How to Fix Broken Supply Chains | Dustin Burke | TED

Transcriber:

譯者: Lilian Chiu 審譯者: Helen Chang

It was a strange feeling, walking into the local supermarket,

這是種很奇怪的感覺， 走進當地的超級市場，

only to find empty shelves,

卻只看到空架子，

and, most notably, no toilet paper.

特別明顯的是，沒有捲筒衛生紙。

We didn't have raw-material shortages or manufacturing defects,

並沒有發生原料短缺或製造瑕疵，

and we didn't discover new uses for toilet paper.

也沒有發現捲筒衛生紙的新用途。

It was panic buying by everyday people.

只是一般人的恐慌搶購。

Supply chains just couldn't keep up.

供應鏈的速度就是跟不上。

And before we knew it, the rumored shortage became a real one.

轉眼間，本來只是 謠言的短缺馬上就成真了。

You remember that, don't you?

各位還記得這件事吧？

Well, maybe not, because I'm not talking about COVID-19.

也許不記得，因為 我說的不是新冠肺炎。

I'm talking about the great toilet paper shortage of 1973.

我說的是 1973 年的 捲筒衛生紙大短缺。

And it wasn't caused by a pandemic,

它的成因並不是疫情爆發，

but by a joke told by Johnny Carson.

而是強尼‧卡森說的一個笑話。

But today's supply-chain challenges are no joke.

但現今供應鏈所遇到的 難題可不是笑話。

Those problems are real,

那些問題是真的，

but they're problems that we've faced, and even solved, in the past.

但我們在過去曾經面對過， 甚至解決過那些問題。

A supply chain is the long and often complicated journey

供應鏈是一段很漫長 且通常很複雜的旅程，

that any item takes before it winds up in your home.

任何物品要到你家之前 都得走過這段旅程。

Raw materials are mined or grown

原料被開採出來或種植出來，

and sold to various suppliers.

接著銷售給各供應商。

Those suppliers sell them to manufacturers,

那些供應商再將原料銷售給製造商，

who transform those raw materials into finished goods.

製造商將原料轉變成成品。

And those finished goods are moved around the world

那些成品

被批發商和貨運商運送到世界各地，

by distributors and carriers,

who, in turn, sell them to retailers,

再銷售給零售商，

who sell those to consumers as a final step.

最後一步是銷售給消費者。

Many supply chains are simple,

許多供應鏈很簡單，

like when you buy strawberries at a local farmers market.

比如你去當地的農民市集買草莓。

But some are almost infinitely complex.

但有些供應鏈卻複雜至極。

In my 14 years working with companies on improving their supply chains,

在我協助企業

改善供應鏈的這十四年間，

I've seen many disruptions, from natural disasters to pandemics

我見過許多次供應中斷，

從天然災害到疫情爆發，

and geopolitical instability.

以及地緣政治的不穩定性。

And every time, the media talks about how, from this point,

每一次，

媒體都會談到從這次之後，

companies can and will make their supply chains more resilient,

企業就能／就會

讓它們的供應鏈變得更有恢復力，

and the common prescriptions include diversifying risk,

而常見的做法包括

分散風險、對未來做更好的預測，

better forecasting the future

and building buffers, like stockpiles of inventory

以及建立緩衝，比如儲備庫存

or more manufacturing equipment.

或更多製造設備。

And this is good advice.

這是很好的建議。

But the question I keep asking myself is:

但我不斷問自己的問題是：

“Why haven’t more companies taken this advice?”

「為什麼沒有更多企業 採用這建議？」

The reason is that it doesn't stand up against competing priorities

原因是，它打不過 為了競爭要優先做的事項，

and steep competition that occurs between the crises and shocks.

以及在危機和衝擊之間 發生的劇烈競爭。

So if we want to build more resilient supply chains

所以，如果我們想要建立 更有恢復力的供應鏈，

that can withstand the next great crisis,

要能承受得住下一個重大危機，

then we need to bring new ideas that can withstand competitive pressures.

那麼我們就得想出能夠 承受競爭壓力的新點子。

Let's talk about sharing risk,

咱們來談談分攤風險、

radical transparency and automated recommendations.

完全透明，

以及自動化推薦。

These three ideas, if we take them together,

如果我們把這三個點子結合起來，

have the potential to help break the trade-off

就有可能協助打破

恢復力和效率之間的權衡。

between resilience and efficiency.

An obvious solution to supply shortages is to build more buffers,

要解決供應短缺， 很明顯的解決方案之一

就是建立更多緩衝，

so that if anything happens along the supply chain,

所以如果供應鏈的任何一處出狀況，

the next recipient isn't waiting empty-handed.

下一個接收者就不用空手等待。

Retail stores can never perfectly predict what we'll buy,

零售店永遠無法完美預測

我們會買什麼， 所以都會有額外庫存。

so they carry extra inventory.

They might run out of a particular size or particular color,

可能某個尺碼或顏色會賣完，

but it’s unlikely that they’ll run out of an entire category, like jeans.

但不太可能會整類都賣完， 比如牛仔褲全數售光。

But we know, across industries,

但我們知道，在各產業，

companies carry less of that backup inventory than they used to.

企業不再像以往會保留 那麼多備用庫存。

And we have immense product variety.

且產品的花樣太多了。

But much of what we buy

但我們買的東西大部分

is made in highly specialized or automated factories,

都是在高度專業化 或自動化的工廠中製造的，

and that makes it harder to repurpose that capacity when demand changes.

因此，當需求改變時， 要改變產能用途會更困難。

That's why during COVID-19,

所以，在新冠肺炎期間，

those toilet-paper manufacturers had enough capacity,

那些捲筒衛生紙製造商 有足夠的產能，

but they didn't have the right kind of capacity.

但這些產能不是它們需要的那一種。

Commercial toilet paper is very different from what we consumers use at home.

商用的捲筒衛生紙和我們 消費者家用的差很多。

They could have met demand,

它們可以滿足需求，

but it would have meant shoppers lugging home rolls that are nine inches wide,

但那就意味著顧客要吃力地 把九英吋寬的捲筒帶回家，

and clearly designed for cost, not for comfort.

且很明顯設計考量是成本 為主，而非舒適。（笑聲）

(Laughter)

Streamlining supply chains

供應鏈瘦身

is a big reason why we consumers have incredible choices at low prices.

是我們消費者能有很棒的選擇

且價格還很低的主要理由之一。

And for many companies,

對很多企業來說，

warehousing extra raw materials

儲存額外的原料

or keeping idle equipment on the factory floor

或者在工廠內擺放閒置的設備，

is simply too expensive.

就真的太昂貴了。

Competition is steep as it is.

競爭非常激烈。

But buffers matter in a crisis.

但在危機中，緩衝很重要。

So how do we get similar benefits, but in a different way?

所以，我們要如何用不同的 方式得到類似的益處？

We can share or pool risk.

我們可以分攤或集合風險。

It's much like a well-established industry that we all know well --

這就很像一個根深蒂固 且我們都很熟知的產業——

insurance.

保險業。

It's unlikely that you'll ever get into a major car accident,

你不太可能會遇到重大的車禍，

but if you do, it will be horribly expensive.

但若遇到了，會非常昂貴。

That's why, for low-probability, high-impact events,

那就是為什麼，針對不太可能 發生卻很有衝擊性的事件，

we share risk,

我們會分攤風險，

and in some instances, like car insurance,

在某些狀況，比如汽車保險，

we even require it.

甚至是規定要買的。

We could do the same thing in supply chains.

在供應鏈也可以用同樣的方式。

Industry players could team up to share the cost of keeping extra raw materials,

業者可以合作，

分攤成本來儲存額外的原料、

key components or even machinery,

重要的元件，或甚至機械，

in exchange for an ongoing shared fee,

交換條件就是持續支付分攤費，

and only to be used in times of a crisis.

這些錢只有在危機發生時才會挪用。

For example,

舉例來說，

many countries stockpile important medicines,

很多國家會儲備重要的藥品，

but relatively few keep their active ingredients, or "APIs."

但相對很少有國家會保存 它們的活性成分（API）。

Pharmaceutical companies could share the cost of storing extra APIs

藥廠

可以分攤平時儲存 額外 API 的成本。

during normal times.

Then, in a crisis,

發生危機時，

drug manufacturers could dip into that supply

製藥商就可以取用那些供給，

to avoid running out of these important medicines.

避免這些重要的藥品缺貨。

Again, it's just like insurance,

這就像是保險，

except instead of pooling money, we're pooling a physical resource.

差別只是我們不是集合金錢， 而是集合實體資源。

And importantly, it would be paid for, and so not seen as pure waste.

重要的是，

會有人買單，

所以不會被視為是純粹的浪費。

But in order to do this, we need to know who shares the same risks.

但若要這麼做，我們就需要 知道誰也要承受同樣的風險。

And in order to know that,

但若要知道這些資訊，

we need a radical improvement in supply-chain transparency.

就需要大大地改善供應鏈的透明度。

Right now, seemingly everything we want to buy is delayed

現在，似乎我們想要買的 每樣東西都被延誤了，

because of a lack of microprocessors,

因為缺乏微處理器，連汽車也一樣。

even cars.

But how could the auto industry --

但汽車業怎麼會——

arguably the industry that invented supplier collaboration

這個產業可說是發明了

供應商合作以及供應鏈 能見度的產業——

and supply-chain visibility --

be caught by surprise?

怎會措手不及？

Microprocessors power the computers

電腦要靠微處理器，

that, increasingly, make our cars work the way they're supposed to.

而我們的汽車 也越來越仰賴微處理器。

And early in the COVID-19 pandemic,

在新冠肺炎疫情爆發初期，

auto manufacturers canceled orders for microprocessors

汽車製造商取消了微處理器的訂單，

out of fear that car sales would plummet.

因為擔心汽車銷售量會爆跌。

And around the same time,

大約同時，

demand for those microprocessors in consumer electronics went way up.

消費者電子產品對於 微處理器需求大增。

Parents bought tablets so their kids could learn from home,

父母要買平板電腦， 讓孩子可以在家學習，

newly remote workers bought laptops.

新加入遠距工作的人要買筆電。

Then, a fire at a chip plant

接著，一座晶片廠失火，

meant fewer of these microprocessors were even being made.

意味著這類微處理器的 產量又更少了。

And by the time car sales began to recover,

等到汽車銷售量開始恢復時，

microprocessors were on back order.

微處理器都缺貨只能預訂。

In other words,

換言之，汽車公司之所以

the reason why automotive companies can't get the microprocessors they need

無法取得它們需要的微處理器，

has little, if anything, to do with the automotive industry.

和汽車業沒什麼關係， 甚至根本沒關係。

And this is a good example of a broader problem.

這是個很好的例子， 說明了一個更廣的問題。

In supply chain,

在供應鏈中，

your risks are not tied only to your customers or to your competitors,

你的風險不僅和你的客戶 或你的競爭對手息息相關，

but also to those companies who are using the same inputs.

還和使用同樣用品的那些公司相關。

I doubt Ford considers the PlayStation 5 to be a competitor to the F-150,

我不覺得福特汽車 會認為 PS5 遊戲主機

是 F-150 車款的競爭對手，

but in this case, they could have been competing for the same, scarce resource.

但在這個例子中，它們可能 得競爭相同且稀少的資源。

那就是為什麼供應鏈的 透明度需要大大的改善。

And that's why we need a radical improvement in supply-chain transparency.

It's not enough to know who your suppliers are.

單單知道你的供應商是誰還不夠。

You have to know who your supplier's suppliers are,

你還得知道你的 供應商的供應商是誰、

where those supplier’s suppliers get their raw materials,

那些供應商的供應商 從哪裡取得原料，

who else is buying from those suppliers,

還有誰向那些供應商購買，

and who else is competing for those raw materials.

以及還有誰在搶那些原料。

Often what looks like several unrelated product lines

通常，看似無關的數條產品線

can be traced back to a single source.

都可以追溯到單一個源頭。

We think we have diversified supply chains, but we don't.

我們以為我們有多樣化的供應鏈，

其實不然。

We have a supply web.

我們有張供應網。

And if key players in that web fail,

如果那張網中的關鍵業者出狀況，

then many supply chains are in big trouble.

許多供應鏈都會有大麻煩了。

If we want more resilient supply chains,

如果我們希望供應鏈能更有恢復力，

then we need accurate, up-to-date maps of key inputs

那麼任一產業都需要有 正確且最新的地圖，

and where they come from,

呈現關鍵用品來自何處的地圖。

in any given industry.

Supply-chain managers are, fundamentally, planners.

基本上，供應鏈管理者就是規劃者。

They analyze and interpret information,

他們要分析和詮釋資訊，

and they revise their plans to efficiently meet expected demand

他們要修改計畫，

以求用穩定的持續供應來

with a steady stream of supply.

有效滿足預期的需求。

Supply-chain control towers bring all of that information into one place,

供應鏈控制塔把所有 那些資訊整合在一起，

and better data should help better decision-making.

有更好的資料，應該能 協助做出更好的決策。

But too much data can simply be overwhelming,

但資料太多可能會讓人無法招架，

and that's why we need technology to help us.

那就是為什麼我們需要科技的協助。

The good news is that advances in data mining,

好消息是，

資料採礦、人工智慧， 以及機器學習的進步，

artificial intelligence and machine learning

increasingly mean that computers can help us

越來越意味著，電腦能協助我們

analyze thousands or millions of points of data,

分析成千上萬或甚至 數百萬個資料點，

predict problems before they arise, notify managers

在問題發生之前就先預測到，

通知管理者，

and even recommend actions to take.

甚至建議該採取什麼行動。

Right now, some types of plastics are in short supply.

現在有幾種塑膠正在短缺。

Plastic resin manufacturers decreased production,

塑性樹脂製造商減少了生產，

dealing with COVID-19 outbreaks.

以因應新冠肺炎疫情的爆發。

But by the time they began to recover,

但到了它們要恢復的時候， 卻又遇到了一連串天然災害，

they were hit with a string of natural disasters,

from Hurricane Laura on the Gulf Coast in 2020

從 2020 年颶風蘿拉襲擊墨西哥灣，

to a brutal winter storm in the South in 2021.

到 2021 年南方出現 嚴酷的冬季風暴。

No amount of data-sharing could have told us

不論分享多少資料都無法 告訴我們哪些公司會被影響、

what companies would be affected,

哪些公司不用塑膠。

what companies don't use plastics.

But a computer could have helped spot the problem among the data points.

但電腦可以協助 在資料點當中發現問題。

Decreased production and COVID-19 lockdowns,

生產減少以及新冠肺炎封城，

combined with severe weather,

再加上劇烈天氣，

a surge in demand for plastic packaging as grocery sales grew,

當雜貨銷售增加時， 塑膠包裝的需求大增，

and a spike in trucking rates

以及貨車運費高漲，

would have been enough to trigger some warnings in specific areas,

就足以觸發在某些領域的警報，

and then notify managers and recommend what they might do about it.

並通知管理人， 建議他們該如何因應。

"Hey, this supplier is looking risky.

「嘿，這供應商看來有風險， 你能否向其他廠商下單？

Do you have a chance to order from somebody else?

Maybe start calling other trucking companies

也許該開始打給其他貨運公司， 確保能準時收到供應品，

to make sure you get your supplies on time,

and we should notify these customers that their orders might be delayed."

我們也應該通知這些客戶， 他們的訂單可能會延誤。」

This is similar to how the airline industry

這就很類似航空業

manages passenger delays and missed connections.

處理乘客延誤以及錯過轉機的方式。

Computers analyze data on available flights, weather conditions,

電腦會分析資料，包括

可用的航班、天氣狀況、乘客所在，

passenger locations and passenger destinations,

以及乘客目的地，

to reroute hundreds or even thousands of people in a day.

在一天中就能為數百甚至 數千名乘客重新安排路線。

And we could do the same thing in a supply chain.

我們也可以在供應鏈中這麼做。

I don’t want to sound

我的意思並不是供應鏈 管理者所做的事情

like the things supply chain managers have done haven’t helped,

沒有幫助，

but we can do better.

但我們能做得更好。

When the virus struck,

病毒來襲時，

we faced a dire need for N95 respirators and personal protective equipment.

我們突然急需大量

N95 口罩及個人保護裝備。

Government stockpiles of N95s were depleted,

政府庫存的 N95 口罩被用盡，

hospital orders were backlogged two to three years,

醫院的訂單已經積到兩、三年，

and health-care workers reused single-use protective equipment.

健康照護從業人員得要 重覆使用一次性的保護裝備。

But again, I'm not talking about COVID-19.

但，我同樣也不是 在說新冠肺炎疫情。

I'm talking about the 2009 outbreak of the H1N1 flu.

我說的是 2009 年 H1N1 流感大爆發。

And we have to stop repeating the same mistakes.

我們得停止重蹈覆轍。

So let's be imaginative

咱們要發揮想像力，

about how we challenge businesses and government

想辦法挑戰企業和政府

to use shared risk,

去做到分攤風險、

supply-chain transparency and automated recommendations

供應鏈透明度，

以及自動化建議，

to make our supply chains more resilient.

讓我們的供應鏈更有恢復力。

Because if they do,

因為，如果做到了，

we can be more resilient too.

我們也會更有恢復力。

Thank you.

謝謝。

（歡呼及掌聲）

(Cheers and applause)