3 questions we should ask about nuclear weapons | Emma Belcher

翻译人员: Saanman Fong 校对人员: Lipeng Chen

So you know when you're doubled over in pain

你们有没有过 身体特别的难受的时候，

and you're wondering, is it your appendix

你在想是不是得了阑尾炎，

or maybe you ate something funny?

或者是吃坏了肚子？

Well, when that happens to me, I call my friend Sasha --

我碰上这种事， 我会给我的朋友萨莎打电话——

Sasha is a doctor --

萨莎是个医生——

and I say, "Should I rush to the nearest emergency room

我说“我是不是得 火急火燎得跑去最近的急救中心？”

in a panic?

Or am I OK to relax and just wait it out?"

还是我可以放轻松， 等它自己好就行？”

Yes, I am that annoying friend.

没错，我就是那个烦人的朋友。

But in September 2017,

不过在 2017 年的九月份，

friends of mine were suddenly calling me

我的一些朋友突然打电话找我，

for my professional opinion.

来征求我专业的看法。

And no, I'm not a doctor,

而且不，我并不是个医生，

but they were asking me questions of life and death.

不过他们问我的是关于生与死的问题。

So what was going on in September of 2017?

那么 2017 年九月发生了什么呢？

Well, North Korea was suddenly and scarily all over the news.

朝鲜在一夜之间， 遍布各大新闻媒体，引得人心惶惶。

Kim Jong-un had tested missiles

金正恩进行了导弹的试射试验，

potentially capable of hitting major US cities,

而这些导弹具有 打击美国主要城市的潜力，

and President Trump had responded with tweets of "fire and fury."

总统特朗普在推特中以“炮火与怒火”回击。

And there was real concern that tensions would escalate

人们非常担忧 目前紧张的局势有可能恶化，

to a potential war

升级成一场潜在的战争，

or even nuclear weapons use.

或甚至要使用核武器。

So what my friends were calling and asking was:

所以我的朋友打电话来问的是：

Should they panic or were the OK to relax?

他们是否要开始恐慌， 还是说他们可以放心？

But really, they were asking me a fundamental question:

其实他们都在问一个基本问题：

"Am I safe?"

“我现在安全吗？”

While I was reassuring them that, no, they didn't need to worry just yet,

在我劝他们放轻松，没事的， 他们还不必为此担心的时候，

the irony of their question dawned on me.

我意识到他们问题中很讽刺的一点。

What they hadn't really thought about

他们没有想到的是，

is that we've all been living under a much larger cloud for decades --

我们在这种乌云笼罩的状况下 生活数十年了——

potentially a mushroom cloud --

甚至还可能是蘑菇云——

without giving it much thought.

我们却没去多想。

Now it's not surprising that friends of mine

那么如今我的朋友和许多其他人

and many others like them don't know much about nuclear weapons

不怎么了解也不去关注核武器，

and don't think about them.

也就不奇怪了。

After all, the end of the Cold War,

毕竟冷战结束后，

the United States and Russia, tension abated,

美国和俄罗斯间局势缓和，

we started dismantling nuclear weapons,

我们开始销毁核武器，

and they started to become a relic of the past.

然后这种武器逐渐成为历史。

Generations didn't have to grow up with the specter of nuclear war

新一代人不需要在 核战争的在阴霾下长大。

hanging over their heads.

And there other reasons people don't like to think about nuclear weapons.

还有其他的原因让人 不喜欢去想核武器的事。

It's scary, overwhelming.

它很吓人，让人无所适从。

I get it.

我能理解。

Sometimes I wish I could have chosen a cheerier field to study.

有时我也希望我当初选个 愉快一点的研究领域。

(Laughter)

（笑声）

Perhaps tax law would have been more uplifting.

也许学税法更能振奋人心一些。

(Laughter)

（笑声）

But in addition to that,

但是除此之外，

people have so many other things to think about in their busy lives,

人们在繁忙的生活中 有那么多别的东西要去考虑，

and they'd much prefer to think about something over which

他们更愿意去为那些

they feel they have some semblance of control,

看似在他们控制之下的事情思考，

and they assume that other people, smarter than they on this topic,

并且他们都以为总有别人， 比他们自己在这方面更聪明的人，

are working away to keep us all safe.

正在全力解决这个问题， 好让大家都平平安安。

And then, there are other reasons people don't talk about this,

另外人们不爱讨论核武器还有其他原因，

and one is because we, as nuclear experts,

其中之一便是我们核专家，

use a whole lot of convoluted jargon and terminology

会用很多晦涩难懂的行话和专业术语

to talk about these issues:

来谈论这些问题：

CVID, ICBM, JCPOA.

CVID、ICBM、JCPOA。

It's really inaccessible for a lot of people.

这对很多人来说是难以理解的。

And, in reality, it actually sometimes I think makes us numb

并且事实上我认为有时

这反而让我们对我们真正 想要讨论的东西感到麻木，

to what we're really talking about here.

And what we are really talking about here

而我们在此真正想要讨论的东西，

is the fact that,

实际上是尽管我们从冷战以来

while we've made dramatic reductions in the number of nuclear weapons

since the Cold War,

已经在数量上大幅减少核武器，

right now, there are almost 15,000 in the world today.

但是现在世界上仍然有 将近一万五千枚核弹头。

15,000.

一万五千枚。

The United States and Russia have over 90 percent of these nuclear weapons.

美国和俄罗斯拥有超过 90% 的核武器。

If you're wondering, these are the countries that have the rest.

如果你想知道的话， 这些国家拥有剩下的核武器。

But they have far fewer,

但是他们拥有的数量少太多了，

ranging in the sort of 300-ish range and below.

在大约 300 多的范围内或者更少。

Adding to this situation is the fact that we have new technologies

更加雪上加霜的是， 我们拥有的最新科技

that potentially bring us new challenges.

可能会给我们带来全新的挑战。

Could you imagine, one day, countries like ours and others

你可以想象吗？ 某一天类似我们的和他们的国家

potentially ceding decisions about a nuclear strike to a robot,

有可能把执行核打击的决策大权

交给一个基于计算机算法的 机器人来决定。

based on algorithms?

And what data do they use to inform those algorithms?

那么他们要用什么数据 来支持这些算法呢？

This is pretty terrifying.

这太可怕了。

So adding to this are terrorism potential,

除此之外还有潜在的恐怖主义、

cyberattacks, miscalculation, misunderstanding.

网络攻击、计算差错和各国间的误会。

The list of nuclear nightmares tends to grow longer by the day.

核武器带来的噩梦 只会一天比一天多。

And there are a number of former officials,

并且有不少前任政府官员

as well as experts,

和专家们

who worry that right now, we're in greater danger

担心我们现在正处于

than we were in various points in the Cold War.

比冷战的各个时刻更大的危险之中。

So this is scary.

这是很恐怖。

What can we do?

那我们能做些什么？

Well, thankfully,

谢天谢地的是，

["Duck and Cover"]

【“卧倒并掩护”】

we don't have to rely on the advice from the 1950s.

我们不需要依靠 50 年代的建议。

(Laughter)

（笑声）

We can take some control,

我们可以对此有所控制，

and the way we do that

而为了实现这个，

is by starting to ask some fundamental questions

我们要对于现状问几个基本的问题，

about the status quo

and whether we are happy with the way it is.

以及我们是否觉得现状可以接受。

We need to begin asking questions of ourselves

我们要向我们自己提问，

and of our elected officials,

向政府官员们提问，

and I'd like to share three with you today.

而今天我很乐意和你们分享三个问题。

The first one is,

第一个是，

"How much nuclear risk are you willing to take or tolerate?"

“你愿意承担多大的核风险？”

Right now, nuclear policy depends on deterrence theory.

现在，核武器政策取决于威慑理论。

Developed in the 1950s,

这套理论在 50 年代提出，

the idea is that one country's nuclear weapons

意思是一个国家拥有核武器

prevents another country from using theirs.

会防止其他国家用他们的核武器。

So you nuke me, I nuke you,

你核爆我，我就核爆你，

and we both lose.

我们都是输家。

So in a way, there's a stalemate.

所以某种程度上说， 双方陷入僵局。

No one uses their weapons, and we're all safe.

没人用他们的武器， 我们就都安全了。

But this theory has real questions.

但这个理论有些实际的问题。

There are experts who challenge this theory

一些挑战这个理论的专家提出：

and wonder: Does it really work this way in practice?

现实中真的会这样吗？

It certainly doesn't allow for mistakes or miscalculations.

这套理论不能容忍 一点失误和计算错误。

Now, I don't know about you,

我不知道你们怎么想，

but I feel pretty uncomfortable gambling my future survival,

不过这让我非常不安，

要把你我的 下一代的存亡作为赌注，

yours, and our future generations',

on a theory that is questionable

全押在一个存在争议

and doesn't allow any room for a mistake.

并且毫无容错率的理论上。

It makes me even more uncomfortable

让我更加不安的是，

to be threatening the evaporation

要去威胁用核武器

of millions of people on the other side of the Earth.

让地球另一边 数以百万计的人全部蒸发。

Surely we can do better for ourselves,

我们当然自己可以做得更好，

drawing on our ingenuity to solve complex problems,

运用我们的创造力去解决复杂的问题，

as we have in the past.

就像我们过去一样。

After all, this is a man-made,

终究，这都是人造的。

human-made --

人类制造的——

I shouldn't say "man," because women were involved --

我不该说人（man）， 因为女人也参与其中——

a human-made problem.

一个人类制造的问题。

We have human solutions that should be possible.

我们有应该可行的、 更有人性的解决方案。

So, next question: "Who do you think should make nuclear decisions?"

所以下一个问题： “你认为谁应该决定使用核武器？”

Right now, in this democracy, in the United States,

现在在我们这个民主政体，在美国，

one person

有一个人

gets to decide whether or not to launch a nuclear strike.

可以决定是否发动核打击。

They don't have to consult anybody.

这个人不需要咨询任何人。

So that's the president.

这就是我们的总统。

He or she can decide --

他或她可以

within a very limited amount of time,

在非常有限的时间内，

under great pressure, potentially, depending on the scenario,

根据不同情况， 也许在巨大的压力之下，

maybe based on a miscalculation or a misunderstanding --

也许基于错误的计算或误解的基础上，

they can decide the fate of millions of lives:

他们可以决定数以百万计的人的命运：

yours, mine, our community's.

你的、我的以及整个社会的。

And they can do this and launch a nuclear strike,

总统可以这样做， 发动一次核打击，

potentially setting in motion the annihilation of the human race.

很可能推动毁灭全人类的进程。

Wow.

哇哦。

This doesn't have to be our reality, though, and in fact,

不过我们并不用接受这样的现实，

in a number of other countries that have nuclear weapons, it's not,

实际上很多别的， 拥有核武器的国家并不是这样的，

including countries that are not democracies.

包括不是民主政体的国家。

We created this system. We can change it.

我们创造这套体制， 我们也可以改变它，

And there's actually a movement underway to do so.

而且有正在进行的运动在为此努力。

So this leads me to my third question:

那这就引出我的第三个问题：

"What do your elected officials know about nuclear weapons,

“你们的政府官员对核武器有多少了解，

and what types of decisions are they likely to take on your behalf?"

并且他们会代表你做出什么样的决定？“

Well, Congress has a very important role to play

确实国会在其中扮演非常重要的角色，

in oversight of and interrogating US nuclear weapons policy.

去监督和讯问美国的核武政策。

They can decide what to fund, what not to fund,

他们可以决定给什么拨款，不给什么拨款，

and they represent you.

而且他们代表你们。

Now unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War,

现在很不幸的是，自冷战结束以来，

we've seen a real decline in the level of understanding,

我们看到的是华盛顿在这些问题上

on Capitol Hill, about these issues.

理解的程度有真真切切的下降。

While we are starting to see some terrific new champions emerge,

在我们开始见证新的 优秀的政治家崭露头角的同时，

the reality is that the general lack of awareness

现实却是这种普遍缺乏的意识，

is highly concerning,

让人非常担忧，

given that these people need to make critically important decisions.

尤其是这些人要负责做出极其重要的决定。

To make matters worse,

更糟糕的是，

the political partisanship that currently grips Washington

在政府内根深蒂固的党派偏见与纷争

also affects this issue.

也同样对此有影响。

This wasn't always the case, though.

不过这并不是总是这样的。

At the end of the Cold War, members from both sides of the aisle

在冷战结束时，对抗的双方都具有

had a really good understanding about the nuclear challenges we were facing

对于我们所面对的核问题的深刻理解，

and worked together on cooperative programs.

并且共同进行合作项目。

They recognized that nuclear risk reduction

他们认识到核武器的削减实在太重要了，

was far too important to allow it to succumb to political partisanship.

以至于政治斗争都要为它让路。

They created programs

他们开启了一些项目，

such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,

比如《纳恩-卢格减少威胁合作计划》，

which sought to lock down and eliminate

该计划旨在控制与销毁

vulnerable nuclear material in the former Soviet Union.

前苏联不稳定的核原料。

So we need to return to this era of bipartisanship,

所以我们需要回到那个 当年双边合作的年代，

mutual problem-solving

根据对于我们面对的挑战

that's based on understanding and awareness about the challenges we face

和实际核危机的意识和理解，

and the real nuclear dangers.

以此来相互解决问题。

And that's where you come in.

而这就是你出场的时候。

Public pressure is important.

公众的压力很关键。

Leaders need a constituent base to act.

领导人需要一群忠实的选民 才会行动起来。

So create that constituent base,

那么为了创造这群忠实的选民，

by asking them some simple questions.

问他们一些简单的问题。

Ask them, "What do you know about nuclear weapons?"

问他们，“你对核武器了解多少？”

"Do you have a nuclear expert on your staff?

“你的麾下是否有核专家？

Or, if not, do you know somebody you could refer to

或者如果没有，你知道有谁 在你要做出重大决定的时候，

if you need to make an important decision?"

可以向其咨询和请教的？”

Start to find out what they believe

开始了解他们的想法，

and whether it aligns with your own views and values.

看看是否和你自己的看法和价值观所吻合。

Ask them, "How would you choose to spend US national treasure?

问他们，“你会怎么去用美国的国家财富？

On a new nuclear arms race

是用在新的核武军备竞赛上，

or another national security priority,

或是别的国家安全优先事项，

such as cybersecurity or climate change?"

比如网络安全或者气候变化？”

Ask them, "Are you willing to put aside partisanship

问他们，“你是否愿意先将党派争斗放在一边，

to address this existential threat that affects my survival

好好着手解决现存的、

影响我和你忠实选民生命的威胁？”

and your constituents' survival?"

Now, people will tell you nuclear policy is far too difficult to understand

然后人们会告你，核武器政策太难理解了，

and complexed and nuanced for the general public to understand,

对于普通大众来讲， 实在太复杂有太多细节了，

let alone debate.

更不要说讨论了。

After all, this is "national security."

毕竟，这是“国家安全”。

There needs to be secrets.

有些事必须得是机密。

Don't let that put you off.

但不要被这套说辞迷惑了。

We debate all sorts of issues

我们讨论各种各样

that are critically important to our lives --

对于我们生活至关重要的事情，

why should nuclear weapons be any different?

为什么核武器就是特例？

We debate health care, education, the environment.

我们讨论医保、教育和环境。

Surely congressional oversight,

当然作为美国民主标志的

civic participation that are such hallmarks of US democracy,

国会监督和公民参与，

surely they apply here.

这些自然都在此适用。

After all, these are cases of life and death that we're talking about.

毕竟我们谈论的事关乎生死。

And we won't all agree,

我们虽不会全都同意彼此，

but whether or not you believe nuclear weapons keep us safe

但无论你觉得核武器确保我们的安全，

or that nuclear weapons are a liability,

或者核武器只是个累赘，

I urge you to put aside partisan, ideological issues

我想在此劝大家放下党派偏见与意识形态，

and listen to each other.

好好聆听他人。

So I'll tell you now what I didn't have the guts to tell my friends at the time.

那么我现在可以告诉你们， 当初我没有胆量告诉我朋友的话。

No, you're not safe --

不，你并不安全——

not just because of North Korea.

不仅仅是因为朝鲜。

But there is something you can do about it.

不过你可以尽自己的一份力，

Demand that your elected representatives

要求你们选出的议员，

can give you answers to your questions,

给出你们问题的答案，

and answers that you can live with

你们可以接受的

and that billions of others can live with too.

以及千千万万民众们可以接受的答案。

And if they can't,

如果他们做不到，

stay on them until they can.

反复跟提这事直到他们做到为止。

And if that doesn't work,

如果还是没用，

find others, who are able to represent your views.

找其他可以代表你们观点的人。

Because by doing so, we can begin to change the answer to the question

因为只有这样做， 我们才能改变这个问题的答案。

"Am I safe?"

“我安全吗？”

(Applause)

（掌声）