How to rob a bank (from the inside, that is) | William Black

譯者: Yamei Huang 審譯者: Adrienne Lin

So today's top chef class is in how to rob a bank,

今天的頂尖主廚要教大家 如何搶銀行，

and it's clear that the general public needs guidance,

很顯然一般民眾需要一些指導，

because the average bank robbery nets

因為銀行搶案

only 7,500 dollars.

平均只搶到美金 7,500 元。

Rank amateurs who know nothing

這完全是不懂得如何做假帳

about how to cook the books.

業餘等級的水準。

The folks who know, of course,

當然，那些內行的人，

run our largest banks,

都是大銀行的高層，

and in the last go-around,

上一次他們一出手，

they cost us over 11 trillion dollars.

我們就損失 11 兆美元。

That's what 11 trillion looks like.

11 兆美元看起來像這樣 。

That's how many zeros?

這個金額有幾個零？

And cost us over 10 million jobs as well.

也讓我們損失超過 1000 萬個 工作機會。

So our task is to educate ourselves

所以當務之急是自我教育，

so that we can understand

以了解

why we have these recurrent,

為何金融危機一再發生，

intensifying financial crises,

而且變本加厲，

and how we can prevent them in the future.

以及如何防範於未來。

And the answer to that is

答案就是

that we have to stop epidemics of control fraud.

我們必須杜絶大規模 管理詐欺的行為，

Control fraud is what happens

管理詐欺是指

when the people who control,

管理者，

typically a CEO,

尤其是執行長，

a seemingly legitimate entity,

管理一個貌似合法的機構時，

use it as a weapon to defraud.

把這個機構當成詐騙的武器。

And these are the weapons of mass destruction

這是金融界裡

in the financial world.

最具殺傷力的武器。

They also follow in finance a particular strategy,

在金融界裡， 他們也採用一種特定的策略，

because the weapon of choice in finance

因為他們在財務上所用的武器

is accounting,

就是會計方法，

and there is a recipe for accounting

以會計方法管理詐欺行為

control fraud, and how it occurs.

及其發生有個秘訣，

And we discovered this recipe

我們在很不尋常的情況下

in quite an odd way that I'll come back to in a moment.

發現了這個秘訣， 我稍後再談。

First ingredient in the recipe: grow like crazy;

第一個秘訣是： 瘋狂地擴張公司資本；

second, by making or buying really crappy loans,

第二個秘訣是： 放出或購買高風險貸款，

but loans that are made at a very high interest rate

這種貸款的利率

or yield;

或收益非常高；

three, while employing extreme leverage --

第三個秘訣是：利用高度財務槓桿

that just means a lot of debt --

這意味著對資產而言

compared to your equity;

有著很大比率的負債；

and four, while providing only trivial loss reserves

第四個秘訣是：提供極少的準備金

against the inevitable losses.

去因應呆帳損失。

If you follow those four simple steps,

如果你遵循這四個簡單的步驟，

and any bank can follow them,

任何銀行都做得到，

then you are mathematically guaranteed

保證一定會發生

to have three things occur.

以下三種情況，

The first thing is

第一是：

you will report record bank profits --

銀行有很高的帳面利潤

not just high, record.

不只是高，而是史無前例地高。

Two, the CEO will immediately be made incredibly wealthy

第二：以目前管理階層的薪資結構，

by modern executive compensation.

執行長將一夕致富。

And three, farther down the road,

第三：長久以來，

the bank will suffer catastrophic losses

銀行將蒙受巨大的損失

and will fail unless it is bailed out.

除非獲得金援，不然就會倒閉。

And that's a hint as to how

了解事情的來龍去脈後，

we discovered this recipe,

我們才發現了這個秘訣，

because we discovered it through an autopsy process.

這是經過我們抽絲剝繭分析出的。

During the savings and loan debacle in 1984,

1984 年貸款危機期間，

we looked at every single failure,

我們研究每一個破產案例，

and we looked for common characteristics,

尋找其中的共同點，

and we discovered this recipe was common

我們發現這個秘訣

普遍存在於每一個詐欺案例中。

to each of these frauds.

In other words, a coroner could find these things

換句話說， 稽查員能夠查到這些事項

because this is a fatal recipe

因為這致命秘訣

that will destroy the banks

不但摧毀銀行

as well as the economy.

也會摧毀經濟。

And it also turns out to be precisely

結果它正是

what could have stopped this crisis,

可以阻止這類危機的方法，

the one that cost us 11 trillion dollars

這危機讓我們損失 11 兆美元，

just in the household sector,

這只是住房領域（房貸部門）而已，

that cost us 10 million jobs,

也讓我們失去 1000 萬個 工作機會，

was the easiest financial crisis by far

這是目前為止最輕而易舉

to have avoided completely

完全解決金融危機，

if we had simply learned the lessons

只要我們從大規模管理詐欺中

of epidemics of control fraud,

記取教訓，

particularly using this recipe.

善加運用這個秘訣。

So let's go to this crisis,

接下來我們開始討論這類危機，

and the two huge epidemics

二種大規模貸款詐欺

of loan origination fraud that drove the crisis --

導致發生危機的來源是：

appraisal fraud and liar's loans --

估價詐欺和欺騙性貸款。

and what we're going to see

我們將發現：

in looking at both of these is

第一：對於這些詐欺行為

we got warnings that were incredibly early

在相當早之前

about these frauds.

就會獲得警訊。

We got warnings that we could have taken advantage of easily,

第二：藉由這些警訊 我們可以輕易採取預防措施，

because back in the savings and loan debacle,

早在儲貨危機發生時，

we had figured out how to respond

我們就知道如何因應

and prevent these crises.

以避免發生這些危機。

And three, the warnings were unambiguous.

第三：這些警訊相當明確。

They were obvious that what was going on

清楚顯示

was an epidemic of accounting control fraud building up.

大規模的會計管理詐欺行為 正在擴大。

Let's take appraisal fraud first.

我們先來看估價詐欺。

This is simply where you inflate the value

簡單地說，估價詐欺就是

of the home that is being pledged

誇大用來擔保貸款

as security for the loan.

的房屋價值。

In 2000, the year 2000,

在 2000 年，

that is over a year before Enron fails, by the way,

這是安隆破產的一年多前，

the honest appraisers got together a formal petition

正直的估價師共同擬定一份請願書

begging the federal government to act,

要求聯邦政府採取措施，

and the industry to act,

及相關業者採取措施，

to stop this epidemic of appraisal fraud.

去阻止大規模的估價詐欺行為。

And the appraisers explained how it was occurring,

估價師解釋這類詐欺行為如何發生，

that banks were demanding that appraisers

銀行要求估價師

inflate the appraisal,

誇大其估價，

and that if the appraisers refused to do so,

如果估價師拒絕配合，

they, the banks, would blacklist

銀行就會將這些正直的估價師

honest appraisers

列入黑名單。

and refuse to use them.

不再僱用他們。

Now, we've seen this before

在儲貸危機期間

in the savings and loan debacle,

我們已經看過這種情形，

and we know that this kind of fraud

我們知道這種詐欺行為

can only originate from the lenders,

只可能來自貸方，

and that no honest lender would ever inflate

不誠實的貸方

the appraisal,

想要為估價灌水，

because it's the great protection against loss.

因為這是防止損失的最好方法。

So this was an incredibly early warning, 2000.

所以，這個預警訊號 早在 2000 年就出現，

It was something we'd seen before,

這是我們之前看過，

and it was completely unambiguous.

且是相當明確的警訊。

This was an epidemic of accounting control fraud

這些大規模會計管理詐欺行為

led by the banks.

是由銀行所主導的。

What about liar's loans?

接下來，什麼是詐欺貸款呢？

Well, that warning actually comes earlier.

實際上，這個警訊出現的更早。

The savings and loan debacle is basically

儲貨危機基本上是發生於

the early 1980s through 1993,

1980 年代的早期 一直到 1993 年，

and in the midst of fighting that wave

在打擊會計管理詐欺

of accounting control fraud,

的行動中，

in 1990, we found that a second front

在 1990 年，我們發現

出現第二波的詐欺行為。

of fraud was being started.

And like all good financial frauds in America,

如同美國所有經過精心策畫 的金融詐欺，

it began in Orange County, California.

起源於加州橘縣，

And we happened to be the regional regulators for it.

我們恰巧是當地的監管單位

And our examiners said,

我們的稽查人員說，

they are making loans without even checking

銀行根本沒有查核

what the borrower's income is.

借款人的收入情況就放款。

This is insane, it has to lead to massive losses,

真是太離譜了， 必定會導致巨大的損失，

and it only makes sense for entities engaged

這種情況只有金融機構

in these accounting control frauds.

參與會計管理詐欺。

And we said, yeah, you're absolutely right,

我們對稽核人員說，你們說的對，

and we drove those liar's loans

於 1990 及 1991 年

out of the industry in 1990 and 1991,

我們將詐欺借款逐出金融業，

but we could only deal with the industry

但是，我們只能處理

we had jurisdiction over,

權限範圍內的業務，

which was savings and loans,

也就是儲蓄和貸款業務，

and so the biggest and the baddest of the frauds,

其中最大、最惡劣的銀行－

Long Beach Savings, voluntarily gave up

長灘儲貸銀行，主動放棄此業務，

its federal savings and loan charter,

主動放棄聯邦政府頒發的 儲蓄和借貸執照，

gave up federal deposit insurance,

放棄聯邦銀行的存款保險，

converted to become a mortgage bank

變成一家抵押銀行，

for the sole purpose of escaping our jurisdiction,

只為了逃避我們的監管，

and changed its name to Ameriquest,

並把公司名稱改為 Ameriquest，

and became the most notorious

是早期欺騙性借貸詐欺行為中

of the liar's loans frauds early on,

最為惡名昭彰的銀行。

and to add to that,

此外，

they deliberately predated upon minorities.

他們還故意欺騙少數民族。

So we knew again about this crisis.

所以我們了解這類詐欺性貸款危機。

We'd seen it before. We'd stopped it before.

我們之前看過，也阻止過。

We had incredibly early warnings of it,

在相當早之前就接獲警訊，

and it was absolutely unambiguous

此警訊相當明確

that no honest lender would make loans in this fashion.

正直的貸方絶不會做這種放款。

So let's take a look at the reaction

我們看一下銀行業，

of the industry and the regulators

監管機關，

and the prosecutors to these clear

檢調單位的反應

early warnings that could have prevented the crisis.

就能夠及早獲得警訊， 預防危機的發生。

Start with the industry.

先從金融業開始，

The industry responded between 2003 and 2006

從 2003 年到 2006 年，

by increasing liar's loans

金融業的詐騙性貸款業務

by over 500 percent.

增加超過 500%。

These were the loans

這些貸款

that hyperinflated the bubble

過度膨漲，泡沬化，

and produced the economic crisis.

造成經濟危機。

By 2006, half of all the loans called subprime

截至 2006 年，半數所謂的次級貸款

were also liar's loans.

就是詐欺性貸款。

They're not mutually exclusive, it's just that together,

這兩者非獨立運作，而是互相影響，

they're the most toxic combination

形成你所能想像的

you can possibly imagine.

致命組合。

By 2006, 40 percent of all the loans

於 2006 年，有 40% 的貸款，

made that year, all the home loans made that year,

所申請的房屋貸款

were liar's loans,

是屬於詐欺性貸款，

40 percent.

高達 40%！

And this is despite a warning

儘管銀行業的

from the industry's own antifraud experts

反詐欺專家警告

that said that these loans were an open invitation

這些詐欺性貸款

to fraudsters,

有如引狼入室，

and that they had a fraud incidence

詐騙率

of 90 percent,

達到 90%，

nine zero.

是九十喔。

In response to that, the industry

金融業的反應是，

first started calling these loans liar's loans,

首先：一開始稱這種貸款 為詐欺性貸款，

which lacks a certain subtlety,

這個稱呼不是很好，

and second, massively increased them,

第二是：大幅地增加這種貸款，

and no government regulator ever

政府監管機關沒有

required or encouraged any lender

要求或鼓勵貸方

to make a liar's loan

去做詐騙性貸款

or anyone to purchase a liar's loan,

或買入詐騙性貸款，

and that explicitly includes Fannie and Freddie.

當然包括房利美和房地美。

This came from the lenders

這詐欺性貸款的手法

because of the fraud recipe.

歸咎於貸方的問題。

What happened to appraisal fraud?

估價詐欺又是怎麼一回事呢？

It expanded remarkably as well.

同樣也是非常快速地膨漲起來。

By 2007, when a survey of appraisers was done,

2007 年， 有一份估價師的調查報告，

90 percent of appraisers reported

90% 的估價師表示，

that they had been subject to coercion

貸方曾向他們施壓

from the lenders trying to get them

要求將估價

to inflate an appraisal.

灌水。

In other words, both forms of fraud

換句話說，這兩種型態的詐欺，

became absolutely endemic and normal,

已變成通病和常態，

and this is what drove the bubble.

這是造成經濟泡沫化的原因。

What happened in the governmental sector?

政府單位又是怎麼一回事？

Well, the government, as I told you,

至於政府，就如我所說的，

when we were the savings and loan regulators,

我們在執行儲貸監管業務時，

we could only deal with our industry,

只能處理我們負責的業務，

and if people gave up their federal deposit insurance,

如果貸方放棄聯邦政府存款保險

we couldn't do anything to them.

我們也束手無策。

Congress, it may strike you as impossible,

至於國會議員，或許你不相信，

but actually did something intelligent in 1994,

事實上，他們在 1994 年 做了一點聰明事，

and passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act

通過了「房屋所有權和權益保護法」

that gave the Fed, and only the Federal Reserve,

賦予美國聯邦儲備局（美聯儲）， 只限美聯儲

the explicit, statutory authority to ban liar's loans

明確的法定權力，禁止貸款人的

by every lender,

詐欺貸款業務，

whether or not they had federal deposit insurance.

無論貸款人是否擁有聯邦存款保險，

So what did Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan,

當柏南奇和葛林斯潘

as chairs of the Fed, do

任職美聯儲主席時， 是採取何種措施

when they got these warnings

以回應以下的警訊：

that these were massively fraudulent loans

大規模的詐欺貸款

and that they were being sold to the secondary market?

以及把這些貸款賣給次級市場？

Remember, there's no fraud exorcist.

請記住，沒有人可以讓這些詐欺消失。

Once it starts out a fraudulent loan,

一旦發生詐欺貸款，

it can only be sold to the secondary market

只能透過更多的詐欺貸款

through more frauds,

轉賣給次級市場，

lying about the reps and warrantees,

捏造財務報告和保證條款，

and then those people are going to produce

然後再包裝成

mortgage-backed securities

不動產抵押貸款證券

and exotic derivatives

和衍生性金融商品

which are also going to be supposedly backed

而為這些產品擔保的是

by those fraudulent loans.

詐欺貸款。

So the fraud is going to progress

所以詐欺貸款

through the entire system,

貫穿整個金融借貸系統，

hyperinflate the bubble, produce a disaster.

惡性通貨膨脹造成泡沬化， 造成災難。

And remember, we had experience with this.

請記得，這類災難我們經歷過，

We had seen significant losses,

我們遭受巨大的損失，

and we had experience of competent regulators

監管機關也阻止

in stopping it.

這類危機的發生。

Greenspan and Bernanke refused

葛林斯潘和柏克南拒絕

to use the authority under the statute

法律賦予他們的權力

to stop liar's loans.

去阻止詐欺貸款。

And this was a matter first of dogma.

首先，這是完全是其個人武斷的看法。

They're just horrifically opposed

他們只竭盡所能地

to anything regulatory.

反對任何監管措施。

But it is also the international competition in laxity,

國際之間的寬鬆政策競爭，

the race to the bottom

競相降低貨款的門檻，

between the United States and the United Kingdom,

尤其是美國和英國，

the city of London, in particular,

特別是倫敦，

and the city of London won that race to the bottom,

倫敦贏得最低貸款門檻的封號，

but it meant that all regulation in the West

這表示西方國家的監管制度，

was completely degraded

在這場誰是最鬆散監管的

in this stupid competition to be

愚蠢競賽中，

who could have the weakest regulation.

已徹底退化。

So that was the regulatory response.

這是監管機關的反應。

What about the response of the prosecutors

檢調單位對金融危機發生後

after the crisis,

的反應又是什麼呢？

after 11 trillion dollars in losses,

在 11 兆美金的損失之後，

after 10 million jobs lost,

喪失 1000 萬個工作之後，

a crisis in which the losses and the frauds

在這場損失和詐欺的規模，

were more than 70 times larger

比儲貸危機

than the savings and loan debacle?

還要大上 70 倍之後呢？

Well, in the savings and loan debacle,

好，在儲貸危機當中，

our agency that regulated savings and loans, OTS,

負責監管儲貸的機關， 也就是 OTS（儲蓄管理局），

made over 30,000 criminal referrals,

提出 30,000 個刑事訴訟，

produced over 1,000 felony convictions

超過 1,000 人被判以重罪，

just in cases designated as major,

這只是重大刑案部分，

and that understates the degree of prioritization,

嚴重的問題尚未浮上枱面，

because we worked with the FBI

因為我們與聯邦調查局 (FBI) 併肩合作

to create the list of the top 100 fraud schemes,

列出國內最惡劣的

the absolute worst of the worst, nationwide.

前 100 個詐欺名單。

Roughly 300 savings and loans involved,

大約有 300 件儲貸違法，

roughly 600 senior officials.

600 名高階主管涉案。

Virtually all of them were prosecuted.

他們幾乎全部被起訴。

We had a 90 percent conviction rate.

90% 被判有罪。

It's the greatest success against

這是有史以來，對抗白領犯罪

elite white collar criminals ever,

最大的勝利，

and it was because of this understanding

那是因為我們了解這類

of control fraud

詐欺的手法，

and the accounting control fraud mechanism.

以及會計管理詐欺機制。

Flash forward to the current crisis.

回到當前的金融危機。

The same agency, Office of Thrift Supervision,

同一個機構，儲蓄管理局，

which was supposed to regulate

應該要去監管

many of the largest makers of liar's loans

國內許多

in the country,

詐欺貸款的銀行，

has made, even today -- it no longer exists,

直至今天，雖然該局已經不存在了，

but as of a year ago,

但直到一年前，

it had made zero criminal referrals.

刑事訴訟案件掛零。

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,

應該要去監管國內各大銀行

which is supposed to regulate the largest national banks,

的金融管理局，

has made zero criminal referrals.

提出的刑事訴訟案件掛零。

The Fed appears to have made

美聯儲提出的

zero criminal referrals.

刑事訴訟案件也是掛零。

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

聯邦存款保險公司狡滑地

is smart enough to refuse to answer the question.

迴避了這個問題。

Without any guidance from the regulators,

沒有任何監管機關的協助，

there's no expertise in the FBI

聯邦調查局沒有相關專業知識，

to investigate complex frauds.

來調查如此複雜的詐欺案件。

It isn't simply that they've had

原因不是單純地

to reinvent the wheel

必須重新擬定

of how to do these prosecutions;

提出訴訟的策略；

they've forgotten that the wheel exists,

他們是忘了訴訟這件事，

and therefore, we have zero prosecutions,

所以造成這場危機的

and of course, zero convictions,

頂尖銀行詐欺高手，

of any of the elite bank frauds,

沒有人被起訴，

the Wall Street types,

華爾街的詐欺高手，

that drove this crisis.

當然也沒有人被定罪，

With no expertise coming from the regulators,

在監管機關沒有提供專業的協助下，

the FBI formed what it calls a partnership

聯邦調查局在 2007 年

with the Mortgage Bankers Association in 2007.

與抵押貸款協會合作。

The Mortgage Bankers Association

抵押貸款協會

is the trade association of the perps.

正是幹這些壞事的同業公會。

And the Mortgage Bankers Association

抵押貸款協會

set out, it had the audacity and the success

開始行動後，膽大妄為

並成功地欺瞞聯邦調查局。

to con the FBI.

It had created a supposed definition

為抵押貸款詐欺 下了一個似是而非的定義，

of mortgage fraud, in which, guess what,

你知道他們怎麼說嗎，

its members are always the victim

協會的成員是受害者，

and never the perpetrators.

沒有詐欺的行為。

And the FBI has bought this hook, line, sinker,

聯邦調查局不疑有他，

rod, reel and the boat they rode out in.

抵押貸款協會闖關成功。

And so the FBI,

至於聯邦調查局，

under the leadership of an attorney general

在非裔美籍的

who is African-American

司法部長，

and a president of the United States who is African-American,

及非裔美籍總統的領導下，

have adopted the Tea Party definition of the crisis,

採信茶黨對金融危機的說詞，

in which it is the first virgin crisis in history,

這是歷史上第一宗

conceived without sin in the executive ranks.

管理高層沒被定罪的 怪異金融危機事件。

And it's those oh-so-clever hairdressers

問題在那些聰明狡滑的小角色，

who were able to defraud the poor, pitiful banks,

他們能夠欺騙毫無金融經驗，

who lack any financial sophistication.

可憐的銀行業者，

It is the silliest story you can conceive of,

這是你能想像的最愚蠢說法，

and so they go and they prosecute the hairdressers,

所以他們起訴那些小角色，

and they leave the banksters alone entirely.

銀行高層毫髮未傷。

And so, while lions are roaming the campsite,

因此，那些詐欺者仍然逍遙法外，

the FBI is chasing mice.

聯邦調查局只是追逐小老鼠， 而不去抓大獅子。

What do we need to do?

我們該怎麼做？

What can we do in all of this?

面對這一切，我們該做些什麼？

We need to change the perverse incentive structures

我們必須改變不正當的激勵機制，

that produce these recurrent epidemics

正是因為這種機制

讓大規模會計管理詐欺 的事件一再發生，

of accounting control fraud

that are driving our crises.

因而造成財務危機。

So we have to first get rid

所以首先必需排除

of the systemically dangerous institutions.

具有系統危險性的金融機構。

These are the so-called too-big-to-fail institutions.

是所謂的「大到不能倒」的金融機構，

We need to shrink them to the point,

在未來的 5 年當中，

within the next five years,

我們必須縮小它們的規模，

that they no longer pose a systemic risk.

使它們不再有系統性風險。

Right now, they are ticking time bombs

現在它們是定時炸彈，

that will cause a global crisis

一旦其中一家銀行倒閉，

as soon as the next one fails --

將引發全球性金融危機。

not if, when.

不是會不會倒， 而是何時會倒的問題。

Second thing we need to do is completely reform

第二：必須徹底改革

modern executive and professional compensation,

當今高階管理人員的酬薪制度，

which is what they use to suborn the appraisers.

他們以高薪來收買估價師。

Remember, they were pressuring the appraisers

請記住，他們透過酬薪制度

through the compensation system,

對估價師施壓，

trying to produce what we call a Gresham's dynamic,

試圖產生所謂的 格萊欣 (Gresham) 效應，

in which bad ethics drives good ethics

在市場上

out of the marketplace.

以劣幣趨逐良幣。

And they largely succeeded,

他們獲得大勝利，

which is how the fraud became endemic.

這是為何詐欺行為 像流行病般蔓延開來，

And the third thing that we need to do

第三件們必需做的事是：

is deal with what we call the three D's:

去處理我們所謂的 3D：

deregulation, desupervision,

放寬管制 (Deregulation)， 放寬監督 (Desupervision)，

and the de facto decriminalization.

事實上的合法化 (De Facto Decriminalization )。

Because we can make

我們能改革以上三件事，

all three of these changes, and if we do so,

如果我們這麼做，

we can dramatically reduce

就能夠大幅減少

how often we have a crisis

危機發生的頻率

and how severe those crises are.

以及危機發生後的危害程度。

That is not simply critical to our economy.

這不僅對經濟而言相當重要。

You can see what these crises do to inequality

你可以看出危機造成貧富不均

and what they do to our democracy.

以及對民主制度的影響。

They have produced crony capitalism,

它造成美國式的

American-style,

親信資本主義，

in which the largest financial institutions

其中最大型的金融機構

are the leading financial donors of both parties,

是兩黨的主要金主，

and that's the reason why

這就是為何

even after this crisis,

比儲貸危機還嚴重 70 倍

70 times larger than the savings and loan crisis,

的危機發生後，

we have no meaningful reforms

除了取締詐欺性貸款外，

in any of the three areas that I've talked about,

以上我提到的 3 個層面

other than banning liar's loans,

依然沒有實際上的改革。

which is good,

這是好事，

but that's just one form of ammunition

詐欺性貸款只是

for this fraud weapon.

其中一種武器。

There are many forms of ammunition they can use.

他們可使用的武器相當多。

That's why we need to learn

這就是為何我們需要學習

what the bankers have learned:

銀行家們的手法：

the recipe for the best way to rob a bank,

搶銀行的最佳秘訣，

so that we can stop that recipe,

這樣我們才能遏止這種做法，

because our legislators,

因為我們的立法者，

who are dependent on political contributions,

仰賴政治獻金，

will not do it on their own.

他們不會主動採取行動。

Thank you very much.

謝謝各位。

(Applause)

（掌聲）