Trump’s 2024 Election Win — and What’s Next | TED Explains the World with Ian Bremmer

Hello everybody, I'm Helen Walters, I'm head of media and curation at TED,

and I am delighted to welcome you

to another episode of TED Explains the World with Ian Bremmer.

Ian, of course, is the president and founder of Eurasia Group.

He is the head of GZERO Media,

and he is here to talk to us

about what just happened in the United States.

Today is November 7, the election was on November 5.

President Trump was reelected in handy terms.

So, Ian, please tell us what you make of what is happening right now.

Ian Bremmer: You’re right, it is not just the electoral vote

but also the popular vote that Trump was able to win.

I mean, it's close,

you know, 51-49, so half of the Americans went against him, pretty much.

We always knew that was going to be the case.

So it's not as if the polls were radically off.

That's not the issue.

One thing that's quite useful, of course, is the fact that a popular vote win,

which doesn't always line up with the electoral vote,

creates more legitimacy for Trump.

And the fact that this wasn't just a matter of one or two states,

and that it’s clear that there was neither significant internal

nor definitive external interference.

Clearly, there was a lot of disinformation and, you know,

bomb threats mailed in, called in by the Russians.

But nothing that would have changed the outcome.

And so you were able to not only get Kamala Harris to concede in short order,

but Democrats across the board, whether or not they're happy with it,

recognizing that Trump is indeed their president.

So unlike in 2020,

where Trump himself precipitated a very significant challenge,

saying that the vote was rigged

and undermining the legitimacy of the outcome,

here, we do not have that.

Furthermore, the Republicans have, as of now, taken the Senate.

Of course, conservative justices have a majority on the Supreme Court,

and the Republicans, in short order,

are very likely, overwhelmingly likely, to have a majority in the House as well.

And what that means

is that the Trump administration will be able to pursue the agenda,

both domestically and in foreign policy,

that they have said that they wish to pursue.

For example, on tariffs or on taxes, or on immigration.

All of these things that Trump was running on

and now will have a mandate to pursue.

So that is the long and short of what happened on Tuesday.

HW: So you talk about tariffs, you talk about taxes.

A lot has been said about the fact

that Americans were voting related to the economy

and how they felt about the economy.

Do you agree with that?

And what do you think that Trump will do with fiscal policy

when he actually comes into the presidency again?

IB: Well, let's talk about what Americans voted on.

They voted on a country

whose direction they did not agree with.

Over 70 percent of Americans, Helen, say that they did not agree

with where the country was heading.

And when that happens,

it is very, very hard to win as an incumbent.

And vice president Harris may not be the president,

but she certainly had accountability

for alignment with the policies of her Biden administration.

And when she was asked on the media,

when she started doing her media tour after the debate with Trump,

you know, "What would you do differently from Biden?"

Her response, and this is the most important question

that you could ask her in this campaign,

her response was, "I can't think of anything that I would do differently."

So most important question, worst possible answer.

And she tried to amend that in various ways later on,

but she was never able to really get away

from what she would do differently from Biden

and why she would do it differently.

I mean, she moved a number of her policies in a more centrist direction,

but she didn't really explain it.

She didn't really disassociate herself from previous iterations of her policies.

So pretty much everybody out there

that was unsatisfied with where the United States is going

felt like she did not represent change.

I mean, she's younger, she's different,

she'd be the first woman.

From a policy perspective,

they didn't believe that she represented change.

And of course, Helen,

this is what we have seen around the world.

In the developed world,

every democracy that has had an election this year

has voted against their incumbents.

Canada is probably about to have one.

They will also throw out Trudeau unceremoniously.

A lot of developing countries, India.

Modi was doing pretty well, now he's in coalition.

South Africa, the ANC, for the first time since Mandela,

now in coalition.

Mexico, is the only country of note that had an election this year,

in the year of elections,

that actually returned the same party.

And, you know, in many ways,

because the Morena party and AMLO are still seen as the outsiders

against a deep, entrenched,

you know, sort of power of existing oligarchs, business,

you know, and the like.

But if anything,

they're the exception that proves the rule.

And so, you know, you and I know, we've talked about this before,

I expected that Trump would win.

I didn't have strong confidence in that call

because Trump was himself very unpopular.

But to the extent that anyone you would think would win

an election in this environment globally,

it was Trump's to lose.

And, you know, he was able to pull it through.

So I think that's the backdrop for what people were voting about.

And specifically what it is,

it is inflation, which is high and it's been coming down,

but the overall prices,

it's not like the prices are lower than they were a year ago,

just because the inflation rate is coming down,

those prices are still very high

and you can't get away, run away from that if you're Harris.

Immigration, something that, frankly,

the Biden administration was very late to recognize

was a problem not just in red states but in blue states, too.

And those numbers are coming down,

but the illegal immigrants that came to the US

are largely still in the US.

And then also disinformation,

a large amount of disinformation

that has made it almost impossible

to have a national debate on policies and issues.

And an awful lot of people, even that align with Harris's policies

didn't necessarily believe that she was implementing them

or Biden was implementing them.

A lot of people in America think

that the inflation rate is still the highest ever,

think that unemployment is a lot higher than it has been.

And the people that say that and believe that

were far more likely to vote against the incumbent.

So I would say, you know, in descending order of importance,

what drove this election was inflation, immigration and disinformation.

And that is something that we have seen all around the world this year.

HW: I think it's all incredibly interesting.

And you said something interesting that I want to just double click on there,

which is this idea that people have feelings about the way things are,

and they don't necessarily know what the actual facts

about a situation are.

So this is also an election

in which there has been plenty of disinformation, as you say.

Elon Musk wrote yesterday on X, “You are the media now.”

And I think we can argue a lot

about how the media has covered the election,

about the way that the media reports things, the horse race,

all of that vapidity, all of that type of thing.

But am I alone in finding that type of statement both facile and alarming?

And isn't that driving us even further

into a future where there are these kind of fractured narratives

or fractured truths that people have,

that actually don't coalesce to reality or accuracy?

IB: Well, when I saw it from Elon, I mean, I'm like,

I thought he was talking to me,

and saying, "Ian, you're media now."

I'm like, about time, right?

I mean, here I am, a political scientist, I'm talking to a lot of people.

So yeah, they should be thinking about me as media.

Of course that's not what he was saying.

What he was saying is that the mainstream media,

CNN, MSNBC, Fox ...

You know, and by the way, he never includes Fox,

even though Fox is every bit as much mainstream media as the other two

because he likes one ideologically now,

he doesn't like the other two,

but you might as well have some intellectual consistency around it.

His view is that all of those publications, cable news,

that they are fake news because, you know, of course,

he's not making money out of those.

And that Twitter/X is real news

and that citizen journalists are the real media.

Now, I have a lot of things to criticize mainstream media for.

I believe that they have gotten way too high on their own supply,

focusing on their own interests, their own clicks, their own news,

they're less trusted than they used to be.

We see that across the country.

They're more politicized.

They're more for their own candidate,

whether it's Fox on the right

or CNN and MSNBC on the left.

But at least the journalists on Fox

not, you know, Hannity,

but the journalists during the day

that are writing the stories and bringing you the news,

the journalists during the day on CNN and MSNBC,

the journalists that are working on the Wall Street Journal

and the New York Times, not the opinion leaders,

but most of the people that are actually doing the reporting,

they have expertise, they've been trained.

And of course, the big difference between citizen journalists,

if you want to call them that, in other words,

people that are posting random information that they think about

on social media,

number one,

they tend to have stronger biases because it is not their professional job

to try to mitigate them when they present things.

Number two, they aren't professionally trained,

so they don't have as much expertise in how to deliver that message

and how to ensure that a headline is a headline,

and you follow through with arguments and you actually properly cite things

and there's research.

And then number three,

a lot of the so-called citizen journalists,

the verified citizen journalists that have blue checks,

are bots

and are anonymous and aren't actually people.

Or are bad actors

that are actively pursuing and displaying disinformation

for their own purposes.

And that is, of course, the antithesis

of what information,

political information is necessary to run a civil society.

I deeply worry that we are in an environment

where almost everyone I know,

educated people in the United States

that voted for Trump and voted for Harris

believe things, believe some fundamental things

about the political system in the US that are not true.

I mean, the number of people that I have spoken to

that believe that large numbers of non-citizens vote in the United States,

which has been, you know, assertively researched and audited,

and you're talking about less than 100th of one percent of Americans,

non-citizens that are on the rolls.

It is not an issue.

And yet you wouldn't know that if you read Elon's posts,

because he actively has worked to promote that lie

as strongly as he can.

And I think that's a horrible thing.

And I have seen that, I mean, I saw it most recently,

I know a lot of Democrats that believed,

a lot of Harris supporters that believed

that Trump actually called for Liz Cheney to be executed,

to be in front of a firing squad.

And if you had watched what he said in context --

that was taken out of context --

you know, he was not saying that.

He was saying that she's a neocon

who supports wars, like in Iraq, for example, and Afghanistan,

and that how would she feel

if it was her that was facing the firing,

as opposed to the people that they are sending off,

the soldiers they're sending off to die?

Something I've heard many Democrats and Republicans that are antiwar,

far left and far right, historically say.

So that environment,

the fact that information is being used in service of a political agenda,

and that is what matters to you,

is one of the most damaging things I see facing democracies today.

It is an unsustainable trajectory.

We will not maintain our democracy if we continue with it.

I get things wrong all the time.

You know, I'll make an analytic call.

And I thought Trump was going to win and he won.

But back in 2016, I thought Trump was going to lose.

And I had reasons to believe that.

And I was wrong.

And I came out and explained why I thought I was wrong.

I get things wrong all the time, but I do it honestly.

It's not in service of a political agenda.

I work my ass off,

as do all the analysts at Eurasia Group,

to try to help people understand and explain

what is happening in the world.

And, you know, not just from a left or a right-wing perspective,

or an American or a Canadian or a Russian or a Chinese perspective.

And I travel all over the world

and talk to people from all over the world

to try to help inform that.

That is a tiny, tiny,

tiny fraction of the information that people digest

today politically,

and particularly today politically,

in the two-year run-up

to a 10-billion-dollar national US election.

And that is no way to run a representative democracy.

And all the people out there

that are saying that they don’t believe in their media,

and they don't believe in their elites,

they don't believe in their political leaders,

their Congress, their executive,

even their business leaders, even their scientists,

they don't believe in them,

that's why they're saying that.

Is because they're existing in an environment

that they can no longer ascertain truth from fiction.

That's not a sustainable place to be.

HW: It seems like a deeply dangerous place to live in.

You floated something yesterday that I hadn't heard

and thought was really interesting.

It was that potentially Musk might buy Truth Media.

Have you thought any more about that?

Do you think that might happen?

And what does that mean if that does happen?

IB: So first of all, I have a hard time imagining that Trump is going to,

as president, be able to continue to own and and post on Truth Media.

Now you know, unprecedented things can happen.

And Trump has said that, you know, you cannot, as sitting president,

commit a crime.

So, I mean, in principle,

that means that rule of law, as applies to him, is what he says it is.

The Supreme Court has punted on that in terms of what an official act is.

So, you know, we'll see where that goes.

We're going to be in an unprecedented place.

But certainly I could easily imagine ...

First of all, I believe that Musk's 75 million dollars in favor of Trump

is probably the smartest strategic political bet

that I have seen made by a billionaire,

by an oligarch in the United States in my life.

I've never seen one that I think is likely to pay off better,

than what Elon just did.

Remember, this was a Biden supporter

and he turned off from Biden

when Biden decided not to invite him to the electric vehicle summit.

Because, you know, Tesla, even though it’s way in front on electric vehicles,

isn’t a union shop,

and Biden decided he was going to play politics with that,

as opposed to lean into ensuring

that the US has the best possible electric vehicle future in the world.

Elon took exception to that, turned against Biden.

And the rest, as we say, is history.

Big own goal by the president.

And I hope he's reflecting on how that was a really dumb thing

for him to do.

Leaving that aside,

I think that Elon is now in a unique position

to help formulate

what the values of the United States are,

and to distribute those algorithmically from himself

with his hundreds of millions of followers

and from the president of the United States.

And there are ways that that could be used to promote American interests.

There are ways that those could be used that are inimical to US interests.

And again, I promise,

if Elon does things that I think are useful,

you'll be the first to hear it from me.

So, for example, I was in China recently.

I met with the leadership

and I met with Wang Yi and members of the Politburo,

many others.

And Elon Musk had recently been to China,

and he travels there frequently.

And they all wanted to know from me,

while Elon is presenting himself

as the guy that can help ensure

that US-China relations don't become maximally confrontational

if Trump becomes president.

Is that true? Is he the guy?

And of course, Elon has very, very strong business interests in China,

developing artificial intelligence with Chinese scientists,

Tesla on the ground manufacturing and selling into the Chinese market.

China is very important for Elon.

And certainly,

Elon would not want there to be a decoupling between the US and China.

And I think that he's going to have a lot of influence over US tech policy,

especially because Trump didn't really have a technology policy

in his first term.

He had a tariff policy on China.

But the CHIPS Act and the export controls on semiconductors,

that was all done under Biden.

And so, Elon, to the extent that he cares about anything,

it's going to be technology policy.

He's going to have, I think, a very strong position

to be able to help determine who's appointed

in those key technology positions under Trump,

and also what kind of regulations,

subsidies, stimulus will be enacted

by a Trump administration for technology, broadly speaking,

and of course, for Elon's own companies,

which I expect he'll benefit from mightily.

Now the question will be,

is Elon going to be able to facilitate

a more functional relationship between the US and the Chinese

in advanced technologies?

And the answer to that may well be yes.

And if Elon helps avoid a cold war between the US and China,

I will absolutely say that.

Now we know that Trump has had a strong view

on wanting to enact much stronger tariffs on China for a very long time,

well before he got involved in politics.

He's thought the tariffs were, you know,

a critical component of US economic and foreign policy.

Trump's "America First" means more capital in the United States,

more jobs in the United States.

It means, you know, bringing back, reining in free trade and market access,

and instead using the power of the dollar

and of the size of the American market

and the strength of industrial policy to get other countries around the world

to nearshore with the Americans.

And Lighthizer in particular,

who I expect will run trade in some manifestation under Trump,

has said he wants to see 60 percent tariffs on all Chinese exports.

Well, I mean, is Elon going to be able to, you know,

help facilitate a deal on that

with a China that is facing very serious economic challenges right now?

And the answer to that is untested.

That's a very interesting proposition

that the Chinese are hoping Elon will help with.

And he has said, "I'll be able to help with."

Now if it turns out that he’s able to help with that,

this guy is absolutely golden in the United States and in China.

He could become the most powerful person on the planet.

If he is not able to do that,

then he will be in a personal position of having directly disappointed

the Chinese president and their leadership,

and I would not want to be in that position.

That strikes me as a challenging position to be in

for someone who does a lot of business in China.

So that's going to be an incredibly interesting thing to watch, Helen,

I mean, we're going to see this play out.

Again, we have a lot of pieces that are moving geopolitically

around the world.

This is only one, there are other really big ones,

Europe, the Middle East.

But this is one that's really, really interesting.

HW: Super interesting and some very big personalities

that will be arguing constructively about it all, I'm sure.

OK, so let's talk about foreign policy.

Let's get into it.

Zelenskyy obviously reached out to Trump almost immediately

that he won the election

and was very complimentary to him.

So what is going to happen with Russia, Ukraine?

What are you seeing there?

IB: And how could Zelensky not, Helen?

HW: Totally.

IB: You know, he is a master communicator.

He's been out there marketing himself and his cause with everybody.

Trump has even called him, like,

doing the best sales job on the United States.

And on the one hand, that's critical

because Trump thinks that the US is spending far too much on Ukraine.

On the other hand, it's begrudging admiration

because Trump sees himself as the best salesperson out there, right?

So, I mean, you know, as my mom would say, "Don't shit a shitter."

And she used to always say that when she was alive.

I saw a flash of my mom in Trump's comment there.

I think that the fact that Zelenskyy said,

"Congratulations, great win."

You know, "We had a wonderful meeting together

in the United States in September, and I want to work with you."

That is not likely to be reciprocated by the great man,

the president-elect.

I suspect that he wants to end the war.

He has said he will end it in 24 hours.

Now Trump does exaggerate.

It might not be 24, it could be a long weekend.

There could be bathroom breaks in there.

But he has repeatedly said, “I’m going to end this war.

Don’t even need to be president, I can just do it in the lame duck.”

What does that mean?

Well, it means he wants to stop the fighting.

He really does.

And to be fair,

I know a lot of people in the Biden administration,

running the Biden administration, that want to end the war

because they think that the Ukrainians are losing,

and it's going to get harder and harder over time.

But you’ve got to convince Zelenskyy to do that.

Now what I expect Trump will do

will be call Zelenskyy, call Putin and say,

"You've got to freeze the conflict where it is,

no more fighting.

That means Russia,

you basically are occupying the territory you're occupying,

but you don't get to keep bombing the rest of Ukraine.

Ukraine, you've got to take it.

But you don't have to worry about defending your cities.

And then we'll sit down and we'll have negotiations

on what that's going to look like going forward.

And if you don't accept that, Ukraine, I'm cutting you off,

and Russia, I'm putting more sanctions on."

That is the opening gambit that Trump intends,

mano a mano, to end the war.

So, Helen, there's a couple of very interesting things that then happen.

One is, is Zelenskyy prepared to accept that to begin negotiations?

Can he get to a limited ceasefire, a freezing of the conflict?

Under a Biden administration, the answer would have been clearly no.

His position is much worse in a Trump administration.

We will see how he responds.

The consequences would be very negative if he says no,

but he could say no.

Politically, it's very hard for him to say yes.

You know, he could lose power if he does.

He will certainly undermine his position with a lot of Ukrainians

that had been bravely fighting,

supporting those that are bravely fighting.

The Russians,

you know, much easier for them to say yes if Ukraine says no.

If the Ukrainians say yes,

you know, I've been speaking to some folks advising the Kremlin.

I've also heard from others in the last 24 hours

that have said, well, Putin wouldn't be prepared to accept that

unless there were other things like Ukraine is disarmed,

can't join NATO, all of that.

Would Trump put any of that on offer?

Would he be capable of putting a lot of that on offer,

given where the Europeans are?

How does Putin react?

If Putin says no, what's Trump going to do?

That's an interesting question.

But Helen, the most important question

is that the Europeans are not likely to be consulted by Trump.

And if they are consulted by Trump,

he certainly doesn't worry

about coordinating a united policy with them and Ukraine

before he contacts the Russians.

Biden wouldn't even talk to Putin,

and he wouldn't consider a negotiation with the Russians

until the Ukrainians and the Europeans were all onboard.

That is absolutely not what Trump's position is.

So what we have to look at here

is whether the Europeans are going to take a more united front,

confronted with a Trump that most of them really don't agree with.

Will Europe be stronger together,

facing not only Trump giving the Ukrainians an ultimatum

and talking directly with Putin,

but also doing things like threatening tougher sanctions,

tariffs against the Europeans?

I mean, we already know that Viktor Orban in Hungary

is more inclined to work with Trump.

He's made the Mar-a-Lago pilgrimage and all the rest.

Well, what about Giorgia Meloni, who's quite close to Elon Musk,

ideologically oriented to Trump,

but has been very anti-Russian

and has a lot of popularity in Italy right now?

Might she shift away from Ukraine towards Russia

in support of a Trump policy?

We don't know.

What about Germany?

They're about to have new elections.

What's a new German chancellor?

We don't even know who that person is.

We don't know how well the far right in Germany would do in those elections,

how much more aligned they might be to Trump.

So one of the most important questions geopolitically will be,

do the Europeans hang together in support of Ukraine

with a much tougher set of relations with the United States,

or do they fragment with a meaningful number of them embracing Trump,

flipping on Russia and saying,

"We don't care about Ukraine anymore"?

And if the latter happens,

what happens to the front-line states in Europe

that see Russia as an existential threat?

Poland, the Baltic states, the Nordic states?

I mean, these are questions that we will have answers to

in very short order,

but right now we are completely in no-man's land.

These are unanswered questions right now, and they could go any which way.

And all of the European leaders I've spoken to in the last 72 hours,

they are mightily concerned about exactly this issue.

This is priority number one for them.

HW: Alright, so we are more than a year into the conflict

in the Middle East between Israel and Hamas.

Obviously there's a lot going on there.

We have talked before about how you thought

that Netanyahu would be holding out until Trump got elected,

was hoping for that to happen.

It has happened.

So what do you think happens next in the Middle East?

IB: Yeah, I thought it was very hard to imagine

that he was going to agree to a ceasefire

where Biden would be seen as the broker,

he had no interest in that.

He wanted Trump.

By the way, the Israeli people want Trump.

There was a “Jerusalem Post” survey recently.

I think it was over 60 percent of Israelis say they wanted Trump

and 12 percent said they want Harris.

That's the biggest gap we've seen with the US ally.

And it's because Trump, when he was president,

he did the Abraham Accords.

He recognized the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel, as Israeli territory.

He moved the US embassy to Jerusalem

after many presidents promised to do it,

Trump actually did it.

So, I mean, Trump's bona fides as a very strong pro-Israel president,

even stronger than the pro-Zionist Biden,

is a really big deal.

Remember, Trump's first trip as president was to the Middle East.

No American presidents do that.

He went to Saudi Arabia, then he went to Israel.

So I'm not surprised that the Israelis and that Netanyahu in particular

are very, very comfortable here.

I think that the question, first of all,

I still think there is room for Biden to get a negotiated settlement

with the Israelis and Hezbollah.

They are close.

If you made me bet right now,

within two weeks, maybe three,

in other words, in the lame duck,

I think that there will be a settlement between Israel and Hezbollah.

They'll stop the fighting.

The Israelis, and particularly the prime minister,

are not looking to destroy Hezbollah the way they have Hamas.

They are looking to push Hezbollah back,

get the Israelis that have been evacuated back into their homes,

back to their schools,

and then stop the fighting.

Netanyahu understands that this is a much bigger fight

that would cause a lot more damage to the Israeli economy,

that he doesn't necessarily want over the long term.

He's also done a lot to destroy Hezbollah's leadership

and degrade their military and communications infrastructure.

So that is a narrow win

that I think can be taken off the table in the Middle East.

Gaza is very different.

I don't see any change in Israel's policy on Gaza.

I think the humanitarian crisis

for the Palestinians living in Gaza will actually get worse,

if you even believe that it can, it will, particularly in the occupied north,

and especially as UNRWA,

which is the United Nations agency

that actually is responsible for the infrastructure

and for bringing humanitarian aid in,

has been just voted by a large majority of the Israeli Knesset as illegal.

They will no longer work with it.

So, I mean, really anything that looked like it was the potential

to build infrastructure for governance in Gaza

has either been bombed away

or is being unwound.

And so I think this is even more of a disaster for the Palestinians.

I don't see any move

towards a two-state solution,

towards independent governance by the Palestinians,

towards anything that would stabilize in the near term.

Iran is the big question.

So Trump has criticized Biden

for constraining the Israelis

in their response to the Iranian strikes

of 180 ballistic missiles against Israel.

Didn't kill any Israelis, but they did launch those missiles.

And they did actually strike Israeli military targets.

And Jared Kushner has recently written some notes

that he's circulated around

on how this is a unique opportunity for the Israelis

to rid themselves of the Iranian nuclear threat

once and for all.

So unlike Biden,

who has worked to prevent the Israelis

from striking Iranian energy and nuclear targets,

it appears that Trump is goading them to do precisely that.

Now there's a very big question.

Is he getting them to do it while Biden is still president?

And then they end all of that

and Trump can say, "I ended the war, I came in,"

or would he rather wait until he's president

so he can coordinate militarily,

provide the intelligence, all the rest,

between the United States and Israel

to together "handle" the Iranian threat?

But I do believe the likelihood

of an expanded military confrontation between the US and Iran

is relatively high.

Now remember, when Trump was president,

he ordered the assassination of the head of the Iranian military,

Qasem Soleimani,

and the Iranian response was to do virtually nothing.

And there were those, like the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley,

who at the time were saying

that Trump wanted to go even much harder against Iran

than he ended up actually doing.

So I mean, Trump, I think, probably does believe

that the Iranians are a paper tiger

and that this is a great opportunity for Israel

and or the United States to take care of that problem.

That's a very interesting point.

Also, let's keep in mind that the Iranians,

who have been involved in interfering in the US election,

like China, like Russia,

but unlike Russia, who wanted Trump,

the Iranians want Harris.

And the Iranians have tried to assassinate Trump

and Mike Pompeo and others involved in the Trump administration,

something that I'm honestly very surprised hasn't gotten more attention

in the US media.

So I think for many reasons,

Trump and a Trump administration

would feel like it is time to hit the Iranians back pretty hard

and show them that you don't mess with a Trump-led America.

So yeah, again, I think that this is a big deal.

And from a global perspective, if that were to happen,

that would lead to much higher oil prices,

at least for a period of time,

because the Iranian capacity to disrupt the Straits of Hormuz

and prevent a lot of oil from being transited globally

is significant.

HW: So you talked about Milley, you talked about Lighthizer.

Who do you see as making up Trump's cabinet?

Who do you think is going to be appointed?

We know a lot of people have said they wouldn't come back.

What are you hearing and what should we be watching for?

IB: Well, certainly not Milley, who ran the Joint Chiefs,

since he's recently said that he thinks Trump is a fascist.

So I think that's probably table stakes for you're not getting a position.

I don't think he wants one either.

The funny thing is that so many of the people

that were in the previous Trump administration

now consider Trump to be an enemy and it is mutual, right?

I mean that is --

One of the interesting things will be

to what extent Trump decides to go after them as president.

Will he launch investigations from the DOJ?

You know, might they be more likely to face an IRS audit?

Will Trump-influenced media go after them to a greater degree?

I mean, those are all interesting questions,

and we don't know the answer to it.

In many ways, I think that Trump actually does hold a grudge against them,

people that he thought were loyal

and then turned against him,

more than against leaders in the Democratic Party.

But, you know, again, that is right now a hunch.

That is not in any way borne out in fact.

But in terms of people that I think will be around Trump,

I do think that they're going to look for adults.

They are going to look for people that are capable of doing their job,

but they will not go for independents

that Trump doesn't have control over,

even though their Republican bona fides are strong.

They did a lot of that the first time around.

So, you know, you had Rex Tillerson appointed as Secretary of State,

who Trump had never met before and who his own advisers said,

"This guy is not aligned with any of what we want, any America First.

He's CEO of ExxonMobil."

And Trump says, "Yeah, but look at him.

He looks like a Secretary of State."

That is not what we will see this time around.

I think that loyalty will be very, very important.

He will want people that will not turn coat on Trump

in three and six month's time,

in a year's time, in a future administration,

in a future election.

There are some people that I continue to hear time and time again.

So people that were heavily involved in the campaign

that were seen to facilitate Trump and make him successful.

Howard Lutnick, who originally said that he didn't want a position,

he just wants to help Trump.

But now that he's spent a lot of time with Trump is feeling like,

“I really do want a job, I’d like to be Secretary of Treasury.”

Well, I think he has a good chance of getting that job.

I think Linda McMahon,

same, from the World Wrestling [Entertainment].

Very close to Trump, very good friends.

For a long time now she wants to be Secretary of Commerce.

Good chance she would get that job.

I think that on State, there are a lot of names.

Bill Hagerty, the senator, former ambassador to Japan,

steady, capable pair of hands.

Certainly interested in that job, would be in the mix.

But frankly, lots of people, will be in that mix,

I think Ric Grenell, the former acting head of national intelligence,

before that, ambassador of the US to Germany,

well-known on social media and on Fox.

A little more incendiary,

more like, willing to be a bomb thrower in public.

More of a populist, Trump likes him a lot.

He really would like to be Secretary of State.

He'll certainly be interviewed for that position.

I think there are others, you know, I'm hearing Mike Waltz,

member of Congress, very smart guy, very capable,

potentially for Secretary of Defense.

Pompeo, Mike Pompeo does not look to be an insider right now.

He took a long time before he was willing to endorse Trump.

And I think the loyalty is open to question.

Hasn't gotten as much access at Mar-a-Lago and with Trump

as a lot of other people have.

Some of the key questions will be what happens

with the so-called power ministries, as we define them around the world

the Department of Justice, the FBI, the IRS.

Will they be politicized?

Will they be weaponized?

I do think it's very hard to imagine someone like Bill Barr,

who is very conservative, very smart,

but not a Trump loyalist.

At the end of the day, someone that was going to ultimately, you know,

vote and act according to his values and ideology

as opposed to Trump's all the time.

I think that is not acceptable for an Attorney General

in a second Trump term,

in the same way that Mike Pence was not the selection for VP,

it was JD Vance.

And a lot of people say, oh,

JD is like, really powerful and he knows politics

and he's going to run the shadow cabinet,

and he's going to be in charge of appointing everyone.

No he's not.

Trump will not tolerate someone to have his star power working for him.

I think there will be priorities that are Trump's.

And when he has priorities, he will be in charge.

And I think there will be lots of different centers of power

that will fight and compete over areas

that Trump doesn't really care as much about,

and then we'll see that play out.

So in that regard, it is likely to look very different

than the first Trump administration.

HW: This is the Trump show.

So just to wrap things up,

I guess a very simple but profound question,

which is, how are you feeling about the future?

IB: I think that the United States

continues to be the most powerful country in the world.

It has the reserve currency,

it has the most powerful global military,

it's producing the most energy,

it dominates the field of artificial intelligence,

which is the most important set of new technologies

that humans have ever been able to have their hands on.

So I mean, there’s a reason why people are betting on the US markets,

on the US dollar in this environment after a Trump victory.

But the global order is in very deep disarray.

There is an absence of global leadership,

and that absence will be felt more strongly and more profoundly

in a Trump, America First second administration.

You know, a lot of allies of the United States

around the world are allies because they have shared interests

but also because they perceive that they have shared values.

And those values include commitment to democracy and rule of law

and the promotion of democracy and rule of law around the world.

Commitment to a multilateral architecture

where norms and values are largely agreed to.

Collective security among allies

and to the extent possible globally.

Free trade and market access

through multilateral agreements that become more committed

and higher standard over time.

I think that what we have just seen with this election

is that the American people do not actually accept those values,

and that the American president-elect does not accept those values.

So US allies around the world

have to recognize that they still may have a lot of shared interests

with the United States,

but they no longer have those shared values.

Biden, to the extent that he had a core global principle,

it was really about autocracies versus democracies,

the bad guys versus the good guys.

Trump completely rejects that.

Trump's view is,

"I don't care what kind of a political system you have internally.

I want to know, can I do a deal with you?

And if you're Putin or Kim Jong Un,

or if you're Trudeau or Claudia Sheinbaum,

if I can do a deal with you, I will do a deal with you.

And by the way, I'm going to do that deal unilaterally,

where I have a lot more power.

I'm not going to do it in a multilateral setting

where a bunch of you think you can gang up on me

and force me into constraints."

So I think that we're in an environment

where our challenges are increasingly global,

where our ability as human beings to affect the world that we live in

are increasingly systemic and structural.

And yet the availability of global leadership is not only absent,

but is decisively rejected by the American people

that have most upheld it over the past decades,

for good and for bad,

and by its president-elect.

So that’s probably the thing that I am most concerned about

and that I think will cause the greatest uncertainty,

volatility and danger in the coming years.

HW: Ian, it is always a pleasure talking to you.

Sobering but fascinating.

Thank you so much for your time and we will speak again soon, I'm sure.

IB: My pleasure, Helen.