Thomas Piketty: New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century

Translator: Klavdija Cernilogar Reviewer: Nika Kotnik

It's very nice to be here tonight.

Lepo je biti z vami nocoj.

So I've been working on the history of income

Zadnjih 15 let se ukvarjam z zgodovino prihodkov in z razporeditvijo bogastva

and wealth distribution for the past 15 years,

and one of the interesting lessons

in eden od zanimivih izsledkov na podlagi zgodovinskih dokazov je,

coming from this historical evidence

is indeed that, in the long run,

da na dolgi rok stopnja donosa na kapital ponavadi preseže gospodarsko rast,

there is a tendency for the rate of return of capital

to exceed the economy's growth rate,

and this tends to lead to high concentration of wealth.

kar vodi v visoko koncentracijo bogastva.

Not infinite concentration of wealth,

Ne neskončno koncentracijo, ampak v večji prepad med r in g,

but the higher the gap between r and g,

the higher the level of inequality of wealth

višji ko je delež neenakosti premoženja, h kateremu se nagiba družba.

towards which society tends to converge.

So this is a key force that I'm going to talk about today,

O tej temeljni sili bom govoril danes,

but let me say right away

a naj kar takoj povem, da to ni edina pomembna stvar

that this is not the only important force

in the dynamics of income and wealth distribution,

v odnosu prihodka in razdelitve bogastva,

and there are many other forces that play

še veliko drugih sil igra pomembno vlogo v dolgoročni dinamiki

an important role in the long-run dynamics

of income and wealth distribution.

prihodkov in razporeditve premoženja.

Also there is a lot of data

Treba je tudi še zbrati veliko podatkov.

that still needs to be collected.

We know a little bit more today

Danes vemo nekoliko več kot nekoč, a še vedno premalo,

than we used to know, but we still know too little,

and certainly there are many different processes —

in obstaja veliko različnih procesov - ekonomskih, socialnih, političnih -

economic, social, political —

ki jih je treba bolje preučiti.

that need to be studied more.

And so I'm going to focus today on this simple force,

Danes bom razdelal to enostavno silo, a to ne pomeni, da druge ne obstajajo.

but that doesn't mean that other important forces

do not exist.

So most of the data I'm going to present

Večina podatkov na to temo prihaja iz te baze,

comes from this database

that's available online:

ki je na voljo na spletu: "World Top Incomes".

the World Top Incomes Database.

So this is the largest existing

Je največja obstoječa baza podatkov o neenakosti

historical database on inequality,

and this comes from the effort

in je rezultat truda preko 30 znanstvenikov iz več deset držav.

of over 30 scholars from several dozen countries.

So let me show you a couple of facts

Naj vam pokažem par dejstev iz te baze,

coming from this database,

and then we'll return to r bigger than g.

potem pa se vrnemo na r, ki je višji kot g.

So fact number one is that there has been

Prvo dejstvo: prišlo je do velikega obrata v razmerju

a big reversal in the ordering of income inequality

neenakosti prihodkov med ZDA in Evropo v zadnjem stoletju.

between the United States and Europe

over the past century.

So back in 1900, 1910, income inequality was actually

Leta 1900 ali 1910 je bila neenakost prihodkov

much higher in Europe than in the United States,

v Evropi mnogo višja kot v ZDA.

whereas today, it is a lot higher in the United States.

Danes pa je veliko višja v ZDA.

So let me be very clear:

Naj pojasnim:

The main explanation for this is not r bigger than g.

Razlaga ni v tem, da je r večji kot g.

It has more to do with changing supply and demand

Gre bolj za spremembo v ponudbi in povpraševanju

for skill, the race between education and technology,

za veščinami, za tekmo med izobrazbo in tehnologijo,

globalization, probably more unequal access

globalizacijo, verjetno bolj neenak dostop do veščin v ZDA,

to skills in the U.S.,

where you have very good, very top universities

kjer so zelo dobre, vrhunske univerze,

but where the bottom part of the educational system

a kjer dno izobraževalnega sistema ni tako dobro,

is not as good,

so very unequal access to skills,

zato je dostop do veščin neenak.

and also an unprecedented rise

Poleg tega pa prihaja do nezaslišane rasti plač najvišjih menedžerjev v ZDA,

of top managerial compensation of the United States,

which is difficult to account for just on the basis of education.

kar je težko upravičiti samo na podlagi izobrazbe.

So there is more going on here,

Še več pomembnih stvari je, a danes o njih ne bom toliko govoril,

but I'm not going to talk too much about this today,

because I want to focus on wealth inequality.

saj se hočem posvetiti neenakosti bogastva.

So let me just show you a very simple indicator

Tole je enostaven indikator prihodkovne neenakosti.

about the income inequality part.

So this is the share of total income

Tole je delež celotnega prihodka najbogatejših deset odstotkov.

going to the top 10 percent.

So you can see that one century ago,

Vidite, da je bil pred sto leti med 45 in 50 odstotki v Evropi

it was between 45 and 50 percent in Europe

and a little bit above 40 percent in the U.S.,

in malo nad 40 odstotki v ZDA.

so there was more inequality in Europe.

V Evropi je bila neenakost večja.

Then there was a sharp decline

Potem je prišel strm padec v prvi polovici 20. stoletja,

during the first half of the 20th century,

and in the recent decade, you can see that

v zadnjem desetletju pa lahko vidite, da so ZDA postale bolj neenake kot Evropa,

the U.S. has become more unequal than Europe,

and this is the first fact I just talked about.

to je prvo dejstvo.

Now, the second fact is more about wealth inequality,

Drugo dejstvo je bolj povezano z neenakostjo premoženja

and here the central fact is that wealth inequality

in pri tem je bistveno, da je taka neenakost

is always a lot higher than income inequality,

vedno precej večja od neenakosti prihodkov

and also that wealth inequality,

in da je neenakost premoženja,

although it has also increased in recent decades,

čeprav v zadnjih desetletjih narašča,

is still less extreme today

še vedno ni tako skrajna kot pred stoletjem,

than what it was a century ago,

although the total quantity of wealth

čeprav si je celotno premoženje v primerjavi s prihodki opomoglo

relative to income has now recovered

from the very large shocks

od velikih šokov prve svetovne vojne, velike depresije, druge svetovne vojne.

caused by World War I, the Great Depression,

World War II.

So let me show you two graphs

Pokazal vam bom dva grafa, ki predstavljata drugo in tretje dejstvo.

illustrating fact number two and fact number three.

So first, if you look at the level of wealth inequality,

Najprej, če pogledamo nivo neenakosti premoženja,

this is the share of total wealth

tole je delež celotnega premoženja,

going to the top 10 percent of wealth holders,

ki ga ima najbogatejših 10 odstotkov lastnikov,

so you can see the same kind of reversal

vidite lahko podoben obrat

between the U.S. and Europe that we had before

med ZDA in Evropo kot prej pri neenakosti prihodkov.

for income inequality.

So wealth concentration was higher

Koncentracija premoženja je bila

pred 100 leti v Evropi večja kot v ZDA, zdaj pa je obratno.

in Europe than in the U.S. a century ago,

and now it is the opposite.

But you can also show two things:

Pokazati pa se da še dve stvari:

First, the general level of wealth inequality

prvič, splošni nivo neenakosti premoženja je vedno višji od neenakosti prihodkov.

is always higher than income inequality.

So remember, for income inequality,

Torej, pri neenakosti prihodkov je najbogatejših 10 odstotkov

the share going to the top 10 percent

was between 30 and 50 percent of total income,

imelo 30 - 50 odstotkov vseh prihodkov,

whereas for wealth, the share is always

pri premoženju pa je delež vedno med 60 in 90 odstotki.

between 60 and 90 percent.

Okay, so that's fact number one,

To je prvo dejstvo, ki je pomembno za to, kar sledi.

and that's very important for what follows.

Wealth concentration is always

Koncentracija premoženja je vedno dosti večja od koncentracije prihodkov.

a lot higher than income concentration.

Fact number two is that the rise

Drugo dejstvo:

rast neenakosti premoženja v zadnjih desetletjih

in wealth inequality in recent decades

is still not enough to get us back to 1910.

še vedno ni blizu tisti iz 1910.

So the big difference today,

Velika razlika danes je, v ogromni neenakosti premoženja,

wealth inequality is still very large,

with 60, 70 percent of total wealth for the top 10,

saj ima najbogatejših 10 odstotkov 60 - 70 odstotkov vsega,

but the good news is that it's actually

a dobra novica je, da smo pravzaprav na boljšem kot pred stoletjem,

better than one century ago,

where you had 90 percent in Europe going to the top 10.

ko je 90 odstotkov bogastva v Evropi imelo le 10 odstotkov ljudi.

So today what you have

Danes imamo t. i. srednjih 40 odstotkov,

is what I call the middle 40 percent,

the people who are not in the top 10

ljudi, ki niso v zgornjih 10 % in ne v spodnjih 50 odstotkih,

and who are not in the bottom 50,

and what you can view as the wealth middle class

to je torej srednji razred, ki si lasti 20 - 30 odstotkov

that owns 20 to 30 percent

of total wealth, national wealth,

skupnega premoženja, nacionalnega premoženja,

whereas they used to be poor, a century ago,

medtem ko so bili pred sto leti revni, saj srednjega razreda ni bilo.

when there was basically no wealth middle class.

Gre za pomembno spremembo

So this is an important change,

and it's interesting to see that wealth inequality

in zanimivo je, da se neenakost premoženja

has not fully recovered to pre-World War I levels,

ni docela vrnila na raven pred prvo svetovno vojno,

although the total quantity of wealth has recovered.

čeprav smo skupno količino premoženja vrnili na to raven. Ok?

Okay? So this is the total value

To je skupna vrednost premoženja glede na prihodek

of wealth relative to income,

and you can see that in particular in Europe,

in vidite lahko, da je predvsem Evropa skoraj na ravni pred prvo svetovno vojno.

we are almost back to the pre-World War I level.

So there are really two

Gre pravzaprav za dve različni plati zgodbe.

different parts of the story here.

One has to do with

Ena se ukvarja s celotno količino premoženja, ki ga kopičimo,

the total quantity of wealth that we accumulate,

and there is nothing bad per se, of course,

in samo po sebi ni nič slabega v kopičenju veliko premoženja,

in accumulating a lot of wealth,

and in particular if it is more diffuse

sploh, če je razpršeno in ni koncentrirano.

and less concentrated.

So what we really want to focus on

Osredotočiti se želimo na dolgoročni razvoj neenakosti premoženja

is the long-run evolution of wealth inequality,

and what's going to happen in the future.

in na to, kaj se bo zgodilo v prihodnje.

How can we account for the fact that

Kako lahko pojasnimo, da je bila neenakost premoženja

until World War I, wealth inequality was so high

do prve svetovne vojne tako velika in je še rasla

and, if anything, was rising to even higher levels,

in kaj to pomeni za prihodnost?

and how can we think about the future?

So let me come to some of the explanations

Ponudil vam bom nekaj razlag in napovedi za prihodnost.

and speculations about the future.

Let me first say that

Najprej naj povem, da je najbrž najboljša razlaga

probably the best model to explain

why wealth is so much

mnogo večje koncentracije premoženja kot prihodkov

more concentrated than income

is a dynamic, dynastic model

v dinamičnem, dinastičnem modelu,

where individuals have a long horizon

kjer posamezniki na dolgi rok kopičijo premoženje iz različnih razlogov.

and accumulate wealth for all sorts of reasons.

If people were accumulating wealth

Če bi ga kopičili samo iz cikličnih razlogov,

only for life cycle reasons,

you know, to be able to consume

da bi lahko trošili, ko ostarijo,

when they are old,

then the level of wealth inequality

potem bi neenakost premoženja

should be more or less in line

šla bolj ali manj vzporedno z nivojem neenakosti prihodkov.

with the level of income inequality.

But it will be very difficult to explain

A težko bo le s cikličnim modelom razložiti,

why you have so much more wealth inequality

zakaj toliko večja neenakost premoženja od neenakosti prihodkov,

than income inequality

with a pure life cycle model,

so you need a story

zato potrebujemo zgodbo,

where people also care

v kateri je kopičenje premoženja za ljudi pomembno iz drugih razlogov.

about wealth accumulation for other reasons.

So typically, they want to transmit

Tipično je, da želijo premoženje prenesti na novo generacijo, na otroke,

wealth to the next generation, to their children,

ali pa ga želijo kopičiti zaradi prestiža in moči, ki spremlja imetje.

or sometimes they want to accumulate wealth

because of the prestige, the power that goes with wealth.

So there must be other reasons

Za kopičenje premoženja morajo torej obstajati razlogi poleg cikličnega,

for accumulating wealth than just life cycle

to explain what we see in the data.

da bi razložili te podatke.

Now, in a large class of dynamic models

V velikem delu dinamičnih modelov

of wealth accumulation

kopičenja premoženja s tako dinastičnim motivom

with such dynastic motive for accumulating wealth,

you will have all sorts of random,

pride do različnih naključnih multiplikativnih šokov.

multiplicative shocks.

So for instance, some families

Nekatere družine imajo denimo veliko otrok,

have a very large number of children,

so the wealth will be divided.

zato se premoženje deli.

Some families have fewer children.

Nekatere jih imajo manj.

You also have shocks to rates of return.

So tudi šoki stopnje donosa.

Some families make huge capital gains.

Nekatere družine imajo ogromen dobiček od kapitala. Druge slabo vlagajo.

Some made bad investments.

So you will always have some mobility

Vedno bo obstajala določena mobilnost v toku premoženja.

in the wealth process.

Some people will move up, some people will move down.

Nekateri se vzpnejo, drugi padejo.

The important point is that,

Pomembno je, da bo v vsakem modelu

in any such model,

for a given variance of such shocks,

pri dani varianci šokov ravnotežna raven neenakosti premoženja

the equilibrium level of wealth inequality

will be a steeply rising function of r minus g.

strmo naraščajoča funkcija r minus g.

And intuitively, the reason why the difference

Razlog za to, da je razlika med stopnjo donosa na premoženje

between the rate of return to wealth

and the growth rate is important

in stopnjo rasti pomembna,

is that initial wealth inequalities

je intuitivno v tem, da se začetna neenakost premoženja

will be amplified at a faster pace

veča hitreje, če je r minus g večji.

with a bigger r minus g.

So take a simple example,

Enostaven primer: če je r 5% in g znaša 1%,

with r equals five percent and g equals one percent,

wealth holders only need to reinvest

morajo lastniki vložiti le petino kapitala, da bi zagotovili

one fifth of their capital income to ensure

that their wealth rises as fast

rast premoženja v enaki meri, kot raste gospodarstvo.

as the size of the economy.

So this makes it easier

Tako je lažje krepiti ogromno bogastvo,

to build and perpetuate large fortunes

because you can consume four fifths,

saj lahko potrošite štiri petine

assuming zero tax,

pri ničelnem obdavčenju, ter ponovno vložite petino.

and you can just reinvest one fifth.

So of course some families will consume more than that,

Nekatere družine seveda trošijo več,

druge manj, zato obstaja

some will consume less, so there will be

some mobility in the distribution,

določena mobilnost v distribuciji

but on average, they only need to reinvest one fifth,

a povprečno morajo naložiti le petino,

so this allows high wealth inequalities to be sustained.

kar omogoča ohranjanje velikih neenakost premoženja.

Now, you should not be surprised

Ne bodite presenečeni, če rečem,

by the statement that r can be bigger than g forever,

da je r lahko vedno večji od g,

because, in fact, this is what happened

saj je bilo tako

večino zgodovine človeštva.

during most of the history of mankind.

And this was in a way very obvious to everybody

To je bilo na nek način vsem jasno,

for a simple reason, which is that growth

in sicer zato, ker je bila rast

was close to zero percent

blizu nič odstotkov

during most of the history of mankind.

večino zgodovine človeštva.

Growth was maybe 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 percent,

Rast je bila morda 0.1, 0.2 ali 0.3 odstotka,

but very slow growth of population

ob zelo počasni rasti prebivalstva

and output per capita,

in proizvodnje per capita,

whereas the rate of return on capital

medtem ko stopnja kapitalskega donosa

of course was not zero percent.

seveda ni bila ničelna.

It was, for land assets, which was

Za nepremičnine,

kar je tradicionalna oblika

the traditional form

of assets in preindustrial societies,

lastnine v predindustrijskih družbah, je bila tipično petodstotna.

it was typically five percent.

Any reader of Jane Austen would know that.

Vsak bralec Jane Austen to ve.

Če želite letni prihodek 1000 funtov,

If you want an annual income of 1,000 pounds,

you should have a capital value

morate imeti kapital

of 20,000 pounds so that

v višini 20.000 funtov,

five percent of 20,000 is 1,000.

saj je 5% od 20000 prav 1000.

And in a way, this was

Na nek način je bil to

the very foundation of society,

temelj družbe,

because r bigger than g

saj je r višji od g

was what allowed holders of wealth and assets

omogočal lastnikom premoženja,

da so živeli od dobička na kapital

to live off their capital income

and to do something else in life

ter se ukvarjali z drugimi stvarmi

than just to care about their own survival.

kot je boj za golo preživetje.

Now, one important conclusion

Pomemben zaključek

of my historical research is that

moje zgodovinske raziskave je,

modern industrial growth did not change

da več gospodarske rasti ni spremenilo

this basic fact as much as one might have expected.

tega temeljnega dejstva toliko, kot bi pričakovali.

Of course, the growth rate

Seveda je stopnja rasti

following the Industrial Revolution

po industrijski revoluciji

rose, typically from zero to one to two percent,

poskočila, od nič do enega, dveh odstotkov,

but at the same time, the rate of return

a hkrati je zrasla tudi stopnja donosa

to capital also rose

na kapital

so that the gap between the two

in razlika med njima

did not really change.

se ni spremenila.

So during the 20th century,

V 20. stoletju

you had a very unique combination of events.

smo imeli edinstven sklop dogodkov.

First, a very low rate of return

Prvič, zelo nizko stopnjo donosa

due to the 1914 and 1945 war shocks,

zaradi šokov vojn leta 1914 in 1945,

destruction of wealth, inflation,

uničenja premoženja, inflacije,

bankruptcy during the Great Depression,

bankrota med veliko depresijo,

and all of this reduced

vse to je spustilo

the private rate of return to wealth

zasebno stopnjo donosa na premoženje

to unusually low levels

na nenavadno nizko raven

between 1914 and 1945.

med letoma 1914 in 1945.

And then, in the postwar period,

V povojnem obdobju

you had unusually high growth rate,

je bila stopnja rasti nenavadno visoka,

partly due to the reconstruction.

deloma zaradi obnove.

You know, in Germany, in France, in Japan,

Veste, v Nemčiji, Franciji, na Japonskem

you had five percent growth rate

je bila petodstotna rast

between 1950 and 1980

med letoma 1950 in 1980

largely due to reconstruction,

predvsem zaradi obnove

and also due to very large demographic growth,

pa tudi zaradi velike demografske rasti,

the Baby Boom Cohort effect.

zaradi baby boom učinka.

Now, apparently that's not going to last for very long,

To ne bo dolgo trajalo,

or at least the population growth

vsaj rast prebivalstva

is supposed to decline in the future,

naj bi v prihodnje upadla,

and the best projections we have is that

in najboljše projekcije kažejo,

the long-run growth is going to be closer

da bo dolgoročna rast bližje

to one to two percent

enemu do dvema odstotkoma

rather than four to five percent.

in ne štirim ali petim.

So if you look at this,

Poglejte tole,

these are the best estimates we have

to so najboljše ocene

of world GDP growth

svetovne rasti BDP-ja

and rate of return on capital,

ter stopnje donosa na kapital,

average rates of return on capital,

povprečne stopnje donosa,

so you can see that during most

in vidite lahko, da je bila

of the history of mankind,

the growth rate was very small,

večino zgodovine

stopnja rasti zelo nizka,

much lower than the rate of return,

mnogo nižja od stopnje donosa,

and then during the 20th century,

v 20. stoletju

it is really the population growth,

pa sta rast prebivalstva,

very high in the postwar period,

visoka predvsem v povojnem obdobju,

and the reconstruction process

ter proces obnove

that brought growth

pripeljala rast

to a smaller gap with the rate of return.

bližje stopnji donosa.

Here I use the United Nations population projections,

To so OZN-ove projekcije prebivalstva,

so of course they are uncertain.

seveda so negotove.

It could be that we all start

Morda bomo v prihodnje

having a lot of children in the future,

vsi imeli veliko otrok

and the growth rates are going to be higher,

in stopnje rasti bodo višje,

but from now on,

these are the best projections we have,

a zaenkrat

so to najboljše projekcije,

and this will make global growth

in tako bo svetovna rast

decline and the gap between

upadla in razlika

the rate of return go up.

s stopnjo donosa bo zrasla.

Now, the other unusual event

Drug nenavaden dogodek

during the 20th century

v 20. stoletju

was, as I said,

je bilo, kot rečeno,

destruction, taxation of capital,

uničenje, obdavčenje kapitala,

so this is the pre-tax rate of return.

to je stopnja donosa pred obdavčitvijo.

This is the after-tax rate of return,

Taka je po obdavčitvi

and after destruction,

in po uničenju,

and this is what brought

kar je za dolgo časa prineslo

the average rate of return

povprečno stopnjo donosa

after tax, after destruction,

po obdavčitvi, po uničenju,

below the growth rate during a long time period.

pod raven rasti.

But without the destruction,

A pred uničenjem,

without the taxation, this would not have happened.

brez davka, se to ne bi zgodilo.

So let me say that the balance between

Ravnotežje med

returns on capital and growth

donosom na kapital in rastjo

depends on many different factors

je odvisno od številnih faktorjev,

that are very difficult to predict:

ki jih je težko predvideti:

technology and the development

tehnologija in razvoj

of capital-intensive techniques.

kapitalsko intenzivnih tehnik.

Trenutno so najbolj kapitalsko intenzivni sektorji

So right now, the most capital-intensive sectors

in the economy are the real estate sector, housing,

gospodarstva nepremičninski, stanovanjski,

the energy sector, but it could be in the future

energetski, a v prihodnje

that we have a lot more robots in a number of sectors

bomo morda v številnih sektorjih imeli veliko več robotov

and that this would be a bigger share

in bo v tem večji delež

of the total capital stock that it is today.

celotnih zalog kapitala kot danes.

Well, we are very far from this,

Še daleč od tega smo,

and from now, what's going on

kar se sedaj dogaja

in the real estate sector, the energy sector,

pri nepremičninah, energetiki,

is much more important for the total capital stock

je veliko bolj pomembno kot celotne zaloge kapitala in kapitalski deleži.

and capital share.

The other important issue

Druga pomembna stvar

is that there are scale effects in portfolio management,

je, da obstajajo učinki obsega pri upravljanju portfeljev

together with financial complexity,

ter finančna kompleksnost, finančna deregulacija,

financial deregulation,

that make it easier to get higher rates of return

kar omogoča višje deleže donosa

for a large portfolio,

velikim portfeljem

and this seems to be particularly strong

in je posebej pomembno

for billionaires, large capital endowments.

za milijarderje, za velike donacije.

Just to give you one example,

Samo za primer,

this comes from the Forbes billionaire rankings

tole je s Forbesovega seznama milijarderjev

over the 1987-2013 period,

v obdobju 1987-2013

and you can see the very top wealth holders

in vidite, da so najbogatejši

have been going up at six, seven percent per year

rasli po šest, sedem odstotkov letno,

in real terms above inflation,

v realnem smislu nad inflacijo,

whereas average income in the world,

medtem ko je povprečni globalni prihodek,

average wealth in the world,

povprečno svetovno premoženje,

have increased at only two percent per year.

raslo samo za dva odstotka letno.

And you find the same

Enako velja

for large university endowments —

za velike univerzitetne donacije,

the bigger the initial endowments,

čim večja je začetna donacija,

the bigger the rate of return.

tem večji je delež donosa.

Now, what could be done?

Kaj lahko storimo?

The first thing is that I think we need

Najprej potrebujemo

more financial transparency.

več finančne transparentnosti.

We know too little about global wealth dynamics,

Premalo vemo o globalnih tokovih premoženja,

zato potrebujemo mednarodni prenos

so we need international transmission

of bank information.

bančnih informacij.

We need a global registry of financial assets,

Potrebujemo globalni register finančne lastnine,

more coordination on wealth taxation,

bolj koordinirano obdavčitev premoženja,

and even wealth tax with a small tax rate

celo nizek davek na premoženje

will be a way to produce information

bo podal informacije,

so that then we can adapt our policies

da lahko politike prilagodimo

to whatever we observe.

opažanjem.

And to some extent, the fight

Do neke mere nas boj

against tax havens

proti davčnim oazam

and automatic transmission of information

ter avtomatski prenos informacij

is pushing us in this direction.

silita v to smer.

Now, there are other ways to redistribute wealth,

Tudi drugi načini prerazdelitve premoženja

which it can be tempting to use.

so privlačni.

Inflation:

Inflacija:

it's much easier to print money

lažje je tiskati denar

than to write a tax code, so that's very tempting,

kot pisati davčne zakone, zato je privlačno,

but sometimes you don't know what you do with the money.

a včasih ne vemo, kaj bi z denarjem.

This is a problem.

V tem je problem.

Expropriation is very tempting.

Razlastitev je privlačna.

Just when you feel some people get too wealthy,

Ko se zdi, da so nekateri prebogati, jih enostavno razlastite.

you just expropriate them.

But this is not a very efficient way

A to ni zelo učinkovit način

to organize a regulation of wealth dynamics.

regulacije toka premoženja.

So war is an even less efficient way,

Vojna je še manj učinkovita,

so I tend to prefer progressive taxation,

zato imam raje progresivno obdavčitev,

but of course, history — (Laughter) —

a seveda bo zgodovina (smeh)

history will invent its own best ways,

izumila svoje načine,

and it will probably involve

ki bodo verjetno vsebovali

a combination of all of these.

kombinacijo vsega tega.

Thank you.

Hvala.

(aplavz)

(Applause)

Bruno Giussani: Thomas Piketty. Thank you.

Bruno Giussani: Hvala, Thomas Piketty.

Thomas, I want to ask you two or three questions,

Thomas, par stvari bi vas vprašal,

because it's impressive how you're in command of your data, of course,

odlično obvladate svoje podatke, seveda,

but basically what you suggest is

a vaša teza je,

da je rastoča koncentracija premoženja

growing wealth concentration is kind of

a natural tendency of capitalism,

nekako naravni trend kapitalizma,

and if we leave it to its own devices,

in če temu pustimo prosto pot,

it may threaten the system itself,

lahko ogrozi sam sistem,

so you're suggesting that we need to act

zato pravite, da moramo

to implement policies that redistribute wealth,

uresničiti politike, ki prerazdelijo premoženje,

including the ones we just saw:

vključno z

progresivno obdavčitvijo, itd.

progressive taxation, etc.

In the current political context,

Kako realne so te

how realistic are those?

v trenutnem političnem stanju?

How likely do you think that it is

Kako verjetno je,

that they will be implemented?

da jih bomo izvedli?

Thomas Piketty: Well, you know, I think

T. Piketty: Mislim, da če

if you look back through time,

pogledate nazaj skozi čas,

the history of income, wealth and taxation

je zgodovina prihodkov, premoženja

is full of surprise.

in obdavčitve polna presenečenj.

So I am not terribly impressed

Zato nisem vznesen nad tistimi, ki vnaprej vedo,

by those who know in advance

what will or will not happen.

kaj se bo ali ne bo zgodilo.

Pred sto leti

I think one century ago,

so mnogi trdili,

many people would have said

that progressive income taxation would never happen

da progresivne obdavčitve ne bo,

and then it happened.

pa je.

And even five years ago,

Še pred petimi leti

many people would have said that bank secrecy

so mnogi trdili, da je tajnost

will be with us forever in Switzerland,

švicarskih bank večna,

that Switzerland was too powerful

da je Švica premočna

for the rest of the world,

za preostali svet,

and then suddenly it took a few U.S. sanctions

pa je bilo za spremembo treba le

against Swiss banks for a big change to happen,

par sankcij ZDA proti švicarskim bankam,

and now we are moving toward

da zdaj gremo proti večji finančni transparentnosti.

more financial transparency.

So I think it's not that difficult

Zato mislim, da ni tako težko

to better coordinate politically.

doseči boljše politične koordinacije.

We are going to have a treaty

Nastala bo pogodba

with half of the world GDP around the table

s sodelovanjem polovice svetovnega BDP-ja

with the U.S. and the European Union,

z ZDA in EU

so if half of the world GDP is not enough

in če polovica BDP-ja ni dovolj

to make progress on financial transparency

za napredek finančne transparentnosti

and minimal tax for multinational corporate profits,

in minimalni davek na dobiček multinacionalk,

what does it take?

kaj potem je?

So I think these are not technical difficulties.

Mislim, da to niso tehnične težave.

I think we can make progress

Mislim, da lahko napredujemo,

if we have a more pragmatic approach to these questions

če smo bolj pragmatični do teh stvari,

and we have the proper sanctions

če imamo prave sankcije

on those who benefit from financial opacity.

za tiste, ki izkoriščajo finančne sence.

BG: One of the arguments

BG: Eden od

against your point of view

protiargumentov je,

is that economic inequality

da ekonomska neenakost

is not only a feature of capitalism but is actually one of its engines.

ni le del kapitalizma, ampak je eden njegovih motorjev.

So we take measures to lower inequality,

Če z ukrepi manjšamo neenakost

and at the same time we lower growth, potentially.

in hkrati nižamo rast, denimo.

What do you answer to that?

Kaj pravite na to?

TP: Yeah, I think inequality

TP: Mislim, da neenakost

is not a problem per se.

sama po sebi ni problem.

I think inequality up to a point

Do neke mere lahko

can actually be useful for innovation and growth.

pomaga inovacijam in rasti.

The problem is, it's a question of degree.

Težava je v stopnji.

When inequality gets too extreme,

Ko neenakost postane skrajna,

then it becomes useless for growth

potem ne pripomore k rasti,

and it can even become bad

postane slaba celo zato,

because it tends to lead to high perpetuation

ker spodbuja ohranjanje

of inequality over time

neenakosti skozi čas

and low mobility.

ter nizko mobilnost.

And for instance, the kind of wealth concentrations

Denimo, koncentracije premoženja,

that we had in the 19th century

kakršne smo imeli v 19. stoletju

and pretty much until World War I

in vse do 1. svetovne vojne

in every European country

v vseh evropskih državah,

was, I think, not useful for growth.

niso pripomogle k rasti.

This was destroyed by a combination

Uničila jih je kombinacija

of tragic events and policy changes,

tragičnih dogodkov in političnih sprememb,

and this did not prevent growth from happening.

kar ni preprečilo rasti.

And also, extreme inequality can be bad

Skrajna neenakost lahko škoduje tudi demokratičnim institucijam,

for our democratic institutions

če ustvarja zelo neenak dostop do političnega glasu,

if it creates very unequal access to political voice,

and the influence of private money

in vpliv zasebnega denarja

in U.S. politics, I think,

v politiki ZDA, je, menim,

is a matter of concern right now.

trenutno skrb vzbujajoč.

Ne želimo se vrniti v take skrajnosti,

So we don't want to return to that kind of extreme,

pre-World War I inequality.

v neenakost pred 1. svetovno vojno.

Having a decent share of the national wealth

Spodoben delež nacionalnega bogastva

for the middle class is not bad for growth.

v rokah srednjega razreda ni slaba stvar.

It is actually useful

Pravzaprav koristi

both for equity and efficiency reasons.

tako enakosti kot učinkovitosti.

BG: I said at the beginning

BG: Na začetku sem omenil,

that your book has been criticized.

da so vašo knjigo kritizirali.

Some of your data has been criticized.

Nekatere podatke so kritizirali.

Some of your choice of data sets has been criticized.

Tudi določen izbor podatkov.

You have been accused of cherry-picking data

Obtožili so vas jemanja podatkov,

to make your case. What do you answer to that?

ki so podprli vašo tezo. Kaj pravite na to?

TP: Well, I answer that I am very happy

TP: Zelo sem vesel,

that this book is stimulating debate.

da ta knjiga sproža razpravo.

This is part of what it is intended for.

To je eden njenih namenov.

Look, the reason why I put all the data online

Razlog, da sem vse podatke objavil

skupaj z natančnimi izračuni

with all of the detailed computation

is so that we can have an open and transparent

je v tem, da omogočim

odprto razpravo.

debate about this.

So I have responded point by point

Na vsak dvom

to every concern.

sem jasno odgovoril.

Let me say that if I was to rewrite the book today,

Če bi moral knjigo še enkrat napisati,

I would actually conclude

bi pravzaprav sklenil,

that the rise in wealth inequality,

da je rast neenakosti premoženja,

particularly in the United States,

sploh v ZDA,

višja od te, ki je v knjigi.

has been actually higher than what I report in my book.

There is a recent study by Saez and Zucman

Nedavna študija Saeza in Zucmana

showing, with new data

z novimi podatki,

which I didn't have at the time of the book,

ki jih tedaj nisem imel, kaže,

that wealth concentration in the U.S. has risen

da je koncentracija premoženja v ZDA zrasla

even more than what I report.

še bolj, kot sem poročal.

And there will be other data in the future.

Še novi podatki bodo prišli.

Some of it will go in different directions.

Nekateri bodo kazali drugače.

Look, we put online almost every week

Skoraj tedensko na spletu objavimo

posodobljeno serijo baze podatkov World Top Income

new, updated series on the World Top Income Database

and we will keep doing so in the future,

in to bomo nadaljevali,

in particular in emerging countries,

sploh v hitro rastočih državah,

and I welcome all of those who want to contribute

in veselim se vseh, ki želijo prispevati

to this data collection process.

k temu zbiranju podatkov.

In fact, I certainly agree

Seveda se strinjam,

that there is not enough

da ni dovolj

transparency about wealth dynamics,

preglednosti o dinamiki premoženja

and a good way to have better data

in dober način za boljše podatke

would be to have a wealth tax

bi bil skozi davek na premoženje

with a small tax rate to begin with

z nizko začetno stopnjo,

so that we can all agree

da bi se uskladili

about this important evolution

o tem pomembnem razvoju

ter prilagodili politike opažanjem.

and adapt our policies to whatever we observe.

So taxation is a source of knowledge,

Davki so vir znanja,

and that's what we need the most right now.

to pa zdaj najbolj potrebujemo.

BG: Thomas Piketty, merci beaucoup.

BG: Thomas Piketty, najlepša hvala.

Thank you. TP: Thank you. (Applause)

Hvala vam. TP: Hvala (aplavz)