Avi Rubin: All your devices can be hacked

43,872 views ใƒป 2015-07-15

TED


์•„๋ž˜ ์˜๋ฌธ์ž๋ง‰์„ ๋”๋ธ”ํด๋ฆญํ•˜์‹œ๋ฉด ์˜์ƒ์ด ์žฌ์ƒ๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.

00:00
Translator: Joseph Geni Reviewer: Morton Bast
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๋ฒˆ์—ญ: K Bang ๊ฒ€ํ† : Jieun Shin
00:12
I'm a computer science professor,
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์ €๋Š” ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๊ณตํ•™ ๊ต์ˆ˜์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
00:15
and my area of expertise is
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์ €์˜ ์ „๋ฌธ ๋ถ„์•ผ๋Š”
00:17
computer and information security.
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์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ์ •๋ณด ๋ณด์•ˆ์ด์—์š”.
00:20
When I was in graduate school,
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์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋Œ€ํ•™์›์„ ๋‹ค๋‹ ๋•Œ
00:22
I had the opportunity to overhear my grandmother
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์ €ํฌ ํ• ๋จธ๋‹ˆ๊ป˜์„œ
00:25
describing to one of her fellow senior citizens
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์ฃผ๋ณ€ ์–ด๋ฅด์‹ ๋“ค๊ป˜
00:29
what I did for a living.
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์ œ ์ง์—…์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ์šฐ์—ฐํžˆ ๋“ค์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
00:31
Apparently, I was in charge of making sure that
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๋“ฃ์žํ•˜๋‹ˆ, ์ €๋Š” ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ์ด ํ•™๊ต์˜ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋ฅผ
00:35
no one stole the computers from the university. (Laughter)
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ํ›”์ณ๊ฐ€์ง€ ๋ชปํ•˜๋„๋ก ํ•˜๋Š” ์—…๋ฌด๋ฅผ ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ์ฃ . (์›ƒ์Œ)
00:39
And, you know, that's a perfectly reasonable thing
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์ œ๊ฐ€ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ๋ณด์•ˆ ์ผ์„ ํ•œ๋‹ค๊ณ 
00:41
for her to think, because I told her I was working
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๋ง์”€๋“œ๋ ธ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์—, ํ• ๋จธ๋‹ˆ๊ป˜์„œ๋Š”
00:43
in computer security,
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์™„์ „ํžˆ ๊ทธ๋ ‡๊ฒŒ ์ƒ๊ฐํ•  ๋งŒ ํ•˜์…จ๋˜ ๊ฑฐ์ฃ .
00:45
and it was interesting to get her perspective.
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ํ• ๋จธ๋‹ˆ์˜ ์˜คํ•ด๋กœ ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ์‹œ์ž‘๋œ ์žฌ๋ฐŒ๋Š” ์—ํ”ผ์†Œ๋“œ์˜€์–ด์š”.
00:48
But that's not the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard
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ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ์ €๋Š” ์ œ ์ง์—…์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด
00:51
anyone say about my work.
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์ด๋ณด๋‹ค ๋” ์šฐ์Šค์šด ์–˜๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๋“ค์€ ์ ๋„ ์žˆ์—ˆ์–ด์š”.
00:53
The most ridiculous thing I ever heard is,
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์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋“ค์€ ๊ฐ€์žฅ ์›ƒ๊ธด ๊ฒƒ์€,
00:55
I was at a dinner party, and a woman heard
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์ œ๊ฐ€ ํ•œ ์ €๋… ํŒŒํ‹ฐ์— ์ฐธ์„ํ–ˆ์„ ๋•Œ ์˜€์–ด์š”.
00:58
that I work in computer security,
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ํ•œ ์—ฌ์„ฑ๋ถ„์ด ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ๋ณด์•ˆ ์ผ์„ ํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š”๊ฑธ ๋“ค์—ˆ์–ด์š”.
01:00
and she asked me if -- she said her computer had been
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๊ทธ ๋ถ„์€, ์ž์‹ ์˜ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐ”์ด๋Ÿฌ์Šค์— ๊ฐ์—ผ๋๋Š”๋ฐ
01:04
infected by a virus, and she was very concerned that she
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๊ทธ ๋ฐ”์ด๋Ÿฌ์Šค๊ฐ€ ์ž์‹ ์—๊ฒŒ๋„ ์˜ฎ๋Š” ๊ฑด ์•„๋‹Œ์ง€
01:07
might get sick from it, that she could get this virus. (Laughter)
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๊ฑฑ์ •์Šค๋Ÿฝ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์ œ๊ฒŒ ๋งํ•œ ์ ์ด ์žˆ์—ˆ์–ด์š”. (์›ƒ์Œ)
01:11
And I'm not a doctor, but I reassured her
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์ €๋Š” ์˜์‚ฌ๊ฐ€ ์•„๋‹ˆ์ง€๋งŒ ๊ทธ ๋ถ„์—๊ฒŒ,
01:14
that it was very, very unlikely that this would happen,
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๊ทธ๋Ÿฐ ์ผ์€ ๊ฑฐ์˜ ์ผ์–ด๋‚˜์ง€ ์•Š๋Š”๋‹ค๊ณ  ์•ˆ์‹ฌ์‹œ์ผœ๋“œ๋ ธ์ฃ .
01:17
but if she felt more comfortable, she could be free to use
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๊ทธ๋ž˜๋„ ์กฐ๊ธˆ ๋” ๊ฑฑ์ •์„ ๋œ๊ณ  ์‹ถ์œผ๋ฉด,
01:20
latex gloves when she was on the computer,
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์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•  ๋•Œ ์–‡์€ ๊ณ ๋ฌด ์žฅ๊ฐ‘์„ ๋ผ์‹œ๋ผ๊ณ  ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:22
and there would be no harm whatsoever in that.
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๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋ฉด ์˜ฎ์„ ์ผ์€ ์ ˆ๋Œ€ ์—†์„๊ฑฐ๋ผ๊ตฌ์š”.
01:25
I'm going to get back to this notion of being able to get
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๋ณธ๋ก ์œผ๋กœ ๋Œ์•„๊ฐ€์„œ, ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ๋ฐ”์ด๋Ÿฌ์Šค์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ
01:28
a virus from your computer, in a serious way.
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์ง„์ง€ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐํ•ด ๋ณด๋ ค๊ณ  ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:31
What I'm going to talk to you about today
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์ €๋Š” ์˜ค๋Š˜ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„๋“ค๊ป˜
01:33
are some hacks, some real world cyberattacks that people
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์ œ ๋ถ„์•ผ, ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‹ˆ๊นŒ ํ•™์ˆ  ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๋ถ„์•ผ์˜ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด
01:38
in my community, the academic research community,
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์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ์‚ฌ์ด๋ฒ„ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์„ ํ–ˆ๋˜ ์‚ฌ๋ก€๋“ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ๋ง์”€๋“œ๋ฆฌ๊ณ ์ž ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:40
have performed, which I don't think
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์ œ ์ƒ๊ฐ์—๋Š” ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„ ์ค‘ ๋‹ค์ˆ˜๋Š”
01:43
most people know about,
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์•„๋งˆ ๋ชจ๋ฅด์‹ค ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:44
and I think they're very interesting and scary,
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์ €๋Š” ์ด๊ฒƒ๋“ค์ด ๋งค์šฐ ํฅ๋ฏธ๋กญ๊ณ ๋„ ๋ฌด์„œ์šด ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐ๋ผ๊ณ  ์ƒ๊ฐํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:47
and this talk is kind of a greatest hits
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์ด ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐ๋Š” ๋ณด์•ˆ ํ•™์ˆ  ์ง‘๋‹จ์ด ์‹คํ–‰ํ•œ ํ•ดํ‚น์˜
01:50
of the academic security community's hacks.
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์ตœ๊ณ  ํžˆํŠธ์ž‘ ์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:53
None of the work is my work. It's all work
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์ œ๊ฐ€ ์ง์ ‘ ๋งก์•˜๋˜ ์ผ์€ ์•„๋‹ˆ๊ณ ,
01:55
that my colleagues have done, and I actually asked them
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๋ชจ๋‘ ์ œ ๋™๋ฃŒ๋“ค์ด ํ•œ ์ผ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:57
for their slides and incorporated them into this talk.
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์ €๋Š” ๊ทธ๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ ์ž๋ฃŒ๋ฅผ ์ข€ ๋‹ฌ๋ผ๊ณ  ๋ถ€ํƒํ–ˆ๊ณ , ์ด ๊ฐ•์—ฐ์— ๊ทธ ์ž๋ฃŒ๋“ค์„ ํฌํ•จ์‹œ์ผฐ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
01:59
So the first one I'm going to talk about
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์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋จผ์ € ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐ ํ•  ๊ฒƒ์€
02:01
are implanted medical devices.
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๋ชธ์†์— ์ด์‹๋œ ์˜๋ฃŒ ์žฅ๋น„๋“ค์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:04
Now medical devices have come a long way technologically.
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ํ˜„์žฌ ์˜๋ฃŒ ์žฅ๋น„๋“ค์€ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์ ์œผ๋กœ ํฌ๊ฒŒ ๋ฐœ์ „ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:07
You can see in 1926 the first pacemaker was invented.
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1926๋…„์— ์ฒ˜์Œ์œผ๋กœ ์‹ฌ์žฅ๋ฐ•๋™๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐœ๋ช…๋˜์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:11
1960, the first internal pacemaker was implanted,
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  1960๋…„์— ์ฒซ ๋ฒˆ์งธ๋กœ ๋ชธ์†์— ์‹ฌ์žฅ๋ฐ•๋™๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ์ด์‹๋์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:14
hopefully a little smaller than that one that you see there,
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์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์ด ํ™”๋ฉด์—์„œ ๋ณด์‹œ๋Š” ์ € ๊ธฐ๊ณ„๋ณด๋‹ค๋Š” ์ž‘์•˜์œผ๋ฉด ์ข‹๊ฒ ๋„ค์š”.
02:17
and the technology has continued to move forward.
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๊ธฐ์ˆ ์€ ๊ณ„์†ํ•ด์„œ ์ง„๋ณดํ–ˆ๊ณ 
02:20
In 2006, we hit an important milestone from the perspective
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2006๋…„ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ๋ณด์•ˆ์˜ ๊ด€์ ์— ์žˆ์–ด์„œ
02:24
of computer security.
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์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ์ „ํ™˜์ ์ด ์™”์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:28
And why do I say that?
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์ œ๊ฐ€ ์ด ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ํ•˜๋Š” ์ด์œ ๋Š”
02:29
Because that's when implanted devices inside of people
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์ธ๊ฐ„์˜ ๋ชธ ์†์˜ ์ด์‹ ์žฅ์น˜๊ฐ€
02:32
started to have networking capabilities.
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๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ฒŒ ๋˜์—ˆ๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:35
One thing that brings us close to home is we look
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ์—๊ฒŒ ์นœ์ˆ™ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋‹ค๊ฐ€์˜ค๋Š” ํ•œ ๊ฐ€์ง€๋Š”
02:36
at Dick Cheney's device, he had a device that
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๋”• ์ฒด์ด๋‹ˆ(Dick Cheney, ์ „ ๋ฏธ๊ตญ๋ถ€ํ†ต๋ น) ์˜ ์žฅ์น˜์ธ๋ฐ์š”,
02:39
pumped blood from an aorta to another part of the heart,
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๋Œ€๋™๋งฅ์œผ๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ์‹ฌ์žฅ์˜ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๋ถ€๋ถ„์œผ๋กœ ํ˜ˆ์•ก์„ ๋‚ด๋ณด๋‚ด๋Š” ์žฅ์น˜์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:43
and as you can see at the bottom there,
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๋˜ํ•œ ์•„๋ž˜์ชฝ์—์„œ ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋“ฏ์ด,
02:44
it was controlled by a computer controller,
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์ด ์žฅ์น˜๋Š” ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ์ œ์–ด ์žฅ์น˜์— ์˜ํ•ด ์ œ์–ด๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:47
and if you ever thought that software liability
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๋งŒ์•ฝ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์ด ์ด ์žฅ์น˜์˜ ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด๊ฐ€
02:50
was very important, get one of these inside of you.
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์–ผ๋งˆ๋‚˜ ์ œ๋Œ€๋กœ ์ž‘๋™ํ•˜๋Š”์ง€ ๊ถ๊ธˆํ•˜๋ฉด, ๋ชธ์— ํ•˜๋‚˜ ์žฅ์ฐฉํ•ด ๋ณด์„ธ์š”. (์›ƒ์Œ)
02:53
Now what a research team did was they got their hands
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์ด์ œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌํŒ€์ด ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์€ ๊ทธ๋“ค์ด ICD๋ผ๊ณ  ๋ถˆ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„
02:57
on what's called an ICD.
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์†์— ๋„ฃ์—ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
02:58
This is a defibrillator, and this is a device
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์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ์ œ์„ธ๋™๊ธฐ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ์žฅ์น˜๋Š” ์‹ฌ์žฅ ๋ฆฌ๋“ฌ์„
03:00
that goes into a person to control their heart rhythm,
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์ œ์–ดํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ ๋ชธ ์†์— ์ด์‹๋œ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ,
03:05
and these have saved many lives.
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๋งŽ์€ ์ƒ๋ช…์„ ๊ตฌํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:07
Well, in order to not have to open up the person
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๋งค๋ฒˆ ์ด ์ œ์„ธ๋™๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์กฐ์ ˆํ•˜๊ฑฐ๋‚˜,
03:10
every time you want to reprogram their device
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๊ฒ€์‚ฌํ•  ๋•Œ๋งˆ๋‹ค ์ˆ˜์ˆ ์„ ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ,
03:12
or do some diagnostics on it, they made the thing be able
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๋ฌด์„ ์œผ๋กœ ์กฐ์ข…์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜๋„๋ก ๋งŒ๋“ค์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:14
to communicate wirelessly, and what this research team did
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์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌํŒ€์€ ๋ฌด์„  ํ”„๋กœํ† ์ฝœ์„ ์‘์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ
03:17
is they reverse engineered the wireless protocol,
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์—ฌ๊ธฐ ๊ทธ๋ฆผ์—์„œ ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”
03:20
and they built the device you see pictured here,
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์ด ์žฅ์น˜๋ฅผ ๋งŒ๋“ค์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:22
with a little antenna, that could talk the protocol
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์ด ์ž‘์€ ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜๋Š” ํ”„๋กœํ† ์ฝœ์„ ํ†ตํ•ด ๊ธฐ๊ณ„์— ๋ช…๋ นํ•˜๊ณ 
03:25
to the device, and thus control it.
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๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์ ์œผ๋กœ๋Š” ์ œ์–ดํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด์ฃ .
03:29
In order to make their experience real -- they were unable
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์‚ฌ๋žŒํ•œํ…Œ ์ง์ ‘ ์‹คํ—˜์„ ํ•  ์ˆ˜๋Š” ์—†๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์— (์›ƒ์Œ)
03:32
to find any volunteers, and so they went
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์ด ์‹คํ—˜์„ ํ˜„์‹คํ™”ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ
03:34
and they got some ground beef and some bacon
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์€ ์†Œ๊ณ ๊ธฐ์™€ ๋ฒ ์ด์ปจ์„ ์‚ฌ์„œ,
03:36
and they wrapped it all up to about the size
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์‹ค์ œ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ์˜ ํ‰๊ณฝ์‚ฌ์ด์ฆˆ๋กœ ๋งŒ๋“ค๊ณ 
03:38
of a human being's area where the device would go,
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๋žฉ์œผ๋กœ ์ŒŒ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:41
and they stuck the device inside it
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์‹ค์ œ์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ
03:42
to perform their experiment somewhat realistically.
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์žฅ์น˜๋ฅผ ๊ณ ๊ธฐ ๋ญ‰์น˜ ์•ˆ์— ๋„ฃ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:46
They launched many, many successful attacks.
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์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ง„์€ ์•„์ฃผ ์„ฑ๊ณต์ ์ธ ํ•ดํ‚น ์‹คํ—˜์„ ๋งŽ์ด ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:49
One that I'll highlight here is changing the patient's name.
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๊ทธ ์ค‘์— ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์—ฌ๊ธฐ์„œ ๊ฐ•์กฐํ•  ๊ฒƒ ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š”, ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ง„์ด ํ™˜์ž์˜ ์ด๋ฆ„์„ ๊ณ ์˜๋กœ ๋ฐ”๊ฟ”๋ฒ„๋ฆฐ ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:52
I don't know why you would want to do that,
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์™œ ์ด๋Ÿฐ ์ง“์„ ํ–ˆ๋Š”์ง€๋Š” ๋ชจ๋ฅด๊ฒ ์ง€๋งŒ,
03:53
but I sure wouldn't want that done to me.
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์ €ํ•œํ…Œ๋Š” ์•ˆ๊ทธ๋žฌ์œผ๋ฉด ์ข‹๊ฒ ๋„ค์š”. (์›ƒ์Œ)
03:55
And they were able to change therapies,
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๊ทธ ํ™˜์ž์˜ ์‹ฌ์„ธ๋™๊ธฐ์˜ ์„ธํŒ…์„ ๋ฐ”๊พธ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
03:57
including disabling the device -- and this is with a real,
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์‹ฌ์„ธ๋™๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๊บผ๋ฒ„๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ๋„ ํฌํ•จํ•ด์„œ ๋ง์ด์ฃ .
04:00
commercial, off-the-shelf device --
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์ฐธ๊ณ ๋กœ ์ด ์‹ฌ์„ธ๋™๊ธฐ๋Š”, ์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ํŒ๋งค๋˜๊ณ  ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์˜๋ฃŒ ์žฅ๋น„์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:01
simply by performing reverse engineering and sending
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๊ทธ๋Ÿฐ๋ฐ ๋‹จ์ง€ ๊ฐ„๋‹จํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋ฌด์„  ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ์กฐ๊ธˆ ๋ฐ”๊พธ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ
04:04
wireless signals to it.
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์กฐ์ž‘์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ ๊ฑฐ์ฃ .
04:07
There was a piece on NPR that some of these ICDs
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์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ์ œ์„ธ๋™๊ธฐ ์œ„์— ๋‹จ์ˆœํžˆ ํ—ค๋“œํฐ์„ ์˜ฌ๋ ค๋†“์•„
04:10
could actually have their performance disrupted
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์ž‘๋™์„ ๋ฐฉํ•ดํ•œ ์‚ฌ๋ก€๊ฐ€
04:13
simply by holding a pair of headphones onto them.
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๋ฏธ๊ตญ ๊ณต์˜ ๋ฐฉ์†ก์— ์†Œ๊ฐœ๋˜์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:16
Now, wireless and the Internet
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์˜ค๋Š˜๋‚  ๋ฌด์„ ๊ณผ ์ธํ„ฐ๋„ท์€
04:18
can improve health care greatly.
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ์˜ ๊ฑด๊ฐ• ๊ด€๋ฆฌ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์„ ์—„์ฒญ๋‚˜๊ฒŒ ํ–ฅ์ƒ ์‹œํ‚ฌ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:19
There's several examples up on the screen
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ํ™”๋ฉด์„ ๋ณด์‹œ๋ฉด ์˜์‚ฌ๋“ค์ด ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค ๋ชธ ์•ˆ์—
04:21
of situations where doctors are looking to implant devices
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์žฅ์น˜๋ฅผ ์ด์‹ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์šฐ์˜ ์˜ˆ๋“ค์ด ๋‚˜์™€์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:24
inside of people, and all of these devices now,
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๊ทธ ๋ชจ๋“  ์žฅ์น˜๋“ค์€ ์ง€๊ธˆ
04:27
it's standard that they communicate wirelessly,
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๋ฌด์„ ์œผ๋กœ ์กฐ์ •ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋„๋ก ๋˜์–ด์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:30
and I think this is great,
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์ €๋Š” ์ด๊ฒƒ์ด ์ฐธ ๋Œ€๋‹จํ•˜๋‹ค๊ณ  ์ƒ๊ฐํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:32
but without a full understanding of trustworthy computing,
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ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ํ”„๋กœ๊ทธ๋žจ์˜ ์™„์ „ํ•œ ์ดํ•ด์™€,
04:35
and without understanding what attackers can do
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ํ•ด์ปค๊ฐ€ ์–ด๋–ค ์ผ๊นŒ์ง€ ์ €์ง€๋ฅผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”์ง€,
04:37
and the security risks from the beginning,
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๋˜ ๋ณด์•ˆ ์œ„ํ—˜์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์ดํ•ด ์—†์ด๋Š”
04:39
there's a lot of danger in this.
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๋งŽ์€ ์œ„ํ—˜์ด ๋”ฐ๋ฆ…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:42
Okay, let me shift gears and show you another target.
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์ข‹์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด์ œ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์„ ๋ฐ”๊พธ์–ด ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„๊ป˜ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์ƒํ™ฉ์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ๋“œ๋ฆฌ๋„๋ก ํ•˜์ฃ .
04:43
I'm going to show you a few different targets like this,
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์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„๊ป˜ ์ฒซ๋ฒˆ์งธ ์‚ฌ๋ก€์™€ ๋น„์Šทํ•œ, ๋ช‡๋ช‡์˜ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋ฌผ๋“ค์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ๋“œ๋ฆด๊ฒ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:45
and that's my talk. So we'll look at automobiles.
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์ด๊ฒƒ์ด ์ œ ๊ฐ•์—ฐ์˜ ์ฃผ์ œ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ทธ๋Ÿผ ์ด์ œ ์ž๋™์ฐจ๋ฅผ ๋ณด์‹œ์ฃ .
04:48
This is a car, and it has a lot of components,
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์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ์ž๋™์ฐจ์ธ๋ฐ ์—ฌ๊ธฐ์—” ๋งŽ์€ ๋ถ€ํ’ˆ๋“ค๊ณผ.
04:51
a lot of electronics in it today.
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์ˆ˜ ๋งŽ์€ ์ „์ž ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์ด ์ด์šฉ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์ฃ .
04:53
In fact, it's got many, many different computers inside of it,
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์‚ฌ์‹ค์€ ์ž๋™์ฐจ๋Š” ์ •๋ง๋กœ ๋งŽ์€ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋“ค์„ ์•ˆ์— ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
04:57
more Pentiums than my lab did when I was in college,
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์ œ๊ฐ€ ๋Œ€ํ•™์ƒ์ผ๋•Œ ์“ฐ๋˜ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋ณด๋‹ค ๋” ์„ฑ๋Šฅ์ข‹์€ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋“ค์„ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ๊ณ ,
05:00
and they're connected by a wired network.
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์ด๊ฒƒ๋“ค์€ ์„ ์œผ๋กœ ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ์ด ๋˜์–ด์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:04
There's also a wireless network in the car,
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์ž๋™์ฐจ ์•ˆ์—๋Š” ๋‹ค์–‘ํ•œ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์œผ๋กœ ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ๋  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”
05:07
which can be reached from many different ways.
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๋ฌด์„  ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ ๋˜ํ•œ ์กด์žฌํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:11
So there's Bluetooth, there's the FM and XM radio,
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์˜ˆ๋ฅผ ๋“ค๋ฉด, ๋ธ”๋ฃจํˆฌ์Šค, FM, XM ๋ผ๋””์˜ค๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๊ณ ์š”, ์™€์ดํŒŒ์ด๋„ ์žˆ์ฃ .
05:14
there's actually wi-fi, there's sensors in the wheels
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ํƒ€์ด์–ด์—๋Š” ๊ณต๊ธฐ์••์„ ์ธก์ •ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์„ผ์„œ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๊ณ ,
05:17
that wirelessly communicate the tire pressure
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๋ฌด์„ ์œผ๋กœ ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ๋˜์–ด, ๋ฐ”ํ€ด์— ๋ฌธ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์ƒ๊ธฐ๋ฉด
05:19
to a controller on board.
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์ฐจ๋Ÿ‰ ๋‚ด๋ถ€์˜ ๊ป˜๊ธฐํŒ์— ํ‘œ์‹œํ•ด์ฃผ์ฃ .
05:21
The modern car is a sophisticated multi-computer device.
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ํ˜„๋Œ€์˜ ์ž๋™์ฐจ๋Š” ๋งค์šฐ ์ •๊ตํ•œ ๋‹ค์ค‘ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ์žฅ๋น„๋ผ๊ณ  ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:26
And what happens if somebody wanted to attack this?
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๋ˆ„๊ตฐ๊ฐ€๊ฐ€ ์ด๊ฒƒ์„ ๊ณต๊ฒฉํ•˜๋ฉด ๋ฌด์Šจ ์ผ์ด ์ผ์–ด๋‚ ๊นŒ์š”?
05:29
Well, that's what the researchers
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์ด๊ฒŒ ๋ฐ”๋กœ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ง„๋“ค์ด ํ•œ ์ผ์ด์ž,
05:31
that I'm going to talk about today did.
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์ œ๊ฐ€ ์˜ค๋Š˜ ์–˜๊ธฐํ•  ์ฃผ์ œ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:33
They basically stuck an attacker on the wired network
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์€ ํ•ดํ‚น ๊ธฐ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ
05:36
and on the wireless network.
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์œ ๋ฌด์„  ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ์— ์žฅ์ฐฉํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:38
Now, they have two areas they can attack.
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์ด์ œ ๊ณต๊ฒฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์„ ๋‘ ๊ฐ€์ง€ ๊ฐ–๊ฒŒ๋œ ๊ฒ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:41
One is short-range wireless, where you can actually
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ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š”, ์žฅ์น˜ ๊ทผ์ฒ˜์—์„œ
05:43
communicate with the device from nearby,
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๋ธ”๋ฃจํˆฌ์Šค๋‚˜ ์™€์ดํŒŒ์ด๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด์„œ
05:44
either through Bluetooth or wi-fi,
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์—ฐ๊ฒฐํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ทผ๊ฑฐ๋ฆฌ ๋ฌด์„  ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์ด๊ตฌ์š”.
05:47
and the other is long-range, where you can communicate
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๋‹ค๋ฅธ ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š”, ์ „ํ™” ํ†ต์‹ ๋ง์ด๋‚˜
05:49
with the car through the cellular network,
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๋ผ๋””์˜ค ๊ธฐ์ง€๊ตญ์„ ํ†ตํ•ด์„œ ์ž๋™์ฐจ์™€ ์—ฐ๊ฒฐํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”
05:51
or through one of the radio stations.
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์žฅ๊ฑฐ๋ฆฌ ํ†ต์‹ ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:52
Think about it. When a car receives a radio signal,
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์ƒ๊ฐํ•ด๋ณด์„ธ์š”. ์ž๋™์ฐจ๊ฐ€ ๋ผ๋””์˜ค ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ๋ฐ›์„ ๋•Œ
05:56
it's processed by software.
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๊ทธ ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋Š” ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด์— ์˜ํ•ด์„œ ์ฒ˜๋ฆฌ๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
05:58
That software has to receive and decode the radio signal,
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์ด ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด๋Š” ๋ผ๋””์˜ค ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ๋ฐ›์•„์„œ ํ•ด๋…ํ•˜๊ณ ,
06:01
and then figure out what to do with it,
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๋ฌด์—‡์„ ํ•ด์•ผํ•  ์ง€ ์•Œ์•„๋ƒ…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:02
even if it's just music that it needs to play on the radio,
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์„ค๋ น ๊ทธ๊ฒŒ ๋‹จ์ˆœํžˆ ์Œ์•…์„ ๋‚ด๋ณด๋‚ด๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ผ์ง€๋ผ๋„์š”.
06:05
and that software that does that decoding,
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๋งŒ์•ฝ์— ํ•ด๋…๋œ ๊ทธ๋Ÿฐ ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด์— ๋ฒ„๊ทธ๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๋‹ค๋ฉด
06:07
if it has any bugs in it, could create a vulnerability
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๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ์ด ์ž๋™์ฐจ๋ฅผ ํ•ดํ‚นํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”
06:10
for somebody to hack the car.
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์ทจ์•ฝ์ ์„ ์ œ๊ณตํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:13
The way that the researchers did this work is,
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์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ง„์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ํ•œ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์€ ์ด๋ ‡์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:16
they read the software in the computer chips
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ์ž๋™์ฐจ์— ์žˆ๋Š” ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ์นฉ์•ˆ์˜
06:21
that were in the car, and then they used sophisticated
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์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด๋ฅผ ์ฝ๊ณ 
06:24
reverse engineering tools
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์–ด๋–ค ์ž‘์—…์„ ํ–ˆ๋Š” ์ง€ ์•Œ์•„๋‚ด๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ,
06:25
to figure out what that software did,
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์ •๊ตํ•œ ์—ญ๊ณตํ•™(reverse engineering) ๋„๊ตฌ๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:27
and then they found vulnerabilities in that software,
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด์˜ ์ทจ์•ฝ์ ์„ ์ฐพ์•„,
06:30
and then they built exploits to exploit those.
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์ด๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์„ ๋งŒ๋“ค์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:34
They actually carried out their attack in real life.
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์€ ๊ณ ์•ˆํ•œ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ๋ฒ•์„ ์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•ด๋ณด๊ธฐ๋กœ ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:36
They bought two cars, and I guess
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ๋‘ ๋Œ€๋ฅผ ์ƒ€์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:37
they have better budgets than I do.
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์ €๋ณด๋‹ค ์˜ˆ์‚ฐ์ด ๋” ๋งŽ๋‚˜ ๋ณด๋„ค์š”. (์›ƒ์Œ)
06:40
The first threat model was to see what someone could do
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์ฒซ ๋ฒˆ์งธ ์‹คํ—˜ ๋ชจ๋ธ์€ ์ž๋™์ฐจ์˜ ๋‚ด๋ถ€ ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ์—
06:43
if an attacker actually got access
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๊ณต๊ฒฉ์ž๊ฐ€ ์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ์ ‘๊ทผ์„ ํ•œ๋‹ค๋ฉด
06:45
to the internal network on the car.
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์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์„ ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š”๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ๋ณด๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
06:47
Okay, so think of that as, someone gets to go to your car,
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์ข‹์•„์š”, ์ด๋ ‡๊ฒŒ ์ƒ๊ฐํ•ด๋ณด์„ธ์š”. ์–ด๋–ค ์‚ฌ๋žŒ์ด ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์˜ ์ž๋™์ฐจ์— ์ ‘๊ทผํ•ด์„œ
06:50
they get to mess around with it, and then they leave,
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์ฐจ์— ์–ด๋–ค ์ง“์„ ํ•ด๋†“๊ณ  ๊ฐ€๋ฒ„๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ฑฐ์ฃ .
06:52
and now, what kind of trouble are you in?
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์ž, ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์€ ์–ด๋–ค ๊ณค๋ž€์„ ๊ฒช๊ฒŒ๋ ๊นŒ์š”?
06:55
The other threat model is that they contact you
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๋˜ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์‹คํ—˜ ๋ชจ๋ธ์€, ๋ˆ„๊ตฐ๊ฐ€๊ฐ€
06:58
in real time over one of the wireless networks
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ํ•ธ๋“œํฐ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ๋ฌด์„  ์—ฐ๊ฒฐ๋ง์„ ํ†ตํ•ด์„œ
07:00
like the cellular, or something like that,
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์ž๋™์ฐจ์— ๋ฌผ๋ฆฌ์ ์œผ๋กœ ์ ‘๊ทผํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š๊ณ 
07:02
never having actually gotten physical access to your car.
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์‹ค์‹œ๊ฐ„์œผ๋กœ ๊ณต๊ฒฉํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:06
This is what their setup looks like for the first model,
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์ด ๊ทธ๋ฆผ์ด ์ž๋™์ฐจ์— ์ง์ ‘ ์ ‘๊ทผ์„ ํ•˜๋Š”
07:09
where you get to have access to the car.
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์ฒซ ๋ฒˆ์งธ ์‹คํ—˜ ๋ชจ๋ธ ์•ˆ์— ์žฅ๋น„๋ฅผ ์„ค์น˜ํ•œ ๋ชจ์Šต์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:11
They put a laptop, and they connected to the diagnostic unit
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์€ ๋…ธํŠธ๋ถ์„ ์„ค์น˜ํ•˜๊ณ  ์ž๋™์ฐจ ๋‚ด๋ถ€์˜ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ์— ์—ฐ๊ฒฐํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:14
on the in-car network, and they did all kinds of silly things,
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๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๊ณ ๋Š” ์ฃผ์ฐจ๋˜์–ด ์žˆ์„ ๋•Œ
07:17
like here's a picture of the speedometer
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์†๋„๊ณ„๋ฅผ 225km/h ๋กœ ํ‘œ์‹œํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ ๋“ฑ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€
07:20
showing 140 miles an hour when the car's in park.
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๋งŽ์€ ์‹ค์—†๋Š” ์‹คํ—˜๋“ค์„ ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:23
Once you have control of the car's computers,
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์ผ๋‹จ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ์กฐ์ •ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ฒŒ ๋˜๋ฉด
07:25
you can do anything.
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๋ฌด์—‡์ด๋“ ์ง€ ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:26
Now you might say, "Okay, that's silly."
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์•„๋งˆ๋„ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„๋“ค์€ "๊ทธ๊ฑด ์“ธ๋ฐ์—†๋Š” ๊ฑฑ์ •์ด์•ผ." ๋ผ๊ณ  ์ƒ๊ฐํ•  ์ˆ˜๋„ ์žˆ๊ฒ ์ฃ .
07:28
Well, what if you make the car always say
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๊ทธ๋Ÿฐ๋ฐ, ๋ˆ„๊ตฐ๊ฐ€๊ฐ€ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์˜ ์ž๋™์ฐจ ์†๋„๊ณ„๋ฅผ
07:29
it's going 20 miles an hour slower than it's actually going?
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์‹ค์ œ ์†๋„๋ณด๋‹ค ํ•ญ์ƒ 32km/h ๋Š๋ฆฌ๊ฒŒ ํ‘œ์‹œ๋˜๋„๋ก ๋งŒ๋“ค์–ด ๋†“์•˜์œผ๋ฉด ์–ด๋–จ๊นŒ์š”?
07:32
You might produce a lot of speeding tickets.
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์†๋„ ์œ„๋ฐ˜ ๋”ฑ์ง€๋ฅผ ์—„์ฒญ ๋Š์„๊ฑฐ์˜ˆ์š”.
07:34
Then they went out to an abandoned airstrip with two cars,
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์€ ์ด ๋‘ ์ž๋™์ฐจ๋ฅผ ํ……๋นˆ ํ™œ์ฃผ๋กœ๋กœ ๊ฐ€์ ธ๊ฐ”์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:38
the target victim car and the chase car,
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ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š” ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์„ ๋ฐ›์„ ์ฐจ๋Ÿ‰์œผ๋กœ, ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š” ๋”ฐ๋ผ๊ฐ€๋ฉด์„œ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์„ ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ์ฐจ๋Ÿ‰์œผ๋กœ ์ด์šฉํ–ˆ์ฃ .
07:41
and they launched a bunch of other attacks.
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋งŽ์€ ๊ณต๊ฒฉ๋“ค์„ ์‹œ์ž‘ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
07:44
One of the things they were able to do from the chase car
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๋’ท์ฐจ์—์„œ ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋˜ ๊ฒƒ ์ค‘์˜ ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š”,
07:47
is apply the brakes on the other car,
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๋‹จ์ˆœํžˆ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋ฅผ ํ•ดํ‚นํ•ด์„œ
07:49
simply by hacking the computer.
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์•ž์ฐจ์˜ ๋ธŒ๋ ˆ์ดํฌ๋ฅผ ์กฐ์ž‘ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด์—ˆ์–ด์š”.
07:50
They were able to disable the brakes.
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๋ธŒ๋ ˆ์ดํฌ๊ฐ€ ์ž‘๋™๋˜์ง€ ์•Š๋„๋ก ๋งŒ๋“ค์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ์ฃ .
07:53
They also were able to install malware that wouldn't kick in
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ๋˜ํ•œ ์ž๋™์ฐจ๊ฐ€ 32km/h ์ด์ƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋‹ฌ๋ฆฌ๋ฉด ์ž‘๋™๋˜๋Š”
07:56
and wouldn't trigger until the car was doing something like
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์ฐจ๋Ÿ‰ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ํŒŒ๊ดด ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด๋ฅผ
07:58
going over 20 miles an hour, or something like that.
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์„ค์น˜ํ•˜๋Š”๋ฐ๋„ ์„ฑ๊ณตํ•˜์˜€์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:02
The results are astonishing, and when they gave this talk,
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์ด ์ด ์‹คํ—˜์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋ฐœํ‘œ๋ฅผ ํ–ˆ์„ ๋•Œ, ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋Š” ์•„์ฃผ ๋†€๋ผ์› ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:05
even though they gave this talk at a conference
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๊ทธ๋“ค์ด ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ ๋ณด์•ˆ ์ „๋ฌธ๊ฐ€๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ
08:06
to a bunch of computer security researchers,
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๊ทธ ๋ฐœํ‘œ๋ฅผ ํ–ˆ์Œ์—๋„ ๋ถˆ๊ตฌํ•˜๊ณ ,
08:08
everybody was gasping.
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์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์€ ๋†€๋ผ์„œ ์ˆจ๋ง‰ํ˜€ ํ•  ์ •๋„์˜€์ฃ .
08:10
They were able to take over a bunch of critical computers
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์€ ์ž๋™์ฐจ์˜ ๋ธŒ๋ ˆ์ดํฌ, ์กฐ๋ช…,
08:13
inside the car: the brakes computer, the lighting computer,
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์—”์ง„, ๊ณ„๊ธฐํŒ, ๋ผ๋””์˜ค ๋“ฑ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์ด ๋งค์šฐ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ
08:17
the engine, the dash, the radio, etc.,
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๋งŽ์€ ์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋“ค์„ ์กฐ์ž‘ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:20
and they were able to perform these on real commercial
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋ผ๋””์˜ค ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ์ด๋ฅผ
08:22
cars that they purchased using the radio network.
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์‹ค์ œ๋กœ ์‹œ์ค‘์— ์œ ํ†ต๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์ž๋™์ฐจ์— ์ ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:25
They were able to compromise every single one of the
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ์ž๋™์ฐจ์˜ ๋ฌด์„  ์žฅ๋น„์„ ํ†ต์ œํ•˜๋Š”
08:28
pieces of software that controlled every single one
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์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด ํ•˜๋‚˜ ํ•˜๋‚˜๊นŒ์ง€๋„
08:31
of the wireless capabilities of the car.
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์กฐ์ž‘ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:34
All of these were implemented successfully.
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์ด ๋ชจ๋“  ๊ฒƒ๋“ค์ด ์„ฑ๊ณต์ ์œผ๋กœ ์‹œํ–‰๋˜์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:36
How would you steal a car in this model?
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๊ทธ๋ ‡๋‹ค๋ฉด ์ด ์‹คํ—˜์—์„œ ์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ ์ž๋™์ฐจ๋ฅผ ํ›”์น  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์„๊นŒ์š”?
08:39
Well, you compromise the car by a buffer overflow
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๋ฒ„ํผ ์˜ค๋ฒ„ํ”Œ๋กœ์šฐ (Buffer overflow) ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์„ ์ด์šฉํ•ด์„œ
08:42
of vulnerability in the software, something like that.
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์ž๋™์ฐจ์˜ ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด๋ฅผ ํ•ดํ‚นํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:45
You use the GPS in the car to locate it.
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์ฐจ์˜ ์œ„์น˜๋ฅผ ์•Œ์•„๋‚ด๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” GPS๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:47
You remotely unlock the doors through the computer
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์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด๋กœ ๋ฉ€๋ฆฌ ๋–จ์–ด์ ธ์„œ ์ฐจ ๋ฌธ์„ ์—ด๊ณ ,
08:49
that controls that, start the engine, bypass anti-theft,
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๋„๋‚œ ๋ฐฉ์ง€ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์„ ํ•ด์ œํ•˜๊ณ , ๊ฐ™์€ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์œผ๋กœ ์‹œ๋™๋„ ๊ฑธ๋ฉด,
08:52
and you've got yourself a car.
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์ž, ์ž๋™์ฐจ๊ฐ€ ์†์— ๋“ค์–ด ์™”์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:54
Surveillance was really interesting.
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๋ˆ„๊ตฐ๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ๋„์ฒญํ•˜๊ณ  ๊ฐ์‹œํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ๋„ ์•„์ฃผ ์žฌ๋ฐŒ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
08:57
The authors of the study have a video where they show
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์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์˜ ์ €์ž๋Š” ํฅ๋ฏธ๋กœ์šด ๋น„๋””์˜ค ์ž๋ฃŒ๋„ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š”๋ฐ์š”,
09:00
themselves taking over a car and then turning on
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์ž๋™์ฐจ๋ฅผ ํ•ดํ‚นํ•ด์„œ ์ง€๋„์˜ GPS๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ์ž๋™์ฐจ์˜ ์œ„์น˜๋ฅผ ์ถ”์ ํ•˜๋ฉด์„œ,
09:02
the microphone in the car, and listening in on the car
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์ฐจ ์•ˆ์˜ ๋งˆ์ดํฌ๋ฅผ ์ผœ
09:05
while tracking it via GPS on a map,
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์ฐจ ์•ˆ์˜ ์†Œ๋ฆฌ๋ฅผ ๋„์ฒญํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฑธ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ฃผ๋Š” ์˜์ƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:08
and so that's something that the drivers of the car
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์šด์ „์ž๋Š” ๋„์ฒญ๋‹นํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ์‚ฌ์‹ค์„
09:10
would never know was happening.
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์ „ํ˜€ ๋ชจ๋ฅด๊ณ  ์žˆ์ฃ .
09:12
Am I scaring you yet?
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์•„์ง๋„ ๋ฌด์„ญ์ง€ ์•Š์œผ์‹ ๊ฐ€์š”? (์›ƒ์Œ)
09:15
I've got a few more of these interesting ones.
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์ด์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ํฅ๋ฏธ๋กœ์šด ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ๋ช‡๊ฐ€์ง€ ๋” ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:16
These are ones where I went to a conference,
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์ œ๊ฐ€ ํšŒ์˜์— ์ฐธ์„ํ•  ๋•Œ ๋“ค์—ˆ๋˜ ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐ๋“ค์ธ๋ฐ์š”,
09:18
and my mind was just blown, and I said,
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๊ทธ ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐ๋Š” ์–ด์•ˆ์„ ๋ฒ™๋ฒ™ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋งŒ๋“ค์—ˆ์–ด์š”.
09:20
"I have to share this with other people."
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"์ด ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค๊ณผ ํ•จ๊ป˜ ๊ณต์œ ํ•ด์•ผ๊ฒ ๋‹ค."๊ณ  ์ƒ๊ฐํ–ˆ์ฃ .
09:22
This was Fabian Monrose's lab
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์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ๋…ธ์Šค์บ๋กค๋ผ์ด๋‚˜ ์ฃผ๋ฆฝ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์— ์žˆ๋Š”
09:24
at the University of North Carolina, and what they did was
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ํŒŒ๋น„์•ˆ ๋จผ๋กœ์ฆˆ(Fabian Momrose)์˜ ์‹คํ—˜์‹ค์—์„œ ์‹คํ—˜ํ•œ ๋‚ด์šฉ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:27
something intuitive once you see it,
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์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ง„๋“ค์€, ๊ธฐ๋ฐœํ•˜๊ณ ๋„
09:29
but kind of surprising.
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์กฐ๊ธˆ ๋†€๋ž๊ธฐ๋„ ํ•œ ์ผ์„ ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:31
They videotaped people on a bus,
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ๋ฒ„์Šค ์•ˆ์— ์žˆ๋Š” ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์„ ๋…นํ™”ํ•ด์„œ
09:33
and then they post-processed the video.
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๋ช‡ ๊ฐ€์ง€ ์ž‘์—…์„ ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:36
What you see here in number one is a
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ํ™”๋ฉด์—์„œ 1๋ฒˆ์„ ๋ณด์‹œ๋ฉด,
09:38
reflection in somebody's glasses of the smartphone
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์Šค๋งˆํŠธํฐ์œผ๋กœ ๋ฌธ์ž๋ฅผ ์“ฐ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด
09:43
that they're typing in.
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์•ˆ๊ฒฝ์— ๋ฐ˜์‚ฌ๋œ ๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:44
They wrote software to stabilize --
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์€ ์ข€ ๋” ์„ ๋ช…ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋ณผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋Š” ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด๋ฅผ ์ผ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:46
even though they were on a bus
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์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ๋ฒ„์Šค๋ฅผ ํƒ€๊ณ  ์žˆ๊ฑฐ๋‚˜,
09:48
and maybe someone's holding their phone at an angle --
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ํ˜น์€ ๋น„์Šค๋“ฌ์ด ํœด๋Œ€ํฐ์„ ๋“ค๊ณ  ์žˆ๋”๋ผ๋„
09:51
to stabilize the phone, process it, and
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ํ™”๋ฉด์„ ์„ ๋ช…ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ๋งŒ๋“ค์–ด ๋‚ด๋Š” ๊ฑฐ์ฃ .
09:53
you may know on your smartphone, when you type
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๋˜, ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์ด ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š” ์Šค๋งˆํŠธํฐ์„ ๋ณด๋ฉด,
09:55
a password, the keys pop out a little bit, and they were able
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๋น„๋ฐ€๋ฒˆํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ์ž…๋ ฅํ•  ๋•Œ, ๋ˆ„๋ฅด๋Š” ์žํŒ์ด ์ˆœ๊ฐ„์ ์œผ๋กœ ์•ฝ๊ฐ„ ์ปค์ง‘๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
09:58
to use that to reconstruct what the person was typing,
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์€ ์ด๊ฒƒ์„ ์ด์šฉํ•ด์„œ, ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด
10:01
and had a language model for detecting typing.
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๋ฌด์—‡์„ ํƒ€์ดํ•‘ํ•˜๋Š”์ง€ ๊ฐ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š” ํ”„๋กœ๊ทธ๋žจ๋„ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:05
What was interesting is, by videotaping on a bus,
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์žฌ๋ฏธ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์€, ๋ฒ„์Šค์—์„œ ๋…นํ™”ํ•˜์—ฌ
10:08
they were able to produce exactly what people
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์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ์Šค๋งˆํŠธํฐ์— ํƒ€์ดํ•‘ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„
10:10
on their smartphones were typing,
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์ •ํ™•ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์•Œ์•„๋‚ผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด์ฃ .
10:12
and then they had a surprising result, which is that
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๋†€๋ผ์šด ์‚ฌ์‹ค์€
10:14
their software had not only done it for their target,
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์ด ํ”„๋กœ๊ทธ๋žจ์€ ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋ฌผ๋ฟ๋งŒ ์•„๋‹ˆ๋ผ
10:17
but other people who accidentally happened
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ํ™”๋ฉด์— ์šฐ์—ฐํžˆ ์žกํžŒ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค๊นŒ์ง€๋„
10:18
to be in the picture, they were able to produce
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๋ฌด์—‡์„ ์“ฐ๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ๋Š”์ง€ ์•Œ์•„๋‚ผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:20
what those people had been typing, and that was kind of
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์ด๊ฒƒ์ด ๋ฐ”๋กœ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๊ฐ€ ์‹คํ—˜ํ•˜๋˜ ์ž‘์—…์˜
10:23
an accidental artifact of what their software was doing.
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์šฐ์—ฐํ•œ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ผ๊ณ  ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค
10:27
I'll show you two more. One is P25 radios.
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๋‘ ๊ฐ€์ง€๋ฅผ ๋” ๋ณด์—ฌ๋“œ๋ฆดํ…๋ฐ์š”, ์ฒซ๋ฒˆ์งธ๋Š” P25 ๋ฌด์„  ํ†ต์‹  ๊ธฐ๊ธฐ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:31
P25 radios are used by law enforcement
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P25 ๋ฌด์„  ํ†ต์‹  ๊ธฐ๊ธฐ๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์ฐฐ๊ณผ
10:34
and all kinds of government agencies
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์˜จ๊ฐ– ์ข…๋ฅ˜์˜ ์ •๋ถ€ ๊ธฐ๊ด€, ๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์ „ํˆฌ์—์„œ
10:37
and people in combat to communicate,
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์—ฐ๋ฝ์„ ์ฃผ๊ณ ๋ฐ›๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:39
and there's an encryption option on these phones.
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์ด ๋ฌด์„  ํ†ต์‹  ๊ธฐ๊ธฐ์—๋Š” ์•”ํ˜ธํ™” ์„ ํƒ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์ด ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:42
This is what the phone looks like. It's not really a phone.
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์ „ํ™”๊ธฐ๋Š” ์ด๋ ‡๊ฒŒ ์ƒ๊ฒผ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค .
10:44
It's more of a two-way radio.
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์‚ฌ์‹ค ์ „ํ™”๊ธฐ๋ผ๊ธฐ ๋ณด๋‹ค๋Š” ๋ฌด์ „๊ธฐ์— ๊ฐ€๊น๊ฒ ๋„ค์š”.
10:46
Motorola makes the most widely used one, and you can see
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๋ชจํ† ๋กœ๋ผ๊ฐ€ ์ œํ’ˆ์ด ์ œ์ผ ๋„๋ฆฌ ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜์—ˆ๊ณ ,
10:49
that they're used by Secret Service, they're used in combat,
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๋ณด์‹œ๋Š” ๋ฐ”์™€ ๊ฐ™์ด ์ฒฉ๋ณด ๊ธฐ๊ด€๊ณผ ์ „ํˆฌ์—์„œ ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:52
it's a very, very common standard in the U.S. and elsewhere.
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์ด ๋ฌด์ „๊ธฐ๋Š” ๋ฏธ๊ตญ์„ ๋น„๋กฏํ•˜์—ฌ ์ „ ์„ธ๊ณ„์— ๋งค์šฐ ํ”ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
10:55
So one question the researchers asked themselves is,
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์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ž๋“ค์ด ๊ทธ๋“ค ์Šค์Šค๋กœ ์˜๋ฌธ์„ ๊ฐ€์กŒ๋˜ ๊ฒƒ์€
10:57
could you block this thing, right?
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'์ด๊ฒƒ์„ ์ฐจ๋‹จํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์„๊นŒ?' ์˜€์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
11:00
Could you run a denial-of-service,
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ํ…Œ๋Ÿฌ๋ฆฌ์ŠคํŠธ๋“ค์ด, ๊ฒฝ์ฐฐ๋“ค๊ณผ ์†Œ๋ฐฉ๊ด€๋“ค์ด
11:01
because these are first responders?
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๊ธด๊ธ‰ ์ƒํ™ฉ์—์„œ ์„œ๋กœ ์—ฐ๋ฝํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์—†๋„๋ก
11:03
So, would a terrorist organization want to black out the
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๋ฌด์ „ ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์„ ์ฐจ๋‹จํ•ด๋ฒ„๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด
11:05
ability of police and fire to communicate at an emergency?
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๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ• ๊นŒ? ๋ผ๋Š” ์˜๋ฌธ์„ ๊ฐ€์ง„ ๊ฑฐ์ฃ .
11:09
They found that there's this GirlTech device used for texting
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์€ P25์™€ ์ •ํ™•ํžˆ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ฃผํŒŒ์—์„œ ์ž‘๋™๋˜๋Š”
11:13
that happens to operate at the same exact frequency
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๋ฌธ์ž ์ „์†ก์— ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฑธํ…(GirlTech)์‚ฌ์˜ ์žฅ์น˜๋ฅผ ์ฐพ์•˜๊ณ 
11:15
as the P25, and they built what they called
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'๋‚˜์˜ ์ฒซ๋ฒˆ์งธ ์ „ํŒŒ๋ฐฉํ•ด๊ธฐ' ๋ผ๊ณ 
11:18
My First Jammer. (Laughter)
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๋ถ€๋ฅด๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ๋งŒ๋“ค์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. (์›ƒ์Œ)
11:22
If you look closely at this device,
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์ด ์žฅ์น˜๋ฅผ ์ž์„ธํžˆ ๋ณด์‹œ๋ฉด,
11:24
it's got a switch for encryption or cleartext.
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์•”ํ˜ธํ™”์™€ ๋น„์•”ํ˜ธํ™”๋ฅผ ์œ„ํ•œ ์Šค์œ„์น˜๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
11:28
Let me advance the slide, and now I'll go back.
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์Šฌ๋ผ์ด๋“œ๋ฅผ ํ•œ ์žฅ ๋„˜๊ฒจ๋ณด๊ฒ ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋‹ค์‹œ ์›๋ž˜ ์Šฌ๋ผ์ด๋“œ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
11:31
You see the difference?
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์ฐจ์ด์ ์ด ๋ณด์ด์‹ญ๋‹ˆ๊นŒ?
11:33
This is plain text. This is encrypted.
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์ด๊ฒŒ ๊ธฐ๋ณธ ๋ฌธ์ž๊ตฌ์š”, ์ด๊ฑด ์•”ํ˜ธํ™”๋œ ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
11:36
There's one little dot that shows up on the screen,
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ํ™”๋ฉด ์œ„์— ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚˜๋Š” ์•„์ฃผ ์ž‘์€ ์ ์ด ์žˆ๋Š”๋ฐ
11:39
and one little tiny turn of the switch.
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์ด ์ž‘์€ ์ ์ด ์Šค์œ„์น˜๋ฅผ ๋„๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด์ฃ .
11:41
And so the researchers asked themselves, "I wonder how
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์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ž๋“ค์€ ๋‹ค์Œ๊ณผ ๊ฐ™์€ ์งˆ๋ฌธ์„ ๋˜์กŒ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
11:43
many times very secure, important, sensitive conversations
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"์•”ํ˜ธํ™”ํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฑธ ๋ˆˆ์น˜์ฑ„์ง€ ๋ชปํ•œ ์ฑ„๋กœ
11:47
are happening on these two-way radios where they forget
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์–ผ๋งˆ๋‚˜ ๋น„๋ฐ€์Šค๋Ÿฝ๊ณ , ์ค‘์š”ํ•˜๊ณ , ๋ฏผ๊ฐํ•œ ๋Œ€ํ™”๋“ค์ด
11:48
to encrypt and they don't notice that they didn't encrypt?"
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์ด ๋ฌด์ „๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ํ†ตํ•ด ์ด๋ฃจ์–ด์งˆ๊นŒ?"
11:51
So they bought a scanner. These are perfectly legal
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๊ทธ๋ž˜์„œ ๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ํŒ๋… ์žฅ์น˜๋ฅผ ์ƒ€์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์™„์ „ํžˆ ํ•ฉ๋ฒ•์ ์ธ ๋ฌผ๊ฑด์ด์˜ˆ์š”.
11:55
and they run at the frequency of the P25,
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  P25์™€ ๊ฐ™์€ ์ฃผํŒŒ์ˆ˜๋กœ ์žก์•„ ๋†“์•˜์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
11:58
and what they did is they hopped around frequencies
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ์ฃผํŒŒ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ ์กฐ์ ˆํ•ด๊ฐ€๋ฉด์„œ
12:00
and they wrote software to listen in.
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์ด๋Ÿฐ ์†Œ๋ฆฌ๋“ค์„ ๋“ฃ๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•œ ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด๋ฅผ ๋งŒ๋“ค์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:02
If they found encrypted communication, they stayed
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์•”ํ˜ธํ™”๋œ ๋Œ€ํ™”๋ฅผ ์ฐพ์•˜์„๋•Œ, ๊ทธ ์ฃผํŒŒ์ˆ˜๋ฅผ
12:05
on that channel and they wrote down, that's a channel
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๊ธฐ๋กํ•ด ๋†“์•˜์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:07
that these people communicate in,
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๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์€ ๊ฒฐ์ฐฐ๊ด€ ๊ฐ™์€ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด
12:09
these law enforcement agencies,
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๋Œ€ํ™”ํ•˜๋Š” ์ฑ„๋„์ด์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:10
and they went to 20 metropolitan areas and listened in
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๊ทธ๋“ค์€ 20๊ฐœ์˜ ๋Œ€๋„์‹œ๋กœ ๊ฐ€์„œ
12:14
on conversations that were happening at those frequencies.
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์ด ์ฃผํŒŒ์ˆ˜์—์„œ ์ผ์–ด๋‚˜๋Š” ๋Œ€ํ™”๋“ค์„ ์—ฟ๋“ค์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:17
They found that in every metropolitan area,
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๋ชจ๋“  ๋Œ€๋„์‹œ ๊ถŒ์—ญ์—์„œ
12:20
they would capture over 20 minutes a day
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๋งค์ผ 20๋ถ„์ด ๋„˜๊ฒŒ ์•”ํ˜ธํ™” ๋˜์ง€ ์•Š์€ ๋Œ€ํ™”๋“ค์„
12:22
of cleartext communication.
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์žก์„ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:25
And what kind of things were people talking about?
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๊ทธ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ์–ด๋–ค ๋Œ€ํ™”๋“ค์„ ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์—ˆ๋ƒ๊ณ ์š”?
12:27
Well, they found the names and information
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์‹คํ—˜ํŒ€์€ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ€ ์ •๋ณด์›์˜ ์ด๋ฆ„๊ณผ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ€ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ
12:28
about confidential informants. They found information
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์•Œ์•„ ๋‚ผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:31
that was being recorded in wiretaps,
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๋ฒ”์ฃ„๋“ค์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๋งŽ์€ ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐ๋“ค,
12:33
a bunch of crimes that were being discussed,
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋ฏผ๊ฐํ•œ ์ •๋ณด๋“ค์ด
12:36
sensitive information.
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๋„์ฒญ ์žฅ๋น„์— ๋…น์Œ๋˜์–ด ์žˆ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:37
It was mostly law enforcement and criminal.
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๋Œ€๋ถ€๋ถ„์ด ๊ฒฝ์ฐฐ๊ณผ ๋ฒ”์ฃ„์ž์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์ด์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:41
They went and reported this to the law enforcement
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ์ต๋ช…์œผ๋กœ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ๋ฐ”๊พผ ๋’ค์—
12:42
agencies, after anonymizing it,
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์‚ฌ๋ฒ• ๋‹น๊ตญ์— ๊ฐ€์„œ ๋ณด๊ณ ํ•˜์˜€์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:44
and the vulnerability here is simply the user interface
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์—ฌ๊ธฐ์„œ ์ทจ์•ฝ์ ์€ ๋‹จ์ˆœํ•˜๊ฒŒ, ๊ทธ ๋ฌด์ „๊ธฐ์—์„œ ์•”ํ˜ธํ™”๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์Œ์„ ๋‚˜ํƒ€๋‚ด๋Š” ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์ด
12:47
wasn't good enough. If you're talking
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์ข‹์ง€ ์•Š์•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:49
about something really secure and sensitive, it should
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๋งŒ์•ฝ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„๊ผ์„œ ์ •๋ง๋กœ ๋น„๋ฐ€์Šค๋Ÿฝ๊ณ  ๋ฏผ๊ฐํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด ์ด์•ผ๊ธฐํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค๋ฉด
12:52
be really clear to you that this conversation is encrypted.
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๊ทธ ๋Œ€ํ™”๊ฐ€ ์•”ํ˜ธํ™”๋˜๊ณ ์žˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ถ„๋ช…ํžˆ ํ™•์ธํ•ด ๋‘์–ด์•ผ ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:55
That one's pretty easy to fix.
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์ด ๋ถ€๋ถ„์€ ๋ฐ”๋กœ์žก๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ ๊ฝค๋‚˜ ์‰ฝ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:57
The last one I thought was really, really cool,
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๋งˆ์ง€๋ง‰ ์ฃผ์ œ๋Š” ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์ •๋ง ๋ฉ‹์ง€๋‹ค๊ณ  ์ƒ๊ฐํ•œ ๊ฒƒ ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
12:58
and I just had to show it to you, it's probably not something
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๋ฐ”๋กœ ๋ณด์—ฌ๋“œ๋ ค์•ผ ํ•  ๊ฒƒ ๊ฐ™๋„ค์š” ์•„๋งˆ๋„ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์ด.
13:01
that you're going to lose sleep over
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์ž๋™์ฐจ๋‚˜ ์‹ฌ์„ธ๋™๊ธฐ์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ
13:02
like the cars or the defibrillators,
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ํฌ๊ฒŒ ๊ฑฑ์ •ํ•ด์•ผ ๋  ๊ฒƒ์€ ์•„๋‹ ๊ฒƒ ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:04
but it's stealing keystrokes.
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๋ฐ”๋กœ ํ‚ค๋ณด๋“œ๋กœ ํƒ€์ดํ•‘ํ•˜๋Š” ๋‚ด์šฉ์„ ํ›”์น˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:07
Now, we've all looked at smartphones upside down.
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์—ฌํƒœ๊นŒ์ง€ ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์Šค๋งˆํŠธํฐ์„ ์ด๋ฆฌ์ €๋ฆฌ ์‚ดํŽด๋ณด์•˜์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:10
Every security expert wants to hack a smartphone,
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๋ชจ๋“  ๋ณด์•ˆ ์ „๋ฌธ๊ฐ€๋Š” ์Šค๋งˆํŠธํฐ์„ ํ•ดํ‚นํ•ด๋ณด๊ณ  ์‹ถ์–ดํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:12
and we tend to look at the USB port, the GPS for tracking,
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” USBํฌํŠธ, GPS, ์นด๋ฉ”๋ผ, ๋งˆ์ดํฌ๋ฅผ
13:17
the camera, the microphone, but no one up till this point
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์‚ดํŽด๋ณด๊ฒ ์ง€๋งŒ, ๊ทธ ๋ˆ„๊ตฌ๋„
13:20
had looked at the accelerometer.
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๊ฐ€์†๋„๊ณ„(accelerometer)์— ๋Œ€ํ•ด์„œ๋Š” ์ƒ๊ฐํ•˜์ง€ ๋ชปํ–ˆ์„ ๊ฒ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:21
The accelerometer is the thing that determines
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๊ฐ€์†๋„๊ณ„๋Š” ์Šค๋งˆํŠธํฐ์—์„œ
13:23
the vertical orientation of the smartphone.
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์ˆ˜์ง ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์„ ๊ฒฐ์ •ํ•˜๋Š” ์žฅ์น˜์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:27
And so they had a simple setup.
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ๊ฐ„๋‹จํ•œ ์…‹ํŒ…์„ ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:28
They put a smartphone next to a keyboard,
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์Šค๋งˆํŠธํฐ์„ ํ‚ค๋ณด๋“œ ์˜†์— ๋†“๊ณ 
13:31
and they had people type, and then their goal was
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์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ํƒ€์ž๋ฅผ ์น˜๊ฒŒํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค
13:33
to use the vibrations that were created by typing
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ํ‚ค๋ณด๋“œ ํƒ€์ดํ•‘์œผ๋กœ ์ธํ•ด์„œ ๋ฐœ์ƒ๋˜๋Š” ์ง„๋™์œผ๋กœ ์ƒ๊ธฐ๋Š”
13:36
to measure the change in the accelerometer reading
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๊ฐ€์†๋„๊ณ„์˜ ๋ณ€ํ™”๋ฅผ ๊ด€์ธกํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:41
to determine what the person had been typing.
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์ด๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์„ ํƒ€์ดํ•‘ํ•˜๊ณ  ์žˆ๋Š”์ง€ ์•Œ์•„๋‚ด๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด ๋ชฉ์ ์ด์—ˆ์ฃ .
13:44
Now, when they tried this on an iPhone 3GS,
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์ž, ์•„์ดํฐ 3GS๋กœ ์ด๊ฒƒ์„ ์‹คํ—˜ํ–ˆ์„ ๋•Œ๋Š”์š”,
13:46
this is a graph of the perturbations that were created
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์ด ๊ทธ๋ž˜ํ”„๊ฐ€ ๋ฐ”๋กœ ํƒ€์ดํ•‘์œผ๋กœ ์ธํ•ด ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•œ ์ง„๋™์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:49
by the typing, and you can see that it's very difficult
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๋ณด์‹œ๋Š” ๋ฐ”์™€ ๊ฐ™์ด, ๋ˆ„๊ฐ€ ์–ธ์ œ ํƒ€์ดํ•‘์„ ํ–ˆ๊ณ ,
13:52
to tell when somebody was typing or what they were typing,
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๋˜ ๋ฌด์—‡์„ ์ณค๋Š”์ง€ ๋ถ„๊ฐ„ํ•˜๊ธฐ๋Š” ๋งค์šฐ ์–ด๋ ต์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:55
but the iPhone 4 greatly improved the accelerometer,
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ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ์•„์ดํฐ4๋Š” ๊ฐ€์†๋„๊ณ„ ๊ธฐ๋Šฅ์„ ๊ต‰์žฅํžˆ ํ–ฅ์ƒ์‹œ์ผฐ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
13:58
and so the same measurement
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๊ฐ™์€ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ•์œผ๋กœ ์ธก์ •ํ•˜์—ฌ
14:02
produced this graph.
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์–ป์€ ๊ทธ๋ž˜ํ”„์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
14:04
Now that gave you a lot of information while someone
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์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ํƒ€์ดํ•‘ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๋งŽ์€ ์ •๋ณด๋ฅผ ์•Œ์•„๋ƒˆ์ฃ .
14:06
was typing, and what they did then is used advanced
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๋‹ค์Œ์œผ๋กœ ๊ทธ๋“ค์ด ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์€
14:10
artificial intelligence techniques called machine learning
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ํ•™์Šต ๋‹จ๊ณ„๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด ๊ธฐ๊ณ„ ํ•™์Šต(machine learning)์ด๋ผ๊ณ  ๋ถˆ๋ฆฌ๋Š”
14:13
to have a training phase,
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๊ณ ๊ธ‰ ์ธ๊ณต ์ง€๋Šฅ์„ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์˜€์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
14:14
and so they got most likely grad students
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์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ง„๋“ค์€ ๋Œ€ํ•™์›์ƒ๋“ค์—๊ฒŒ
14:16
to type in a whole lot of things, and to learn,
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๋ฐฉ๋Œ€ํ•œ ์–‘์„ ํƒ€์ดํ•‘ํ•˜๊ฒŒ ํ–ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
14:20
to have the system use the machine learning tools that
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๊ฐ€์†๋„๊ณ„์˜ ๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ์™€ ์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ํƒ€์ดํ•‘ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ๋น„๊ตํ•˜์—ฌ,
14:23
were available to learn what it is that the people were typing
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์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์„ ํƒ€์ดํ•‘ํ•˜๋Š”์ง€ ์•Œ์•„๋‚ด๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ
14:26
and to match that up
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๋จผ์ € ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์ด ํ•™์Šต์„ ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋„๋ก ํ•˜๋Š”
14:28
with the measurements in the accelerometer.
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๋‹จ๊ณ„์˜€์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
14:31
And then there's the attack phase, where you get
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๊ณต๊ฒฉ ๋‹จ๊ณ„์—์„œ๋Š”
14:33
somebody to type something in, you don't know what it was,
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๊ทธ๊ฒƒ์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์ธ์ง€๋Š” ๋ชจ๋ฅด์ง€๋งŒ ๋ˆ„๊ตฐ๊ฐ€ ๋ฌด์–ธ๊ฐ€๋ฅผ ์ž…๋ ฅํ•˜์˜€๊ณ 
14:35
but you use your model that you created
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ํ•™์Šต ๋‹จ๊ณ„์—์„œ ์ƒ์„ฑ๋œ ๋ชจ๋ธ์„ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ
14:37
in the training phase to figure out what they were typing.
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์‚ฌ๋žŒ๋“ค์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์„ ์ผ๋Š”์ง€ ์•Œ์•„ ๋‚ผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
14:40
They had pretty good success. This is an article from the USA Today.
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์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ๊ฝค ์ข‹์€ ์„ฑ๊ณผ๋ฅผ ๊ฑฐ๋’€์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ด๊ฑด ์œ ์—์Šค ์—์ด ํˆฌ๋ฐ์ด์— ๋‚œ ๊ธฐ์‚ฌ ์ค‘ ํ•œ ๋ถ€๋ถ„์ธ๋ฐ์š”,
14:44
They typed in, "The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ "์ผ๋ฆฌ๋…ธ์ด ๋Œ€๋ฒ•์› (Illinois Supreme Court)์€ ๋žŒ ์— ๋งˆ๋ˆ„์—˜(Rahm Emanuel)์ด
14:46
that Rahm Emanuel is eligible to run for Mayor of Chicago"
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์‹œ์นด๊ณ ์˜ ์‹œ์žฅ์œผ๋กœ ์ถœ๋งˆํ•  ์ž๊ฒฉ์ด ์žˆ์œผ๋ฉฐ,
14:49
โ€” see, I tied it in to the last talk โ€”
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๊ทธ์—๊ฒŒ ์‹œ์žฅํ›„๋ณด๋กœ ๋‚จ์•„์ค„ ๊ฒƒ์„ ๋ช…๋ นํ–ˆ๋‹ค" ๋ผ๊ณ  ์ผ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
14:51
"and ordered him to stay on the ballot."
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๋งˆ์ง€๋ง‰ ๊ฐ•์—ฐ ์ฃผ์ œ๋กœ ์•„์ฃผ ๋”ฑ ์•Œ๋งž๋„ค์š”.
14:53
Now, the system is interesting, because it produced
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์ž, ์ด ์‹œ์Šคํ…œ์€ ํฅ๋ฏธ๋กญ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
14:55
"Illinois Supreme" and then it wasn't sure.
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์™œ๋ƒํ•˜๋ฉด "Illinois Supreme"์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ฃผ๊ธฐ๋Š” ํ–ˆ์ง€๋งŒ ๊ทธ ๋’ค์–ด ๋‹จ์–ด๋Š” ํ™•์‹ค์น˜ ์•Š์•˜๊ธฐ ๋•Œ๋ฌธ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
14:58
The model produced a bunch of options,
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์ด ํ”„๋กœ๊ทธ๋žจ์€ ์ˆ˜ ๋งŽ์€ ์˜ต์…˜์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ค๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
15:00
and this is the beauty of some of the A.I. techniques,
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ์ด๊ฒƒ์€ ์ธ๊ณต ์ง€๋Šฅ ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์˜ ํŠน์žฅ์ ์ด๋ผ ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
15:03
is that computers are good at some things,
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์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ๋Š” ํ•œ ์ชฝ์„ ์ž˜ํ•˜๊ณ 
15:05
humans are good at other things,
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์‚ฌ๋žŒ์€ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ๊ฒƒ์„ ์ž˜ํ•˜๊ณ 
15:07
take the best of both and let the humans solve this one.
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์–‘์ชฝ์˜ ์žฅ์ ์„ ํƒํ•ด ์‚ฌ๋žŒ์ด ํ•ด๊ฒฐํ•˜๋ฉด ๋˜๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ด์ฃ .
15:09
Don't waste computer cycles.
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์ปดํ“จํ„ฐ์— ๋„ˆ๋ฌด ์˜์กดํ•˜์ง€ ๋งˆ์„ธ์š”.
15:10
A human's not going to think it's the Supreme might.
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์‚ฌ๋žŒ์€ 'Supreme might' ๋ผ๊ณ  ์ƒ๊ฐํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์„ ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
15:12
It's the Supreme Court, right?
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๋Œ€๋ฒ•์›(Supreme Court)์ด์ฃ , ๊ทธ๋ ‡์ฃ ?
15:14
And so, together we're able to reproduce typing
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์ด๋ ‡๊ฒŒ, ์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ๋‹จ์ง€ ๊ฐ€์†๋„๊ณ„๋ฅผ ์ธก์ •ํ•˜์—ฌ
15:16
simply by measuring the accelerometer.
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ํƒ€์ดํ•‘ํ•œ ๋‚ด์šฉ์„ ๋ณต์›ํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ฒŒ ๋œ ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
15:19
Why does this matter? Well, in the Android platform,
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์™œ ์ด๊ฒƒ์ด ์ค‘์š”ํ•˜๋ƒ๊ตฌ์š”? ์˜ˆ๋ฅผ ๋“ค์–ด, ์•ˆ๋“œ๋กœ์ด๋“œ ๊ธฐ๋ฐ˜์—์„œ
15:23
for example, the developers have a manifest
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๊ฐœ๋ฐœ์ž๋“ค์€ ๋งˆ์ดํฌ๋‚˜ ๊ธฐํƒ€ ๋“ฑ๋“ฑ์„ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋ ค๋ฉด
15:27
where every device on there, the microphone, etc.,
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๋ฐ˜๋“œ์‹œ ๋“ฑ๋กํ•ด์•ผ ํ•˜๋Š”
15:30
has to register if you're going to use it
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๋ชฉ๋ก์„ ๊ฐ€์ง€๊ณ  ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
15:32
so that hackers can't take over it,
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ํ•ด์ปค๋“ค์ด ์นจํˆฌํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์—†๋„๋ก ๋ง์ด์ฃ .
15:34
but nobody controls the accelerometer.
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ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ, ๊ทธ ๋ˆ„๊ตฌ๋„ ๊ฐ€์†๋„๊ณ„์—๋Š” ์‹ ๊ฒฝ์“ฐ์ง€ ์•Š์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
15:37
So what's the point? You can leave your iPhone next to
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์š”์ ์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์ด๋ƒ๊ตฌ์š”? ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์˜ ์•„์ดํฐ์„
15:39
someone's keyboard, and just leave the room,
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๋ˆ„๊ตฐ๊ฐ€์˜ ํ‚ค๋ณด๋“œ ์˜†์— ๋‘๊ณ  ๋ฐฉ์„ ๋‚˜๊ฐ„ ๋‹ค์Œ์—,
15:41
and then later recover what they did,
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๋‚˜์ค‘์— ๊ทธ ์•„์ดํฐ์„ ๊ฐ€์ ธ์™€ ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜๋ฉด, ๊ทธ๋“ค์ด ๋ฌด์—‡์„ ํ–ˆ๋Š”์ง€
15:43
even without using the microphone.
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๋งˆ์ดํฌ ์—†์ด๋„ ์•Œ์•„๋‚ผ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๊ฒ ์ฃ .
15:45
If someone is able to put malware on your iPhone,
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๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ  ๋งŒ์•ฝ ๋ˆ„๊ตฐ๊ฐ€๊ฐ€ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์˜ ์•„์ดํฐ์— ํ•ดํ‚น ํ”„๋กœ๊ทธ๋žจ์„ ์„ค์น˜ํ•œ๋‹ค๋ฉด,
15:47
they could then maybe get the typing that you do
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์ด ์•„์ดํฐ์„ ํ‚ค๋ณด๋“œ ์˜†์— ๋‘๊ณ  ํƒ€์ž๋ฅผ ์น  ๋•Œ๋งˆ๋‹ค
15:50
whenever you put your iPhone next to your keyboard.
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์—ฌ๋Ÿฌ๋ถ„์ด ํƒ€์ดํ•‘ ํ•˜๋Š” ๋‚ด์šฉ์„ ์•Œ์•„๋‚ผ ์ˆ˜๋„ ์žˆ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
15:52
There's several other notable attacks that unfortunately
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๋ˆˆ์— ๋„๋Š” ๋ช‡๋ช‡์˜ ๋‹ค๋ฅธ ์˜ˆ๋“ค์ด ์žˆ์ง€๋งŒ ์•ˆํƒ€๊น๊ฒŒ๋„ ๋ชจ๋‘ ์–ธ๊ธ‰ํ•  ์‹œ๊ฐ„์ด ์—†๋„ค์š”.
15:54
I don't have time to go into, but the one that I wanted
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ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ์ œ๊ฐ€ ์–ธ๊ธ‰ํ•˜๊ณ  ์‹ถ์€ ํ•˜๋‚˜๋Š”
15:56
to point out was a group from the University of Michigan
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๋ฏธ์‹œ๊ฐ„๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์˜ ํ•œ ๊ทธ๋ฃน์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
15:59
which was able to take voting machines,
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๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ๋ณต๋„์— ๋ฒ„๋ ค์ ธ์žˆ๋˜
16:01
the Sequoia AVC Edge DREs that
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Sequoia AVC Edge DREs๋ผ๋Š”
16:04
were going to be used in New Jersey in the election
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๋‰ด์ €์ง€์—์„œ ์„ ๊ฑฐ์— ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋ ค๋˜ ํˆฌํ‘œ ๊ธฐ๊ณ„๋ฅผ
16:05
that were left in a hallway, and put Pac-Man on it.
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ํ•ดํ‚นํ•˜์—ฌ ํŒฉ๋งจ ๊ฒŒ์ž„์„ ์ง‘์–ด๋„ฃ์—ˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
16:07
So they ran the Pac-Man game.
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๊ทธ๋ž˜์„œ ๊ทธ๋“ค์€ ํŒฉ๋งจ ๊ฒŒ์ž„์„ ํ–ˆ์ฃ .
16:11
What does this all mean?
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์ด๊ฒŒ ๋‹ค ๋ฌด์Šจ ๋œป์ผ๊นŒ์š”?
16:13
Well, I think that society tends to adopt technology
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์ œ ์ƒ๊ฐ์— ์šฐ๋ฆฌ ์‚ฌํšŒ๋Š” ๊ธฐ์ˆ ์„ ์ •๋ง ๋นจ๋ฆฌ ๋ฐ›์•„๋“ค์ด๋Š” ๊ฒƒ ๊ฐ™์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
16:16
really quickly. I love the next coolest gadget.
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์ €๋Š” ์ฐจ๊ธฐ์— ๋‚˜์˜ฌ ๋ฉ‹์ง„ ๋ฌผ๊ฑด๋“ค์ด ๊ธฐ๋Œ€๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
16:19
But it's very important, and these researchers are showing,
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ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ์ด ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์ด ๋ณด์—ฌ์ฃผ๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ฒ˜๋Ÿผ ๋งค์šฐ ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ ๊ฒƒ์€,
16:22
that the developers of these things
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์ด๊ฒƒ๋“ค์˜ ๊ฐœ๋ฐœ์ž๊ฐ€
16:23
need to take security into account from the very beginning,
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์ดˆ๊ธฐ ๋‹จ๊ณ„๋ถ€ํ„ฐ ๊ณ„์ •์— ๋ณด์•ˆ์„ ์ทจํ•  ํ•„์š”๊ฐ€ ์žˆ๊ณ 
16:26
and need to realize that they may have a threat model,
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์ด๊ฒƒ๋“ค์„ ์œ„ํ˜‘ํ•˜๋Š” ๋ชจ๋ธ์ด ์žˆ์„์ง€๋„ ๋ชจ๋ฅธ๋‹ค๊ณ  ์ธ์ง€ํ•ด์•ผํ•œ๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
16:29
but the attackers may not be nice enough
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ํ•˜์ง€๋งŒ ํ•ด์ปค๋“ค์€ ์œ„ํ˜‘์„ ๊ทธ ๋ชจ๋ธ์—๋งŒ
16:31
to limit themselves to that threat model,
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๊ตญํ•œํ•  ๋งŒํผ ์ฐฉํ•˜์ง€ ์•Š์„์ง€๋„ ๋ชจ๋ฆ…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
16:33
and so you need to think outside of the box.
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๋”ฐ๋ผ์„œ ๋„“๊ฒŒ ์ƒ๊ฐํ•  ํ•„์š”๊ฐ€ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
16:36
What we can do is be aware
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์šฐ๋ฆฌ๋Š” ์†Œํ”„ํŠธ์›จ์–ด๊ฐ€ ์„ค์น˜๋œ
16:37
that devices can be compromised,
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๋ชจ๋“  ์žฅ์น˜๋“ค์€ ์•ˆ์ „ํ•˜์ง€ ๋ชปํ•˜๊ณ 
16:40
and anything that has software in it
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์ทจ์•ฝํ•˜๋‹ค๋Š” ๊ฒƒ์„ ๊นจ๋‹ฌ์•„์•ผ ํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
16:41
is going to be vulnerable. It's going to have bugs.
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๋ชจ๋“  ์žฅ๋น„๋“ค์€ ๋ฒ„๊ทธ๋ฅผ ๊ฐ€์งˆ ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ์Šต๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.
16:44
Thank you very much. (Applause)
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๋Œ€๋‹จํžˆ ๊ฐ์‚ฌํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค (๋ฐ•์ˆ˜)
์ด ์›น์‚ฌ์ดํŠธ ์ •๋ณด

์ด ์‚ฌ์ดํŠธ๋Š” ์˜์–ด ํ•™์Šต์— ์œ ์šฉํ•œ YouTube ๋™์˜์ƒ์„ ์†Œ๊ฐœํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์ „ ์„ธ๊ณ„ ์ตœ๊ณ ์˜ ์„ ์ƒ๋‹˜๋“ค์ด ๊ฐ€๋ฅด์น˜๋Š” ์˜์–ด ์ˆ˜์—…์„ ๋ณด๊ฒŒ ๋  ๊ฒƒ์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๊ฐ ๋™์˜์ƒ ํŽ˜์ด์ง€์— ํ‘œ์‹œ๋˜๋Š” ์˜์–ด ์ž๋ง‰์„ ๋”๋ธ” ํด๋ฆญํ•˜๋ฉด ๊ทธ๊ณณ์—์„œ ๋™์˜์ƒ์ด ์žฌ์ƒ๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ๋น„๋””์˜ค ์žฌ์ƒ์— ๋งž์ถฐ ์ž๋ง‰์ด ์Šคํฌ๋กค๋ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค. ์˜๊ฒฌ์ด๋‚˜ ์š”์ฒญ์ด ์žˆ๋Š” ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์ด ๋ฌธ์˜ ์–‘์‹์„ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ฌธ์˜ํ•˜์‹ญ์‹œ์˜ค.

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