Ralph Langner: Cracking Stuxnet, a 21st-century cyber weapon

312,558 views ใƒป 2011-03-29

TED


์•„๋ž˜ ์˜๋ฌธ์ž๋ง‰์„ ๋”๋ธ”ํด๋ฆญํ•˜์‹œ๋ฉด ์˜์ƒ์ด ์žฌ์ƒ๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

๋ฒˆ์—ญ: J J LEE ๊ฒ€ํ† : JY Kang
00:15
The idea behind the Stuxnet computer worm
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'์Šคํ„ฑ์Šค๋„ท(Stuxnet)' ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ์›œ์˜ ๊ฐœ๋…์€
00:18
is actually quite simple.
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์‚ฌ์‹ค ์•„์ฃผ ๋‹จ์ˆœํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
00:20
We don't want Iran to get the bomb.
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๋‹ค๋“ค ์ด๋ž€์ด ์›์žํญํƒ„์„ ๋ณด์œ ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฑธ ์›์น˜ ์•Š์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
00:23
Their major asset for developing nuclear weapons
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ํ•ต๋ฌด๊ธฐ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ์„ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ทธ๋“ค์˜ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ์ž์‚ฐ์€
00:26
is the Natanz uranium enrichment facility.
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๋‚˜ํƒ„์ฆˆ ์šฐ๋ผ๋Š„ ๋†์ถ•์‹œ์„ค์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
00:30
The gray boxes that you see,
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์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์ด ๋ณด๋Š” ํšŒ์ƒ‰ ์ƒ์ž๋“ค์€
00:32
these are real-time control systems.
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์‹ค์‹œ๊ฐ„ ์ œ์–ด ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
00:35
Now if we manage to compromise these systems
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๊ตฌ๋™ ์†๋„์™€ ๋ฐธ๋ธŒ๋ฅผ ์ œ์–ดํ•˜๋Š” ์ด ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์„
00:38
that control drive speeds and valves,
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์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ๋“  ํ•ด์„œ ์œ„ํƒœ๋กญ๊ฒŒ ํ•œ๋‹ค๋ฉด,
00:41
we can actually cause a lot of problems
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์›์‹ฌ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ์— ๋งŽ์€ ๋ฌธ์ œ๋ฅผ
00:44
with the centrifuge.
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์œ ๋ฐœ์‹œํ‚ฌ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์„ ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
00:46
The gray boxes don't run Windows software;
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์ด ์ œ์–ด ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์—์„œ ์œˆ๋„์šฐ์ฆˆ ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด๋Š” ์ž‘๋™ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
00:48
they are a completely different technology.
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์ด ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์€ ์™„์ „ํžˆ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์ด์ฃ .
00:51
But if we manage
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ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ํ•ด์„œ๋“ 
00:53
to place a good Windows virus
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์žฅ๋น„ ๊ด€๋ฆฌ์ž์˜ ๋…ธํŠธ๋ถ์—
00:56
on a notebook
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์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ์„ค์ •์„ ์œ„ํ•œ
00:58
that is used by a maintenance engineer
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์“ธ๋งŒํ•œ ์œˆ๋„์šฐ์ฆˆ ๋ฐ”์ด๋Ÿฌ์Šค๋ฅผ
01:00
to configure this gray box,
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์‹ฌ์–ด ๋†“๊ธฐ๋งŒ ํ•œ๋‹ค๋ฉด
01:03
then we are in business.
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์ค€๋น„๋Š” ๋๋‚œ ์…ˆ์ด์ฃ .
01:05
And this is the plot behind Stuxnet.
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์Šคํ„ฑ์Šค๋„ท์— ๊ฐ์ถฐ์ง„ ๊ณ„ํš์€ ์ด๋ ‡์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:08
So we start with a Windows dropper.
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์ž, ์œˆ๋„์šฐ์ฆˆ ๋“œ๋กœํผ ์›œ์—์„œ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ์‹œ์ž‘ํ•ด๋ณด์ฃ .
01:13
The payload goes onto the gray box,
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์›œ์—์„œ ๋งŒ๋“ค์–ด์ง„ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ๋Š” ์ œ์–ด ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์œผ๋กœ ๋ณด๋‚ด์ง€๊ณ ,
01:16
damages the centrifuge,
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์›์‹ฌ ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ์— ์†์ƒ์„ ์ผ์œผํ‚ค๋ฉด,
01:18
and the Iranian nuclear program is delayed --
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์ด๋ž€์˜ ํ•ต๊ฐœ๋ฐœ ํ”„๋กœ๊ทธ๋žจ์€ ์ง€์—ฐ๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:20
mission accomplished.
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๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋ฉด ์ž„๋ฌด๊ฐ€ ์™„์ˆ˜๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด์ฃ .
01:22
That's easy, huh?
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์‰ฝ์ฃ , ๊ทธ๋ ‡์ฃ ?
01:24
I want to tell you how we found that out.
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์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๊ทธ๊ฑธ ์•Œ์•„๋ƒˆ๋Š”์ง€ ๋ง์”€๋“œ๋ฆฌ๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:27
When we started our research on Stuxnet six months ago,
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6๊ฐœ์›” ์ „, ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ์Šคํ„ฑ์Šค๋„ท์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์‹œ์ž‘ํ–ˆ์„ ๋•Œ
01:30
it was completely unknown what the purpose of this thing was.
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๊ทธ ๋ชฉ์ ์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์ธ์ง€ ์ „ํ˜€ ์•Œ ์ˆ˜ ์—†์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:33
The only thing that was known
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์•Œ์•„๋‚ธ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ๊ณ ๋Š”
01:35
is it's very, very complex on the Windows part, the dropper part,
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๊ทธ ๋งค์šฐ ๋ณต์žกํ•œ ์œˆ๋„์šฐ์ฆˆ ๋“œ๋กœํผ ์›œ์ด ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๊ฐ€์ง€
01:38
used multiple zero-day vulnerabilities.
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์ œ๋กœ๋ฐ์ด ์ทจ์•ฝ์ ์„ ์ด์šฉํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. (์ฃผ:์ œ๋กœ๋ฐ์ด ์ทจ์•ฝ์  : ๋Œ€์‘์ฑ…์ด ์•„์ง ๋ฐœํ‘œ๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ๋ณด์•ˆ ์ทจ์•ฝ์ )
01:41
And it seemed to want to do something
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์€ ์ด ํšŒ์ƒ‰ ์ƒ์ž๋“ค,
01:44
with these gray boxes, these real-time control systems.
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์‹ค์‹œ๊ฐ„ ์ œ์–ด ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์— ๋ญ”๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ํ•˜๊ณ ์ž ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ ๊ฐ™์•˜์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:46
So that got our attention,
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ทธ ์ ์— ์ฃผ๋ชฉํ–ˆ๊ณ ,
01:48
and we started a lab project
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์„ ์Šคํ„ฑ์Šค๋„ท์œผ๋กœ
01:50
where we infected our environment with Stuxnet
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๊ฐ์—ผ์‹œํ‚จ ํ›„์—, ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ํ”„๋กœ์ ํŠธ๋ฅผ ์‹œ์ž‘ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:54
and checked this thing out.
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์ด๊ฒƒ์„ ์กฐ์‚ฌํ–ˆ์ฃ .
01:56
And then some very funny things happened.
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋‚˜์„œ ์•„์ฃผ ์žฌ๋ฏธ์žˆ๋Š” ์ผ์ด ๋ฒŒ์–ด์กŒ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:59
Stuxnet behaved like a lab rat
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์Šคํ„ฑ์Šค๋„ท์€ ์น˜์ฆˆ๋ฅผ ์ข‹์•„ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š๋Š”
02:02
that didn't like our cheese --
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์‹คํ—˜์‹ค ์ฅ์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ ๋™์ž‘ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:05
sniffed, but didn't want to eat.
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๋ƒ„์ƒˆ๋Š” ๋งก์ง€๋งŒ ๋จน์ง€๋Š” ์•Š์ฃ .
02:07
Didn't make sense to me.
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์ €๋Š” ์ดํ•ด๊ฐ€ ๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์•˜์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:09
And after we experimented with different flavors of cheese,
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๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์ข…๋ฅ˜์˜ ๋จน์ž‡๊ฐ์œผ๋กœ ์‹คํ—˜์„ ํ•ด ๋ณธ ํ›„์—์•ผ,
02:12
I realized, well, this is a directed attack.
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์ด๊ฒƒ์ด ๋ชฉํ‘œ๊ฐ€ ์ •ํ•ด์ง„ ์œ ๋„๊ณต๊ฒฉ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ์•Œ์•˜์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:16
It's completely directed.
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ํ™•์‹คํ•œ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ๋ชฉํ‘œ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. .
02:18
The dropper is prowling actively
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๊ทธ ๋“œ๋กœํผ ์›œ์€ ์ œ์–ด์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์ด
02:20
on the gray box
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ํŠน์ •ํ•œ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์„ค์ •์— ์žˆ์„ ๋•Œ๋งŒ
02:22
if a specific configuration is found,
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ํ™œ๋ฐœํžˆ ํ™œ๋™ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:25
and even if the actual program code that it's trying to infect
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๊ฒŒ๋‹ค๊ฐ€ ๊ฐ์—ผ์‹œํ‚ค๊ณ ์ž ํ•˜๋Š” ๋Œ€์ƒ ํ”„๋กœ๊ทธ๋žจ์ด
02:29
is actually running on that target.
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์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ๊ตฌ๋™๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์„ ๋•Œ๋งŒ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์„ ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:31
And if not, Stuxnet does nothing.
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๊ทธ๋ ‡์ง€ ์•Š๋‹ค๋ฉด, ์Šคํ„ฑ์Šค๋„ท์€ ์•„๋ฌด๊ฒƒ๋„ ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:34
So that really got my attention,
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๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์ด ์ œ ์ฃผ์˜๋ฅผ ๋Œ์—ˆ๊ณ ,
02:36
and we started to work on this
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์—ฌ๊ธฐ์— ๊ฑฐ์˜ 24์‹œ๊ฐ„ ๋‚ด๋‚ด
02:38
nearly around the clock,
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๋งค๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ ์‹œ์ž‘ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:40
because I thought, "Well, we don't know what the target is.
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๊ทธ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ๋Œ€์ƒ์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์ธ์ง€ ๋ชฐ๋ž๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:43
It could be, let's say for example,
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๊ณต๊ฒฉ๋ชฉํ‘œ๊ฐ€, ์˜ˆ๋ฅผ ๋“ค์ž๋ฉด,
02:45
a U.S. power plant,
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๋ฏธ๊ตญ ๋ฐœ์ „์†Œ๋‚˜
02:47
or a chemical plant in Germany.
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๋…์ผ์˜ ํ™”ํ•™ ๊ณต์žฅ์ด ๋  ์ˆ˜๋„ ์žˆ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด์—ˆ์ฃ .
02:49
So we better find out what the target is soon."
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๊ทธ๋ž˜์„œ ๋นจ๋ฆฌ ๊ทธ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ๋Œ€์ƒ์„ ์ฐพ์•„์•ผ ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:52
So we extracted and decompiled
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ์ฝ”๋“œ๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ถœํ•ด์„œ
02:54
the attack code,
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์—ญํ•ด์„์„ ํ–ˆ๊ณ ,
02:56
and we discovered that it's structured in two digital bombs --
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๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์ด ์ž‘์€ ๊ฒƒ๊ณผ ํฐ ๊ฒƒ, ๋‘ ๊ฐœ์˜ ๋””์ง€ํ„ธ ํญํƒ„์œผ๋กœ
02:59
a smaller one and a bigger one.
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๊ตฌ์„ฑ๋˜์–ด ์žˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ์•Œ์•„๋ƒˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:02
And we also saw that they are very professionally engineered
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๋˜ํ•œ ๋ช…๋ฐฑํžˆ ๋ชจ๋“  ๋‚ด๋ถ€ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์‚ฌ๋žŒ์ด
03:06
by people who obviously had all insider information.
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์•„์ฃผ ์ „๋ฌธ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ œ์ž‘ํ–ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ๋„ ์•Œ์•„๋ƒˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:10
They knew all the bits and bites
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ๊ณต๊ฒฉํ•ด์•ผ ํ•  ๋Œ€์ƒ์˜
03:12
that they had to attack.
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๋ชจ๋“  ๊ฒƒ์„ ์•Œ๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:14
They probably even know the shoe size of the operator.
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์–ด์ฉŒ๋ฉด ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ์šด์˜์ž์˜ ์‹ ๋ฐœ ์‚ฌ์ด์ฆˆ ๊นŒ์ง€ ์•Œ๊ณ  ์žˆ์„์ง€๋„ ๋ชจ๋ฅด์ฃ .
03:17
So they know everything.
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์–ด์จŒ๋“  ๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ๋ชจ๋“  ๊ฒƒ์„ ์•Œ๊ณ  ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:19
And if you have heard that the dropper of Stuxnet
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์Šคํ„ฑ์Šค๋„ท์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๋“œ๋กœํผ ์›œ์ด
03:22
is complex and high-tech,
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๋ณต์žกํ•œ ์ฒจ๋‹จ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ์•Œ๊ณ  ๊ณ„์‹œ๋‹ค๋ฉด,
03:24
let me tell you this:
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์ด๊ฑฐ ํ•˜๋‚˜๋งŒ ๋ง์”€๋“œ๋ฆฌ์ฃ .
03:26
the payload is rocket science.
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๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์˜ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์šฉ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ๋Š” ์ •๋ง ์–ด๋ ต์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:28
It's way above everything
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์ง€๊ธˆ๊ป ๋ด ์™”๋˜ ๋ชจ๋“  ๊ฒƒ์„
03:30
that we have ever seen before.
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๋›ฐ์–ด ๋„˜์„ ์ •๋„์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:33
Here you see a sample of this actual attack code.
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์—ฌ๊ธฐ ์‹ค์ œ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ์ฝ”๋“œ์˜ ์ƒ˜ํ”Œ์„ ๋ณด์„ธ์š”.
03:36
We are talking about --
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์•ฝ 15,000์ค„์˜ ์ฝ”๋“œ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ
03:38
around about 15,000 lines of code.
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๋ง์”€๋“œ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:41
Looks pretty much like old-style assembly language.
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๊ตฌ์‹์˜ ์–ด์…ˆ๋ธ”๋ฆฌ ์–ธ์–ด์™€ ๋งค์šฐ ์œ ์‚ฌํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋ณด์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:44
And I want to tell you how we were able
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๊ทธ๋Ÿผ ์ด ์ฝ”๋“œ๋ฅผ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ํ•ด์„ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋Š”์ง€
03:46
to make sense out of this code.
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์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„๊ป˜ ๋ง์”€๋“œ๋ฆฌ๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:48
So what we were looking for is, first of all, system function calls,
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ์ฐพ๋˜ ๊ฒƒ์€ ๋ฌด์—‡๋ณด๋‹ค๋„ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ ํ•จ์ˆ˜ ํ˜ธ์ถœ ๋ถ€๋ถ„์ด์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:51
because we know what they do.
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๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์ด ์–ด๋–ค ์—ญํ• ์„ ํ• ์ง€ ์•Œ๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด์ฃ .
03:53
And then we were looking for timers and data structures
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๋‹ค์Œ์œผ๋กœ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ํƒ€์ด๋จธ์™€ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ฅผ ์ฐพ์•˜๊ณ ,
03:57
and trying to relate them to the real world --
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๊ทธ๊ฒƒ๋“ค์„ ์‹ค์ œ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ๋ชฉํ‘œ๊ฐ€ ๋  ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์ด ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ๋“ค๊ณผ
03:59
to potential real world targets.
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์—ฐ๊ด€์‹œ์ผœ ๋ณด์•˜์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:01
So we do need target theories
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์ฆ๋ช…ํ•˜๊ฑฐ๋‚˜ ๋ฐ˜์ฆํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”
04:04
that we can prove or disprove.
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ํ‘œ์  ์ด๋ก ์ด ํ•„์š”ํ–ˆ์ฃ .
04:07
In order to get target theories,
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ํ‘œ์  ์ด๋ก ์„ ์„ธ์šธ ๋•Œ,
04:09
we remember
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ์œ ๋…ํ–ˆ๋˜ ๊ฒƒ์€
04:11
that it's definitely hardcore sabotage,
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๊ฐ•๋ ฅํ•œ ํŒŒ๊ดดํ–‰์œ„๊ฐ€ ๋ชฉ์ ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ์ ,
04:13
it must be a high-value target
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์ค‘์š”์‹œ์„ค์ด ๋Œ€์ƒ์ด์–ด์•ผ ํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ์ ์ด์—ˆ๊ณ ,
04:15
and it is most likely located in Iran,
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ํ‹€๋ฆผ์—†์ด ์ด๋ž€์— ์œ„์น˜ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ฆฌ๋ผ ์ƒ๊ฐํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:18
because that's where most of the infections had been reported.
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์™œ๋ƒํ•˜๋ฉด ๋ฐ”์ด๋Ÿฌ์Šค ๊ฐ์—ผ์˜ ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์€ ์ด๋ž€์—์„œ ๋ณด๊ณ ๋˜๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ด์ฃ .
04:22
Now you don't find several thousand targets in that area.
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์ด์ œ ๊ทธ ์ง€์—ญ์—์„œ ์ˆ˜ ์ฒœ๊ฐœ์˜ ํ‘œ์ ์„ ์ฐพ์„ ํ•„์š”๋Š” ์—†์ฃ .
04:25
It basically boils down
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๊ธฐ๋ณธ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๋ถ€์‹œ๋ฅด ํ•ต๋ฐœ์ „์†Œ์™€
04:27
to the Bushehr nuclear power plant
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๋‚˜ํƒ„์ฆˆ ์—ฐ๋ฃŒ ๋†์ถ• ๊ณต์žฅ์œผ๋กœ
04:29
and to the Natanz fuel enrichment plant.
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์••์ถ•์‹œํ‚ฌ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:31
So I told my assistant,
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์ €๋Š” ์กฐ์ˆ˜์—๊ฒŒ ๋งํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:33
"Get me a list of all centrifuge and power plant experts from our client base."
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"์šฐ๋ฆฌ ๊ณ ๊ฐ์ค‘์—์„œ ์›์‹ฌ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ์™€ ๋ฐœ์ „์†Œ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ์ „๋ฌธ๊ฐ€ ๋ช…๋‹จ์„ ๊ฐ€์ ธ๋‹ค์ฃผ๊ฒŒ."
04:36
And I phoned them up and picked their brain
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๊ทธ๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ ์ „ํ™”๋ฅผ ๊ฑธ์–ด
04:38
in an effort to match their expertise
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๊ทธ๋“ค์˜ ์ „๋ฌธ์  ์˜๊ฒฌ๋“ค์„
04:40
with what we found in code and data.
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์ฝ”๋“œ์™€ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ์—์„œ ์ฐพ์•„๋‚ธ ๊ฒƒ๋“ค๊ณผ ๋งž์ถฐ ๋ดค์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:43
And that worked pretty well.
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๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์€ ์•„์ฃผ ํšจ๊ณผ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:45
So we were able to associate
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๊ฒฐ๊ตญ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ทธ '์ž‘์€ ๋””์ง€ํ„ธ ๋ฌด๊ธฐ'๊ฐ€
04:47
the small digital warhead
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ํ•ต์‹œ์„ค์˜ ํšŒ์ „์ž ์ œ์–ด๊ธฐ์™€
04:49
with the rotor control.
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๊ด€๋ จ์žˆ์Œ์„ ์•Œ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:51
The rotor is that moving part within the centrifuge,
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ํšŒ์ „์ž๋Š” ์›์‹ฌ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๊ตฌ๋™์‹œํ‚ค๋Š” ๋ถ€ํ’ˆ์œผ๋กœ,
04:54
that black object that you see.
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์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์ด ๋ณด์‹œ๋Š” ๊ฒ€์€ ๋ฌผ์ฒด์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:56
And if you manipulate the speed of this rotor,
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์ด ํšŒ์ „์ž์˜ ์†๋„๋ฅผ ์กฐ์ ˆํ•œ๋‹ค๋ฉด,
04:59
you are actually able to crack the rotor
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ํšŒ์ „์ž๋ฅผ ๋ง๊ฐ€ํŠธ๋ฆด ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ณ ,
05:01
and eventually even have the centrifuge explode.
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๊ฒฐ๊ตญ ์›์‹ฌ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ํญ๋ฐœํ•˜๋„๋ก ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:05
What we also saw
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๋˜ํ•œ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ์•Œ์•„๋‚ธ ๊ฒƒ์€
05:07
is that the goal of the attack
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๊ทธ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ๋ชฉ์ ์ด ํšŒ์ „์ž๋ฅผ
05:09
was really to do it slowly and creepy --
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์ •๋ง ๋”๋””๊ณ  ๋Š๋ฆฌ๊ฒŒ ํšŒ์ „ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋งŒ๋“ค์–ด์„œ
05:12
obviously in an effort
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์ •๋น„ ์—”์ง€๋‹ˆ์–ด๋“ค์ด
05:14
to drive maintenance engineers crazy,
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์ •์‹ ์—†๋„๋ก ๋งŒ๋“ค๊ณ ,
05:17
that they would not be able to figure this out quickly.
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๋นจ๋ฆฌ ์•Œ์•„์ฑ„์ง€ ๋ชปํ•˜๋„๋ก ํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:20
The big digital warhead -- we had a shot at this
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๋‹ค์Œ์€ 'ํฐ ๋””์ง€ํ„ธ ๋ฌด๊ธฐ'์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:23
by looking very closely
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ์™€ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ฅผ
05:25
at data and data structures.
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์•„์ฃผ ๋ฉด๋ฐ€ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๊ด€์ฐฐํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:27
So for example, the number 164
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์˜ˆ๋ฅผ ๋“ค์–ด, 164๋ผ๋Š” ์ˆซ์ž๊ฐ€
05:29
really stands out in that code;
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์ฝ”๋“œ์—์„œ ํŠนํžˆ ๋ˆˆ์— ๋„๋Š”๋ฐ์š”.
05:31
you can't overlook it.
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๊ฐ„๊ณผํ•  ์ˆ˜๊ฐ€ ์—†์ฃ .
05:33
I started to research scientific literature
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์ €๋Š” ์ด ์›์‹ฌ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ๋‚˜ํƒ„์ฆˆ์—์„œ
05:35
on how these centrifuges
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์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ๊ฑด์„ค๋˜์—ˆ๋‚˜
05:37
are actually built in Natanz
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๊ณผํ•™ ๋ฌธํ—Œ์„ ์ฐพ๊ธฐ ์‹œ์ž‘ํ–ˆ๊ณ ,
05:39
and found they are structured
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๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์ด '์ผ€์Šค์ผ€์ด๋“œ'๋ผ๋Š” ๋‹ค์ธต ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋กœ ๋˜์–ด ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ,
05:41
in what is called a cascade,
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๊ฐ ์ธต์—๋Š” 164๊ฐœ์˜ ์›์‹ฌ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ๊ฐ€
05:43
and each cascade holds 164 centrifuges.
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์„ค์น˜๋˜์–ด ์žˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ์•Œ์•„๋ƒˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:47
So that made sense, that was a match.
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์•ž ๋’ค๊ฐ€ ๋”ฑ ๋งž์•„ ๋–จ์–ด์กŒ์ฃ .
05:49
And it even got better.
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋”์šฑ ์ง„์ „์ด ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:51
These centrifuges in Iran
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์ด๋ž€์— ์žˆ๋Š” ์ด ์›์‹ฌ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ๋“ค์€
05:53
are subdivided into 15, what is called, stages.
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15๊ฐœ์˜ ๋‹จ๊ณ„๋กœ ๋‚˜๋‰˜์–ด ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:57
And guess what we found in the attack code?
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๊ทธ๋Ÿผ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ์ฝ”๋“œ์—์„œ ๋ฌด์—‡์„ ์ฐพ์•˜์„๊นŒ์š”?
05:59
An almost identical structure.
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๊ฑฐ์˜ ๋™์ผํ•œ ๊ตฌ์กฐ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:01
So again, that was a real good match.
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๋˜ ๋‹ค์‹œ ์ •ํ™•ํžˆ ๋งž์•„ ๋–จ์–ด์กŒ์ฃ .
06:04
And this gave us very high confidence for what we were looking at.
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์ด๊ฒƒ์ด ์šฐ๋ฆฌ์—๊ฒŒ ํ™•์‹คํ•œ ์ž์‹ ๊ฐ์„ ์‹ฌ์–ด์คฌ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:07
Now don't get me wrong here, it didn't go like this.
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์˜คํ•ดํ•˜์ง€๋Š” ๋งˆ์„ธ์š”. ๋ง์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ ์‰ฝ๊ฒŒ ํ’€๋ฆฐ ๊ฒƒ์€ ์•„๋‹™๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:10
These results have been obtained
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์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ๋ช‡ ์ฃผ๊ฐ„์˜ ์ •๋ง ๊ณ ๋œ ์ž‘์—… ๋์—
06:13
over several weeks of really hard labor.
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์–ป์–ด์ง„ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:16
And we often went into just a dead end
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์ข…์ข… ๋ง‰๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๊ธธ์— ๋ถ€๋”ชํ˜”๊ณ ,
06:19
and had to recover.
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์ฒ˜์Œ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๋‹ค์‹œ ์‹œ์ž‘ํ•ด์•ผ ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:21
Anyway, so we figured out
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์–ด์จŒ๋“ , ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์‹ค์ œ๋กœ
06:23
that both digital warheads
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ํ•˜๋‚˜์˜ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋ฅผ ๋‘๊ณ 
06:25
were actually aiming at one and the same target,
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๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๊ฐ๋„๋กœ ์ ‘๊ทผํ•˜๋Š” ๋‘ ๊ฐœ์˜ ๋””์ง€ํ„ธ ๋ฌด๊ธฐ๋ฅผ
06:27
but from different angles.
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์ฐพ์•„๋‚ธ ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:29
The small warhead is taking one cascade,
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'์ž‘์€ ๋ฌด๊ธฐ'๋Š” ํ•œ ๋‹จ๊ณ„๋ฅผ ๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœ
06:32
and spinning up the rotors and slowing them down,
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ํšŒ์ „์ž์˜ ํšŒ์ „์†๋„๋ฅผ ๋Š๋ฆฌ๊ฒŒ ๋งŒ๋“ญ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:35
and the big warhead
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  'ํฐ ๋ฌด๊ธฐ'๋Š”
06:37
is talking to six cascades
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6๋‹จ๊ณ„์— ๊ฑธ์ณ์„œ
06:39
and manipulating valves.
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๋ฐธ๋ธŒ๋“ค์„ ์กฐ์ž‘ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด์ฃ .
06:41
So in all, we are very confident
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๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์ ์œผ๋กœ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ๋ชฉํ‘œ๊ฐ€ ๋ฌด์—‡์ธ์ง€
06:43
that we have actually determined what the target is.
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์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ์•Œ์•„๋ƒˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ํ™•์‹ ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:45
It is Natanz, and it is only Natanz.
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๋‚˜ํƒ„์ฆˆ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‚˜ํƒ„์ฆˆ ๋ฟ์ด์ฃ .
06:48
So we don't have to worry
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๊ทธ๋ž˜์„œ ์Šคํ„ฑ์Šค๋„ท์˜ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๊ฐ€ ๋ ๋งŒํ•œ
06:50
that other targets
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๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๋Œ€์ƒ๋“ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ๋Š”
06:52
might be hit by Stuxnet.
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๊ฑฑ์ •ํ•  ํ•„์š”๊ฐ€ ์—†์–ด์กŒ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:54
Here's some very cool stuff that we saw --
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์—ฌ๊ธฐ์—์„œ ์•„์ฃผ ๋ฉ‹์ง„ ๊ฑธ ํ•˜๋‚˜ ๋ฐœ๊ฒฌํ–ˆ๋Š”๋ฐ์š”.
06:57
really knocked my socks off.
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์ •๋ง ์ €๋ฅผ ๊นœ์ง ๋†€๋ผ๊ฒŒ ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด์ฃ .
06:59
Down there is the gray box,
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์•„๋ž˜ ์ชฝ์— ํšŒ์ƒ‰ ์ƒ์ž๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๊ณ ,
07:01
and on the top you see the centrifuges.
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๊ทธ ์œ„์— ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ์›์‹ฌ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:04
Now what this thing does
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์ด๊ฒƒ์ด ํ•˜๋Š” ์ผ์€
07:06
is it intercepts the input values from sensors --
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๊ฐ์ง€๊ธฐ๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ์˜ ์ž…๋ ฅ๊ฐ’์„ ๊ฐ€๋กœ์ฑ„๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:09
so for example, from pressure sensors
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์˜ˆ๋ฅผ ๋“ค๋ฉด, ์••๋ ฅ ๊ฐ์ง€๊ธฐ์™€
07:11
and vibration sensors --
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์ง„๋™ ๊ฐ์ง€๊ธฐ์˜ ์ž…๋ ฅ๊ฐ’์„ ๊ฐ€๋กœ์ฑ„๊ณ ,
07:13
and it provides legitimate program code,
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๊ฑฐ์ง“ ์ž…๋ ฅ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ๋กœ ์ด๋ฃจ์–ด์ง„
07:16
which is still running during the attack,
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์ ์ ˆํ•œ ์ฝ”๋“œ๋ฅผ ๊ฑด๋‚ด์ฃผ๋ฉด ๊ณต๊ฒฉ๋ฐ›๋Š” ์ค‘์—๋„
07:18
with fake input data.
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๊ณ„์† ์ž‘๋™ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋˜์ฃ .
07:20
And as a matter of fact, this fake input data
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์‚ฌ์‹ค, ์ด ๊ฑฐ์ง“ ์ž…๋ ฅ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ๋Š”
07:22
is actually prerecorded by Stuxnet.
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์Šคํ„ฑ์Šค๋„ท์ด ๋ฏธ๋ฆฌ ๊ธฐ๋กํ•ด ๋‘” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:25
So it's just like from the Hollywood movies
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๊ทธ๊ฑด ๋งˆ์น˜ ํ—๋ฆฌ์šฐ๋“œ ์˜ํ™”์—์„œ์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ
07:27
where during the heist,
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์€ํ–‰์„ ํ„ฐ๋Š” ๋™์•ˆ์—
07:29
the observation camera is fed with prerecorded video.
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๋ฏธ๋ฆฌ ๋…นํ™”ํ•ด๋‘” ์˜์ƒ์„ ๊ฐ์‹œ์นด๋ฉ”๋ผ๋กœ ๋ณด๋‚ด๋Š” ๊ฒƒ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ๊ฑฐ์ฃ .
07:32
That's cool, huh?
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๋ฉ‹์ง€์ฃ ? ์•ˆ๊ทธ๋Ÿฐ๊ฐ€์š”?
07:35
The idea here is obviously
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์ด๋Ÿฐ ๊ฐœ๋…์€ ๋ช…๋ฐฑํžˆ
07:37
not only to fool the operators in the control room.
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์ œ์–ด์‹ค ์šด์˜์ž๋งŒ์„ ๋ฐ”๋ณด๋กœ ๋งŒ๋“œ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ์•„๋‹™๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:40
It actually is much more dangerous and aggressive.
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์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ํ›จ์”ฌ ๋” ์œ„ํ—˜ํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์ ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:44
The idea
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๊ทธ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ๊ฐœ๋…์€
07:46
is to circumvent a digital safety system.
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๋””์ง€ํ„ธ ์•ˆ์ „ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์„ ํšŒํ”ผํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:50
We need digital safety systems
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์šด์˜์ž๊ฐ€ ์ถฉ๋ถ„ํžˆ ๋น ๋ฅด๊ฒŒ ๋ฐ˜์‘ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์—†๋Š” ๊ณณ์—๋Š”
07:52
where a human operator could not act quick enough.
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๋””์ง€ํ„ธ ์•ˆ์ „ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์ด ํ•„์š”ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:55
So for example, in a power plant,
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์˜ˆ๋ฅผ ๋“ค๋ฉด, ๋ฐœ์ „์†Œ์—์„œ
07:57
when your big steam turbine gets too over speed,
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ํฐ ๊ทœ๋ชจ์˜ ์ฆ๊ธฐ ํ„ฐ๋นˆ์ด ๋„ˆ๋ฌด ๋น ๋ฅธ ์†๋„๋กœ ๋Œ๋ฉด,
08:00
you must open relief valves within a millisecond.
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100๋ถ„์˜ 1์ดˆ ๋‚ด๋กœ ์™„ํ™” ๋ฐธ๋ธŒ๋ฅผ ์—ด์–ด์ค˜์•ผ๋งŒ ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:03
Obviously, this cannot be done by a human operator.
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์ ˆ๋Œ€๋กœ, ์‚ฌ๋žŒ์ด ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์—†์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:06
So this is where we need digital safety systems.
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์ด๋Ÿฐ ๊ณณ์—๋Š” ๋””์ง€ํ„ธ ์•ˆ์ „ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์ด ํ•„์š”ํ•˜์ฃ .
08:08
And when they are compromised,
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๊ทธ๋Ÿฐ ์ƒํ™ฉ์— ์ž˜ ๋Œ€์ฒ˜ํ•˜์ง€ ๋ชปํ•˜๋ฉด
08:10
then real bad things can happen.
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์ •๋ง ์•ˆ์ข‹์€ ์ผ์ด ๋ฒŒ์–ด์งˆ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:13
Your plant can blow up.
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๊ณต์žฅ์ด ๋‚ ์•„๊ฐ€๋ฒ„๋ฆด ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์ฃ .
08:15
And neither your operators nor your safety system will notice it.
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์šด์˜์ž๋‚˜ ์•ˆ์ „ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ, ๊ทธ ์–ด๋Š๊ฒƒ๋„ ์•Œ์•„์ฑ„์ง€ ๋ชปํ•œ๋‹ค๋ฉด,
08:18
That's scary.
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๋ฌด์„œ์šด ์ผ์ด ์ผ์–ด๋‚˜๊ฒ ์ฃ .
08:20
But it gets worse.
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ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ๋” ๋‚˜์œ ์ƒํ™ฉ๋„ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:22
And this is very important, what I'm going to say.
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์ง€๊ธˆ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๋ง์”€๋“œ๋ฆฌ๋ ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ์•„์ฃผ ์ค‘์š”ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:25
Think about this:
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์ด๊ฒƒ์„ ์ƒ๊ฐํ•ด๋ณด์„ธ์š”.
08:27
this attack is generic.
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์ด๋Ÿฐ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์€ ์ผ๋ฐ˜์ ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:30
It doesn't have anything to do, in specifics,
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์›์‹ฌ๋ถ„๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ๋‚˜ ์šฐ๋ผ๋Š„ ๋†์ถ• ์‹œ์„ค๊ฐ™์€
08:34
with centrifuges,
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ํŠน์ •ํ•œ ๋Œ€์ƒ์—๋งŒ
08:36
with uranium enrichment.
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๊ด€๊ณ„๋œ ๊ฒƒ์€ ์•„๋‹™๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:39
So it would work as well, for example,
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์˜ˆ๋ฅผ ๋“ค๋ฉด ๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์€ ๋ฐœ์ „์†Œ๋‚˜
08:42
in a power plant
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์ž๋™์ฐจ ๊ณต์žฅ๋„
08:44
or in an automobile factory.
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๊ณต๊ฒฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:47
It is generic.
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๋ชจ๋“  ๊ฒƒ์ด ๊ณต๊ฒฉ๋Œ€์ƒ์ด์ฃ .
08:49
And you don't have -- as an attacker --
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์Šคํ„ฑ์Šค๋„ท์˜ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ์—์„œ ๋ณด์•˜๋“ฏ์ด,
08:51
you don't have to deliver this payload
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๊ณต๊ฒฉ์ž๋Š” ๋ฐ˜๋“œ์‹œ
08:54
by a USB stick,
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USB ๋ฉ”๋ชจ๋ฆฌ ์Šคํ‹ฑ์œผ๋กœ
08:56
as we saw it in the case of Stuxnet.
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์›œ์„ ์˜ฎ๊ธฐ์ง€ ์•Š์•„๋„ ๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:58
You could also use conventional worm technology for spreading.
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ํผ๋œจ๋ฆฌ๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ ์ƒํˆฌ์ ์ธ ์›œ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์„ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜๋„ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:01
Just spread it as wide as possible.
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๊ทธ๋ƒฅ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ ๋„“๊ฒŒ ํผํŠธ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:04
And if you do that,
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๊ทธ๋ ‡๊ฒŒ๋งŒ ๋œ๋‹ค๋ฉด,
09:06
what you end up with
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๋Œ€๋Ÿ‰ํŒŒ๊ดด ์‚ฌ์ด๋ฒ„ ๋ฌด๊ธฐ๊ฐ€
09:08
is a cyber weapon of mass destruction.
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๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚˜๊ฒŒ ๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:14
That's the consequence
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๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์ด ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ์ง๋ฉดํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋ 
09:16
that we have to face.
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๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:19
So unfortunately,
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋ถˆํ–‰ํ•œ ์‚ฌ์‹ค์€
09:22
the biggest number of targets for such attacks
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๊ทธ๋Ÿฐ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ ๋Œ€์ƒ์˜ ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์€
09:25
are not in the Middle East.
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์ค‘๋™์— ์žˆ์ง€ ์•Š์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:27
They're in the United States and Europe and in Japan.
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๊ณต๊ฒฉ ๋Œ€์ƒ์˜ ๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์€ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ, ์œ ๋Ÿฝ, ์ผ๋ณธ์— ์žˆ์ฃ .
09:30
So all of the green areas,
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๊ทธ๋ž˜์„œ ๋ชจ๋“  ๋…น์ƒ‰ ํ‘œ์‹œ ์ง€์—ญ๋“ค์€
09:32
these are your target-rich environments.
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๊ณต๊ฒฉ๋Œ€์ƒ์ด ํ’๋ถ€ํ•œ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์„ ๊ฐ–์ถ˜ ๊ณณ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:35
We have to face the consequences,
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ทธ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์— ์ง๋ฉดํ•ด์•ผ๋งŒ ํ•˜๊ณ ,
09:38
and we better start to prepare right now.
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์ง€๊ธˆ ๋‹น์žฅ ๊ทธ ๋Œ€๋น„๋ฅผ ์‹œ์ž‘ํ•ด์•ผ ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:41
Thanks.
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๊ฐ์‚ฌํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:43
(Applause)
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(๋ฐ•์ˆ˜)
09:49
Chris Anderson: I've got a question.
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ํฌ๋ฆฌ์Šค ์•ค๋”์Šจ: ์งˆ๋ฌธ์ด ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:53
Ralph, it's been quite widely reported
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๋ž„ํ”„, ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ๋ชจ์‚ฌ๋“œ๊ฐ€
09:55
that people assume that Mossad
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์ด ์ผ์˜ ๋ฐฐํ›„์— ์žˆ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์˜ˆ์ƒํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์€
09:57
is the main entity behind this.
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๊ฝค๋‚˜ ์•Œ๋ ค์ง„ ์‚ฌ์‹ค์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:59
Is that your opinion?
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๋‹น์‹ ์˜ ์˜๊ฒฌ๋„ ๊ทธ๋Ÿฐ๊ฐ€์š”?
10:02
Ralph Langner: Okay, you really want to hear that?
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๋ž„ํ”„ ๋žญ๊ทธ๋„ˆ: ์ข‹์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ •๋ง ์ œ ์ƒ๊ฐ์„ ๋“ฃ๊ณ  ์‹ถ์œผ์‹ ๊ฐ€์š”?
10:04
Yeah. Okay.
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๋„ค, ์ข‹์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:06
My opinion is that the Mossad is involved,
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์ œ ์ƒ๊ฐ์—๋Š” ๋ชจ์‚ฌ๋“œ๊ฐ€ ์—ฐ๋ฃจ๋˜์–ด ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:09
but that the leading force is not Israel.
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ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ์ฃผ๋„์„ธ๋ ฅ์€ ์ด์Šค๋ผ์—˜์ด ์•„๋‹™๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:12
So the leading force behind that
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๊ทธ ๋ฐฐํ›„์˜ ์ฃผ๋„ ์„ธ๋ ฅ์€
10:14
is the cyber superpower.
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์‚ฌ์ด๋ฒ„ ์ดˆ๊ฐ•๋Œ€๊ตญ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:17
There is only one,
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๊ทธ ์œ ์ผํ•œ ๋‚˜๋ผ๊ฐ€
10:19
and that's the United States --
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๋ฐ”๋กœ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:21
fortunately, fortunately.
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๋‹คํ–‰์Šค๋Ÿฐ ์ผ์ด์ฃ . ๋‹คํ–‰์ด์—์š”.
10:23
Because otherwise,
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๊ทธ๋ ‡์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋”๋ผ๋ฉด
10:25
our problems would even be bigger.
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๋ฌธ์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋” ์‹ฌ๊ฐํ–ˆ์„ ํ…Œ๋‹ˆ๊นŒ์š”.
10:28
CA: Thank you for scaring the living daylights out of us. Thank you, Ralph.
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CA: ์šฐ๋ฆฌ ๋ชจ๋‘๋ฅผ ๊ฒ๋‚˜๊ฒŒ ํ•ด์ฃผ์…”์„œ ๊ฐ์‚ฌํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ฐ์‚ฌํ•ด์š” ๋ž„ํ”„.
10:32
(Applause)
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(๋ฐ•์ˆ˜)
์ด ์›น์‚ฌ์ดํŠธ ์ •๋ณด

์ด ์‚ฌ์ดํŠธ๋Š” ์˜์–ด ํ•™์Šต์— ์œ ์šฉํ•œ YouTube ๋™์˜์ƒ์„ ์†Œ๊ฐœํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ „ ์„ธ๊ณ„ ์ตœ๊ณ ์˜ ์„ ์ƒ๋‹˜๋“ค์ด ๊ฐ€๋ฅด์น˜๋Š” ์˜์–ด ์ˆ˜์—…์„ ๋ณด๊ฒŒ ๋  ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ฐ ๋™์˜์ƒ ํŽ˜์ด์ง€์— ํ‘œ์‹œ๋˜๋Š” ์˜์–ด ์ž๋ง‰์„ ๋”๋ธ” ํด๋ฆญํ•˜๋ฉด ๊ทธ๊ณณ์—์„œ ๋™์˜์ƒ์ด ์žฌ์ƒ๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋น„๋””์˜ค ์žฌ์ƒ์— ๋งž์ถฐ ์ž๋ง‰์ด ์Šคํฌ๋กค๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์˜๊ฒฌ์ด๋‚˜ ์š”์ฒญ์ด ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์ด ๋ฌธ์˜ ์–‘์‹์„ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ฌธ์˜ํ•˜์‹ญ์‹œ์˜ค.

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