When Biden Met Xi (and What's Going On with the US and China) | Ian Bremmer | TED

翻译人员: Evelyn LIAO 校对人员: suya f.

Helen Walters: Last week, US President Biden

海伦·沃尔特斯（Helen Walters）： 上周，美国总统拜登

and Xi Jinping, the president of the People's Republic of China,

和中华人民共和国主席习近平

met at the APEC Summit in San Francisco.

在旧金山的亚太经合组织峰会上会面。

The meeting was notable for being the first time

值得注意的是，这次会议

that Xi had visited the US in six years

是习近平六年来首次访问美国，

and the first time the two leaders have met in person in a year.

也是两位领导人一年 来首次面对面会晤。

Now, obviously, what goes on between these two nations

现在，很明显， 这两个国家之间发生的事情

matters to everyone.

对每个人都很重要。

So we found ourselves post-summit with a bunch of follow-up questions,

我们在峰会后 发现还有很多后续问题，

and we've turned to our resident geopolitical expert, Ian Bremmer,

因此我们求助于常驻地 缘政治专家伊恩·布雷默，

to help us understand what to pay attention to and why.

以帮助我们了解需要注意 的事项和原因。

Ian, hi.

伊恩，你好。

Ian Bremmer: Helen, good to be back with you.

伊恩·布雷默（Ian Bremmer）： 海伦，很高兴能回到你身边。

HW: OK, so let's get right to it.

海伦（HW）： 好的，让我们开始吧。

These are, alas, not peaceful times.

唉，现在不是和平时期。

And I think it's safe to say that the meeting between these two leaders

而且我认为可以肯定地说， 这两位领导人之间的会晤，

felt perhaps even more momentous than it might have done

可能比从中东到乌克兰的战争没有肆虐时

were war not raging everywhere, from the Middle East to Ukraine.

还要重要。

So tell us,

那么，请告诉我们，

what happened in San Francisco, and what stood out most to you?

旧金山（的会议）发生了什么， 对你来说最突出的是什么？

IB: Well, look, that is the backdrop.

伊恩·布雷默（IB）： 嗯，你看，这就是背景。

That this is a world of unprecedented geopolitical danger and risk.

这是一个前所未有的 地缘政治危险和风险的世界。

And the efforts are not in trying to make everything better.

而且，努力并不是 为了让一切变得更好。

It's rather to try to stop the existing conflicts from getting much worse.

更确切地说，是努力阻止 现有冲突变得更糟。

And that is absolutely the macro focus

这绝对是一个

that both President Biden and President Xi bring to the meeting.

拜登总统和习近平总书记 在会议上都提到过的宏观焦点。

I mean, there's a lot to discuss around the issues around US-China relations.

我的意思是，围绕中美关系的问题， 有很多话要讨论。

I'm sure we'll get to that.

我敢肯定我们会明白的。

But, you know, it's interesting

但是，你知道，有趣的是，

that insofar as the Americans and Chinese are actually on opposite sides

美国人和中国人实际上处于对立面

of the two major global conflicts in the world right now.

就目前世界上两大全球冲突而言。

On Russia-Ukraine,

在俄罗斯-乌克兰问题上，

the Chinese are the close friends, without limits, to Vladimir Putin,

中国人无限制地是 弗拉基米尔·普京的亲密朋友，

while the Americans are providing more support

而美国人向乌克兰提供的军事支持

than any other country in the world, militarily, to Ukraine.

比世界上任何其他国家都多。

The Chinese have not condemned Hamas for their terrorist attacks.

中国人没有谴责哈马斯的恐怖袭击。

The United States finds Israel its most important and enduring ally

美国认为以色列是其在中东

in the Middle East.

最重要、最持久的盟友。

So you would think, Helen,

因此，海伦，你会认为

that this would be an area of contention between the United States and China.

这将是中美 之间争论的领域。

It's not.

不是。

Both the Americans and Chinese are deeply concerned

美国人和中国人都对冲突的恶化

that these conflicts are going to get worse.

深感担忧。

And they don't want that.

而且他们不想要那样。

They want to find ways to contain these conflicts.

他们想找到 遏制这些冲突的方法。

And I think it's a very important point,

我认为这是非常重要的一点，

because we hear a lot about, you know,

因为我们听到很多关于

Americans looking for adversaries around the world

美国人在 世界各地寻找对手

and lumping in China with countries like Russia, Iran,

并将中国 与俄罗斯、伊朗、

North Korea.

朝鲜等国家混为一谈的消息。

And those other countries are rogue states.

而那些其他国家 都是流氓国家。

They're pariahs.

他们是贱民。

They're countries that benefit from chaos.

它们是从混乱中获益的国家。

They want to take advantage of vacuums geopolitically.

他们想在地缘政治上的真空。

Where the Americans and Chinese actually geopolitically have a lot more in common,

实际上，美国人和中国人在 地缘政治上有更多共同点，

in addition to the fact that they have a lot of interdependence,

除了高度相互依存的事实之外，

they also both benefit from a global backdrop that is stable.

它们还受益于稳定的全球背景。

They want relatively free and open trade of goods.

他们想要相对自由 和开放的商品贸易。

They want a global economy that's working.

他们想要一个行之有效的全球经济。

They don't want political instability everywhere

他们不希望到处都是政治不稳定，

or social instability everywhere.

也不希望到处都是社会不稳定。

And so even though the United States and China

因此，尽管美国和中国

have different preferred end-states for Russia-Ukraine

对俄罗斯-乌克兰事件 和以色列-加沙事件

and for Israel-Gaza,

有不同的首选最终状态，

in the near-term,

但在短期内，

you've got two leaders that are meeting and saying,

有两位领导人 会面并说，

how do we stop this from getting worse?

我们如何阻止情况恶化？

And that ended up being a significant piece of the conversation,

这最终成为了这场 拜登总统和习近平主席之间

the four-hour, three-session conversations

长达四小时、三轮对话的

that Presidents Biden and Xi were having.

重要组成部分。

In some ways, maybe the most important takeaway

在某些方面，也许 最重要的结论

that the two most powerful countries in the world

是世界上最强大的两个国家

are not looking at the Middle East and Russia-Ukraine

在看待中东和俄罗斯-乌克兰问题时，

through a lens of cold war,

不是从冷战的角度，

but instead are looking at it through the lens of,

而是从

"Oh my God, this is really a problem.

“天啊，这确实是个问题。

And are there anything that we can do, individually or collectively

而且，我们可以 单独或集体地做些什么，

or with our friends and allies in the regions,

或者与我们在该 地区的朋友和盟友一起做什么，

that might help to stop this from getting much, much worse?"

以防止情况变得更糟？”

HW: Can you say any more about what that actually looks like?

HW：你能再说 一下那到底是什么样子吗？

What might those alignments be?

这些对齐方式可能是什么？

IB: Well, in the case of the Middle East,

IB：嗯，就中东而言，

China has a relationship with Iran that the United States does not have.

中国与伊朗的关系 是美国所没有的。

And both the American cabinet as well as Biden directly

而且，美国内阁 和拜登都直接

have been talking to the Chinese

与中国人说过

about getting messages to the Iranians

向伊朗人传递信息，

to help ensure that they don’t get directly involved in the war

以帮助确保他们不会 直接卷入战争，

and that they limit the support that they have given

以及限制他们

to proxies in the region

对该地区代理人的支持，

that could, for example, not only expand the war,

例如，该地区不止可能扩大战争，

but also lead to challenges in global energy supply.

还可能为全球能源供应带来挑战。

You know, the Americans sent two carrier strike groups

你知道，10 月 7 日 的恐怖袭击之后，

to the Eastern Med and the Persian Gulf

美国立刻向地中海东部和波斯湾

almost immediately after the October 7 terrorist attacks.

派出了两支航母打击小组。

China has destroyers in the region,

中国在该地区有驱逐舰，

and they were there for military exercises.

他们曾在那里 进行军事演习。

They’ve kept them there, and they’ve expanded the military presence.

他们一直把驱逐舰留在那里， 并扩大了军事存在。

Not to fight the Americans

这样做不是为了与美国人作战，

but rather to show that the Chinese want to ensure

而是为了表明 中国想要确保

that there is not a fight in the region

该地区不会因为发生战争

that would suddenly prevent energy

而使得能源突然被妨碍

from getting through the Straits of Hormuz,

经过霍尔木兹海峡（运输），

a critical choke point.

霍尔木兹海峡是一个关键的阻塞点。

So, you know, frankly, there's more alignment on this issue.

因此，坦率地说，你知道， 在这个问题上有更多的一致性。

The Chinese also, just earlier today, as you and I are talking,

就在今天早些时候， 正如你我所说的那样，

hosting a group of foreign ministers from the Muslim world,

中国人还接待了一群 来自穆斯林世界的外交部长

including the Palestinian Authority,

包括巴勒斯坦权力机构在内。

they're talking about a ceasefire and a two-state solution.

他们正在谈论停火 和两国解决方案。

Biden wants an extended humanitarian pause,

拜登希望延长 人道主义暂停期，

not a ceasefire,

不是停火，

but also a two-state solution.

而是两国解决方案。

There's been a lot of conversation

已经有很多的讨论

around trying to bring Middle Eastern countries

是关于试着让中东地区国家

to be more constructive in helping to ensure stability in this conflict.

更具建设性地帮助 确保这场冲突的稳定。

So around the Middle East,

因此，在中东，

there's been a lot, because it's more recent,

有很多，因为这是最近才发生的，

and because it’s frankly more geopolitically dangerous --

坦率地说，它在地缘 政治上更危险——

the Russia-Ukraine war has more knock-on economic implications --

俄乌战争对经济的影响更大——

but the Middle East conflict is much more geopolitically fraught

但是中东的这场冲突 从地缘政治上看更让人担忧，

in the sense that you could have a religious war from, you know,

从宗教战争的意义上讲，你知道，

Ecuador to Indonesia.

从厄瓜多尔到印度尼西亚。

Because you could have, you know,

因为你可能知道，

they could have a much greater impact on the US presidential election,

例如，它们可能会对美国总统大选

for example.

产生更大影响。

That is one that is driving a lot more direct attention

这促使中美领导人一起更加直接地

and engagement from the American and Chinese leaders together.

关注和参与。

HW: So I think it's interesting and heartening

HW：因此，我认为 既有趣又令人振奋的是

that stability might be a watchword at this moment.

稳定性可能成为此时此刻的口号。

The US and China,

美国和中国

they obviously subscribe to very different political systems.

显然奉行截然不同的政治制度。

And I think of a quote from the MIT economist Yasheng Huang,

我想到了麻省理工学院 经济学家黄亚生的一句话，

who was once quoted saying

他曾经被引述

that the two countries kind of got married without knowing one another's religions.

说，这两个国家是在 不了解对方宗教的情况下结婚的。

How much did this summit, if anything,

本次峰会为解决紧张局势的根本原因

do to address the root causes of the tension?

IB: You know, it's interesting.

IB：你知道，这很有趣。

I see the analogy of US and China getting married

我看过这个比喻， 说美国和中国在

without knowing the families

不了解家庭、宗教

or the religions or any of the other, you know,

或任何其他方面的情况下结婚，

sort of red lines that one connects with when you make that lifetime bond.

就像是人们建立终身纽带 时连接的红线。

But, you know, I've always thought of it as a couple,

但是，你知道，我一直认为， 这像是作为一对夫妻，

that the love has left the relationship,

关系中已经没有爱意，

but they have children together,

但是他们有孩子，

and they love the children very much,

他们非常爱孩子，

and they both want to make sure that the children aren't hurt.

他们都想确保孩子们不会受到伤害。

And so as a consequence, as much as we can talk about, you know,

因此，我们尽可能地谈论，

derisking as a term of art, or decoupling,

作为一个艺术术语， 去风险化 或 脱钩，

and these countries having very different political and economic systems,

这些国家有截然不同的政治和经济体系，

and they don’t particularly trust each other,

彼此之间并不特别信任，

and yet they know they need to work together.

但他们知道需要 共同努力。

So in a sense, they're adults, geopolitically.

因此，从某种意义上说， 从地缘政治上讲，他们是成年人。

I mean, when you have the US and China in a room at the highest level,

我的意思是，

当美国和中国以最高规格 在同一个房间里，

and here I'm not just talking about the presidents,

这里我说的不仅仅是最高领导人，

I'm talking about, you know, any of the cabinet meetings

我说的是，

that have happened at great level and scope

在过去几个月里的任何高层内阁会议，

over the past months after really none at all

你知道，疫情这几年里

during the couple plus years of pandemic,

实际上没有任何会议。

all of those meetings, they haven't been easy,

所有的这些会议，并不轻松，

they've frequently been tense,

它们通常是很紧张的氛围，

but they have all been handled as adults,

但它们都被当作成年人来处理，

handled as two parents

当作两个父母

that know the children need to be taken care of long-term.

知道它们的孩子需要被长期照顾一样。

And when I say the children,

当我说孩子们时，

I'm not disparaging other countries.

我并不是在贬低其他国家。

I'm really talking about the collective interest,

我说的其实是集体利益，

the knock-on interests that come from what happens

即中美关系突然陷入冷战或更糟情况

if the US-China relationship suddenly becomes one of cold war or worse,

所产生的连锁利益，

which is absolutely plausible in today's political environment.

这在当今的政治环境中是绝对合理的。

So if that's the backdrop,

因此，如果是这样的背景，

I think that Biden in particular spent an enormous amount of time

我认为拜登在过去的六个月里， 尤其花了大量时间

over the last six months in preparation for this event,

为这次活动做准备，

trying to convince the Chinese that the meeting would go well,

他试图说服中国人 相信会议会顺利进行，

that the Americans were not planning on dropping any surprises,

并且当他们的国家元首 出现在旧金山的美国领上时，

on undermining or embarrassing their head of state

美国人不会让损害两国利益 或者让国家元首感到尴尬

when he showed up on American turf in San Francisco.

的意外发生。

They were very concerned about that because there's no trust,

他们之所以对此非常担忧， 是因为缺乏信任，

and because there are plenty of issues of significant tension

也因为有许多严峻的问题

between the two countries.

存在两国之间。

And I think that they succeeded critically in that.

而且我认为他们在这方面取得了 至关重要的成功。

Again, we haven't talked yet about the specific issues,

再说一遍，我们还没有讨论具体问题，

and I know we'll get to them.

我知道我们会讨论的，

But the macro backdrop is important.

但是宏观背景很重要。

Over the last couple of months,

在过去的几个月中，

China has been on a charm offensive,

中国一直在

with the Australians,

对澳大利亚进行魅力攻势，

inviting the Australian prime minister for a state visit to China

邀请澳大利亚总理

just a few weeks ago.

在几周前对中国进行国事访问。

That went extremely well

访问非常顺利，

with expanded trade and energy agreements

达成了扩大贸易和能源的相关协议

on the back of, you know, a relationship where they weren't talking to each other,

你知道，这个的背景是两国之间不交谈，

where they were cutting off business,

切断了业务，

where they were engaging in massive tariffs and sanctions.

实行了大规模关税和制裁。

That's seen a breakthrough.

这已经取得了突破。

I've seen some of that in South Korea.

我在韩国见过一些这样的情况。

I've seen some of that with the Japanese.

我在日本见过一些这样的情况。

And over a one-hour meeting

在亚太经合组织峰会上，

between Prime Minister Kishida and Xi Jinping in person

习近平和岸田首相 进行了一个多小时的会晤，

at the APEC Summit, first time in over a year that they have met.

这是他们一年多以来的首次会晤。

I've seen that with the Europeans.

我在欧洲见过一些这样的情况。

I've also seen it with a large number of American and European CEOs

我还看到许多美国和 欧洲的首席执行官

who have reported individually

都报告了

just how much more access they've gotten,

他们在北京之行中， 获得了更多的访问权限、

welcoming they've gotten from their trips to Beijing,

更多的欢迎、

positive press coverage,

更积极的新闻报道、

movement on issues that have mattered to them,

更多重要问题上的进展，

all of which a sense that a better Biden relationship with Xi Jinping,

所有这些都让人感觉 拜登与习近平的良好关系

not a breakthrough, not an entente,

不是突破，不是协议，

but simply a commitment

而是简单地承诺

that the US wants a more stable baseline relationship

美国希望建立更稳定的基线关系

and would work towards that,

并将努力实现这一目标，

in San Francisco,

在旧金山，

that gave the Chinese leadership permission

这使中国领导人

to engage in this charm offensive with other countries

可以与其他国家和私营部门

and with the private sector.

一起参与这场魅力攻势。

And why was that so important?

那为什么这么重要？

Well, first, because it lowers the temperature of the relationship.

好吧，首先， 因为它降低了关系的温度。

It makes sudden, unsuspected crises less likely to occur,

这使得突然发生 意想不到的危机的可能性降低，

but also critically,

但也很关键地是，

because the Chinese economy is underperforming dramatically.

因为中国经济表现严重不佳。

For many reasons, maybe most structurally,

原因有很多，也许是结构性原因，

because 50 years of China acting as the world's factory,

因为中国 50 年来一直是世界工厂，

with all of this inexpensive labor, well,

工厂里都是廉价的劳动力，

you don't need all that inexpensive labor anymore.

现在不再需要所有这些廉价的劳动力了。

And by the way, that labor is not so inexpensive anymore.

顺便说一句，这种劳动力 已经不那么便宜了。

And, you know, China hasn't become an open-governance system.

而且，你知道，中国还没有 成为一个开放的治理体系。

They haven't moved towards rule of law.

他们还没有走向法治。

And the Chinese competitors are a lot stronger,

而且中国竞争对手要强得多，

and their demographics are challenging.

而且他们的人口结构也充满挑战。

And they've got lots of nonperforming debt

而且他们有大量的不良债务，

and their real estate sector's in trouble.

他们的房地产行业陷入了困境。

And zero-COVID went really badly.

而且“动态清零”进展非常糟糕。

And then they unwound it

然后他们全面放开，

but the consumers don't feel like they've got, you know,

但消费者不觉得 他们能做到（放开消费），

animal spirits driving them right now.

动物精神驱使着他们。

And I can keep going.

我还能讲更多。

But the point is that China is severely underperforming

但关键是，坦率地说，

in a way that, frankly, we haven't seen structurally

这是自从全球化在 70 年代和 80 年代真正推动中国人进入以来，

since globalization bringing the Chinese in,

在结构上没有见过的

you know, really got moving in the '70s and '80s.

表现不佳。

So in other words, Helen,

换句话说，海伦，

you and I have never seen this structural economic headwinds

你我从未在中国这么多方面

on so many fronts in China.

见过这种结构性经济阻力。

And the Chinese are much more aware of that than you and I are.

而中国人比你我更 了解这一点。

So they're very strongly incented,

因此他们被非常强烈地激励着，

even if they fully intend to take Taiwan over the long-term

尽管他们完全打算长期占领台湾，

and they want to be the leading economy in the world

他们想成为世界领先的经济体，

and they want to dominate artificial intelligence

他们想主导人工智能领域，

and all of these things that Americans and others worry about.

以及美国人和其他人担心的所有事情。

For the near and foreseeable, medium-term future,

在短期和可预见的中期将来，

they’ve got to just right the boat.

他们必须调整局面。

They've got to get things stable.

他们必须让情况保持稳定。

They don't want a big fight right now.

他们现在不想打一场激烈的战斗。

And so I think that the Americans, being a little more confident,

因此，我认为， 美国人稍微自信一些，

a little less concerned about, you know,

美国人的担忧更少点，你知道，

sort of, China taking over everything in the near-term

就是中国在近期内接管一切

and wanting to stabilize things,

并想要稳定局势，

really got you a lot more

实际上会比过去几天的峰会上

than you would have otherwise expected from this summit meeting

你所期望带来的

over the last several days.

更多。

HW: So it’s interesting to hear you talk about the economic dysfunction in China.

HW：因此，听到你 谈论中国的经济失调很有趣。

And of course, I think it’s safe to say

当然，我认为可以肯定地说，

that America is experiencing pretty significant political dysfunction

美国目前正在经历

at the moment.

相当严重的政治功能失调。

But what often goes unremarked is the fact

但是，经常被忽视的是，

that President Biden is actually extending,

拜登总统实际上是在延长 特朗普总统对中国的政策，

perhaps doubling down, on President Trump’spolicies when it comes to China.

也许是加倍努力。

So given that next year is an election year,

那么，鉴于明年是选举年，

what should we make of that?

我们应该如何看待呢？

And do you think that the policies will continue?

你认为（对华）政策会继续下去吗？

IB: First of all, that backdrop,

IB：首先，在这种背景下，

that right now, China's in probably the worst economic position structurally

目前中国可能处于 40、50 年来

that they've been in in 40, 50 years.

从结构上看最糟糕的经济形势中，

But their political consolidation around Xi is completely uncontested.

但他们围绕习近平的政治巩固 是完全没有争议的。

And certainly XI Jinping feels very comfortable

当然，习近平对

that he's consolidated a lot of power.

自己巩固了大量权力 感到非常自在。

The United States, exactly the opposite.

美国，恰恰相反。

The US coming out of the pandemic,

摆脱疫情的美国，

by far in the strongest economic position of any advanced industrial economy

迄今为止在所有发达工业经济体中 处于最强的经济地位，

in terms of growth, in terms of productivity,

在增长方面， 在生产力方面，

in terms of leading in technologies

在技术领先方面，

and in terms of lower inflation than its peers.

通胀也低于同行。

But the US political system is more dysfunctional,

但是，美国的政治制度 比我们一生中的任何时候都

more divided than at any point in our lifetimes.

更加失调，更加分裂。

And for now,

就目前而言，

that certainly is creating a level of risk aversion

这无疑也让美国方面 产生了一定程度

on the American side as well.

的避险情绪。

So I do think that, you know,

所以我确实这么认为，你知道，

at the same time that you hear a lot of people say,

同时你会听到很多人说：

"Oh, if things go really badly, maybe they want to lash out."

“哦，如果事情进展非常糟糕， 也许他们想猛烈抨击。”

Yeah, not for these two leaders at this point in time.

是的，但现在不适合这两位领导人。

Other leaders, different countries, different positions, maybe.

可能还有其他领导人， 不同的国家，不同的立场。

But that's not the way that this is actually playing out.

但实际情况并非如此。

Now 2024 is coming out,

现在 2024 年即将到来，

and people are certainly starting to talk a lot more about it.

人们肯定开始更多地谈论它。

It's interesting that, as you point out,

有趣的是，正如你指出的那样，

the United States on China have policies that are fairly consistent

美国对中国的政策始终如一，

across the board politically.

包括在政治上。

Which is not true for most other issues.

对于大多数其他问题而言， 情况并非如此。

If Trump became president, Ukraine policy would be very different.

如果特朗普当选总统， 乌克兰的政策将大不相同。

Iran policy would be very different.

伊朗的政策将大不相同。

Europe policy would be very different.

欧洲的政策将大不相同。

China, not so different.

中国，没什么不同。

There's a lot of consistency between Biden and Trump on China.

拜登和特朗普在 中国问题上有很多一致性。

A lot of people thought Biden was going to remove

很多人认为 拜登会取消

the Trump tariffs on the Chinese.

特朗普对中国的关税。

He did no such thing.

他没有做过这样的事情。

In fact, he largely extended some of them.

实际上，他在很大程度上 扩展了其中的一些。

Furthermore, export controls on semiconductors,

此外，在拜登的领导下， 对半导体的出口管制

pretty minimal from the Trump administration,

对半导体的出口管制在结构上有所扩大，

expanded structurally under Biden

特朗普政府的管制则很小，

to the extent that China now really feels like America wants to contain them

以至于中国现在真的觉得美国想要

in the most advanced areas of the 21-century economy.

在21世纪经济最先进的领域牵制他们。

And the US is also leaning into industrial policy,

而且，美国还倾向于 在国内或与韩国、荷兰等国家

like the CHIPS Act,

制定产业政策

domestically and with countries like South Korea and the Netherlands.

比如 CHIPS 法案。

The Chinese clearly would prefer a Trump policy on China there,

中国人显然更喜欢特朗普的对华政策，

than they do the Biden administration.

相比拜登政府而言。

And, you know, you can tell this when you talk to Chinese leaders,

而且，你知道， 当你与中国领导人交谈时，

compared to leaders of other countries around the world,

与世界其他国家的领导人相比，

most of whom have pretty strong preferences

他们中的大多数人对于

of whether Biden or Trump is president,

拜登还是特朗普是他们想要的总统

of who they want.

有着强烈的偏好。

The Chinese aren't sure.

中国人不确定。

The Chinese are thinking, well, I mean, if Trump comes in,

中国人在想，好吧， 我的意思是，如果特朗普进来，

there's greater likelihood that American allies are going to be less aligned

有很大的可能性是 美国的盟友就不那么一致，

because he'll push them transactionally on spending more money on defense

因为他会在交易中推动 他们花更多的钱在国防上，

or maybe he doesn't care about the Japanese or the South Koreans,

或者他并不在意日本人或者韩国人，

and he'll put tariffs or threaten tariffs on anybody, friends or enemies.

他会对任何人，朋友或者敌人， 征收关税或威胁要征收关税。

Biden's less likely to do that.

拜登不太可能这样做。

But Trump is also a wild card on negative tail risks

但特朗普也是一个直接和中国

directly with the Chinese.

产生负面尾部风险的未知因素。

You know, he was the guy that was willing to work with North Korea,

你知道，他是 愿意与朝鲜合作的人，

but also was prepared to hit them harder if things don't go well.

但也是准备在事情进展不顺利时对 他们进行更严厉的打击的人。

Well, how lucky did the Chinese feel?

那么，中国人觉得有多幸运？

And I think, you know, the answer you get is we really don't know.

我想，答案是我们真的不知道。

We don't know who we want there.

我们不知道我们想要谁在那里。

So there's a lot of uncertainty that the Chinese have

因此，中国人对美国政治制度的未来

about the future of the American political system.

有很多不确定性。

And there's a lot of uncertainty that the Americans have

以及美国人对中国经济体系的未来

about the future of the Chinese economic system.

有很多不确定性。

At a time when the interdependence of these two economies

目前这两个经济体的相互依存度，

and, frankly, of their diplomatic interdependence,

以及坦白地说，外交的相互依存度

is remaining quite high-level.

是相当高的。

We may not be comfortable with that reality,

我们可能对这种现实不舒服，

but that is the abiding reality

但那是一个长久不变的

that we're going to have to deal with going forward.

我们在未来将必须面对的事实。

HW: So you mentioned technology,

HW：所以你提到了技术，

and I think that we have to talk about artificial intelligence.

我认为我们必须来聊聊人工智能。

Now, one of the major breaking stories this weekend

现在，这周最震惊的新闻之一

was the management implosions and excitement over at OpenAI.

是 OpenAI 管理层内部动荡。

And I'm sure we could have a whole conversation about that.

而且我敢肯定，我们可以 就此进行一个完整的对话。

But given the implications of AI rolling out at every level of society,

但是，考虑到人工智能 席卷社会的各个方面所带来的影响，

where are the Chinese and the US governments on this?

中国和美国政府 在这个问题的立场是什么呢？

And what did they talk about in San Francisco?

他们在旧金山谈了什么？

IB: Well, in San Francisco,

IB：嗯，在旧金山，

they spoke about starting a track 1.5 working group

他们谈到

on artificial intelligence,

要成立一个人工智 能方面的 1.5 轨工作组

which means the private sector and the public sector engaging together.

这意味着私营部门 和公共部门将共同参与。

Which makes sense from the American perspective,

从美国的角度来看，这是有道理的，

because, you know, the US is a country

因为，你知道，美国是一个

that really does promote entrepreneurialism

非常促进创业

and its private sector corporations,

促进私营企业发展的国家，

so much so that a lot of people think

以至于很多人认为

the US is less democratic than it should be,

美国没有应有的民主，

because corporations, private sector,

因为企业和私营部门

capture the regulatory process through big money lobbying and the rest.

通过大笔资金游说等方式操控监管过程。

The Chinese, of course, if anything, the state captures the private sector.

当然，中国人，如果有的话， 就是国家掌控私营部门。

So the fact that they're willing to have not just government-to-government,

因此，事实上，他们 不仅愿意有政府对政府，

but government-to-government plus these big companies

还愿意有政府对政府再加上这些大公司，

that are, you know, effectively sovereign

你知道，

when we talk about the digital space,

当我们谈论数字空间时，

the platforms they have, the algorithms they drive

大公司拥有平台、驱动算法

and artificial intelligence that they are rolling out

以及快速更迭的人工智能技术，

very, very quickly.

它们实际上是有效主权方。

That's a fairly significant move.

这是一个相当重要的进展。

And it comes on the back of the Americans and Chinese

在此背景下，美国人和中国人

both sending senior officials to Bletchley Park in the UK,

都向英国的布莱奇利公园 派出高级官员 ，

agreeing to a set of principles on safety for frontier AI models,

就 未来会出现的前沿 AI 模型 安全性所制定的一系列准则

the AI models that are coming in the future.

达成了一致。

So there is a level of understanding between the US and China

因此，美国和中国之间有一定程度的共识

that they need to share information,

即他们需要共享信息，

and they need to work together

他们需要共同努力

to avoid some of the worst negative potentials

来避免一些由极具 颠覆性的人工智能所带来的

from very disruptive AI,

负面可能性。

while obviously benefiting from extraordinary, you know,

同时显然受益于卓越的、

sort of, world-changing new productivity, invention and efficiency.

改变世界的新的生产力、发明和效率。

But there's a really, really big unknown question

但是，有一个非常 非常重要的未知问题

that underpins the rolling out of AI.

是人工智能推出的基础。

Because let's think about what AI does today.

因为让我们想一想 AI 目前做了什么。

It's taking, it's these models,

正是这些模型，

these large language models,

这些大型语言模型，

that are taking the entire corpus of global data,

正在获取整个全球数据语料库，

as we have it on the internet,

正如我们在互联网

as we have it in the digital world,

和数字世界中拥有的那样，

and is making predictions,

并正在进行预测，

pattern recognition and predictions,

模式识别和预测，

on the basis of all of that information instantaneously.

基于所有即刻产生的信息。

And we've never had such powerful tools.

而且我们从未有过如此强大的工具。

Now, when you have all of that data at your fingertips,

现在，当所有这些数据触手可及，

so you can therefore assess and measure

你就可以因此实时评估和衡量的

metrics of the world in real time

世界的指标

and how human beings interact with it in real-time,

以及人类如何与之进行实时互动，

that creates really big questions

这就产生了非常重要的问题

about what political and economic models will be most functional.

即哪些政治和经济模型最实用。

So, for example, 30 years ago,

因此，举个例子，30年前，

you know, we thought, well, democracy is definitely

你知道，我们认为， 好吧，民主绝对是

the most functional model.

最实用的模式。

And the internet, as it rolls out, is making that more clear,

然后互联网推出， 它更清楚地表明了这一点，

because you've got all these people

因为所有这些人

with their access to the World Wide Web,

都可以访问万维网，

and that really undermines authoritarian countries

这确实削弱了

that want to control information and it helps democracies.

想要控制信息的专制国家， 并帮助了民主。

And that's how you got colored revolutions or the Arab Spring.

这就是“有色人种革命”或 “阿拉伯之春”发生的原因。

And then you have the data revolution, the surveillance revolution,

然后是数据革命， 监控革命，

you say, well, wait a second.

好吧，等一下。

You know, governments that have access to all that data

你知道，能够获得所有这些数据的政府

can actually create, you know, all sorts of incentives,

实际上可以创造各种激励措施，

both carrots and sticks, to motivate patriotic behavior,

包括胡萝卜和大棒， 来激励爱国行为，

where in democracies that can create a lot more polarization.

而在民主国家，这可能会造成 更多的两极分化。

So now let's take AI and look forward

因此，现在让我们以人工智能为例，展望

three, five years, when you've got large language models

三五年，那时你的智能手机上

that are tailored to your individual data corpus on your smartphone.

会有针对个人数据语料库量身定制 的大型语言模型。

So everyone has an individual AI that has all the data on you,

因此，每个人都有 一个个人的人工智能 ，

它拥有关于您的所有数据，

and collectively it has all the data on the planet real-time.

并且共同拥有地球上的所有实时数据。

In that environment,

在这种环境下，

is a planned economy less efficient or more efficient

计划经济会比

than a free-market economy

不同企业竞争的自由市场经济

with different corporations that are competing?

更低效还是高效呢？

We don't know the answer.

我们不知道答案。

In that environment,

在这种环境下，

is an authoritarian political system more or less stable

专制政治制度

than a democratic political system?

比民主政治制度 更稳定还是更不稳定？

We actually don't know the answer.

我们实际上不知道答案。

I mean, Helen, I know the answer I want it to be.

我的意思是，海伦， 我知道我想要的答案。

I want it to be a well-regulated free market and a democracy.

我希望它成为一个监管良好的 自由市场和民主国家。

But I'd be lying to you, right?

但我就在对你撒谎，对吧？

We don't know the answer to that.

我们不知道这个问题的答案。

And so, I mean, suddenly, the United States and China

因此，我的意思是， 突然之间，美国和中国

are entering into a world

进入了一个世界，

where a small number of actors in the private sector

那里私营部门的少数行动者

are investing immense amounts of money

正在投入巨额资金

and developing unprecedented tools

并开发前所未有的工具，

that will determine, more than anything else,

这些资金和工具将首先决定

the viability and strength

这两种基础竞争的政治和经济模式

of these two fundamentally competing political and economic models.

的可行性和优势所在。

And we don't know which one is going to do better.

而且我们不知道 哪一个会做得更好。

Which one might even win, or can they both exist,

哪一个甚至可能获胜， 或者两者都能存在，

continue to exist at the same time.

继续同时存在。

And so in that environment,

因此，在这种环境下，

you better believe that the Americans and Chinese both want to have,

你最好相信，美国人和中国人都想要

you know, a very significant seat at the head of the table

在帮助理解人工智能到底发生了什么方面

in helping understand what the hell is going on with AI.

占据非常重要的位置。

You need to know that early so you have some time to plan for it,

你需要尽早知道这一点， 这样你才有时间为它做计划、

to respond to it, to govern it,

做出回应、进行治理、

to create institutions and structure around it.

围绕它设立机构和建立架构。

And I think right now both governments are playing catch-up,

而且我认为 现在两国政府都在追赶，

but they understand they need to do it hand in glove with the private sector.

但他们知道他们需要 与私营部门携手合作。

And my God, I mean,

天哪，我的意思是，

the events at OpenAI

OpenAI 的事件

are absolutely essential to understanding that future.

对于理解未来绝对至关重要。

HW: I mean, complexity is the operative word there.

HW：我的意思是， 复杂性是那里至关重要的词。

I mean, what is the likelihood?

我的意思是，可能性有多大？

I mean, many speakers at TED have called

我的意思是，TED的许多发言者都

for some form of international regulatory agency or for some kind of oversight.

呼吁建立某种形式的国际监管 机构或某种形式的监督。

What are the chances that we could actually see that actually happen,

我们真正看到这种情况 真实发生的可能性有多大，

and what are the chances that it could have teeth?

它发展的可能性有多大？

IB: Well, there are governments all over the world

IB：嗯，世界各地的政府

that are treating this issue with urgency.

都在紧急处理这个问题。

They're making it a priority.

他们把它当作优先事项。

And they're doing that in part,

他们之所以这样做，部分原因

not only because they know AI is important,

不仅在于他们知道 人工智能很重要，

but they also see that AI is critically important to things

而且他们还意识到

that they're already prioritizing.

人工智能对于他们已经 优先考虑的事情至关重要。

So if you look at Russia-Ukraine,

因此，如果你看看俄罗斯-乌克兰，

the future of that war may well be critically determined

那场战争的未来很可能关键取决于

by the ability of the Ukrainians to use autonomous lethal weapons

乌克兰人使用基于人工智能 技术的自动致命武器

powered by AI against Russia.

去打击俄罗斯的能力。

You better understand that if you're the Americans

你最好明白，

and US allies going forward,

如果你是美国人和美国盟友在向前的话，

both in terms of getting outcomes you want

不管是得到你想要的结果

and also potentially destabilizing the region

还是潜在地使该地区动荡，

in ways that you're not prepared for.

你都没有准备过。

The AI-driven disinformation around the US election in 2024

围绕 2024 年美国大选的 人工智能驱动的虚假情报

is an absolute critical concern for US policy makers

对美国政治决策者来说 绝对是个最关心的问题，

and, frankly, around disinformation for Israel-Palestine

坦率地说，围绕着 以色列-巴勒斯坦的虚假情报

and who wins the information war,

以及谁赢得这场信息战，

which, I mean, the Israelis are militarily doing

我的意思是，以色列人在军事上 做着他们想做的事，

what they want to, tactically on the ground,

战术性地摆在明面上。

but broader information war, at least presently, they're losing.

但更广泛的信息战， 至少在目前，他们正在输。

Understanding AI is critical to all of these issues.

了解人工智能 对所有这些问题都至关重要。

It's not just a new space.

这不仅仅是一个新空间。

And so I think everyone is taking it very, very seriously.

因此，我认为每个人都在 非常非常认真地对待它。

And they're putting a lot of resources into it.

而且他们在其中投入了大量资源。

There clearly is a level of effort

显然，我们付出了一定程度的努力

to regulate AI in ways that align with individual government goals

来约束人工智能，

and systems

使它与不同地方的政府目标和制度

that is different from place to place.

相一致。

So, I mean, in China,

因此，我的意思是，在中国，

part of it is we can't allow

部分原因是我们不能允许

the average Chinese citizen to have access to a chatbot that could provide,

普通的中国公民访问

you know, responses on any data.

可以对任何数据提供响应的聊天机器人。

You know, we can't allow --

你知道，我们不能允许 ——

there's got to be severe penalties

当开始讨论类似台湾独立

in starting to talk about independence of Taiwan

或天安门事件时

or Tiananmen Square or anything like that.

将会有严重的处罚。

And these companies have to be responsible not just for the inputs

而且，这些公司不仅要对输入负责，

but also the outputs that are coming from these platforms.

还要对这些平台的产出负责。

Where in the United States, right,

在美国，对，

you have the companies that are working very closely

有些公司正在

with the US government to try to figure out,

与美国政府密切合作 ， 试图弄清楚，

OK, what are the areas that we're going to be comfortable

好吧，在哪些领域 我们可以放心地

having significant regulation.

进行严格的监管。

Like for example,

例如，

red teaming on how one can break new models

红色团队合作研究如何在开发新模型时

as they're developed.

将其打破。

Or in having watermarks that help to determine

或者使用水印来帮助确定

whether something is or is not created by artificial intelligence.

某物是否由人工智能创造。

Where in Europe, the focus is so much more on privacy and data protections

在欧洲，重点更多地放在

for citizens.

保护公民的隐私和数据上。

So, you know, right now,

所以，你知道，现在，

you would say it looks like they're moving in very,

你会说他们 看起来在朝着非常

very different directions.

非常不同的方向前进。

But that's in part because we don't yet have

但这在一定程度上是因为我们还没有

anything close to global agreement

对人工智能可以做什么

on what artificial intelligence can do.

达成近乎全球的共识。

What are the things that need to be measured,

需要衡量的事情有哪些，

what are the things that we want to promote,

我们想要推广的东西是什么，

and what are the areas that we need to try to contain or constrain or regulate?

我们需要努力遏制、 限制或监管的领域有哪些？

And I think that there's a United Nations process

而且我认为

that I'm involved in,

有一个我正在参与的联合国进程，

a high-level panel that I think is trying to make immediate strides on that.

一个高级别小组正在 努力在这方面立即取得进展。

I mean, the report's going to come out within eight months,

我的意思是，这份报告将在八个月内发布，

which is light speed in terms of the United Nations.

对联合国而言这简直太快了。

But we will see whether all of those efforts

但是，我们将看看所有这些努力是否

will get you to pieces of global governance

会让你进入全球治理的各个方面，

like you have the beginnings of for climate change, for example.

比如就像气候变化一开始那样。

But you had decades to get it together on climate change,

但是你有几十年的时间来 共同解决气候变化，

and you have months to a few years to do it effectively on AI.

而你有几个月到几年的时间 在人工智能上有效地解决这个问题。

I would say that I am hopeful, but I am not yet optimistic.

我想说我充满希望， 但我还不乐观。

HW: All right, we'll take it.

HW：好吧，我们会接受这个答案的。

OK, I want to change the topic.

好的，我想换个话题。

I want to talk about infrastructure.

我想谈谈基础设施。

So the Belt and Road Initiative is subject to a lot of debate.

因此，“一带一路” 倡议备受争议。

And just as a quick background reminder for those who don't know,

对于那些不知道的人， 简要提醒一下背景信息，

the Belt and Road Initiative is one of the most ambitious

“一带一路” 倡议 是有史以来最雄心勃勃的

physical infrastructure projects that was ever conceived.

基础设施建设项目之一。

It was launched by Xi in 2013,

它由习近平于 2013 年推出，

and originally it was devised to link East Asia and Europe,

最初旨在连接东亚和欧洲，

has since expanded to the Global South and to Latin America.

后来扩展到“全球南方”和拉丁美洲。

Do you think that the US is losing out to China in this regard?

你认为美国在这方面输给了中国吗？

And what should the US do to counter potential China dominance

特别是，美国应该怎么做才能对抗中国

in the Global South, particularly?

在全球南方的潜在主导地位呢？

IB: It’s certainly true that the Chinese have far more influence

IB：的确，中国人在全球南边 的商业和贸易关系方面

in terms of their commercial and trade relations across the Global South

比美国人影响力

than the Americans do.

大得多。

In part because they invest a lot more

部分原因是他们的投资要多得多，

and in part because those investments are driven much more

而且部分原因是这些投资更多地

by the Chinese government.

是由中国政府推动的。

And that's because that's the nature of the Chinese system.

那是因为这就是中国制度的本质。

I mean, if Apple decides to invest in India as opposed to China,

我的意思是，如果苹果决定 在印度而不是中国投资，

that decision has virtually nothing to do with the US government,

那个决定几乎与美国政府无关，

maybe at the margins.

可能（对美国政府来说）是很轻微的。

But overwhelmingly,

但绝大多数情况下，

that decision is made by Apple for reasons intrinsic to Apple.

那个决定是由苹果出于内部原因作出的。

Where if the Chinese are investing,

如果中国人投资，

certainly if it's a state- owned enterprise,

当然如果是一家国有企业，

it's being coordinated strategically with the Chinese government.

那么就是在与中国政府进行战略协调。

And even if it's a private-sector company,

而且，即使它是一家私营公司，

there's a lot more alignment with the Chinese.

与中国人的结盟程度也要高得多。

So I'm saying that in part

所以我之所以这样说，

because there's some degree

部分原因是从某种程度上

to which this is not a winnable fight by the Americans.

这不是一场美国人可以打赢的战斗。

The Chinese exert influence around the world

中国人主要通过

through their state capitalist system primarily.

其国家资本制度在世界 范围内施加影响。

Their power is projected more commercially than the United States,

他们的国家实力展现比美国更商业性，

which historically has projected power,

美国历来通过

a lot of soft power through its political institutions

自己的政治机构和文化机构展现软实力

and through its cultural institutions,

当然，

but also, of course, a lot of hard power through its military might.

也通过军事力量展现硬实力。

And then, of course, the role of the US dollar as reserve currency,

当然，还有美元作为储备货币，

which allows you to weaponize it,

它允许你将其武器化，

get countries to do what they want that way,

让各国以这种方式做他们想做的事情，

but not through state-directed trade and investment.

但不是通过国家主导的贸易和投资。

So you could say the Chinese are in the lead there,

因此，你可以说中国 在那里处于领先地位，

though I would argue that the size of that lead

但我认为，这种领先优势的规模被夸大

has been overstated.

被夸大了。

In part because China is no longer spending anywhere near as much

部分原因是中国在 “一带一路”上的支出

on Belt and Road as they used to.

已不再像以前那样多。

And that's one of the reasons

这也是

why a lot fewer heads of state showed up a month ago

为什么一个月前

at their Belt and Road summit

出席“一带一路”峰会的国家元首

than did during their summits before the pandemic,

比疫情前峰会少得多的原因之一，

because they just don't have the same amount of money

因为他们

that they are willing to throw at these countries,

不愿意向这些国家投入 相同的资金，

but also because a lot of the investments they made

也因为他们做的许多投资

did not perform very well.

表现不佳。

And as a consequence, you've got a lot of bad debt

因此，有大量坏账产生，

that now they have to restructure in countries all over the world

现在他们必须在世界各 地风险敞口非常大的国家

where they have really, really big exposures,

进行重组，

like Pakistan and like Zambia and like Sri Lanka, I mean,

比如巴基斯坦、赞比亚， 还有斯里兰卡，

我的意思是，

countries that 10 years ago, 15 years ago,

那些在10年前、15年前，

you were heralding as China's taking over these places.

你曾预示中国 正在接管的这些地方。

And then it's like, oh my God, what are we dealing with?

然后就像，天啊， 我们在处理什么？

Venezuela, right?

委内瑞拉，对吧？

I mean, a lot of the countries that the Chinese are dominating

我的意思是， 中国占主导地位的许多国家

are some of the worst-performing markets out there

都是目前表现最差的市场，

with debt that is going to be incredibly hard to service,

其债务将很难偿还，

especially in a really challenging interest rate environment.

尤其是在非常艰难的 利率环境中。

So I'm not so sure that that Belt and Road, you know,

因此，我不太确定 “一带一路”的优势在

sort of, advantage is so critical,

某种程度上是否如此重要，

especially because a lot of that Belt and Road

尤其是因为 “一带一路” 的许多地方

is in hard infrastructure.

都来自硬基础设施。

And once you build it, everyone can use it.

一旦你建造了它， 每个人都可以使用它。

You build a port, you build a railway.

你建造港口，你修建铁路。

I mean, I'd rather the Americans build it than the Chinese

我的意思是，我宁愿美国人 建造它，也不愿中国人建造它，

because it redounds more to American shareholders, sure.

因为它对美国股东的回报肯定更大。

But you'd rather the port be built, than no one build the port.

但是你宁愿建造港口， 也不愿没人建造港口。

Because that then leads to more economic growth.

因为这会 带来更多的经济增长。

And if the US is the largest economy in the world,

而且，如果美国是世界上 最大的经济体，

the US benefits disproportionately

那么美国将

from more economic growth around the world.

从全球经济增长中获得不成比例的收益。

That's just kind of a reality.

这只是现实。

It's what globalization is all about.

这就是全球化的全部意义。

But I'm not so sure,

但是我不太确定，

when you talk about new technologies, now it's a very different place.

当你谈论新技术时， 现在情况已经完全不同了。

Now, the Americans are leading the world in AI,

现在，美国人在人工智能方面 处于世界领先水平，

and the Chinese are leading the world in transition energy technology:

而中国人在能源技术转型

electric vehicles, batteries, supply chain.

（电动汽车、电池、供应链） 方面处于世界领先地位。

And we're seeing that play out in the fight between the US and China.

我们在中美之间的斗争中 看到了这一点。

So there were some big positives that came between Xi and Biden.

因此，习近平和拜登之间 有一些重大的积极因素。

You've got a lot of military- to-military direct engagement

有许多军事上高能级的直接冲突，

in a high level that the Chinese had resisted before.

这是中国人以前所抵制的。

And so now the next time you have an American and Chinese aircraft

因此，现在，下次当有一架美国 的飞机和一架中国的飞机

five feet next to each other, near-miss or God forbid,

彼此相隔五英尺， 差点发生 或者上帝保佑

actually have a collision,

真的发生了碰撞，

you'll have hot lines to deconflict that immediately.

两国领导人就会直接 通话来立即消除冲突。

And that's a good thing.

这是一件好事。

And on Taiwan, there were a lot of conversations.

在台湾，有很多讨论。

And now the two opposition parties in Taiwan

现在，台湾的两个反对党派

look like they're going to run on a joint ticket.

看上去要联合竞选。

They still have to figure out the final methodology on that.

他们仍然需要找出这方面的最终方法。

But if that happens, that means the guy that, you know,

但是，如果发生这种情况， 那就意味着，你知道，

China thinks of as pro-independence,

中国认为支持独立、

that would lead to a lot more tensions,

会导致更加紧张局势的那个人

probably isn't going to win.

可能不会获胜。

That reduces near-term tensions.

这缓解了短期的紧张局势。

That's a big issue.

这是个大问题。

But the big area of conflict that has not been addressed

但是，尚未解决冲突

and that is still moving towards more confrontation is technology.

且仍在走向更多对抗的领域是技术。

And here the Americans are continuing with existing export controls,

美国人仍在继续执行现有的出口管制，

and they plan to expand them.

并计划扩大这些管制。

In fact, in the coming months,

实际上，在接下来的几个月中，

I think you will see new export controls on cloud computing.

我认为你会看到新的出口 管制，在云计算方面。

And meanwhile, the Chinese are responding with export controls

同时，中国人也以出口管制进行回应，

in the critical minerals space.

在关键的矿产资源领域。

They talked about gallium and germanium,

他们谈到了镓和锗，

which, you know, are pretty widely available

你知道，镓和锗非常普遍，

and not so essential for so much of that supply chain.

对供应链的大部分来说并不是那么重要。

But now they're talking about graphite,

但是现在他们在谈论石墨，

which is much more essential for batteries, for EVs

石墨对电池、电动汽车

and where the Chinese have much more control.

以及中国人控制着的 其它相关领域重要得多。

And if those move from licenses to direct controls,

而且，如果这些问题 从许可证转向直接控制，

then you're going to have a very significant fight

那么中美将会有一场非常激烈的斗争

between the United States containing Chinese growth in AI

美国牵制中国在人工智能方面的增长，

and the Chinese containing American and allied growth in transition energy.

中国牵制美国和盟友 在能源转型方面的增长。

That's the opposite of globalization.

这与全球化恰恰相反。

It's less efficient.

它的效率较低。

It's more expensive, right?

它更昂贵，对吧？

It's industrial policy, it's not free market.

这是产业政策， 不是自由市场。

And it will create a much more tense structural relationship

它将在中美之间

between the US and China.

造成更加紧张的结构性关系。

This is the area that we need to watch the most closely

在未来（比如）六个月中，

over the coming, say, six months.

这是我们最需要密切关注的领域。

It's where we could end up getting a much bigger blow up,

尽管双方都在努力

despite the level of stability that both sides are trying to achieve

在关系中实现一定程度的稳定，

in the relationship.

但我们最终可能会遭受更大的打击。

HW: So the mention of energy is obviously salient.

HW：能源问题显然很突出。

And, you know, the COP conference is coming up in Abu Dhabi

而且，你知道， COP会议

in ten days' time.

10 天后将在阿布扎比举行。

And so I'm wondering, did they talk about climate policy?

所以我想知道， 他们有没有谈到气候政策？

Were they talking about energy?

他们在谈论能源吗？

What happened?

发生了什么？

IB: It was part of the run-up to the summit where John Kerry,

IB：这是峰会筹备过程的一部分，

on cabinet and special climate envoy at state for the Biden administration,

拜登政府的内阁 兼州气候特使约翰·克里

was meeting with his interlocutor in the Chinese government.

正在与中国政府的对话者会面。

They've engaged a lot of late, and there's a replacement there.

他们最近约定了很多， 但还有一个继任者

So Kerry met with the replacement, which is useful, younger,

凯利和这个继任者见了面，

继任者很有用、 更年轻，在全球没那么出名，

not as well-known globally, but has the portfolio on the Chinese side.

但他是中国的外交官员。

And in the run-up to the COP summit in Abu Dhabi,

在阿布扎比的 COP 峰会之前，

where, you know, the world comes together to talk about commitments on climate,

全世界聚集在一起讨论气候承诺，

there has been more willingness of the Chinese

中国人更愿意说

to say that they will come up with some joint plan

他们将提出一些联合计划，

to further reduce emissions by 2030

在 2030 年之前进一步减少排放，

and further invest in transition energy.

并进一步投资能源转型。

But, you know, in reality,

但是，你知道，实际上，

the US and China are fighting more

美国和中国在气候领域的斗争

or competing more

或竞争

than they are cooperating in the climate space.

比他们在气候领域的合作还要多。

This is one where the Americans looked at China

这是美国人看中国人的地方，

you know, no matter what you think about climate change in the US,

你知道，无论你如何 看待美国的气候变化，

no matter how much of a tree hugger you are or aren't,

无论你是否是环保主义人士，

you see the Chinese putting hundreds of billions

你看到中国人向新的后碳技术 投入了数千亿美元，

into new post-carbon technologies and you say, wait a second,

然后你会说，等一下，

I can't let the Chinese dominate the world in that.

我不能让中国人主导这个领域。

I want the Americans to do that.

我希望美国人做那件事。

So there is, you know, some sort of, you know,

因此，你知道，

virtuous cycle of competition,

有某种良性竞争，

even if it's not alignment and coordination.

即使不是同盟和配合。

Now, the alignment between the US and China on climate

现在，美国和中国 在气候问题上的协调

is a challenging alignment.

是一项具有挑战性的调整。

It's one where the Chinese are emitting by far

迄今为止，

the most carbon in the world today.

中国人现在排放了最多的二氧化碳，

And the Americans have emitted by far the most carbon in the world historically

美国人在历史上排放了最多的二氧化碳，

and emit much more per capita today than the Chinese do,

并且美国今天的人均 排放量比中国人多得多，

though the Chinese per capita actually emit more than Europe,

尽管中国人均碳排放量实际上超过欧洲，

which is quite something,

但考虑到 中国人相对贫困，

given how comparatively poor the Chinese are.

这确实是一个不错的数字。

You look at that and you say, well,

你看着就会说，好吧，

neither of these economies really wants to spend a lot of money

这两个经济体都不想花很多钱，

admitting that they're the ones responsible

（不想）承认他们是责任人，

and they have to be the ones paying for loss and damages and transition

（不想）承认他们必须 为那些还没有机会实现工业化、

for the poorer countries that haven't had a chance to industrialize yet,

还没有机会实现碳强度工业化的贫穷国家

haven't had a chance to industrialize with carbon intensity yet, right?

赔偿损失、弥补伤害以及 支付转型的代价，对吧？

And there are a lot of countries around the world, especially India,

世界上有许多国家，尤其是印度，

but broadly the Global South,

但更广泛的全球南方国家，

that really want a very different outcome.

确实想要一个截然不同的结果。

So, you know, China used to be a member of the Global South.

所以，你知道， 中国曾经是全球南方的一员。

And this is one -- we haven't talked about this,

这是一个 —— 我们还没有讨论过这个问题，

but it's kind of a really interesting point to make.

但这是一个非常 有趣的观点。

China is not a part of the Global South anymore, right?

中国不再是全球 南方的一部分，对吧？

When they're the leading carbon emitter

当他们成了主要的碳排放者，

and they're the leading creditor to the world's developing countries

当他们成了世界发展 中国家的主要债权人，

and they're increasingly -- and the second,

当他们越来越多地作为 世界第二领先的科技国家，

the second-lead technology country in the world in terms of biotech

在生物技术、

and new energy and digital commerce

新能源、电子商务、

and, you know, facial recognition,

面部识别、语音识别方面，

you know, voice recognition, the list goes on and on and on.

这样的例子不胜枚举。

You know, China is not a developed country,

你知道，中国不是发达国家，

but they’re not in the Global South.

但他们不在全球南方国家范围里。

And part of the reason,

部分原因是，

to go back to what we talked about at the beginning here,

回到我们一开始所说的，

part of the reason why the Americans and the Chinese

美国人和中国人之所以成为

are the "adults" in the room

会议室里的 “成年人”，部分原因

is precisely because they both have so much at stake

正是因为在现有现状依然存在的情况下，

with the existing status quo remaining.

他们都处在成败关头。

The Chinese want to change their level of influence over existing institutions.

中国人想改变他们对现有 机构的影响力水平。

They want more voting rights in the IMF, for example,

例如，他们希望在国际货币 基金组织获得更多的投票权，

but they don't want to break those institutions.

但他们不想破坏这些机构。

They want them to persist.

他们希望他们坚持下去。

In fact, the Chinese, you know, see

实际上，你知道，中国人看到

that they're the largest contributor in the world

他们是世界上

to UN peacekeeping operations.

对联合国维和行动的最大贡献者。

That's an organization the Americans created at the end of World War II.

这是美国人在第二次世界大战 结束时创建的组织。

But the Chinese are really committed to it.

但是中国人确实致力于此。

Where the Russians, I mean, you know, basically,

我的意思是，你知道，基本上

they're the ones that are sending, you know,

俄罗斯人派遣

Wagner and their successors in

瓦格纳及其继任者进入那些

to countries where nobody can participate.

而其他人无法插手。

To, you know, literally, to ungoverned regions of chaos.

从字面上看，你知道的， 那些地方是无人管理的混乱地区。

So again, it's not that we suddenly say, oh,

因此再说一次， 并不是我们突然说，哦，

China is a democracy that we should really like,

中国是一个我们真正 应该喜欢的民主国家。

they're friendly, they're cuddly.

他们很友善，他们很可爱。

No, no, no, not at all.

不，不，不，一点也不。

But they are really invested in the present global system.

但是他们确实投资 于当前的全球体系。

And that is a piece of stability

这是一种稳定，

at a time that a lot of the world appears to be coming apart.

当世界许多地方 似乎正在分崩离析的时候。

HW: So one final question and then we have to wrap up.

HW：所以最后一个问题 然后我们必须结束了。

And this question came from our community who also sent in questions for you.

这个问题来自我们的社区， 他们也向您发送了问题。

How did this meeting change your outlook on future relations

这次会议 如何改变了

between the US and China?

你对中美未来关系关系的看法？

IB: In the near term, it almost guarantees

IB：在短期内，这几乎可以

that US-China relations will be more frequent

保证中美关系 将更加频繁

and will be more constructive.

和更具建设性。

That does not mean that there will be massive breakthroughs,

这并不意味着会取得 重大突破，

but the willingness of both sides to see that they benefit

而是双方都愿意看到

when they engage with each other substantively

他们能从在政府最高层面上 进行实质性接触

at the highest levels across all of the government.

获利。

I mean, it's not just on, you know,

我的意思是，你知道，

Gina Raimondo in Commerce going over there and saying,

这不仅仅是商务部 的吉娜·雷蒙多在那边说

"Hey, we want to make sure

“嘿，我们想

that Disney and the NBA can still do business."

确保迪士尼和 NBA 还能做生意。”

That's happening,

这种情况正在发生，

it's much broader than that.

范围远不止于此。

It's climate, it's defense, it's technology, it's the leaders.

这是气候，是国防， 是技术，是领导者。

And I'll tell you, this wasn't in the talking points,

我要告诉你， 这不在谈话要点中，

but it is important

但重要的是，

that Biden and Xi Jinping privately did talk about the fact

拜登和习近平确实 私下里谈到了

that they need to spend more time with each other personally.

他们需要花更多时间亲自相处的事实。

And, you know, that Biden and Xi knew each other quite well,

而且，你知道， 拜登和习近平非常了解对方，

spent a lot of time when they were both vice presidents.

在他们都是副总统时度过了很多时间。

And that's something that Biden's pretty proud of.

这是拜登非常自豪的事情。

And he talks about it privately in a way that, for example,

例如，他私下里谈论这件事的方式是，

he never got to know Putin, and he doesn’t like Putin.

他从来不认识普京， 也不喜欢普京。

Xi Jinping, he may not trust him, but he does respect him.

习近平，他可能不信任他， 但他确实尊重他。

They actually do have a person-to-person relationship that matters.

实际上，他们确实有着重要的人 与人之间的关系。

And, you know, for two leaders

而且，你知道，

of the most powerful countries in the world

对于世界上最强大的国家 的两位领导人来说，

that hadn't talked to each other for such a long time,

面对面地相处四个小时确实很重要，

spending four hours together really matters, face-to-face.

他们已经很长时间没有互相交谈了。

And I think we're going to see more of that,

而且我认为，在接下来的几个月中，

at least by Zoom, over the coming months.

会看到更多这样的相互交谈， 至少通过视频会议。

And we should welcome that.

我们应该对此表示欢迎。

Irrespective of what you think of either or both of those leaders,

无论你如何看待 其中一位或两位领导人，

it's a very important thing for them to be talking.

谈话对他们来说 都是一件非常重要的事情。

HW: Ian, always a pleasure, thank you so much for your time.

HW：伊恩（Ian），一直很高兴， 非常感谢你抽出时间。

IB: Thank you. Helen.

IB：谢谢。海伦。