How to rob a bank (from the inside, that is) | William Black

翻译人员: Zachary Lin Zhao 校对人员: Wei Wu

So today's top chef class is in how to rob a bank,

今天的“顶级大厨”寓教于食，揭秘怎么抢银行，

and it's clear that the general public needs guidance,

显然，大众对这个外行。

because the average bank robbery nets

因为一般的劫匪抢一次银行，

only 7,500 dollars.

平均只能抢到区区7500刀，

Rank amateurs who know nothing

这是完全不懂做假帐的

about how to cook the books.

业余会计的水平。

The folks who know, of course,

当然，懂行的专业人士

run our largest banks,

全是大银行的头头们，

and in the last go-around,

上次他们出手，

they cost us over 11 trillion dollars.

我们损失11万亿刀。

That's what 11 trillion looks like.

11万亿看起来是酱紫的。

That's how many zeros?

数数多少个0？

And cost us over 10 million jobs as well.

还让我们损失1000万个工作岗位。

So our task is to educate ourselves

所以我们的当务之急是

so that we can understand

好好学习，长长见识，搞清楚

why we have these recurrent,

金融危机一再出现

intensifying financial crises,

并且愈演愈烈的原因，

and how we can prevent them in the future.

以及未来如何防范。

And the answer to that is

答案就是

that we have to stop epidemics of control fraud.

我们需要制止大面积的管理欺诈行为。

Control fraud is what happens

何为管理欺诈？

when the people who control,

管理人员，

typically a CEO,

通常是CEO

a seemingly legitimate entity,

在管理一个貌似合法的金融机构时，

use it as a weapon to defraud.

把这个机构当成武器来使，搞诈骗。

And these are the weapons of mass destruction

这些算是金融界的

in the financial world.

大规模杀伤性武器。

They also follow in finance a particular strategy,

在金融领域，他们还采取一种特定的策略，

because the weapon of choice in finance

因为他们所使用的武器是会计（accounting），

is accounting,

这是金融领域的不二之选。

and there is a recipe for accounting

会计管理欺诈行为及其发生

control fraud, and how it occurs.

都有固定的“套路”。

And we discovered this recipe

我们发现这一点

in quite an odd way that I'll come back to in a moment.

也是不期而然。我稍后再谈。

First ingredient in the recipe: grow like crazy;

这一套路不可缺少的“原料”：首先是疯狂地膨胀扩张。

second, by making or buying really crappy loans,

其次是放出或者购买“垃圾贷款”，

but loans that are made at a very high interest rate

不过这种贷款的利率或者收益

or yield;

非常之高。

three, while employing extreme leverage --

第三，大肆利用金融杠杆，

that just means a lot of debt --

也就是相对于资产而言不成比例

compared to your equity;

的大量债务。

and four, while providing only trivial loss reserves

第四，为应对必然发生的坏账

against the inevitable losses.

提供少之又少的准备金。

If you follow those four simple steps,

只要遵循这四个简单的步骤，

and any bank can follow them,

任何银行都做得到，

then you are mathematically guaranteed

就会确定无疑地出现以下

to have three things occur.

三种情况。

The first thing is

第一，银行的账面利润

you will report record bank profits --

将会是史无前例的高

not just high, record.

不是一般的高，是史无前例的高。

Two, the CEO will immediately be made incredibly wealthy

第二，鉴于现代的高管薪酬结构，

by modern executive compensation.

CEO会一夜暴富。

And three, farther down the road,

第三，长此以往

the bank will suffer catastrophic losses

银行就会遭受巨额损失，

and will fail unless it is bailed out.

除非获得救助，不然就将倒闭。

And that's a hint as to how

因为我们对整个流程进行了“解剖”。

we discovered this recipe,

顺藤摸瓜，

because we discovered it through an autopsy process.

我们才发现了这个固定的套路。

During the savings and loan debacle in 1984,

1984年储贷危机期间，

we looked at every single failure,

我们仔细研究了每一个破产案例。

and we looked for common characteristics,

寻找其中的共同点，

and we discovered this recipe was common

我们发现这一套路在每个欺诈案例中

to each of these frauds.

都存在。

In other words, a coroner could find these things

换言之，“验尸官”能够找到这些东西。

because this is a fatal recipe

因为这是致命的“毒方”，

that will destroy the banks

不仅会毁掉银行，

as well as the economy.

也会毁掉我们的经济。

And it also turns out to be precisely

这也正是可以阻止

what could have stopped this crisis,

这场危机发生的东西，

the one that cost us 11 trillion dollars

这一危机仅在经济的私人部门就让我们

just in the household sector,

损失11万亿，

that cost us 10 million jobs,

丢掉1000万个工作岗位，

was the easiest financial crisis by far

如果我们能够运用这一固定套路

to have avoided completely

从大面积的管理欺诈行为中吸取教训，

if we had simply learned the lessons

我们就可以

of epidemics of control fraud,

轻而易举地

particularly using this recipe.

避免这场危机的发生。

So let's go to this crisis,

现在我们来看看这场危机

and the two huge epidemics

以及导致它发生的

of loan origination fraud that drove the crisis --

两种大面积借贷欺诈行为：

appraisal fraud and liar's loans --

估价欺诈和欺骗性贷款。

and what we're going to see

研究这两者，

in looking at both of these is

我们发现：

we got warnings that were incredibly early

第一，对于这些欺诈行为，我们接到的预警信号

about these frauds.

非常之早。

We got warnings that we could have taken advantage of easily,

第二，我们可以轻而易举地利用这些预警信号采取措施，

because back in the savings and loan debacle,

因为早在储贷危机时期，

we had figured out how to respond

我们就知道了如何应对，

and prevent these crises.

从而避免危机的发生。

And three, the warnings were unambiguous.

第三，这些预警信号确切不疑。

They were obvious that what was going on

它们清楚地表明了

was an epidemic of accounting control fraud building up.

大面积的会计管理欺诈行为正在升级。

Let's take appraisal fraud first.

我们先来看估价欺诈

This is simply where you inflate the value

简单地说，估价欺诈就是

of the home that is being pledged

夸大用作贷款担保的

as security for the loan.

房屋的价值。

In 2000, the year 2000,

在2000年，

that is over a year before Enron fails, by the way,

也就是安然破产一年多前，

the honest appraisers got together a formal petition

有节操的估价师聚在一起，起草了一份正式的请愿书。

begging the federal government to act,

要求联邦政府采取措施，

and the industry to act,

要求行业自身采取措施，

to stop this epidemic of appraisal fraud.

制止这种大面积的估价欺诈行为。

And the appraisers explained how it was occurring,

这些估价师解释问题是如何发生的：

that banks were demanding that appraisers

银行要求估价师弄虚作假

inflate the appraisal,

夸大估值，

and that if the appraisers refused to do so,

一旦估价师拒绝配合，

they, the banks, would blacklist

银行就把这些有节操的估价师

honest appraisers

拉入黑名单，

and refuse to use them.

不再雇佣他们。

Now, we've seen this before

在储贷危机期间，

in the savings and loan debacle,

我们就遇到过这种情况，

and we know that this kind of fraud

我们知道这种欺诈行为的

can only originate from the lenders,

罪魁祸首就是借方，

and that no honest lender would ever inflate

有节操的借方绝对不会

the appraisal,

为估值灌水，

because it's the great protection against loss.

因为拒绝灌水才是防止损失的上策。

So this was an incredibly early warning, 2000.

所以说，预警信号早在2000年就已出现。

It was something we'd seen before,

这是我们之前见到过，

and it was completely unambiguous.

并且确切不疑。

This was an epidemic of accounting control fraud

这就是银行主导的

led by the banks.

大面积会计管理欺诈行为。

What about liar's loans?

欺骗性贷款又是神马呢？

Well, that warning actually comes earlier.

实际上，它的预警信号来得更早。

The savings and loan debacle is basically

储贷危机基本上从1980年代早期开始

the early 1980s through 1993,

持续到1993年，

and in the midst of fighting that wave

在打击那波会计管理欺诈

of accounting control fraud,

的行动中，我们在1990年

in 1990, we found that a second front

发现欺诈行为出现了

of fraud was being started.

第二波。

And like all good financial frauds in America,

果不其然，和美国的所有牛逼的金融欺诈行为一样，

it began in Orange County, California.

发源地又是加州橙县。

And we happened to be the regional regulators for it.

我们刚好是当地的监管机构。

And our examiners said,

我们的检查人员说，

they are making loans without even checking

当地银行根本不核实借款人的收入情况

what the borrower's income is.

直接就发放借款。

This is insane, it has to lead to massive losses,

这太没底线了，必然会导致大规模损失，

and it only makes sense for entities engaged

这种情况只可能是金融机构进行了

in these accounting control frauds.

会计管理欺诈行为。

And we said, yeah, you're absolutely right,

我们对检查人员说，没错，你们说的对，

and we drove those liar's loans

然后就在90、91年，我们在银行业取缔了

out of the industry in 1990 and 1991,

这些欺诈性的贷款。

but we could only deal with the industry

但是，我们只能处理我们有权

we had jurisdiction over,

管理的业务，

which was savings and loans,

也就是储蓄和贷款业务。

and so the biggest and the baddest of the frauds,

业内最大最狡猾的诈骗银行

Long Beach Savings, voluntarily gave up

“长滩储蓄”主动放弃

its federal savings and loan charter,

联邦政府颁发的储蓄和借贷执照，

gave up federal deposit insurance,

放弃联邦存款保险，

converted to become a mortgage bank

变身一家抵押银行，

for the sole purpose of escaping our jurisdiction,

煞费苦心，只为了逃避我们的监管，

and changed its name to Ameriquest,

“长滩储蓄”后来更名为Ameriquest，

and became the most notorious

是早期欺骗性借贷欺诈行为中

of the liar's loans frauds early on,

最为臭名昭著的。

and to add to that,

此外，

they deliberately predated upon minorities.

他们还故意欺骗美国的少数族裔。

So we knew again about this crisis.

所以这样的诈骗性贷款危机也是我们所了解的，

We'd seen it before. We'd stopped it before.

我们之前见过，我们之前也阻止过。

We had incredibly early warnings of it,

我们接到的预警信号非常之早，

and it was absolutely unambiguous

预警信号确切不疑：

that no honest lender would make loans in this fashion.

有节操的借方绝不会这样放款。

So let's take a look at the reaction

我们来看看面对这些完全可以

of the industry and the regulators

阻止危机发生的清晰预警信号，

and the prosecutors to these clear

从行业自身、监管机构到

early warnings that could have prevented the crisis.

检调人员都做了些什么。

Start with the industry.

先看行业本身。

The industry responded between 2003 and 2006

从2003年到2006年，金融行业

by increasing liar's loans

的欺骗性借贷业务增加了

by over 500 percent.

5倍之多。

These were the loans

正是这些贷款

that hyperinflated the bubble

使泡沫飞速膨大，

and produced the economic crisis.

造成了经济危机。

By 2006, half of all the loans called subprime

截至2006年，半数被称为次贷的借款，

were also liar's loans.

同时也是欺骗性借贷。

They're not mutually exclusive, it's just that together,

这两者并不互斥，而是交织在一起

they're the most toxic combination

共同构成你所能想象出的

you can possibly imagine.

最坏组合。

By 2006, 40 percent of all the loans

截至2006年，当年发放的所有贷款，

made that year, all the home loans made that year,

当年的所有房屋贷款中，

were liar's loans,

四成是欺骗性贷款。

40 percent.

高达四成啊，亲。

And this is despite a warning

行业自身的反欺诈专家

from the industry's own antifraud experts

曾经警告，

that said that these loans were an open invitation

这些贷款简直是引狼入室，

to fraudsters,

诈骗率高达九成，百分之九十。

and that they had a fraud incidence

尽管有这些警告，

of 90 percent,

问题

nine zero.

还是发生了。

In response to that, the industry

作为回应，金融行业

first started calling these loans liar's loans,

首先开始称呼这些贷款为欺骗性借贷，

which lacks a certain subtlety,

听上去不太悦耳。

and second, massively increased them,

其次，大幅增加这种贷款。

and no government regulator ever

没有任何政府监管机构

required or encouraged any lender

要求或者鼓励任何借方

to make a liar's loan

放出欺骗性贷款

or anyone to purchase a liar's loan,

要求或鼓励任何人去购买欺骗性借贷，

and that explicitly includes Fannie and Freddie.

这当然也包括房利美和房地美。

This came from the lenders

由于欺诈的成因和模式，

because of the fraud recipe.

借方难辞其咎。

What happened to appraisal fraud?

估价欺诈行为又是怎样呢？

It expanded remarkably as well.

同样膨胀得非常了得。

By 2007, when a survey of appraisers was done,

2007年，有份针对估价师的调查，

90 percent of appraisers reported

9成受访的估价师表示，

that they had been subject to coercion

他们受到借方的胁迫，

from the lenders trying to get them

要求他们对估值进行

to inflate an appraisal.

灌水（夸大价值）。

In other words, both forms of fraud

换言之，两种形式的欺诈行为

became absolutely endemic and normal,

成为常态，疯狂肆虐，

and this is what drove the bubble.

泡沫于是成型。

What happened in the governmental sector?

政府部门的情况呢？

Well, the government, as I told you,

政府啊，不提也罢，说多了都是泪，

when we were the savings and loan regulators,

我们监管储贷的时候，

we could only deal with our industry,

我们只能处理我们负责的行业，

and if people gave up their federal deposit insurance,

如果借方放弃他们的联邦存款保险，

we couldn't do anything to them.

我们就将束手无策。

Congress, it may strike you as impossible,

国会，说起来你们可能不信，

but actually did something intelligent in 1994,

在1994年实际上倒是干了点实事，

and passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act

通过了《房屋所有权和股权保护法》，

that gave the Fed, and only the Federal Reserve,

法案赋权美联储，仅限美联储

the explicit, statutory authority to ban liar's loans

明确的法律权力去取缔来自任何借方的

by every lender,

欺骗性贷款业务，

whether or not they had federal deposit insurance.

无论这些借方有无联邦存款保险。

So what did Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan,

在接到这些预警信号：

as chairs of the Fed, do

这些大面积的欺诈性贷款

when they got these warnings

这些要转售给次级市场的欺骗性贷款

that these were massively fraudulent loans

作为美联储主席

and that they were being sold to the secondary market?

到底做了些什么？

Remember, there's no fraud exorcist.

请记住，没有神人能将这些欺诈行为消失。

Once it starts out a fraudulent loan,

欺骗性贷款一旦出现，

it can only be sold to the secondary market

只能通过更多的欺诈行为，

through more frauds,

如编造合约声明和保证条款

lying about the reps and warrantees,

把这一借款转售给次级市场。

and then those people are going to produce

然后借方再推出

mortgage-backed securities

抵押贷款证券和

and exotic derivatives

衍生产品，

which are also going to be supposedly backed

而为这些产品进行担保的正是

by those fraudulent loans.

欺骗性借款。

So the fraud is going to progress

欺诈行为将贯穿

through the entire system,

整个系统的始终，

hyperinflate the bubble, produce a disaster.

使泡沫急剧膨胀，进而造成灾难。

And remember, we had experience with this.

想想看，这事我们之前经历过。

We had seen significant losses,

我们遭受了巨大的损失，

and we had experience of competent regulators

职能监管机构也有阻止危机出现的

in stopping it.

先例。

Greenspan and Bernanke refused

但是格林斯潘和伯南克拒绝

to use the authority under the statute

使用法律赋予他们的权力来取缔

to stop liar's loans.

欺骗性借贷。

And this was a matter first of dogma.

首先，这完全是意识形态在作祟。

They're just horrifically opposed

他们反对任何形式的监管措施，

to anything regulatory.

令人震惊和深恶痛绝。

But it is also the international competition in laxity,

但同时也是国际上放松监管的竞争，

the race to the bottom

力争下游。

between the United States and the United Kingdom,

这场竞争在美国和英国，确切说是

the city of London, in particular,

伦敦之间展开，

and the city of London won that race to the bottom,

伦敦获胜，监管最松。

but it meant that all regulation in the West

这也意味着，

was completely degraded

从这场看谁的监控最松的愚蠢竞争中

in this stupid competition to be

可以看出在西方社会，

who could have the weakest regulation.

监管措施是多么的不受待见。

So that was the regulatory response.

这就是监管层面的反应。

What about the response of the prosecutors

这场让我们损失11万亿

after the crisis,

1000万个工作岗位，

after 11 trillion dollars in losses,

损失和欺诈规模

after 10 million jobs lost,

超过储贷危机

a crisis in which the losses and the frauds

70倍的危机之后，

were more than 70 times larger

检调人员

than the savings and loan debacle?

又做了些什么呢？

Well, in the savings and loan debacle,

在储贷危机中，

our agency that regulated savings and loans, OTS,

负责储贷监管的机构-储蓄管理局

made over 30,000 criminal referrals,

提出3万起刑事诉讼，

produced over 1,000 felony convictions

1千人被判以重罪，

just in cases designated as major,

这还仅是大案要案方面，

and that understates the degree of prioritization,

而且还没反映问题的严重性，

because we worked with the FBI

因为我们跟联邦调查局携手，

to create the list of the top 100 fraud schemes,

开列了一个清单，上面是全国范围内

the absolute worst of the worst, nationwide.

最没节操最无底线的100种诈骗伎俩。

Roughly 300 savings and loans involved,

差不多300个储贷机构，

roughly 600 senior officials.

600个高级官员涉案。

Virtually all of them were prosecuted.

几乎全被起诉，

We had a 90 percent conviction rate.

定罪率9成。

It's the greatest success against

堪称针对白领精英犯罪的

elite white collar criminals ever,

一场漂亮仗，史无前例，

and it was because of this understanding

原因无他，我们掌握了管理欺诈及

of control fraud

会计管理欺诈的内幕

and the accounting control fraud mechanism.

和伎俩。

Flash forward to the current crisis.

再回到当前的这场危机。

The same agency, Office of Thrift Supervision,

同一个机构-储蓄管理局，

which was supposed to regulate

本应该监管全国

many of the largest makers of liar's loans

欺骗性贷款祸首的各大银行。

in the country,

到今天，什么都没做，

has made, even today -- it no longer exists,

好像一切不曾发生过，

but as of a year ago,

一年前，提出的

it had made zero criminal referrals.

刑事诉讼案件数还是零。

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,

负责全国性大银行

which is supposed to regulate the largest national banks,

监管任务的金融管理局，

has made zero criminal referrals.

提出的刑事诉讼案件数同样为零。

The Fed appears to have made

美联储提出的刑事诉讼案件貌似

zero criminal referrals.

也是零。

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

联邦存款保险公司更刁钻，顾左右而言他，

is smart enough to refuse to answer the question.

根本不回答这个问题。

Without any guidance from the regulators,

没有监管机构的协助，

there's no expertise in the FBI

联邦调查局在调查复杂的欺诈案件上

to investigate complex frauds.

无能为力。

It isn't simply that they've had

提出诉讼不是什么难事，

to reinvent the wheel

不过是举手之劳，易如反掌。

of how to do these prosecutions;

只是他们忘了怎么举，

they've forgotten that the wheel exists,

忘了怎么反。

and therefore, we have zero prosecutions,

因而，

and of course, zero convictions,

造成这场危机的

of any of the elite bank frauds,

华尔街顶尖银行诈骗犯们

the Wall Street types,

没有一个被起诉

that drove this crisis.

没有一个被定罪。

With no expertise coming from the regulators,

监管机构不愿伸出援手，

the FBI formed what it calls a partnership

联邦调查局2007年与抵押贷款银行家协会

with the Mortgage Bankers Association in 2007.

携起手来。

The Mortgage Bankers Association

抵押贷款银行家协会

is the trade association of the perps.

是这些祸首的行业组织。

And the Mortgage Bankers Association

抵押贷款银行家协会

set out, it had the audacity and the success

出手了，他们不仅有能力也有动机

to con the FBI.

去欺骗联邦调查局。

It had created a supposed definition

抵押贷款银行家协会为抵押欺诈行为

of mortgage fraud, in which, guess what,

下了个定义，不出所料，按照这个定义，

its members are always the victim

这个协会的成员都是欺诈行为的受害者，

and never the perpetrators.

没一个是欺诈行为的加害者。

And the FBI has bought this hook, line, sinker,

联邦调查局不疑有他

rod, reel and the boat they rode out in.

照单全收。

And so the FBI,

就这样，

under the leadership of an attorney general

在一个非裔司法部长

who is African-American

和一个非裔美国总统的

and a president of the United States who is African-American,

领导之下，联邦调查局完全相信了

have adopted the Tea Party definition of the crisis,

茶党对这场危机的说辞，

in which it is the first virgin crisis in history,

成了破天荒的“圣女生子案”，

conceived without sin in the executive ranks.

高管层人人清白。

And it's those oh-so-clever hairdressers

问题出在狡猾的临时工身上，

who were able to defraud the poor, pitiful banks,

他们在欺骗穷人，他们在欺骗对金融行业一无所知

who lack any financial sophistication.

的银行业者。

It is the silliest story you can conceive of,

这简直是最奇葩的谎话，

and so they go and they prosecute the hairdressers,

然后他们把临时工抓起来了，

and they leave the banksters alone entirely.

银行家们毫发未损。

And so, while lions are roaming the campsite,

就这样，满地西瓜

the FBI is chasing mice.

联邦调查局却在那里捡芝麻。

What do we need to do?

我们该怎么办？

What can we do in all of this?

面对这一切，我们能做什么？

We need to change the perverse incentive structures

我们需要改革不正常的激励机制，

that produce these recurrent epidemics

正是这种机制在催生一再出现的大面积

of accounting control fraud

会计管理欺诈行为，

that are driving our crises.

进而导致危机的发生。

So we have to first get rid

第一，我们要排除这种具有

of the systemically dangerous institutions.

系统性危险的金融机构。

These are the so-called too-big-to-fail institutions.

所谓“尾大不掉”的金融机构。

We need to shrink them to the point,

在接下来的五年里，

within the next five years,

我们要给它们大幅瘦身，

that they no longer pose a systemic risk.

让它们不再具有系统性风险。

Right now, they are ticking time bombs

现在，它们就是定时炸弹，

that will cause a global crisis

其中一个破产倒闭，

as soon as the next one fails --

就会引发全球性危机。

not if, when.

而且问题还不是会不会倒，而是什么时候倒的问题。

Second thing we need to do is completely reform

第二，我们要彻底改革

modern executive and professional compensation,

当前的高管人员薪酬制度，

which is what they use to suborn the appraisers.

这也是他们用来胁迫估价师的工具和手段。

Remember, they were pressuring the appraisers

想想看，他们在通过薪酬体系

through the compensation system,

向估价师施压，

trying to produce what we call a Gresham's dynamic,

造成“劣币驱逐良币”的

in which bad ethics drives good ethics

格雷欣效应，

out of the marketplace.

市场上道德节操无人问津。

And they largely succeeded,

很大程度上，他们得逞了。

which is how the fraud became endemic.

这就是为什么欺诈行为如此猖獗。

And the third thing that we need to do

第三，我们要解决三“无”问题：

is deal with what we call the three D's:

无规章制度、无有效监管

deregulation, desupervision,

出事后，无人担责被绳之以法

and the de facto decriminalization.

的问题。

Because we can make

因为我们可以

all three of these changes, and if we do so,

从这三方面进行改革，只要我们这样做，

we can dramatically reduce

就能大幅降低危机

how often we have a crisis

发生的频率和危机发生后的

and how severe those crises are.

危害程度。

That is not simply critical to our economy.

这不仅事关我们的经济。

You can see what these crises do to inequality

看看这些危机对贫富差距的影响，

and what they do to our democracy.

对我们的民主制度的破坏。

They have produced crony capitalism,

危机产生了裙带资本主义，

American-style,

有美国特色的裙带资本主义，

in which the largest financial institutions

最大的金融机构是

are the leading financial donors of both parties,

两党的最大金主。

and that's the reason why

这就是为什么

even after this crisis,

这场比储贷危机严重

70 times larger than the savings and loan crisis,

70倍的危机发生之后，

we have no meaningful reforms

在我提到的三个方面依然没有

in any of the three areas that I've talked about,

任何实质性的改革。

other than banning liar's loans,

除了欺骗性贷款被取缔，

which is good,

这当然是好事

but that's just one form of ammunition

但欺骗性贷款只是他们手中的

for this fraud weapon.

一种武器。

There are many forms of ammunition they can use.

他们可用的武器还很多。

That's why we need to learn

这就是为什么我们需要

what the bankers have learned:

求教银行家的地方：

the recipe for the best way to rob a bank,

抢银行的最佳“秘方”，

so that we can stop that recipe,

这样我们才能除掉它。

because our legislators,

因为我们的国会议员

who are dependent on political contributions,

离不开政治献金，

will not do it on their own.

所以他们不会主动来做这一切。

Thank you very much.

谢谢，多谢。

(Applause)

（掌声）