what we need to know

並沒有告訴我們對於

about power transition.

權力轉移所需要知道的東西。

But you might ask, well so what in any case?

但你可能會問，好吧，但是如果中國真的崛起了那又怎樣?

Why does it matter? Who cares?

這很重要嗎?為什麼我們應該去關心這件事?

Is this just a game

這是不是一場

that diplomats and academics play?

外交官和學術家們在玩的遊戲?

The answer is it matters quite a lot.

答案是，這的確很重要。

Because, if you believe in decline

因為，如果你相信衰退，

and you get the answers wrong on this,

而你對於衰退的疑問的回答是不正確的

the facts, not the myths,

事實，甚至不是神話，

you may have policies which are very dangerous.

你可能會採取一些很危險的政策。

Let me give you an example from history.

讓我從歷史來給你們舉個例子，

The Peloponnesian War

伯羅奔尼撒戰爭

was the great conflict

是那場

in which the Greek city state system

希臘式城邦系統

tore itself apart

被自己摧毀的大衝突，

two and a half millennia ago.

這發生在大約兩千五百年前。

What caused it?

什麼導致它的發生?

Thucydides, the great historian of the the Peloponnesian War,

修昔底德，紀錄伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的偉大史學家，

said it was the rise in the power of Athens

說是雅典為首的同盟的實力盛興

and the fear it created in Sparta.

進而對斯巴達帶來恐懼而導致的。

Notice both halves of that explanation.

注意這兩半的解釋，

Many people argue

很多人會說

that the 21st century

二十一世紀

is going to repeat the 20th century,

將會重覆二十世紀：

in which World War One,

像第一次世界大戰是

the great conflagration

歐洲各國政治系統

in which the European state system

摧毀自己

tore itself apart

和摧毀歐洲在世界中心

and destroyed its centrality in the world,

的導火綫。

that that was caused by

而原因是由於

the rise in the power of Germany

德國實力的崛起

and the fear it created in Britain.

和它在英國造成的恐懼導致的。

So there are people who are telling us

所以現在我們就聽到

this is going to be reproduced today,

類似的歷史將會重演，

that what we're going to see

而我們將會看到

is the same thing now in this century.

同樣的事情發生在這個世紀。

No, I think that's wrong.

不，我認為這是錯的。

It's bad history.

這是拙劣的歷史。

For one thing, Germany had surpassed Britain

我們必須知道，德國

in industrial strength by 1900.

在1900年就已經在工業實力上超越了英國，

And as I said earlier,

而我早些已經提到了，

China has not passed the United States.

中國還沒有超越美國。

But also, if you have this belief

但是，如果你相信中國已經超越美國，

and it creates a sense of fear,

而那產生了一種恐懼感，

it leads to overreaction.

這就會導致過度反應。

And the greatest danger we have

而我們當前

of managing this power transition

在管理這個權力朝東方轉移

of the shift toward the East is fear.

最大的危險就是恐懼。

To paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt

我來改述富蘭克林‧羅斯福

from a different context,

在另一個場合所講的，

the greatest thing we have to fear is fear itself.

我們最大的恐懼，就是恐懼本身。

We don't have to fear the rise of China

我們不需要害怕中國的崛起，

or the return of Asia.

或是亞洲重返國際舞臺，

And if we have policies

而如果我們有

in which we take it

把歷史放入考量

in that larger historical perspective,

的政策，

we're going to be able

我們將可以

to manage this process.

有效度過這個過程。

Let me say a word now

現在讓我來談談

about the distribution of power

權力的分配

and how it relates to power diffusion

以及它和權力的擴散的關係，

and then pull these two types together.

然後在把這兩者連結在一起。

If you ask how is power distributed in the world today,

如果你問說今天全球的權力是如何分配的?

it's distributed much like

答案是

a three-dimensional chess game.

那就像一場立體3D的三層西洋棋賽：

Top board:

最上一個棋盤：

military power among states.

不同國家的軍事實力。

The United States is the only superpower,

美國是唯一的強權，

and it's likely to remain that way

而這很有可能在

for two or three decades.

未來二三十年保持如此，

China's not going to replace the U.S. on this military board.

中國在這個層面不會取代美國。

Middle board of this three-dimensional chess game:

中間的棋盤：

economic power among states.

不同國家的經濟實力，

Power is multi-polar.

實力是多極化的，

There are balancers --

這有很多的平衡者：

the U.S., Europe,

美國、歐洲、

China, Japan

中國、日本

can balance each other.

會平衡彼此。

The bottom board of this three-dimensional,

最下層的棋盤：

the board of transnational relations,

國家之間的關係，

things that cross borders outside the control of governments,

外於政府控制而跨國界的東西，

things like climate change, drug trade,

像是氣候變遷、毒品交易、

financial flows,

財務流、

pandemics,

全球流行病等，

all these things that cross borders

所有這些跨越國界

outside the control of governments,

而外於政府控制的東西，

there nobody's in charge.

沒有人是真正的領頭。

It makes no sense to call this unipolar

要稱之為單極化

or multi-polar.

或多極化並不正確。

Power is chaotically distributed.

權力很混亂的分散，

And the only way you can solve these problems --

而唯一能解決這些問題的方法

and this is where many greatest challenges

而這也是很多這世紀

are coming in this century --

最大的挑戰

is through cooperation,

就是合作，

through working together,

同心協力的來解決。

which means that soft power becomes more important,

這也表示軟實力越來越重要。

that ability to organize networks

軟實力能夠組織、

to deal with these kinds of problems

解決這些問題

and to be able to get cooperation.

和組織合作的連結。

Another way of putting it

另一種描述這的方式，

is that as we think of power in the 21st century,

就是當我們思考二十一世紀裡的權力，

we want to get away from the idea

我們必須摒棄

that power's always zero sum --

權力是零和遊戲這個觀念--

my gain is your loss and vice versa.

我的增是你的減。

Power can also be positive sum,

權力的總和可以是正數，

where your gain can be my gain.

也就是你的增加也可以是我的增加。

If China develops greater energy security

如果中國開發了更多的能源保證

and greater capacity

和更多的能力

to deal with its problems of carbon emissions,

來處理它境內的碳排放的問題，

that's good for us

那對我們有益、

as well as good for China

對中國有益、

as well as good for everybody else.

也對所有其他人有益。

So empowering China

所以激勵中國

to deal with its own problems of carbon

來處理它的碳排放問題

is good for everybody,

對所有人都有益，

and it's not a zero sum, I win, you lose.

而這不會是權力加總起來是零，

It's one in which we can all gain.

而是所有人都從中獲益。

So as we think about power

所以當我們想到

in this century,

這個世紀裡的權力，

we want to get away from this view

我們必須遠離

that it's all I win, you lose.

我嬴你輸這種看法。

Now I don't mean to be Pollyannaish about this.

我無意做一個盲目而樂觀的人，

Wars persist. Power persists.

戰爭仍然在發生，權力仍然重要，

Military power is important.

軍事實力很重要，

Keeping balances is important.

保持平衡很重要，

All this still persists.

這些所有的仍然持續著，

Hard power is there,

硬實力還是存在，

and it will remain.

而且還會繼續存留。

But unless you learn how to mix

但除非你學著將

hard power with soft power

硬實力和軟實力

into strategies that I call smart power,

混合成所謂我稱呼的巧實力，

you're not going to deal with the new kinds of problems

你將無法處理我們正在面對

that we're facing.

的新的問題。

So the key question that we need to think about as we look at this

所以我們現在最需要思考的關鍵問題，

is how do we work together

就是我們如何可以同心協力合作

to produce global public goods,

來產生對於全球都有好處

things from which all of us can benefit?

使得每個人都可以獲益?

How do we define our national interests

我們如何定義我們的國家利益，

so that it's not just zero sum,

使得權力的總和不會是零，

but positive sum.

而是大於零。

In that sense, if we define our interests,

如果我們能使用這種思維來定義國家利益，

for example, for the United States

舉個例子：對美國來說

the way Britain defined its interests in the 19th century,

英國在十九世紀定義國家利益的方法，

keeping an open trading system,

是保持開放的貿易系統、

keeping a monetary stability, keeping freedom of the seas --

保持貨幣穩定、保持航海的自由--

those were good for Britain,

這些對英國有益，

they were good for others as well.

也對其他國家有益。

And in the 21st century, you have to do an analog to that.

而在二十一世紀裡，你必須要做出類似的舉動。

How do we produce global public goods,

我們如何產生全球公共財，

which are good for us,

那不只對我們有益

but good for everyone at the same time?

也在同時讓所有人獲益，

And that's going to be the good news dimension

而那就是屬於我們在思考

of what we need to think about

二十一世紀裡的權力

as we think of power in the 21st century.

的好消息的方面

There are ways to define our interests

在定義國家利益的時候，

in which, while protecting ourselves with hard power,

除了使用硬實力來保護自己，

we can organize with others in networks

我們還能組織我們和其他人

to produce, not only public goods,

來生產，不只有公共財

but ways that will enhance our soft power.

還有能夠提升我們軟實力的方法。

So if one looks at the statements

所以如果有人來檢驗

that have been made about this,

官方對於此的發言，

I am impressed that when Hillary Clinton

希拉蕊‧柯林頓在描述

described the foreign policy

歐巴馬政府的外交政策

of the Obama administration,

的發言給我很深刻的印象：

she said that the foreign policy of the Obama administration

她說歐巴馬政府的外交政策

was going to be smart power,

將會以巧實力為中心，

as she put it, "using all the tools

她說：「使用我們外交政策

in our foreign policy tool box."

工具箱裡所有的工具。」

And if we're going to deal

而如果我們要面對

with these two great power shifts that I've described,

我所提到的重大權力轉移：

the power shift represented by transition among states,

由轉移在不同國家之間所代表的，

the power shift represented

和由擴散遠離於政府

by diffusion of power away from all states,

所代表的權力轉移，

we're going to have to develop a new narrative of power

我們將會有一個對於權力的新的闡述方法。

in which we combine hard and soft power

結合硬和軟實力

into strategies of smart power.

來創造聰明實力的策略，

And that's the good news I have. We can do that.

這就是我的好消息。我們真的做得到。

Thank you very much.

非常謝謝你們

(Applause)

(掌聲)