Are You Really As Good at Something As You Think? | Robin Kramer | TED

92,308 views ・ 2023-11-16

TED


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I don't mean to brag,
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but there are lots of things that I'm pretty average at.
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From playing table tennis,
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cooking risotto, finding countries on a map,
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just to name a few.
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Now, in our everyday lives,
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we're not typically assessed on our skills and abilities,
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so we're forced to rely on our own judgments.
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I may think I'm pretty decent with Italian cuisine,
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but how accurate is my assessment?
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Now, what we’re talking about here is metacognition:
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our insight into our own thought processes.
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If I have good metacognitive insight,
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then how good I think I am at a particular task
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should line up pretty well with how good I actually am.
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Of course, in the real world this is often not the case.
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And indeed, we probably all know someone
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who thinks they're great at navigating maps,
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when in fact the reality is often the opposite.
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Not to name any names, of course, but still.
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Perhaps you think this applies to other people
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and that you, yourself, wouldn't make this sort of mistake.
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So let's try a quick experiment.
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I want you to think about how you would rate yourself
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in terms of your driving ability.
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Would you rate yourself as below average, average
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or perhaps even above average?
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So most people rate themselves as above average,
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which, of course, is mathematically impossible,
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and something that we call the "better than average" effect.
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This is just one of a number of cognitive biases that we see
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when people judge their own abilities.
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Today, I'm going to focus on a related bias,
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the Dunning-Kruger effect.
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So back in 1999,
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two psychologists at Cornell University, Dunning and Kruger,
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described the mistakes people make when estimating their own abilities.
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So if we take a sample of people and we divide them into four groups
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based on their scores on a test,
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and order those groups from lowest to highest.
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If we plot those scores on a graph along with their self-estimates,
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so how well they thought they did on the test,
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this is the pattern that we see.
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So the red line is a steep slope representing their actual scores.
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As it must be, since we ordered the groups
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based on their scores in the first place.
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Now what's interesting is the blue shallower line.
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This represents their self-estimates.
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So, how good they thought they did on the test.
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Now the Dunning-Kruger effect describes how the weakest performers
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significantly overestimate their performance,
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shown here in the green oval.
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The explanation for this, according to Dunning and Kruger,
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is that insight and ability rely on the same thing.
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So if I'm poor at a task,
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I also lack the metacognitive insight to accurately assess my ability.
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Now this pattern has been seen again and again
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across a number of domains,
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from driving skill to exam-taking, even chess-playing.
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However, in recent years,
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a number of criticisms have been leveled at this approach,
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and we now have reason to believe
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that this pattern results is virtually unavoidable.
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One reason for this is the statistical effect,
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regression to the mean.
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Now this is something that comes about
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when we have two measures that are related but not perfectly so.
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So imagine we have a sample of people
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and we measure their heights and their weights.
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Now height and weight are related,
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tall people are typically heavier,
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but the relationship is far from perfect.
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So unlike in the figure at the top here,
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the shortest people in red won't all be the lightest people.
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Some of them will be overweight or particularly muscular, for example.
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Similarly at the top end,
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the tallest people in blue won't all be the heaviest people.
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Some of them will be underweight, and so on.
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Now as a result, on average,
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the shortest people will rank higher for weight than they do for height,
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and the tallest people will rank lower for weight than they do for height
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producing this blue line here
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and the crossover pattern you're now becoming familiar with.
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Now, some people might put forward a spurious explanation
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for why short people are relatively overweight
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or tall people relatively underweight,
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when in fact no explanation is needed.
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Perhaps more compelling a reason to doubt the Dunning-Kruger effect
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is that we can produce the same pattern in our data
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when our data is entirely meaningless.
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So if we collect people's test scores
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along with their self-estimates of those scores,
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but then we shuffle those self-estimates
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and then analyze as before,
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then we still find that same pattern in the data.
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Of course, any effect that we can find
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with shuffled or randomized data
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is one that we should surely be suspicious of.
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So, given these and other issues with the Dunning-Kruger approach,
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I was saddened and disappointed
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and, frankly, a little annoyed to discover
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that the same approach was now being applied
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in my field of expertise,
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which is face-matching.
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Now, this is a task where we're showing two images of faces
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or an image and a live person,
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and we're asked to decide whether they show the same person
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or two different people.
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Now, we've all stood in line at passport control,
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anxiously awaiting the passport officer's decision
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as to whether our ID photos look sufficiently like us or not.
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Indeed, I've included at the top here
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some examples of ID images from my own life,
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just to illustrate some variability.
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Some proud moments in photographic history,
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I'm sure you'll agree.
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And so what I'd like to do now
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is first see how well you might perform as passport officers.
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So here are four pairs of images,
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some students’ ID images and some student photos.
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For each pair, I'd like you to decide whether it's a match,
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so two images of the same person,
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or a mismatch,
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two images of different people.
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Some of you might be surprised to hear that the top two pairs are matches,
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so images of the same people,
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and the bottom two pairs show mismatches,
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so two different people.
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Now we know this task is particularly difficult
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when the images show identities that we're unfamiliar with.
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This is because it's hard to take into account the changes
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that can happen to the face across time,
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as well as over different situations,
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so changes in facial expression or lighting, for instance.
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We know this task is difficult for passport officers as well,
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and they also make mistakes.
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So this is why I thought it would be particularly interesting
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to look at the relationship between insight and ability
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in this important security context.
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So given the issues we’ve described already
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with looking at overall scores and people’s self-estimates,
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I instead decided to focus on individual decision making.
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So over a series of experiments,
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I asked people to look at pairs of images
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and decide whether they were a match or a mismatch.
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But I also asked people to provide a rating of confidence in each decision.
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Now a good metacognitive insight
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would be reflected in people being much more confident
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in decisions that turned out to be correct
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and much less confident in decisions that turned out to be incorrect.
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So let's have a look at how people did.
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Now I think this pattern is particularly fascinating,
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but also fairly intuitive.
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Let's start with the red line,
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which represents people's confidence in their incorrect responses.
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So as you can see,
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it doesn't matter how good people were at the test overall,
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represented by the score on the X-axis at the bottom there;
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people were approximately the same
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in terms of their confidence when they were incorrect.
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Now what's interesting is the blue line,
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which represents confidence when people were correct in their decisions.
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As you can see, the best performers on the test
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were much more confident in their correct responses
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in comparison with their incorrect ones.
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So shows good metacognitive insight.
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The weakest performers, on the other hand,
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were no different in their confidence
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for their correct and incorrect responses,
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shown here in the green circle.
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And so they show poor metacognitive insight.
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So what might be going on with these weak performers?
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Now it could be the case that they have some sense
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they tend to perform poorly on tests in general,
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and so they're just less confident overall in their responses.
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However, I didn't find that pattern of lower confidence in my data,
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at least with individual decision-making.
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Instead, it's more likely that they were more confident in their correct responses
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in comparison with their incorrect ones.
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But this was simply unrelated to their accuracy on each trial
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because they had poor insight.
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So how does this all fit in with the Dunning-Kruger effect?
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So Dunning and Kruger argued that the weakest performers
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show the least amount of insight
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and they overestimated their performance.
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And that's implied that they had greater confidence.
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Now, we didn't see that here in our data.
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The weakest performers didn't seem to be overly confident.
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However, the Dunning-Kruger effect
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also describes how insight depends on ability.
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And so the weakest performers showed the least amount of insight,
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overestimating their performance in their case.
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As we've just seen,
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the weakest performers do seem to show the least amount of insight.
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Here, they couldn't differentiate between their correct and incorrect responses.
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So insight does appear to depend on ability,
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but not in the way that Dunning and Kruger originally thought.
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So if there are two things I'd like you to remember from this talk
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and take home, think about afterwards,
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they are: first, more broadly, science is always updating.
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Research comes along, new evidence that may contradict
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or even disprove previous work.
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In this case, the Dunning-Kruger effect may well not be a thing,
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despite the fact that it's so prevalent in popular culture.
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Second, insight depends on ability.
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For the weakest performers,
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there's no difference between their confidence
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for correct and incorrect responses.
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They have poor insight, they can't tell the difference.
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For strong performers,
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when they're giving a correct answer,
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they're much more confident.
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Of course, the inverse isn't always true.
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Being more confident doesn't mean that you're right.
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You might be wrong and simply have poor insight.
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So in our everyday lives,
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you should think about who it is that you ask the opinions of.
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If someone is an expert in their field,
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then if they're more confident, they're probably right,
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but if they're unsure,
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this is also informative and tells us something useful.
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It's much more sensible to find someone that we know is knowledgeable in an area,
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rather than someone who is simply confident in their opinion,
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because confidence is easily misplaced.
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And finally,
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for those of you who are still wondering how good my risotto actually is,
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that may have to wait for a future talk.
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Thank you.
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(Applause)
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